A service-disabled veteran and his company, MJL Enterprises, LLC, alleged that the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) Section 8(a) Business Development Program discriminated against him based on race. The program uses a race-conscious presumption to determine social disadvantage, which the plaintiffs argued was unconstitutional. They sought a declaration that the program's racial classifications were unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the case, ruling it moot due to changes in the 8(a) Program following an injunction in another case, Ultima Services Corp. v. U.S. Department of Agriculture. The district court also found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to demonstrate economic disadvantage and could not establish social disadvantage without the presumption.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court’s ruling on mootness, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the case was not moot because the changes to the 8(a) Program were not final and could be appealed. However, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal based on lack of standing. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an injury in fact, as they did not show they were "able and ready" to bid on 8(a) Program contracts due to their inability to meet the program’s social and economic disadvantage requirements. The court also found that the plaintiffs could not establish causation or redressability, as their ineligibility for the program was not solely due to the race-conscious presumption.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to sue and affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Hierholzer v. Guzman" on Justia Law

Santa Rita Holdings, Inc. applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) from the County of Santa Barbara to cultivate cannabis on a 2.54-acre parcel owned by Kim Hughes. The only access to this parcel is via a private easement over land owned by JCCrandall, LLC. JCCrandall objected to the use of its easement for cannabis transportation, citing federal law and the terms of the easement deed. Despite these objections, the County granted the CUP, and the County’s Board of Supervisors upheld this decision on appeal.JCCrandall then petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate, challenging the County’s determination that the easement provided adequate access for the project. JCCrandall argued that the use of the easement for cannabis activities was prohibited by federal law and the easement deed, that state law required its consent for such use, and that the road did not meet County standards. The trial court denied the petition, applying the substantial evidence standard and finding the County’s decision supported by substantial evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the trial court should have applied the independent judgment standard because JCCrandall’s right to exclude unauthorized persons from its property is a fundamental vested right. The court further held that under federal law, cannabis is illegal, and thus, JCCrandall cannot be forced to allow its property to be used for cannabis transportation. The court also found that the use of the easement for cannabis activities exceeded the scope of the easement, which was created when cannabis was illegal under both state and federal law. The judgment was reversed, and costs were awarded to JCCrandall. View "JCCrandall, LLC v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

Tintina Montana, Inc. sought to operate an underground copper mine in Meagher County, Montana, which required the removal of substantial quantities of groundwater. Tintina planned to use part of this water for mining operations and return the rest to the aquifer. Montana Trout Unlimited and other environmental groups (collectively "MTU") challenged the issuance of a water use permit by the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) for the mine's operations, arguing that the removal and discharge of water should be considered a beneficial use requiring a permit under the Montana Water Use Act (MWUA).The Fourteenth Judicial District Court denied MTU's petition for judicial review and affirmed DNRC's decision. The court held that DNRC correctly categorized the removal and discharge of water as neither a beneficial use nor waste, thus falling outside the permitting process of the MWUA. The court also found that DNRC's interpretation of the MWUA did not contravene the Montana Constitution.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that DNRC's longstanding interpretation of the MWUA, which categorizes mine dewatering as neither a beneficial use nor waste, was reasonable and consistent with legislative intent. The court also concluded that the MWUA's exclusion of mine dewatering from the permitting process did not render the Act unconstitutional, as the primary purpose of the MWUA is to regulate water rights, not the water resource itself. The court noted that other statutory frameworks, such as the Montana Water Quality Act and the Metal Mine Reclamation Act, provide for the regulation of water quality and environmental impacts. View "Trout Unlimited v. DNRC" on Justia Law

A.D. Improvements, Inc. (ADI) leased property from the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) and sought to purchase it under Streets and Highways Code section 118.1, which mandates that Caltrans offer to sell commercial real property deemed excess to the current occupant at fair market value. ADI used the property commercially and applied to purchase it after Caltrans designated it as excess. However, Caltrans denied the application, arguing that the property was not commercial when initially acquired. The trial court agreed with Caltrans and denied ADI's petition for a writ of mandate.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County found that ADI met the conditions of section 118.1, including leasing, occupying, and improving the property. However, it ruled that the statute applied only to property that was commercial when acquired by Caltrans, interpreting "acquired" as a past-tense verb.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case de novo. The court determined that the plain and contextual reading of section 118.1 requires the property to be commercial at the time it is deemed excess, not when it was acquired. The court found that the statute's language, legislative history, and Caltrans' own manuals support this interpretation. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case with directions to issue a writ requiring Caltrans to offer to sell the property to ADI at fair market value. The court held that ADI is entitled to its costs on appeal. View "A.D. Improvements v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Lucky Chances, Inc. and its owners, Rommel and Ruell Medina, had their gambling licenses renewed by the California Gambling Control Commission with additional conditions. The Commission also imposed a 14-day suspension, stayed it, and ordered a monetary penalty based on findings that Rene Medina, a disqualified person, was materially involved in the gambling operation. The trial court issued a writ of administrative mandamus, ordering the Commission to reconsider the penalty, limiting it to $20,000 per violation.The Superior Court of Sacramento County found substantial evidence supporting the Commission's finding of Rene's material involvement but ruled that the monetary penalty exceeded statutory limits. The court ordered the Commission to set aside the penalty and reconsider it in light of the court's decision.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the Commission was authorized to impose additional license conditions based on its findings. However, it determined that the Commission could not use California Code of Regulations, title 4, section 12554, subdivision (d) to impose discipline because the Commission did not find that the Licensees violated any relevant law, regulation, or previously imposed license condition.The Court of Appeal modified the judgment to order the Commission to reconsider the discipline imposed under California Code of Regulations, title 4, section 12554, subdivision (d) in a manner consistent with its opinion. The judgment, as modified, was affirmed, and costs on appeal were awarded to Lucky Chances, Inc., Rommel Medina, and Ruell Medina. View "Lucky Chances, Inc. v. Cal. Gambling Control Com." on Justia Law

Santa Rita Holdings, Inc. applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) from the County of Santa Barbara to cultivate cannabis on a 2.54-acre parcel owned by Kim Hughes. The only access to the parcel is through a private easement over land owned by JCCrandall, LLC. The County's fire and public works departments deemed the road adequate for the project. Despite JCCrandall's objections, the County granted the CUP, and the Board of Supervisors upheld this decision.JCCrandall petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate, arguing that the use of the easement for cannabis activities was prohibited by the easement deed and federal law, that state law required their consent for such activities, and that the road did not meet County standards. The trial court denied the petition, applying the substantial evidence standard and finding the County's decision supported by substantial evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court determined that the trial court erred in applying the substantial evidence standard instead of the independent judgment standard, as JCCrandall's right to exclude unauthorized persons from their property is a fundamental vested right. The appellate court held that under federal law, cannabis is illegal, and thus, the use of the easement for cannabis transportation exceeds the scope of the easement. The court also found that the County's reliance on Civil Code section 1550.5, subdivision (b), which deems cannabis activities lawful under California law, defies the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Consequently, the judgment was reversed, and costs were awarded to JCCrandall. View "JCCrandall v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lorenza Maksimow slipped and fell on a patch of ice in a public parking lot in the City of South Lake Tahoe. She sued the City, alleging the ice patch was a dangerous condition of public property under Government Code sections 830 and 835. The City moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, entering judgment in favor of the City. Maksimow appealed, arguing there were triable issues of material fact regarding the City’s actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.The Superior Court of El Dorado County granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Maksimow failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition. The court sustained the City’s objections to certain evidence presented by Maksimow, including climatological data and expert testimony, and found no evidence that the City had actual or constructive notice of the ice patch.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that there was no triable issue of material fact regarding the City’s actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. The court found that while City employees may have had general knowledge of snowfall and the presence of the Mitsubishi, there was no evidence they had actual notice of the specific ice patch that caused Maksimow’s fall. Additionally, the court concluded that the evidence did not support an inference that the ice patch existed for a sufficient period of time to impute constructive notice to the City. The judgment in favor of the City was affirmed. View "Maksimow v. City of South Lake Tahoe" on Justia Law

The petitioner was charged with first-degree murder. During the investigation, the prosecution informed the defense that one of the investigating officers had a sustained finding of dishonesty, and the officer’s department intended to release related records under Penal Code section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The defense counsel requested these records under the California Public Records Act (CPRA). Concurrently, the petitioner filed a Pitchess motion seeking additional Brady material from the officer’s personnel file. The trial court, after an in-camera review, found no additional Brady material and ordered the disclosure of the records related to the officer’s dishonesty, but issued a protective order limiting their dissemination.The petitioner sought an extraordinary writ of mandate to vacate the protective order, arguing that the records were nonconfidential and subject to public inspection under section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The trial court had issued the protective order under Evidence Code section 1045(e), which restricts the use of disclosed records to the court proceeding.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court noted that Senate Bill No. 1421 amended sections 832.7 and 832.8 to make certain law enforcement personnel records, including those involving sustained findings of dishonesty, nonconfidential and subject to public disclosure. The court held that the trial court should not have issued a protective order for records that are nonconfidential under section 832.7(b)(1)(C). Consequently, the appellate court granted the petition for writ of mandate and directed the trial court to vacate its protective order concerning the records of the officer’s sustained finding of dishonesty. View "Banuelos v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 1996, the City of Perris disbanded its police department and contracted with Riverside County for law enforcement services, leading to the hiring of former Perris PD officers as deputies in the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department. The plaintiffs, former Perris PD officers or their surviving spouses, argued that this transition constituted a merger under Government Code section 20508, entitling them to more favorable pension benefits from the County and CalPERS.The Superior Court of Riverside County ruled that section 20508 only applies when there is a merger of contracts between successive employing agencies and CalPERS. The court found no such merger occurred because Riverside County did not assume any municipal functions of the City of Perris. Consequently, the service pensions for the former Perris PD officers and the Sheriff’s Department deputies were calculated separately under the distinct contracts each entity had with CalPERS.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court held that section 20508 requires an actual merger of CalPERS contracts, which did not happen in this case. The County did not assume the City’s municipal functions, and no steps were taken to merge the contracts. Therefore, the County and CalPERS were not required to treat the former Perris PD officers’ service as service with the Sheriff’s Department. The court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, concluding that the requirements for a contract merger under section 20508 were not met. View "Petree v. Pub. Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

The San Diego City Attorney filed a complaint against Experian Data Corp. on March 6, 2018, alleging a violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) due to Experian's failure to promptly notify consumers of a data breach as required by Civil Code section 1798.82(a). The complaint sought civil penalties and injunctive relief. Experian demurred, arguing the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations. The trial court overruled the demurrer and denied summary judgment motions from both parties, finding the discovery rule could apply to delay the accrual of the claim.The trial court later granted Experian's motion in limine to exclude evidence of civil penalties, concluding the discovery rule did not apply to the UCL claim because it was a non-fraud claim and an enforcement action seeking civil penalties. The court also denied the City Attorney's motion for reconsideration and motion to file a Third Amended Complaint. The parties then stipulated to dismiss the entire complaint, and the City Attorney appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and concluded that the discovery rule could apply to delay the accrual of the UCL claim. The court found that the nature of the claim, the enforcement action seeking civil penalties, and the involvement of a governmental entity did not preclude the application of the discovery rule. The court reversed the trial court's orders granting Experian's motion in limine and denying reconsideration, and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine when the UCL claim accrued based on the actual or constructive knowledge of the relevant actors. The court also vacated the order denying the City Attorney's request to file a Third Amended Complaint. View "P. v. Experian Data Corp." on Justia Law