Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A dispute arose between a regional fishermen’s association and the federal government concerning changes to catch limits for several fish species in the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan. The association, representing commercial fishermen allegedly harmed by reduced catch limits, challenged the legality of the Framework Adjustment 65 Final Rule and its implementing regulations. At the core of the association’s argument was the claim that the involvement of the New England Fishery Management Council in the development of these rules violated the U.S. Constitution’s Appointments Clause. The association argued that the Council exercised significant authority in the regulatory process but its members were not properly appointed as federal officers.The United States District Court for the District of Maine reviewed the case. It concluded that the association had standing due to the economic injury suffered by its members. The district court rejected the primary constitutional claim, holding that the Council’s role was advisory and final binding authority rested solely with the Secretary of Commerce, who promulgated the regulations. The court did, however, agree with the association in part, finding certain unrelated statutory provisions unconstitutional, but determined that this did not entitle the association to its requested relief. The district court severed those statutory provisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit heard the appeal. After reviewing the statutory framework and the specific facts, the court held that the Council’s role was advisory and did not amount to the exercise of significant federal authority under the Appointments Clause. The harm to the association’s members derived from the Secretary’s independent decision to promulgate the binding regulations, not from the Council’s recommendations. The First Circuit affirmed the denial of injunctive and declaratory relief and reversed the district court’s severance of the unrelated statutory provisions. View "New England Fishermen's Stewardship Association v. Lutnick" on Justia Law

In 2021, the United States seized over 700,000 barrels of crude oil from two tankers in the Mediterranean Sea. The government alleged that the oil belonged to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), an entity it claimed materially supported the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. The government further asserted that NIOC’s activities included supplying, transporting, and selling oil to benefit the IRGC, which used these resources to fund terrorist activities targeting the United States. A Turkish commodities trading company, Aspan Petrokimya Co., claimed ownership of the seized oil and sought to recover the proceeds from its sale.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed the government’s forfeiture complaints without prejudice, finding that the government had not adequately pled that NIOC’s sale of oil affected foreign commerce. The government then filed an Amended Complaint consolidating the cases and providing additional factual detail. The district court denied Aspan’s renewed motion to dismiss, concluding that the amended allegations sufficiently addressed the jurisdictional element and all other statutory requirements. To expedite appellate review, Aspan admitted the complaint’s factual allegations, consented to judgment on the pleadings, and appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss de novo. The appellate court held that the government needed only to allege NIOC’s ownership of the property at the time of the offense, not at the time of seizure. The court also found that the Amended Complaint plausibly alleged that NIOC’s material support of the IRGC substantially affected foreign commerce, and that NIOC’s actions were calculated to influence the U.S. government. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. All Petroleum-Product Cargo Onboard the M/T Arina" on Justia Law

A trade association representing the majority of the world’s liner shipping services challenged a rule issued by the Federal Maritime Commission. Under recent amendments to the Shipping Act, Congress directed the Commission to define what constitutes an “unreasonable refusal to deal or negotiate” by ocean common carriers regarding vessel space accommodations. The Commission responded by adopting a rule specifying non-binding factors for evaluating unreasonable refusals, including whether a carrier quoted rates vastly above market value, required carriers to submit an annual “documented export policy,” and removed explicit reference to “business decisions” from its list of factors. The association objected, arguing that the rule exceeded the Commission’s authority and was arbitrary and capricious.After the Commission published its final rule, the association filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The association claimed that the Commission lacked authority to consider price in its analysis, that the requirement for a documented export policy was ultra vires and arbitrary, and that removal of the “business decisions” factor was likewise arbitrary. The Commission defended the rule’s approach, asserting its statutory power to require reports and to evaluate factors relevant to reasonableness.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that the Commission’s consideration of price as an indicator of unreasonable refusal did not amount to unauthorized rate regulation, and that the requirement for a documented export policy was within the Commission’s statutory authority. The court also found that the omission of “business decisions” as a listed factor did not preclude their consideration in individual cases. The court concluded that the rule was neither beyond the Commission’s statutory authority nor arbitrary and capricious. View "World Shipping Council v. FMC" on Justia Law

A group of Maine lobstermen challenged a state rule requiring all federally permitted lobster fishers to install electronic tracking devices on their vessels, which transmit GPS location data whenever the vessels are in the water. This rule was adopted by the Maine Department of Marine Resources (MDMR) to comply with an addendum to the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s American Lobster Fishery Management Plan. The addendum aimed to reduce risks to North Atlantic right whales, improve fishery data, and support regulatory enforcement. The tracking devices must remain powered and transmit data at all times, including when vessels are docked or used for personal purposes.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, arguing that the MDMR Rule violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment, as well as equal protection and state administrative law. The district court granted the state’s motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Fourth Amendment because the lobster fishery is a closely regulated industry and the rule was not unreasonably invasive. The court noted several concessions by the parties, including that the GPS tracking constituted a search, that the lobster industry is closely regulated, and that the search was administrative in nature.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the lobster industry is a closely regulated industry and that the administrative search exception, as articulated in New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), applied. The court found that the MDMR Rule satisfied the Burger test: it served a substantial government interest, warrantless searches were necessary to the regulatory scheme, and the rule provided a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Thompson v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The case concerns a rule issued by the Federal Maritime Commission in 2024 to address concerns about demurrage and detention charges in maritime shipping. These charges are imposed by ocean carriers and marine terminal operators on shippers, truckers, and other entities for delays in the movement or return of shipping containers. The rule sought to clarify which parties could be billed for these charges, limiting invoices to those in a contractual relationship with the billing party—typically shippers or consignees. However, the rule categorically excluded motor carriers from being billed, even when they had a direct contract with the ocean carrier.Prior to review by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the Federal Maritime Commission promulgated the rule and responded to public comments. Initially, the Commission suggested that motor carriers in contractual privity could be billed, but later issued a correction stating that motor carriers could not be billed under any circumstances, regardless of contractual relationship. The World Shipping Council, representing ocean carriers, petitioned for review, arguing that the rule was arbitrary and capricious, among other challenges.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that the Commission’s rule was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that the Commission failed to reasonably explain its exclusion of motor carriers from the set of billable parties, despite its stated rationale of limiting billing to those in contractual privity. The court granted the petition for review, severed and set aside the portion of the rule (46 C.F.R. § 541.4) that confined billing to shippers or consignees, and left the remainder of the rule intact. View "World Shipping Council v. FMC" on Justia Law

A coastal town in Maine, known for its small population and proximity to a national park, experienced a significant increase in cruise ship tourism, with large vessels bringing thousands of passengers daily. In response to concerns about congestion, public safety, and the impact on local amenities, residents approved an ordinance capping the number of cruise ship passengers who could disembark in the town to 1,000 per day. The ordinance imposed fines for violations and was intended to address issues primarily at the waterfront and, to a lesser extent, in the downtown area.Several local businesses, a business association, and a pilots’ association challenged the ordinance in the United States District Court for the District of Maine. They argued that the ordinance was preempted by federal and state law, violated the Commerce Clause (including its dormant aspect), and infringed on due process rights. After a bench trial, the District Court largely ruled in favor of the town and an intervening resident, rejecting most claims but finding that the ordinance was preempted by federal regulations only to the extent it restricted crew members’ shore access. The court declined to enjoin the ordinance, noting the town’s intent to address this issue through further rulemaking.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s rejection of the state law preemption, federal preemption (except for the now-moot crew access issue), and due process claims. The First Circuit also affirmed the dismissal of discrimination-based Dormant Commerce Clause claims, finding no similarly situated in-state and out-of-state competitors. However, the court vacated and remanded the District Court’s dismissal of the Pike balancing Dormant Commerce Clause claim, instructing further analysis of whether the ordinance’s burdens on interstate commerce are clearly excessive in relation to its local benefits. The court dismissed as moot the appeals related to the crew access issue. View "Ass'n to Preserve and Protect Local Livelihoods v. Town of Bar Harbor" on Justia Law

A jurisdictional dispute arose between the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) over maintenance work at SSA Terminals in the Port of Seattle. Both unions claimed the right to perform the work under their respective collective bargaining agreements. SSA initially assigned the work to ILWU, but IAM threatened economic action, prompting SSA to seek a resolution from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB assigned the work to IAM, leading ILWU to pursue a grievance against SSA, which an arbitrator upheld.SSA then filed an unfair labor practice charge against ILWU, alleging that ILWU's pursuit of the grievance violated section 8(b)(4)(D) of the National Labor Relations Act. ILWU defended itself by invoking the work-preservation defense, which protects primary union activity. The NLRB rejected this defense, stating it was not applicable in pure jurisdictional disputes where multiple unions have valid contractual claims. The NLRB ordered ILWU to cease and desist from pursuing the maintenance work at Terminal 5.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the NLRB's position was foreclosed by its previous decision in International Longshore and Warehouse Union v. NLRB (Kinder Morgan), which established that a valid work-preservation objective provides a complete defense against alleged violations of section 8(b)(4)(D). The court vacated the NLRB's order and remanded the case for the NLRB to evaluate the merits of ILWU's work-preservation defense. The court also denied the petitions for review by IAM and the NLRB's cross-petition for enforcement. View "International Longshore and Warehouse Union v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Captain Matthew Hight trained with the Saint Lawrence Seaway Pilots Association from 2015 to 2018 to become a maritime pilot on Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence River. The Great Lakes Pilotage Act of 1960 requires certain ships on these waters to have a registered pilot on board. The Coast Guard oversees the registration of American pilots and supervises private pilotage associations responsible for training new pilots. Hight applied for registration in 2018, but the Pilots Association recommended denial, citing incomplete training and concerns about his temperament. The Coast Guard denied his application after an independent review.Hight challenged the decision in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the Coast Guard acted arbitrarily and capriciously, unconstitutionally delegated authority to the Pilots Association, and violated the First Amendment by requiring him to train with and join the Pilots Association. The district court rejected all claims, finding that the Coast Guard's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including Hight's failure to complete the required training and concerns about his temperament.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Coast Guard's decision was reasonable and supported by the record, as Hight had not completed the required supervised trips on the St. Lawrence River. The court also found that the Coast Guard did not unconstitutionally delegate authority to the Pilots Association, as the association's role was limited to providing advice and gathering facts. Finally, the court determined that Hight's First Amendment claim regarding mandatory association membership was not ripe for review, as he was not yet eligible to join the Pilots Association. The court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Hight v. DHS" on Justia Law

The California Air Resources Board (CARB) adopted a regulation in August 2020 to limit emissions from ocean-going vessels while docked at California ports. The Western States Petroleum Association (WSPA) challenged this regulation, arguing that CARB acted arbitrarily and capriciously by setting unfeasible compliance deadlines for emissions control measures. WSPA also claimed that CARB violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) by not timely disclosing a commissioned report on tanker emissions and failed to adequately analyze safety hazards and cumulative environmental impacts under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied WSPA’s petition for a writ of mandate, finding that CARB had the authority to set emissions standards requiring future technology and that WSPA did not prove the necessary technology would not be developed in time. The court also found that CARB substantially complied with the APA’s notice provisions and did not violate CEQA in its environmental analysis.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court held that CARB’s determination that compliance with the regulation was feasible did not lack evidentiary support. CARB relied on assurances from technology providers that capture and control systems could be adapted for tankers by the compliance deadlines. The court also found that CARB substantially complied with the APA by making the emissions report available before the end of the comment period, allowing WSPA to provide feedback. Finally, the court held that CARB’s environmental analysis under CEQA was adequate, as it provided a general discussion of potential impacts and appropriately deferred more specific analysis to future site-specific reviews. View "Western States Petroleum Ass'n. v. Cal. Air Resources Bd." on Justia Law

Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company (Great Lakes) sought a letter ruling from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) regarding the application of the Jones Act to its offshore wind farm project. CBP's initial ruling required Jones Act-qualified vessels for transporting scour protection rock from U.S. points to the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). However, a modified ruling stated that the first delivery of rock to the OCS did not require a Jones Act-qualified vessel, but subsequent deliveries did. Great Lakes appealed this modified ruling, which CBP denied.Great Lakes then filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Texas, claiming the modified ruling was contrary to law and would expose its planned Jones Act-compliant vessel to unlawful competition. The American Petroleum Institute (API) intervened, arguing that Great Lakes lacked standing as it had no actual or imminent injury. The district court agreed with API and dismissed the case, finding Great Lakes' injury hypothetical since it did not have a vessel capable of handling the Vineyard Project and no current contract for the project.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Great Lakes argued it had competitor standing due to the potential for increased competition from foreign vessels. However, the court found no evidence of actual or imminent increased competition, as the Vineyard Project was completed and there was no indication that future projects would source rock from U.S. points. The court also rejected CBP's argument that the ruling applied to identical future projects, as there was no record evidence of such projects involving U.S.-sourced rock.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Great Lakes lacked standing to challenge the CBP's modified ruling. View "Great Lakes Dredge v. Magnus" on Justia Law