Amanda Shrewsbury, the respondent, was employed as a teacher’s aide in a pre-kindergarten classroom at Cumberland Heights Elementary School during the 2018-2019 school year. She reported witnessing abuse and neglect of students by the classroom teacher, Alma Belcher, to the school principal, Steve Hayes, and later to the superintendent, Dr. Deborah Akers. Following her complaints, Shrewsbury alleges that her employment was terminated. She subsequently filed a lawsuit against the Mercer County Board of Education, Dr. Akers, and others, claiming wrongful discharge and other related grievances.The Circuit Court of Mercer County reviewed the case and denied the petitioners' motion for summary judgment, which was based on the assertion of qualified immunity. The court found that the petitioners were not entitled to qualified immunity under the circumstances presented.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the petitioners, as a political subdivision and an employee of a political subdivision, were not entitled to qualified immunity solely because the claims against them fell within the exceptions to statutory immunity set forth in the West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act. The court clarified that the mere inapplicability of the Tort Claims Act due to specific exemptions does not permit the petitioners to claim qualified immunity. Therefore, the circuit court's denial of the motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity was upheld. View "Mercer County Board of Education v. Shrewsbury" on Justia Law

the State of Missouri bears no legal liability for any judgment against MOHELA. The Act makes clear that MOHELA’s debts and obligations are not debts or obligations of the State. See MO. REV. STAT. § 173.410. This includes any judgments against MOHELA. The State’s lack of legal liability for MOHELA’s debts and judgments is a strong indicator that MOHELA’s finances are independent from the State’s. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 51; Duke, 127 F.3d at 978.In sum, the third Steadfast factor weighs against arm-of-the-state status. MOHELA receives no direct financial assistance from the State, has the ability to generate its own revenue, retains control over its own funds, and the State bears no legal liability for MOHELA’s debts or judgments.d. Factor Four: State or Local AffairsThe fourth Steadfast factor considers whether the entity is concerned primarily with state or local affairs. This factor examines the entity’s function, composition, and purpose. See Hennessey, 53 F.4th at 528; Steadfast, 507 F.3d at 1253. Here, the district court concluded that this factor weighed in favor of arm-of-the-state status, and we agree.MOHELA’s primary function is to help Missourians access student loans needed to pay for college. See MO. REV. STAT. § 173.360. This is a statewide concern, not a local one. MOHELA’s activities are not confined to any particular locality within Missouri; rather, they are intended to benefit residents across the entire state. See Biden, 143 S. Ct. at 2366 (noting that MOHELA was established to perform the “essential public function” of helping Missourians access student loans).Moreover, MOHELA’s board is composed of members appointed by the Governor and representatives from state agencies, further indicating that its focus is on statewide, rather than local, affairs. See MO. REV. STAT. § 173.360. The fact that MOHELA’s profits are used to fund education in Missouri, including providing grants and scholarships for Missouri students, also supports the conclusion that MOHELA is concerned with state affairs. See Biden, 143 S. Ct. at 2366.In conclusion, the fourth Steadfast factor weighs in favor of arm-of-the-state status.3. The Second Step of the Arm-of-the-State Test: The Twin Goals of the Eleventh AmendmentBecause the Steadfast factors point in different directions, we proceed to the second step of the Hennessey test and consider the twin goals underlying the Eleventh Amendment: avoiding an affront to the dignity of the state and the impact of a judgment on the state treasury. See Hennessey, 53 F.4th at 528.As discussed above, the State of Missouri bears no legal liability for any judgment against MOHELA. This means that a judgment against MOHELA would not impact the state treasury. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 51; Duke, 127 F.3d at 978. The lack of impact on the state treasury is a strong indicator that MOHELA is not an arm of the state. See Hennessey, 53 F.4th at 528.Regarding the dignity of the state, MOHELA operates with substantial autonomy and is financially independent from the State. The State has not clearly demarcated MOHELA as sharing its sovereignty. See Hennessey, 53 F.4th at 529. Therefore, treating MOHELA as an arm of the state would not accord with the dignity interests protected by the Eleventh Amendment.In conclusion, considering the twin goals of the Eleventh Amendment, we determine that MOHELA is not an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Good v. United States Department of Education" on Justia Law

A group of organizations and a resident challenged a plan by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Park Service (NPS) regulating tourist flights over four national parks near San Francisco. The agencies determined that no environmental analysis was needed under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) because the plan would cause minimal additional environmental impact compared to existing conditions.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the agencies had previously announced their intent to prepare an environmental assessment but later terminated that process. The agencies then decided to use the existing number of flights as the baseline for their environmental analysis, concluding that the plan would have no significant environmental impact.The court held that the agencies acted arbitrarily by using the existing flights under interim operating authority as the baseline for their NEPA analysis. This approach effectively enshrined the status quo without evaluating the environmental impacts of the existing flights. The court found that the agencies' reliance on interim operating authority as the baseline was unreasonable and contrary to their duties under the National Parks Air Tour Management Act and NEPA.The court vacated the FAA's order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the agencies to conduct a proper NEPA analysis. The court also noted that the agencies could move for a stay of the mandate if they wished to keep the current plan in place while conducting the new analysis. View "Marin Audubon Society v. FAA" on Justia Law

Grand Canyon University (GCU), a private university in Arizona, applied to the U.S. Department of Education to be recognized as a nonprofit institution under the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA). The Department denied GCU’s application, despite GCU having obtained 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) recognition from the IRS as a tax-exempt organization. The Department concluded that GCU did not meet the operational test’s requirement that both the primary activities of the organization and its stream of revenue benefit the nonprofit itself.The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, upholding the denial of GCU’s application. The court found that the Department’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law. GCU appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the Department applied the wrong legal standards in evaluating GCU’s application. Specifically, the Department incorrectly relied on IRS regulations that impose requirements beyond those of the HEA. The correct HEA standards required the Department to determine whether GCU was owned and operated by a nonprofit corporation and whether GCU satisfied the no-inurement requirement. The Department’s failure to apply these correct legal standards necessitated that its decision be set aside.The Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case with instructions to set aside the Department’s denials and to remand to the Department for further proceedings consistent with the correct legal standards under the HEA. View "GRAND CANYON UNIVERSITY V. CARDONA" on Justia Law

The case involves the termination of a police chief, Erica Barga, by the Village Council of St. Paris. Barga was placed on administrative leave by the mayor, who filed charges against her for insubordination and neglect of duty. Barga requested a public hearing to address these charges. The village council conducted the hearing in public but deliberated in executive session before voting to terminate Barga's employment.The Champaign County Court of Common Pleas upheld the village council's decision, concluding that Barga did not have a substantive or procedural right to have the entire disciplinary hearing open to the public. The court also found that the village council's decision was presumed valid and that Barga had not overcome this presumption.The Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision regarding the Open Meetings Act, relying on a federal district court decision that exempted quasi-judicial proceedings from the Act. However, it found that the common pleas court had applied the wrong standard of review and remanded the case for a de novo review.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the court of appeals' decision, holding that the village council violated the Open Meetings Act by deliberating in executive session after Barga requested a public hearing. The court emphasized that the plain terms of the Act required the council to consider the charges in a public hearing. The court remanded the case to the village council for a public hearing in compliance with the Open Meetings Act. View "Barga v. St. Paris Village Council" on Justia Law

The case involves a criminal defendant charged with domestic violence offenses who served a pretrial subpoena on Clackamas Women’s Services (CWS) to obtain records related to services provided to the alleged victim (AV). CWS moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that the records were protected under Oregon Evidence Code (OEC) 507-1 and ORS 147.600, which protect confidential communications and records created or maintained in the course of providing services to victims of domestic violence. The defendant sought the records to challenge AV’s credibility, claiming she fabricated her claims to obtain financial assistance.The Clackamas County Circuit Court quashed the subpoena in part but ordered CWS to produce records disclosing the cell phone information and financial assistance provided to AV. CWS sought mandamus relief from the Oregon Supreme Court, arguing that the records were protected under the statute and rule, and disclosure without AV’s consent was prohibited.The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with CWS, holding that the records ordered for production by the trial court were protected under OEC 507-1 and ORS 147.600. The court concluded that the statute and rule broadly protect all records created or maintained by CWS in the course of providing services to victims of domestic violence, including those that do not contain confidential communications. The court also determined that the trial court had no authority to require CWS to create a new document disclosing the information contained in the protected records. Consequently, the court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its orders. View "State v. Sacco" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former officers of the City of Perris Police Department or their surviving spouses, claimed that the closure of the Perris PD and their subsequent hiring by the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department resulted in a merger of the two departments under Government Code section 20508. They argued that this merger required Riverside County and the Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) to credit their service with the Perris PD as service with the Sheriff’s Department, entitling them to a more generous pension.The Superior Court of Riverside County found that section 20508 only applies when there is a merger of contracts between successive employing agencies and CalPERS. The court concluded that no such merger occurred because Riverside County did not assume any of the City’s municipal functions. Consequently, the service pensions for the Perris PD officers and the Sheriff’s Department deputies were calculated and paid out by CalPERS under separate contracts with the City and County, respectively. The court ruled in favor of the defendants, Riverside County and CalPERS.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that section 20508 requires an actual merger of the contracting agencies’ CalPERS contracts before the succeeding agency assumes any statutory obligations. The court found that the County did not assume the City’s municipal obligations but merely contracted to provide law enforcement services. Therefore, the requirements for a contract merger under section 20508 were not met. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that the County and CalPERS were not required to treat the former police officers’ service as service with the Sheriff’s Department. View "Petree v. Public Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

Richard Shreves, while incarcerated at the Montana State Prison, received medical care and subsequently filed a complaint against Dr. Paul Rees with the Board of Medical Examiners at the Montana Department of Labor and Industry (DLI). The Correctional Health Care Review Team (CHCRT) reviewed the complaint and found no violation of law or practice rules by Dr. Rees, leading to the closure of the complaint without forwarding it to the Board of Medical Examiners. Shreves then petitioned for judicial review, challenging the CHCRT's decision and the lack of detailed findings in their response.The First Judicial District Court dismissed Shreves's petition, concluding that he lacked standing. The court reasoned that the CHCRT process did not implicate Shreves's legal rights, as it was designed to screen complaints for potential disciplinary action against the healthcare provider, not to adjudicate the complainant's rights.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's dismissal. The court held that Shreves did not have standing to petition for judicial review because the statute governing the CHCRT process did not authorize judicial review at the behest of the complainant. The court also found that Shreves's constitutional challenge to the CHCRT's authority did not confer standing, as he lacked a personal stake in the outcome. Additionally, the court determined that any alleged mishandling of filings by the District Court did not affect the outcome, as the legal conclusions regarding standing were correct. View "Shreves v. Montana Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

Sarah Marshall, a pet-sitter, was bitten by a pit bull mix named Julian while attempting to separate a dog fight. Julian had been placed with Loren Poss by Tulsa Animal Welfare, a department within the City of Tulsa. Poss, who was fostering Julian, left him with Marshall while she went on vacation. Marshall sued the City of Tulsa under the strict liability dog bite statute, 4 O.S. § 42.1, and for common law negligence.The District Court of Tulsa County granted summary judgment in favor of the City, finding that Marshall was considered an "owner" of the dog under 4 O.S. § 42.1 and thus could not recover under the statute. The court also found that the City did not owe a duty of care to Marshall. Marshall appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that Marshall was indeed an "owner" under 4 O.S. § 42.1 when read in conjunction with the Tulsa Municipal Ordinance, which defines an owner as anyone having care, maintenance, or control of a dog. The court also held that the City did not owe a duty of care to Marshall because her injury was not foreseeable, as there was no evidence that Julian had shown signs of aggression prior to the incident. Therefore, the trial court's judgment was affirmed. View "MARSHALL v. CITY OF TULSA" on Justia Law

The case involves an order issued by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (Commission) that prevented certain utilities from billing customers for municipal franchise fees and municipal gross receipts taxes based on securitized revenue, as per the February 2021 Regulated Utility Consumer Protection Act. The City of Oklahoma City challenged this order, arguing that it unlawfully canceled municipal taxes and franchise fees, and exceeded the Commission's jurisdiction.The Public Utilities Division (PUD) of the Commission filed an application to prevent utilities from billing customers for these fees and taxes, arguing that such charges would result in a windfall for municipalities. The Commission granted the PUD's application, concluding that the fees and taxes related to extraordinary fuel costs from the 2021 winter storm should not be collected from customers. The Oklahoma Municipal League (OML) intervened, arguing that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to alter franchise agreements and that the fees were legal obligations of the utilities.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and determined that the OML had standing in the controversy. The Court found that the Commission's determination that the February 2021 Regulated Utility Consumer Protection Act changed or altered a utility's legal obligations concerning municipal franchise fees and gross receipts taxes was not sustained by law. The Court held that the Commission did not have the authority to determine the legality of these fees and taxes or to prevent their collection based on securitized revenue.The Supreme Court of Oklahoma reversed the Commission's order, concluding that the Commission's decision was not supported by the law. The case was remanded to the Corporation Commission for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. View "CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY v. OKLAHOMA CORPORATION COMMISSION" on Justia Law