John David Wurdemann was convicted of seven felonies related to a 2000 attack on a woman in Canyon County, Idaho. Sixteen years later, a district court granted his petition for post-conviction relief, vacating his convictions due to ineffective assistance of counsel. This decision was affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court in 2017. Wurdemann was not retried. In 2021, Idaho enacted the Idaho Wrongful Conviction Act, which allows for compensation for wrongfully convicted individuals who meet specific criteria. Wurdemann filed a petition under this Act seeking compensation and a certificate of innocence.The district court granted the State's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Wurdemann had not established that the basis for vacating his conviction was not legal error unrelated to his factual innocence, as required by the Act. Wurdemann appealed this decision.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and interpreted the statutory language of the Idaho Wrongful Conviction Act. The Court held that the phrase “not legal error unrelated to his factual innocence” means “legal error related to his factual innocence.” The Court concluded that the legal error in Wurdemann’s case—ineffective assistance of counsel due to failure to challenge a suggestive police lineup—did not establish his factual innocence. The reversal of his convictions was based on the deficient performance of his trial attorneys, not on evidence proving his innocence. Therefore, Wurdemann did not meet the statutory requirement for compensation under the Act.The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the State, concluding that Wurdemann could not satisfy the necessary element of showing that the basis for reversing his conviction was related to his factual innocence. View "Wurdemann v. State" on Justia Law

Hunter Smith, a phlebotomist employed by Laboratory Corp of America (Labcorp), sustained a work-related back injury on January 27, 2021, when a shelving unit fell on his head. This incident led to acute lower back injuries requiring surgery. Despite the surgery, Smith continued to experience significant pain and other symptoms. Medical evaluations by Dr. Gregory Lanford and Dr. Jules Barefoot assessed a 24% permanent impairment rating, attributing 19% to the work injury and 5% to pre-existing conditions. Dr. Michael Best, however, disagreed, attributing all of Smith's back issues to pre-existing conditions and assessing a 10% impairment rating.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) awarded Smith permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits, accepting Dr. Best's 10% impairment rating but attributing 5% to the work injury. The ALJ also awarded benefits for Smith's psychological condition based on a 20% impairment rating by Dr. Robert Sivley, despite Labcorp's contention that this rating was improperly based on a conditional impairment rating.Labcorp appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board, arguing that the ALJ improperly relied on Dr. Sivley's rating and should have accepted Dr. Trivette's 0% rating. Smith cross-appealed, arguing that the ALJ misapplied the AMA Guides and should not have admitted Dr. Best's report. The Board affirmed the ALJ's decision, and both parties appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which also affirmed the Board's decision.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court held that the ALJ's reliance on Dr. Sivley's impairment rating was justified and that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence. The Court found no compelling reason to disturb the ALJ's findings, as they were not clearly erroneous. View "LABORATORY CORP. OF AMERICA V. HUNTER SMITH" on Justia Law

Darrie Rushin was indicted on multiple charges, including first-degree burglary and first-degree sodomy. He pled guilty to amended charges and was sentenced to seven years in prison, followed by a five-year period of postincarceration supervision. After completing his initial sentence, Rushin was released but later reincarcerated for violating the terms of his supervision.Rushin requested the Department of Corrections (DOC) to review his sentence calculation, arguing he was wrongfully denied sentence credits that would reduce his reincarceration period. The DOC denied his request, and his subsequent administrative appeal was also denied. Rushin then filed a motion in his underlying criminal case seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial court dismissed his claim on separation-of-powers grounds. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded the trial court improperly dismissed the petition but affirmed on other grounds, holding Rushin was not entitled to relief as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that inmates reincarcerated for violating postincarceration supervision terms are entitled to earn statutory sentence credits under KRS 197.045 during their reincarceration. The court reasoned that the initial term of imprisonment and the subsequent period of postincarceration supervision are parts of a single sentence. The court emphasized that statutory sentence credits apply to all inmates unless explicitly excluded by statute. Consequently, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. View "RUSHIN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

In 2016, John O. Kalu, an inmate at FCI Allenwood, alleged that he was sexually assaulted on three separate occasions by Lieutenant K. Middernatch. Kalu reported the first two incidents to Warden Spaulding, who responded that he would investigate but took no further action. Following his report, Kalu was placed in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) and later returned to the general population, where he was assaulted a third time. Kalu also claimed that he was subjected to inhumane conditions of confinement, including being forced to sleep on a cold metal bunk in freezing temperatures without adequate clothing.Kalu filed a pro se complaint in the Middle District of Pennsylvania against Warden Spaulding and Lt. Middernatch, seeking damages under Bivens for violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed Kalu’s claims against Warden Spaulding for lack of personal involvement but allowed the sexual assault claim against Lt. Middernatch to proceed. Kalu later amended his complaint, but the District Court ultimately dismissed all claims, determining that they presented new Bivens contexts and that special factors counseled against extending Bivens remedies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The court held that Kalu’s Eighth Amendment sexual assault and conditions-of-confinement claims presented new Bivens contexts. It found that special factors, including the availability of alternative remedies through the Bureau of Prisons’ Administrative Remedy Program, Congress’s omission of a standalone damages remedy in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), and separation of powers principles, counseled against extending Bivens liability. The court also agreed that Kalu’s complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a plausible claim against Warden Spaulding for deliberate indifference or failure to protect. View "Kalu v. Spaulding" on Justia Law

The case involves a petition for a writ of quo warranto challenging the authority of the Financial Impact Estimating Conference to issue a revised financial impact statement for a proposed constitutional amendment titled “Amendment to Limit Government Interference with Abortion.” The petitioners, Floridians Protecting Freedom and Sara Latshaw, argue that the Estimating Conference acted beyond its authority. The respondents include the Financial Impact Estimating Conference, its four principals, the President of the Florida Senate, and the Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives.The Estimating Conference initially submitted a financial impact statement in November 2023. Following a Florida Supreme Court decision in April 2024, which did not address the financial impact statement, the petitioners filed a declaratory judgment action in circuit court, claiming the original statement was outdated and misleading. The circuit court ruled in favor of the petitioners, remanding the statement for redrafting. The government appealed, but the First District Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot after the Estimating Conference voluntarily issued a revised statement in July 2024. The petitioners then sought relief from the Florida Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of Florida denied the petition for a writ of quo warranto. The Court held that the petitioners waived or forfeited their right to challenge the Estimating Conference’s authority by actively participating in the revision process without objecting to the Conference’s authority. The Court emphasized that the petitioners had accepted the legality of the revision process and focused on influencing the content of the revised statement. Consequently, the Court did not address the merits of the petition or the substantive legality of the revised financial impact statement. View "Floridians Protecting Freedom, Inc. v. Passidomo" on Justia Law

In 2023, the City of Mansfield, Texas, enacted ordinances regulating Unattended Donation Boxes (UDBs), which led to enforcement threats against Arms of Hope (AOH), a charitable organization with three non-compliant UDBs. AOH sued, claiming the ordinances infringed on its First Amendment rights. The district court found AOH likely to succeed on the merits and preliminarily enjoined the city's enforcement of the ordinances.The City of Mansfield appealed the preliminary injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, while AOH cross-appealed, arguing the district court should have applied strict scrutiny instead of intermediate scrutiny. During the appeal, the city enacted new ordinances in 2024 that addressed many of the district court's concerns and repealed the 2023 ordinances to the extent they conflicted.The Fifth Circuit determined that the new ordinances rendered the appeal and cross-appeal moot because the 2023 ordinances no longer had any effect. The court noted that the case itself was not moot, as the district court could still address any remaining issues under the new ordinances. The court dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal as moot but did not vacate the preliminary injunction, as the mootness resulted from the city's voluntary actions. View "Arms of Hope v. City of Mansfield" on Justia Law

In 2021, the Montana Legislature amended the Opencut Mining Act to create "dryland" permits for mining projects that do not affect water sources and are located away from populated areas. LHC, Inc. applied for such a permit for a project near the Clearwater River. The Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) approved the permit after LHC addressed initial deficiencies. Protect the Clearwater, an environmental group, challenged the permit, arguing it did not meet statutory requirements and that DEQ's environmental assessment was inadequate.The Fourth Judicial District Court granted a preliminary injunction to Protect the Clearwater, halting LHC's mining activities. The court found that Protect the Clearwater was likely to succeed on the merits of its claim that DEQ erred in issuing the dryland permit. The court also determined that Protect the Clearwater would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, that the balance of equities favored the injunction, and that the injunction was in the public interest. The court's decision was based on Montana's general preliminary injunction statute, rather than the specific provisions of the Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA).The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and concluded that the District Court improperly applied the general preliminary injunction statute. The Supreme Court held that Protect the Clearwater should have sought relief under MEPA's exclusive remedy provisions, given that the permit was issued under Title 75 and Title 82. The Supreme Court vacated the District Court's preliminary injunction and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the application for the injunction. View "Protect the Clearwater v Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

In 1999, Mark McCloy was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) for tampering with a potential witness in an EEOC proceeding. In 2021, he applied to purchase a handgun in Maryland, stating he had no disqualifying convictions. The Maryland State Police (MSP) disapproved his application, determining his federal conviction was equivalent to a disqualifying Maryland crime under CR § 9-305.McCloy appealed the MSP's decision to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) was not equivalent to CR § 9-305 but sua sponte determined it was comparable to CR § 9-306, affirming the MSP's disapproval. McCloy sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County, which affirmed the ALJ’s decision but on the grounds that CR § 9-305 was the appropriate equivalent Maryland crime.The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s decision, holding that the relevant Maryland law for determining equivalency is the law in effect at the time of the application, not the conviction. The court used a two-step approach to determine equivalency, comparing the elements of the statutes and considering whether a reasonable mind could conclude the statutes prohibit similar conduct.The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Appellate Court’s decision. It held that the relevant Maryland law for determining whether an out-of-State crime is disqualifying is the law in effect when the application is submitted. The court adopted a modified categorical approach, comparing the elements of the out-of-State crime with the Maryland crime. If the elements are broader, the MSP must have conclusive evidence of the acts forming the basis of the conviction to determine if those acts would support a conviction under a disqualifying Maryland crime. The court concluded that McCloy’s federal conviction was not equivalent to a disqualifying Maryland crime and remanded the case with instructions to reverse the MSP’s disapproval of McCloy’s firearm application. View "In the Matter of McCloy" on Justia Law

The case involves current and former San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) employees who sued the United States, alleging that the Navy misled the City of San Francisco and the SFPD about the safety of a contaminated former Naval shipyard leased by the City for use as a facility for SFPD employees. The plaintiffs claimed that the Navy's misrepresentations about the safety of the site caused them to be exposed to hazardous substances, resulting in health problems.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, indicating that the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) misrepresentation exception likely barred their claims. The plaintiffs then filed a Second Amended Complaint, which the district court also dismissed, concluding that the misrepresentation exception applied because the plaintiffs' claims were fundamentally based on the Navy's alleged misrepresentations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the FTCA’s misrepresentation exception applied because the plaintiffs' claims arose out of the Navy’s alleged misrepresentations, even if the misrepresentations were made to the City and the SFPD rather than directly to the plaintiffs. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) implicitly limited or suspended the misrepresentation exception, finding no indication that Congress intended CERCLA to override the FTCA’s misrepresentation exception. The court concluded that the claims were barred by the FTCA’s misrepresentation exception and affirmed the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "ABBEY V. USA" on Justia Law

J.B., a student with multiple disabilities, was enrolled in the Kyrene Elementary School District. Due to concerns about the school's handling of J.B.'s behavioral issues, J.B.'s parent, L.B., withdrew J.B. from the District and placed J.B. in a private school, Brightmont Academy. The District attempted to conduct evaluations to update J.B.'s Individualized Education Program (IEP), but L.B. refused to consent to these evaluations, proposing instead that the District use video recordings for assessments.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the District did not violate the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and ruled in favor of the District. L.B. appealed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, which affirmed the ALJ's decision. The District Court found that L.B. refused to consent to the District's evaluations and made it clear that she did not intend to re-enroll J.B. in the District.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the District did not deny a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) to J.B. because L.B.'s refusal to consent to evaluations relieved the District of further obligations under IDEA. Additionally, the court found that the District's procedural error in stating that no further IEP meetings would occur because J.B. was not enrolled in the District was harmless, as it did not result in a deprivation of educational opportunity for J.B. Consequently, L.B. was not entitled to reimbursement for private school tuition and related expenses. View "J.B. V. KYRENE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 28" on Justia Law