Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

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The case involves a congressional program that awards grants for family-planning projects, with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) setting eligibility requirements. Oklahoma, a grant recipient, expressed concerns about these requirements, citing state laws prohibiting counseling and referrals for abortions. HHS proposed that Oklahoma provide neutral information about family-planning options, including abortion, through a national call-in number. Oklahoma rejected this proposal, leading HHS to terminate the grant. Oklahoma challenged the termination and sought a preliminary injunction.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma denied Oklahoma's motion for a preliminary injunction, determining that Oklahoma was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claims. Oklahoma then appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. Oklahoma argued that it would likely succeed on the merits for three reasons: (1) Congress's spending power did not allow it to delegate eligibility requirements to HHS, (2) HHS's requirements violated the Weldon Amendment, and (3) HHS acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The Tenth Circuit rejected these arguments, holding that:1. The spending power allowed Congress to delegate eligibility requirements to HHS, and Title X was unambiguous in conditioning eligibility on satisfaction of HHS's requirements. 2. The Weldon Amendment, which prohibits discrimination against health-care entities for declining to provide referrals for abortions, was not violated because HHS's proposal to use a national call-in number did not constitute a referral for the purpose of an abortion. 3. HHS did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in terminating Oklahoma's grant, as the eligibility requirements fell within HHS's statutory authority, and Oklahoma did not demonstrate a likely violation of HHS's regulations.The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction, concluding that Oklahoma had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims. View "State of Oklahoma v. HHS" on Justia Law

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The case involves trade associations representing manufacturers of children's products challenging Oregon's Toxic-Free Kids Act (TFKA) and its implementing regulations. The TFKA requires the Oregon Health Authority (OHA) to maintain a list of high priority chemicals of concern for children's health and imposes reporting and removal requirements for these chemicals. The trade associations argued that these state requirements are preempted by the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA) and the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA).The United States District Court for the District of Oregon partially dismissed the trade associations' claims and granted partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The district court concluded that the federal Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) had not exercised independent judgment or expertise to trigger the express preemption provisions of the FHSA or CPSA for all 73 chemicals listed by the OHA. Therefore, the trade associations' facial challenges failed because they could not show that the Oregon statute and its regulations were invalid in all their applications.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the FHSA and CPSA did not expressly preempt the TFKA and its regulations because the CPSC had not promulgated regulations for all the chemicals at issue. The court also found that the CPSA did not impliedly preempt the TFKA through principles of conflict preemption. The court concluded that the state law did not interfere with the federal regulatory scheme and upheld the district court's judgment. The decision was affirmed. View "AMERICAN APPAREL & FOOTWEAR ASSOCIATION, INC. V. BADEN" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute over the distribution of interest associated with antidumping and countervailing duties under the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (CDSOA). Plaintiffs, who are affected domestic producers, argued that the United States Customs and Border Protection (Customs) unlawfully excluded delinquency interest from the distributions they were entitled to receive under the CDSOA. Customs had been distributing only interest charged on antidumping and countervailing duties at liquidation, as specified by 19 U.S.C. § 1677g, and not delinquency interest assessed under 19 U.S.C. § 1505(d).The United States Court of International Trade (CIT) initially dismissed claims related to distributions made more than two years before the complaints were filed, citing the statute of limitations. The CIT found that the Final Rule published by Customs in 2001 provided adequate notice of its decision to exclude delinquency interest. The CIT also denied plaintiffs' motions for reconsideration, maintaining that the Final Rule sufficiently informed the public of Customs' decision. Finally, the CIT denied plaintiffs' motions for judgment on the agency record, holding that the CDSOA did not require Customs to distribute delinquency interest.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the CIT's decisions. The Federal Circuit held that the Final Rule provided adequate notice of Customs' decision to exclude delinquency interest, thus supporting the CIT's dismissal of claims outside the two-year statutory period. The court also concluded that the CDSOA unambiguously excludes delinquency interest from distributions to affected producers. Therefore, the court affirmed the CIT's judgment in favor of the government, upholding Customs' practice of excluding delinquency interest from CDSOA distributions. View "ADEE HONEY FARMS v. US " on Justia Law

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Joshua Jones applied for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) on October 1, 2019, citing various medical conditions including disc herniation, diabetes, and high blood pressure. His applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. Jones then requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), which took place on August 5, 2021. The ALJ denied his claims on October 6, 2021. Jones appealed to the Appeals Council, which denied review. Subsequently, he sought judicial review in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, which upheld the Commissioner’s decision.The district court reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment and adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation to deny Jones’ motion and grant the Commissioner’s motion. The court found that the ALJ had applied the correct legal standards and that substantial evidence supported the decision. Jones then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the ALJ correctly applied Listing 1.15, which became effective on April 2, 2021, rather than the older Listing 1.04, to evaluate Jones’ claims. The court found that applying the new listing to pending claims did not constitute impermissible retroactivity. Additionally, the court determined that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, including the finding that Jones did not meet the criteria for medical equivalency under Listing 1.15. The court also concluded that the ALJ properly considered the impact of Jones’ medical treatments on his ability to maintain employment, finding no evidence that his treatment regimen significantly interrupted his ability to work. View "Jones v. O'Malley" on Justia Law

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Charles Johnson, Jr. was arrested by Officer Garrett Rolfe for driving while intoxicated. Johnson alleged that Rolfe used excessive force during the arrest, resulting in a broken collarbone. Johnson sued Rolfe and the City of Atlanta under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia state law, claiming excessive force and battery. Johnson's complaint stated that he was respectful and did not resist arrest, but Rolfe threw him to the ground, causing his injury.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia reviewed the case. The City moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it failed to state a claim for Monell liability. Rolfe moved for judgment on the pleadings, submitting body camera and dashcam footage showing Johnson resisting arrest. The district court considered the video evidence, determining it was central to Johnson's claims and its authenticity was not disputed. The court found that Rolfe did not use excessive force and was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. Consequently, the court dismissed the Monell claim against the City, as there was no underlying constitutional violation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the video evidence was properly considered under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. The court found that Rolfe's use of force was objectively reasonable given the circumstances, including Johnson's resistance and the dangerous location of the arrest. Therefore, Rolfe was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claim against the City, as no constitutional violation occurred. View "Johnson v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

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Space Exploration Holdings (SpaceX) applied for a license from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to operate 29,988 low-altitude non-geostationary orbit satellites for its second-generation Starlink system. The FCC conditionally approved the license for 7,500 satellites, citing the public interest in improving broadband access. The approval was contingent on SpaceX obtaining a favorable finding from the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) regarding compliance with power flux-density limits to prevent signal interference.DISH Network Corporation and the International Dark-Sky Association opposed the license. DISH argued that SpaceX's satellites would cause unacceptable interference and that the FCC unlawfully delegated its authority to the ITU. The FCC dismissed DISH's evidence, relying on SpaceX's self-certification and the ITU's eventual verification. The FCC also granted an interim waiver allowing SpaceX to begin operations before the ITU's finding, citing public interest. The International Dark-Sky Association argued that the FCC failed to conduct an environmental review as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The FCC concluded that its regulations did not require such a review and denied the request.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the FCC's decision to license SpaceX's satellites was lawful and reasonably explained. The court found that the FCC was not required to independently verify SpaceX's self-certification and that the interim waiver was justified by public interest considerations. The court also determined that the FCC did not unlawfully delegate its authority to the ITU, as the ITU's role was limited to fact gathering and compliance verification. Regarding the environmental review, the court held that the FCC reasonably concluded that SpaceX's mitigation efforts and the FAA's environmental assessment of rocket launches were sufficient to avoid significant environmental impacts.The court affirmed the FCC's order licensing SpaceX's Gen2 Starlink satellites. View "International Dark-Sky Association, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

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Range Resources-Appalachia, LLC (Range) and Columbia Gulf Transmission, LLC (Columbia Gulf) filed administrative complaints against Texas Eastern Transmission, LP (Texas Eastern) with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Range, a natural gas producer, has long-term agreements with Texas Eastern and Columbia Gulf to transport gas through the Adair Interconnect. During two periods in 2019 and 2021, Texas Eastern's pipeline pressure was too low to move gas into Columbia Gulf's system, causing significant financial losses for Range. Petitioners sought FERC's intervention to require Texas Eastern to maintain higher pipeline pressures.FERC dismissed the complaints, finding that Texas Eastern had no minimum delivery pressure obligation. FERC also denied rehearing requests, stating that the complaints did not sufficiently demonstrate a violation of any pressure obligations. Petitioners argued that Texas Eastern failed to comply with its tariff and the Adair Interconnection Agreement, but FERC found these arguments procedurally and substantively insufficient. Additionally, FERC concluded that Texas Eastern's force majeure declaration in 2021 was irrelevant to the issue of reservation charge credits, as Columbia Gulf's refusal to accept gas was outside Texas Eastern's control.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld FERC's dismissal, agreeing that the complaints did not adequately plead violations of the Texas Eastern Tariff or the Adair Interconnection Agreement. The court also found that FERC did not need to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issues of equal service and the force majeure declaration, as the written record was sufficient. The court denied the petitions for review, affirming FERC's orders. View "Columbia Gulf Transmission, LLC v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute between the City of Hastings and a group of appellants referred to as the "chief petitioners." The chief petitioners submitted a referendum petition to repeal a city council measure approving the demolition of a viaduct. The City of Hastings sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether it was required to hold a special referendum election, given that the viaduct was demolished during the pendency of the action.The District Court for Adams County initially denied the chief petitioners' request for a temporary injunction to prevent the demolition. Subsequently, the viaduct was demolished. The district court then ruled that the case was moot because the viaduct no longer existed, and any referendum would be ineffectual. However, the court also addressed other arguments and ultimately declared that no election or ballot submission should be made.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with the district court's finding that the case was moot. The court noted that the demolition of the viaduct eradicated the parties' legal interests in the dispute, making any referendum on the issue meaningless. The court also considered whether the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied but concluded that the specific circumstances of the case did not warrant an authoritative adjudication for future guidance.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case with directions to dismiss the action due to mootness. View "City of Hastings v. Sheets" on Justia Law

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Gerardo Arvizu Velador was charged with battery on a peace officer, resisting or obstructing a peace officer, and reckless driving. His counsel requested a competency evaluation, and proceedings were suspended pending this determination. While the competency evaluation was ongoing, Velador's counsel filed a motion for mental health diversion, supported by various reports and records indicating Velador's mental health issues.The trial court granted the motion for mental health diversion before determining Velador's competency, which led the People to appeal to the appellate division of the Riverside County Superior Court. The appellate division upheld the trial court's decision, concluding that the court had jurisdiction to grant mental health diversion even while the competency determination was pending. The appellate division reasoned that the statutes governing mental health diversion and competency did not require a competency determination before granting diversion.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case to settle the legal question. The court affirmed the appellate division's decision, holding that a trial court can grant mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36 before resolving a defendant's competency to stand trial. The court found that the statutory language of section 1001.36 and the competency statutes allowed for diversion regardless of the defendant's competency status. The court also determined that the suspension of criminal proceedings under section 1368 did not preclude the trial court from considering and granting diversion. The decision emphasized that diversion could be granted to both competent and incompetent defendants, aligning with legislative intent to provide alternatives to incarceration for individuals with mental health disorders. View "People v. Velador" on Justia Law

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WasteXperts, Inc. (WasteXperts) filed a complaint against Arakelian Enterprises, Inc. dba Athens Services (Athens) and the City of Los Angeles (City) in June 2022. WasteXperts alleged that Athens, which holds a waste collection franchise from the City, sent a cease and desist letter to WasteXperts, arguing that WasteXperts was not legally permitted to handle Athens’s bins. WasteXperts sought judicial declarations regarding the City’s authority and Athens’s franchise rights, and also asserted tort claims against Athens for interference with contract, interference with prospective economic advantage, unfair competition, and trade libel.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Athens’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike the entire complaint, finding that the claims were based on Athens’s communications, which anticipated litigation and were therefore protected activity. The court also held that the commercial speech exemption did not apply and that WasteXperts had no probability of prevailing on the merits of its claims. WasteXperts’s request for limited discovery was denied.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court concluded that the declaratory relief claim did not arise from protected activity, as it was based on an existing dispute over the right to move waste collection bins, not on the prelitigation communications. The court also found that the commercial speech exemption applied to Athens’s communications with WasteXperts’s clients, removing those communications from the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute. Consequently, the tort claims did not arise from protected activity. The appellate court did not address the probability of WasteXperts prevailing on the merits or the request for limited discovery. View "Wastexperts, Inc. v. Arakelian Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law