Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

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The plaintiff, Shanita Terrell, alleges that two deputies from the Harris County Sheriff’s Office forced her into a patrol car, and one of them sexually assaulted her. The deputies were off-duty but were in uniform and using patrol vehicles while working side jobs at a bar. Terrell woke up the next morning at home with pain in her vaginal area and no memory of having sex. A DNA test revealed that semen in her underwear matched one of the deputies, Michael Hines. Hines was later charged with sexually assaulting Terrell.Terrell sued Deputy Hines, Deputy Mark Cannon, Harris County Sheriff Ed Gonzalez, and Harris County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed her claims against Cannon, Gonzalez, and Harris County for failing to state a claim. Terrell appealed the dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Terrell failed to establish that Deputy Cannon violated a clearly established constitutional right. She also failed to allege the type of pattern of deliberate indifference required to establish liability for the County or its Sheriff. The court also dismissed Terrell's supervisory and municipal liability claims against Sheriff Gonzalez and Harris County, respectively. The court concluded that Terrell's allegations were insufficient to show a failure-to-train policy or a widespread pattern of misconduct. View "Terrell v. Harris County" on Justia Law

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The case involves Lion Elastomers, a synthetic rubber manufacturer, and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Lion Elastomers had been found guilty of unfair labor practices by the NLRB for threatening, disciplining, and discharging an employee, Joseph Colone, for engaging in protected activities. The NLRB applied the Atlantic Steel standard to assess whether Colone's behavior lost its protected status. However, before the appeal of the Board’s decision had been briefed, the NLRB issued a new interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in a case called General Motors, which overruled Atlantic Steel. The NLRB then sought a remand to apply this new interpretation to the Lion Elastomers case.The case was remanded to the NLRB by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. However, instead of applying the new interpretation from General Motors as expected, the NLRB used the remand proceeding to overrule General Motors and return to the Atlantic Steel standard. Lion Elastomers argued that the NLRB exceeded the scope of the remand and violated its due-process rights during the remand proceeding.The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Lion Elastomers. The court found that the NLRB had exceeded the scope of the remand by not applying the General Motors standard as expected. The court also found that the NLRB had violated Lion Elastomers's due-process rights by not giving the company an opportunity to be heard before deciding to overturn General Motors. The court vacated the NLRB's decision and remanded the case back to the NLRB, instructing it to apply the General Motors standard to this case. View "Lion Elastomers v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around Benjamin Ramirez, who, on behalf of a putative class, sued the Director and the Treasurer of the Missouri Department of Revenue in their official capacities. Ramirez had resolved criminal charges against him by pleading guilty and paying court costs, including certain mandatory surcharges. These surcharges were then paid to various funds, as authorized by Missouri statute. Ramirez alleged that the Director and the Treasurer received payment of, collected, and deposited the surcharges in and otherwise managed these funds. He claimed a single count of unjust enrichment and asserted the statutes authorizing the surcharges violate a section of the Missouri Constitution.The Director and the Treasurer moved for summary judgment, asserting that Ramirez’s suit is barred by sovereign immunity and the statutes authorizing the surcharges do not violate the Missouri Constitution. The circuit court sustained the motion, concluding the statutes authorizing the surcharges do not violate the Missouri Constitution. Ramirez appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court's judgment. The court held that sovereign immunity, a common law judicial doctrine barring suit against a government or public entity, applied to Ramirez's claim for unjust enrichment. The court noted that sovereign immunity is the default rule in all suits against the state and applies to non-tort claims. The court found that the state had not waived its sovereign immunity through express statutory consent or a recognized common law exception. Therefore, Ramirez's unjust enrichment suit against the Director and the Treasurer was barred by sovereign immunity. View "Ramirez vs. Missouri Prosecuting Attorneys' & Circuit Attorneys' Retirement System" on Justia Law

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The case involves Raymond Sefakor Yao Azumah, a Ghanaian national who was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2010. After a trip to Ghana in 2014, Azumah was deemed inadmissible due to an intervening embezzlement conviction. Despite this, the government paroled Azumah into the country and initiated removal proceedings against him. These proceedings were later dismissed, and Azumah applied for citizenship. However, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services denied his application, arguing that Azumah was statutorily ineligible because he was not “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” upon his return to the United States in 2014. The district court affirmed this denial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the lower court's decision. The court noted that Azumah was indeed “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” at all relevant times, including 2010, 2014, and when he sought citizenship, because he had the status of a legal permanent resident of the United States. The court did not interpret the agency regulation to impose upon Azumah the additional burden of showing that he was “lawfully admitted” rather than paroled when he returned to the United States in 2014. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Azumah v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

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Three Chinese individuals invested in a project to improve Philadelphia’s transit infrastructure as part of an effort to obtain EB-5 visas, which are visas for foreign investors who create jobs in the United States. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) approved their visa applications. However, due to the oversubscription of the EB-5 visa program, the investors were waiting in line for visas to become available. In 2022, Congress changed the eligibility requirements for EB-5 visas, creating a new category of “reserved” EB-5 visas for foreigners who invest in “infrastructure projects”. The investors believed that they should be eligible for the new “reserved” visas based on their past investments in infrastructure. They sued the Department of Homeland Security and USCIS, arguing that previous investments in already-approved infrastructure-focused projects should be eligible for reserved EB-5 visas. The district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the government had taken no final agency action that may be challenged at this time.The case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court agreed with the lower court that the arguments made by the appellants were premature. The court found that the statements made by USCIS in a Q&A and a policy manual merely clarified the existing process for seeking an immigration benefit and did not constitute final agency action. The court also noted that the appellants were not precluded from applying for reserved EB-5 visas. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the district court, dismissing the appellants' claims for lack of finality under the Administrative Procedure Act. View "Delaware Valley Regional Center, LLC v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Federal Election Commission (FEC), the Campaign Legal Center, and the political action committee Correct the Record. The Campaign Legal Center alleged that Correct the Record coordinated with Hillary Clinton's 2016 presidential campaign and spent close to $6 million without disclosing these expenditures as contributions. Correct the Record argued that these expenditures were exempt from disclosure due to the FEC's "internet exemption," which exempts unpaid internet communications from contribution limitations and disclosure requirements.The FEC dismissed the complaint, leading to a lawsuit by the Campaign Legal Center. The district court ruled in favor of the Campaign Legal Center, finding that the FEC's dismissal was contrary to law. The FEC appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the FEC's interpretation of the "internet exemption" was contrary to the Federal Election Campaign Act's regulation of coordinated expenditures. The court also found that the FEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in dismissing allegations of coordination between Correct the Record and the Clinton campaign. The case was remanded back to the FEC for further action consistent with the court's decision. View "Campaign Legal Center v. Federal Election Commission" on Justia Law

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This case involves Duke Energy Progress, LLC, a grid operator, and two energy generation companies, American Beech Solar, LLC, and Edgecombe Solar LLC. The dispute centers around two orders by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The first order rejected Duke Energy's agreement with American Beech Solar, which did not require Duke Energy to reimburse the cost of network upgrades. The second order accepted Duke Energy's agreement with Edgecombe Solar, which Duke Energy filed unsigned and under protest, and required Duke Energy to reimburse the cost of network upgrades.In the lower courts, FERC rejected the agreement with American Beech Solar, arguing that it was not just and reasonable because Duke Energy had threatened to delay construction of the upgrades, preventing American Beech from connecting to the grid, unless American Beech agreed to forego reimbursement. FERC also approved the agreement with Edgecombe Solar, despite Duke Energy's protest that it should not be required to pay reimbursements.In the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the court denied Duke Energy's petitions for review. The court held that FERC's orders were not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. The court found that FERC's interpretation of its own regulation, Order 2003, was reasonable and entitled to deference. The court also found that FERC reasonably rejected Duke Energy's request for a deviation from the reimbursement requirement. Finally, the court held that FERC's orders did not violate the principle of treating similarly situated utilities differently without a reasonable justification. View "Duke Energy Progress, LLC v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

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The case involves a group of self-described "lawful and peaceful protestors" who sued the City of Dallas, Dallas County, and the Dallas County Sheriff’s Office under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages for alleged constitutional violations stemming from their participation in the George Floyd demonstrations in Dallas. The plaintiffs claimed that they were wrongfully arrested and mistreated by the police during the protests. They also alleged that the City of Dallas had a policy of failing to adequately discipline its police officers, which led to their constitutional rights being violated.The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against the City, the County, and the Sheriff’s Office. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their municipal liability claims against the City, arguing that the district court erred in doing so.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that the City of Dallas had a persistent and widespread practice of failing to discipline its police officers that amounted to deliberate indifference. The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to establish a causal link between the City's alleged failure to discipline and the violation of their rights. Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that General Order 609.00, an official policy relating to mass arrests, was unconstitutional on its face. The court concluded that the policy did not affirmatively allow or compel unconstitutional conduct. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims against the City of Dallas. View "Verastique v. City of Dallas" on Justia Law

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The case involves two Georgia non-profit organizations, New Georgia Project and New Georgia Project Action Fund (collectively referred to as "New Georgia"), and the Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign Finance Commission. New Georgia was accused of violating the Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign Finance Act by failing to register with the Commission and disclose their campaign expenditures and sources. The Commission initiated an investigation and found "reasonable grounds" to conclude that New Georgia had violated the Act.New Georgia then filed a federal lawsuit claiming that the Act violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted a preliminary injunction preventing the state from enforcing the Act against New Georgia. The state appealed, arguing that the district court should have abstained from exercising its jurisdiction under the doctrine established in Younger v. Harris.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court should have abstained under the Younger doctrine. The court found that the state's enforcement action against New Georgia was ongoing and implicated important state interests, and that New Georgia had an adequate opportunity in the state proceeding to raise constitutional challenges. The court vacated the district court's decision and remanded with instructions to dismiss New Georgia's action. View "New Georgia Project, Inc. v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

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This case involves five large water utilities and an association representing investor-owned water utilities' interests, collectively referred to as the Water Companies. The Water Companies sought to overturn an order by the Public Utilities Commission (Commission) that eliminated a conservation-focused ratesetting mechanism known as the Water Revenue Adjustment Mechanism (WRAM). The WRAM was designed to encourage water conservation by decoupling a water company's revenue from the amount of water sold. The Commission's order to eliminate the WRAM was not based on the merits of the mechanism but on procedural issues.The Commission's decision to eliminate the WRAM was made in a proceeding that was ostensibly focused on improving the accuracy of water sales forecasts. The Water Companies argued that the Commission did not provide adequate notice that the elimination of the WRAM was one of the issues to be considered in the proceeding.The Supreme Court of California agreed with the Water Companies. The court found that the Commission's scoping memos, which are supposed to outline the issues to be considered in a proceeding, did not provide adequate notice that the WRAM's elimination was on the table. The court concluded that the Commission's failure to give adequate notice required the order to be set aside. The court did not rule on the merits of the WRAM itself. View "Golden State Water Co. v. Public Utilities Com." on Justia Law