Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Admiralty & Maritime Law
In the Matter of Energetic Tank, Inc.
In the early hours of August 21, 2017, the M/V ALNIC, a Liberian-flagged oil-and-chemical tanker, collided with the U.S.S. JOHN S. MCCAIN, a Navy destroyer, in the Singapore Strait. The collision resulted in the deaths of ten Navy sailors and injuries to dozens more. Both vessels sustained significant damage. Energetic Tank, Inc., the owner of ALNIC, sought exoneration from or limitation of liability for the collision. Forty-one Navy sailors or their representatives, along with the United States, filed claims for damages against Energetic. Energetic counterclaimed against the United States. The parties agreed on the monetary value of the damages to ALNIC and MCCAIN as $442,445 and $185 million, respectively.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York concluded that Singapore law would govern the determination of liability and the calculation of damages. After a Phase 1 bench trial, the district court denied Energetic’s petition for exoneration or limitation of liability, allocating 80% of the fault to the United States and 20% to Energetic. The court indicated it would proceed to a Phase 2 trial to determine damages to the Sailor-Claimants. Energetic appealed, and while the appeal was pending, the district court dismissed Energetic’s claims for contribution or indemnity against the United States for any damages awarded to the Sailor-Claimants, citing sovereign immunity. Energetic also appealed this order. The district court retroactively certified its earlier opinion on the apportionment of liability as a final judgment as to the United States. Several Sailor-Claimants cross-appealed, challenging the application of Singapore law to the calculation of damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found no error in the district court’s apportionment of liability under Singapore law or its sovereign immunity ruling, affirming the district court’s judgment and order on Energetic’s appeals. However, the court dismissed the Sailor-Claimants’ cross-appeals for lack of jurisdiction, as the choice-of-law ruling was a non-appealable collateral order. View "In the Matter of Energetic Tank, Inc." on Justia Law
Evergreen Shipping Agency (America) Corp. v. Federal Maritime Commission
The case revolves around Evergreen Shipping Agency (America) Corp. and its affiliates, who were charged by the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) for imposing "unjust and unreasonable" detention charges on TCW, Inc., a trucking company. The charges were for the late return of a shipping container. The FMC argued that the charges were unreasonable as they were levied for days when the port was closed and could not have accepted a returned container. Evergreen contested this decision, arguing that the FMC's application of the interpretive rule was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.The FMC had previously ruled in favor of TCW, Inc. in a small claims program. The Commission then reviewed the decision, focusing on the application of the interpretive rule on demurrage and detention. The FMC upheld the initial decision, stating that no amount of detention can incentivize the return of a container when the terminal cannot accept the container. The Commission dismissed Evergreen's arguments that failing to impose detention charges during the port closure would have disincentivized the return of the container before the closure.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and found the FMC's decision to be arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that the FMC failed to consider relevant factors and did not provide a reasoned explanation for several aspects of its decision. The court also found that the FMC's application of the incentive principle was illogical. The court concluded that a detention charge does not necessarily lack any incentivizing effect because it is levied for a day on which a container cannot be returned to a marine terminal. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the Commission’s order, and remanded the matter to the agency for further proceedings. View "Evergreen Shipping Agency (America) Corp. v. Federal Maritime Commission" on Justia Law
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo
The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed two cases involving challenges to a rule promulgated by the National Marine Fisheries Service under the Magnuson-Stevens Act. The rule required certain fishing vessels to carry observers onboard to collect data necessary for fishery conservation and management, with the cost of these observers to be borne by the vessel owners. The petitioners, various fishing businesses, argued that the Act did not authorize the Fisheries Service to impose these costs on them.In the lower courts, the District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit and the First Circuit Court of Appeals both upheld the rule. They applied the Chevron framework, a two-step process used to interpret statutes administered by federal agencies. Under this framework, if a statute is ambiguous, courts defer to the agency's interpretation as long as it is reasonable. Both courts found that the Magnuson-Stevens Act was ambiguous on the issue of observer costs and deferred to the Fisheries Service's interpretation.The Supreme Court, however, overruled the Chevron doctrine, holding that it was inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The APA requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority. Courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous. The Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts and remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The Court emphasized that while courts may seek guidance from the interpretations of those responsible for implementing particular statutes, they must not defer to these interpretations. Instead, they must independently interpret the statute and ensure that the agency has acted within its statutory authority. View "Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo" on Justia Law
PSA V. PORT OF TACOMA
The case involves the Puget Soundkeeper Alliance (Soundkeeper), an environmental organization, and the Port of Tacoma and SSA Terminals, LLC (collectively, the Port), operators of the West Sitcum Terminal, a marine cargo terminal. The dispute centers on a portion of the terminal known as "the Wharf," where stormwater runoff carries pollutants into Puget Sound. The Soundkeeper alleges that the Port violated the Clean Water Act by not implementing stormwater controls across the entire facility, including the Wharf. The Port argues that the Wharf is not subject to regulation because it does not conduct industrial activities that require a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, which granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Port. The court concluded that the Industrial Stormwater General Permits (ISGPs) issued by the Washington State Department of Ecology did not extend coverage to the Wharf, as the Wharf did not conduct the industrial activities specified in the permits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the plain text of the 2010 and 2015 ISGPs required a transportation facility conducting industrial activities to implement stormwater controls across the entire facility. Therefore, the Port needed to implement appropriate stormwater controls across the Terminal while the 2010 and 2015 ISGPs were in effect. The court also held that the ISGPs were enforceable in a citizen suit, even if they exceeded the requirements of the federal regulations.However, the court vacated the district court's decision regarding the 2020 ISGP, which was subject to an ongoing state-court challenge, and remanded the case for further consideration. The court instructed the district court to consider the effect of the state proceedings on this case. View "PSA V. PORT OF TACOMA" on Justia Law
Melone v. Coit
The case involves a dispute over the construction of an offshore wind project aimed at reducing reliance on fossil fuels. The project, proposed by Vineyard Wind 1, LLC, was expected to provide energy sufficient to power 400,000 Massachusetts homes. However, residents of Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket opposed the project, arguing that federal agencies failed to properly assess the potential impact of the project on the endangered North Atlantic right whale.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts had granted summary judgment in favor of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and Vineyard Wind, rejecting the residents' challenge to a biological opinion issued by the NMFS and relied on by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management in permitting the construction of the wind power project.In the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the residents challenged the lower court's decision, arguing that the NMFS's determination that the incidental harassment of up to twenty right whales constituted a "small number" under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) was arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful. They also argued that NMFS's consideration of the "specified activity" and the "specific geographic region" within which that activity would occur for purposes of issuing the Incidental Harassment Authorization (IHA) to Vineyard Wind was impermissibly narrow in scope.The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that the NMFS's determination was not arbitrary or capricious and that it had properly delineated the "specific geographic region" for the purposes of the IHA. The court also found that the residents' concerns about the broader effect of the project on the right whale population were unwarranted, as the agency had considered the impact on the entire right whale population in its "negligible impact" analysis, its biological opinion, and in its participation in the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management's Environmental Impact Statement. View "Melone v. Coit" on Justia Law
Diamond Services v. Maritime
The case revolves around a dispute over the eligibility of a dredging barge, the DB AVALON, to operate in U.S. waters. Federal law stipulates that only vessels "built in the United States" can dredge in U.S. waters, a determination made by the U.S. Coast Guard. Curtin Maritime Corporation sought the Coast Guard's ruling that the AVALON, which incorporated foreign-made spuds and a crane, could operate in U.S. waters. The Coast Guard ruled that the AVALON would be considered U.S.-built. Diamond Services Corporation, a competitor of Curtin, challenged this ruling as arbitrary and capricious.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court deferred to the Coast Guard's interpretation of its own regulations and granted the Coast Guard summary judgment. Diamond Services Corporation appealed this decision.The case was then reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that the Coast Guard's interpretation of its own regulations was reasonable. The court found that the regulations were genuinely ambiguous as to whether the crane was part of the AVALON’s superstructure. The court also found that the Coast Guard's interpretation fell within the regulatory zone of ambiguity and was reasonable. The court concluded that the Coast Guard's ruling was made by the agency, implicated the agency’s substantive expertise, and reflected fair and considered judgment. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment for the Federal Defendants. View "Diamond Services v. Maritime" on Justia Law
American Cruise Lines v. United States of America
The case involves a dispute over the legality of an agreement between River 1, LLC, an American company, and Viking USA LLC, a subsidiary of a Swiss company, under federal maritime law. The United States Maritime Administration (MARAD) had confirmed the legality of the agreement as a "time charter" under 46 U.S.C. § 56101(a)(i). However, American Cruise Lines argued that the agreement should be construed as a "bareboat" charter which is not covered under the standing blanket approval of MARAD, and thus, grants a foreign company impermissible control of an American vessel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed MARAD's decision. It found that the agreement didn't grant Viking exclusive possession and control of the cruise ship in a way that blackletter maritime law recognizes as sufficient to create a bareboat charter. It noted that the ship's crew was provided by River 1, the vessel master was overseen by River 1, and River 1 bore primary responsibility for the ship’s day-to-day maintenance and care. Viking's ability to set the itinerary was consistent with the maritime law definition of a time charter.The court also rejected American Cruise Lines' allegations that MARAD failed to follow the notice and comment provisions applicable to this case. It concluded that MARAD fully complied with the new procedural requirements imposed by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2021. View "American Cruise Lines v. United States of America" on Justia Law
A.P. Bell Fish Company, Inc. v. Raimondo
In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit examined a dispute over Final Amendment 53 to the Fishery Management Plan for the Reef Fish Resources of the Gulf of Mexico. Commercial fishers challenged the amendment, which modified the allocation of red grouper between commercial and recreational sectors, for relying on inconsistent economic analyses and failing to comply with the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act.The commercial fishers argued that the Final Amendment 53 arbitrarily relied on an economic analysis that the Fisheries Service had previously rejected and that it lacked the required catch limits and accountability measures. They also claimed that the amendment violated National Standards 4 and 9 of the Act.The court agreed with the commercial fishers in part, affirming that the Fisheries Service had failed to adequately explain its reliance on the disputed economic analysis and that further analysis was needed to determine how this influenced the application of National Standards 4 and 9. However, it also affirmed that Final Amendment 53 complied with the Act's requirement to establish a mechanism for specifying annual catch limits.As a result, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the grant of summary judgment to the Secretary of Commerce. It remanded the case, without vacating the Final Rule implementing Final Amendment 53, so the Fisheries Service could further explain its economic methodology and the implications for National Standards 4 and 9. View "A.P. Bell Fish Company, Inc. v. Raimondo" on Justia Law
Avena v. Avena
This case involves a lawsuit against the United States for allegations of negligence in a search-and-rescue mission by the U.S. Coast Guard. The plaintiffs, the estate of Aaron Greenberg (who drowned in a boating accident), Adrian Avena (who survived the accident), and AA Commercial, LLC, claimed that the Coast Guard was negligent in its response to the distress signal from their capsized vessel. They argued that the Coast Guard broadcasted incorrect information about the vessel in distress and did not deploy the closest helicopter for the rescue mission.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the case, stating that the United States was immune from such a suit. According to the court, the plaintiffs failed to show how the Coast Guard's alleged negligence "increased the risk of physical harm" to Greenberg. The court noted that under the "Good Samaritan" doctrine, the Coast Guard would only be liable if its actions increased the risk of harm or if harm was suffered because of the plaintiffs' reliance on the Coast Guard. In this case, the court found that even if the Coast Guard had done nothing, the outcome would have been the same, thus the Coast Guard did not increase the risk of harm to Greenberg.Furthermore, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend their complaint, stating it would be futile as they had not identified any set of facts that could demonstrate how the Coast Guard's actions increased the risk of physical harm to Greenberg. View "Avena v. Avena" on Justia Law
USA v. Abbott, No. 23-50632 (5th Cir. 2023)
In 2023, the State of Texas, under the direction of Governor Greg Abbott, installed a floating barrier in the Rio Grande near Eagle Pass, Texas. The United States government filed a civil enforcement action against Texas, alleging that the installation of the barrier violated the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 (“RHA”). The United States sought a preliminary injunction, which was granted by the district court, ordering Texas to cease work on the barrier and to relocate it to the Texas riverbank. Texas appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Court of Appeals found that the United States demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its RHA claims. The court determined that the part of the Rio Grande where the barrier was installed was a navigable waterway and that the barrier constituted an obstruction to this waterway. The court also found that the barrier was a structure as defined by the RHA and that it had been constructed without necessary authorization.In addition, the court found that the United States had demonstrated that it was likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief. The court noted that the barrier strained diplomatic relations with Mexico, interfered with the ability of the International Boundary and Water Commission to implement the provisions of a treaty concerning the allocation of waters in the Rio Grande, and posed a risk to human life.The court also held that the balance of equities favored the United States and that the issuance of a preliminary injunction was in the public interest. Specifically, the court noted that the barrier threatened navigation and federal government operations on the Rio Grande, and also posed a potential threat to human life.Taking all of these factors into account, the court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction ordering Texas to cease work on the barrier and to relocate it. View "USA v. Abbott, No. 23-50632 (5th Cir. 2023)" on Justia Law