Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Several businesses involved in the cultivation, distribution, and sale of hemp products in Wyoming and elsewhere challenged a Wyoming statute, Senate Enrolled Act 24 (SEA 24), which significantly altered the state’s regulation of hemp. SEA 24 narrowed the definition of hemp to exclude synthetic substances and expanded the definition of THC to include both delta-9 and delta-8 THC, requiring that the combined concentration not exceed 0.3%. The law also added both naturally occurring and synthetic delta-8 THC to Wyoming’s Schedule I controlled substances, making it unlawful to manufacture, deliver, or possess hemp products exceeding the new THC limits or containing synthetic substances, even if such products are legal under federal law.After SEA 24 was enacted, the plaintiffs filed a preenforcement action in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They argued that SEA 24 was preempted by the federal 2018 Farm Bill, violated the Dormant Commerce Clause, constituted an unconstitutional regulatory taking, and was void for vagueness. The plaintiffs also sought a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to prevent the law from taking effect. The district court denied the motion for preliminary relief and subsequently dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that most defendants were protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity and that the remaining claims lacked legal merit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked a substantial federal right to support their preemption claim, failed to demonstrate a Dormant Commerce Clause violation, did not establish a regulatory taking of their commercial personal property, and did not show that SEA 24 was unconstitutionally vague. The court also dismissed the appeal of the denial of preliminary relief as moot due to the dismissal of the complaint. View "Green Room v. State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

A group of out-of-state pig farmers and a pork processor challenged a Massachusetts law that prohibits the use of certain confinement methods for breeding pigs (specifically, gestation crates) and bans the sale in Massachusetts of pork products derived from pigs confined in such a manner. The plaintiffs, who operate outside Massachusetts and use these confinement methods, argued that the law discriminates against out-of-state producers and is preempted by federal statutes. The law was enacted by ballot initiative and became enforceable after the Supreme Court’s decision in National Pork Producers Council v. Ross.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed most of the plaintiffs’ claims, including those based on the Privileges and Immunities Clause, preemption by the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) and the Packers and Stockyards Act (PSA), the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Import-Export Clause. The court allowed the dormant Commerce Clause claim to proceed, but ultimately granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs on that claim as well, after severing a provision of the law that it found discriminatory (the “slaughterhouse exemption”). The court found that the remaining provisions of the law did not discriminate against out-of-state interests and did not impose a substantial burden on interstate commerce.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The First Circuit held that the Massachusetts law does not discriminate against out-of-state producers in purpose or effect, does not impose a substantial burden on interstate commerce under the Pike balancing test, and is not preempted by the FMIA or PSA. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ claims under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Full Faith and Credit Clause, Due Process Clause, and Import-Export Clause. The court found no procedural error in the district court’s handling of the case. View "Triumph Foods, LLC v. Campbell" on Justia Law

A Puerto Rico-based poultry importer, Northwestern Selecta, Inc. (NWS), challenged a regulation by the Puerto Rico Department of Agriculture (PRDA) requiring a PRDA inspector to be present when shipping containers of poultry meat are opened and unloaded. NWS argued that this requirement is preempted by the federal Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA), which regulates the inspection and distribution of poultry products. The PPIA includes a preemption clause that prohibits states from imposing additional or different requirements on official establishments beyond those established by the PPIA.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico agreed with NWS, finding that the PRDA's inspector requirement falls within the scope of the PPIA's preemption clause and is not exempted by the PPIA's savings clause. The district court granted declaratory relief to NWS and permanently enjoined the enforcement of the PRDA's regulation against NWS. The PRDA appealed the decision, arguing that the district court misinterpreted the scope of the PPIA's preemption clause and the application of the savings clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the PPIA's preemption clause broadly covers state regulations related to the operations of official establishments, which includes the opening and unloading of shipping containers at NWS's facility. The court found that the PRDA's inspector requirement directly impacts NWS's operations and is therefore preempted by the PPIA. Additionally, the court determined that the savings clause does not exempt the PRDA's regulation from preemption because it does not apply to poultry products outside of NWS's facility. Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding the permanent injunction against the enforcement of the PRDA's regulation. View "Northwestern Selecta, Inc. v. Gonzalez-Beiro" on Justia Law

Marjorie Johnson, the owner of farmland, was denied a permit by the Village of Polk to drill a new well for irrigating her farmland. She sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance requiring a permit for new wells in the village’s wellhead protection area was invalid, arguing it was preempted by the Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act (NGWMPA) and violated state law by interfering with her existing farming operations.The district court for Polk County denied her request for declaratory judgment and her petition in error. The court found that the ordinance was not preempted by the NGWMPA, as the Legislature intended for both local natural resources districts (NRDs) and municipalities to have control over water sources. The court also found that the ordinance did not interfere with Johnson’s existing farming operations, as the land was previously irrigated through an agreement with a neighbor, and it was the dispute with the neighbor, not the ordinance, that resulted in the land being dryland.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the ordinance was enacted under the necessary statutory grant of power to the municipality, as the Wellhead Protection Area Act and other statutes granted villages the authority to adopt controls to protect public water supplies. The court also found no field or conflict preemption by the NGWMPA, as the Legislature did not intend to deprive municipalities of their statutory authority to require permits for wells within wellhead protection areas. Finally, the court agreed that the ordinance did not interfere with Johnson’s existing farming operations, as the existing farming at the time of the permit request was dryland farming, and it was the neighbor’s actions, not the ordinance, that prevented irrigation. View "Johnson v. Village of Polk" on Justia Law

Petitioners, including various agricultural and trade organizations, challenged the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) over a rule that set an equation for calculating vehicle fuel economy, specifically the "Ra factor." They argued that the Ra factor was set arbitrarily low, which effectively increased federal fuel economy standards and decreased demand for gasoline, harming their businesses.The case was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The petitioners contended that the EPA's rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by ignoring significant comments and data that flagged flaws in the determination of the Ra factor. They pointed out that the EPA's test program used too few and outdated vehicles, included data from a malfunctioning vehicle, and excluded data from a properly functioning one. Additionally, they argued that the EPA failed to consider alternative data sources, such as manufacturer certification data, which showed a higher Ra factor.The Fifth Circuit found that the EPA's rule was arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that the EPA did not adequately respond to significant comments that raised substantial issues with the test program's sample size, the representativeness of the vehicles tested, and the inclusion and exclusion of certain test data. The court also found that the EPA failed to justify its rejection of alternative data sources. As a result, the court held that the EPA did not demonstrate that its decision was the product of reasoned decision-making.The court granted the petition for review and vacated the portion of the EPA's rule that set and implemented the Ra factor of 0.81. The court concluded that there was no serious possibility that the EPA could substantiate its decision on remand, and thus, vacatur was the appropriate remedy. View "Texas Corn Producers v. EPA" on Justia Law

Bryan and Ami Hauxwell, farmers using ground and surface water for irrigation, submitted a request to pool ground water from several registered wells for the 2023-2027 allocation period. The Middle Republican Natural Resources District (NRD) denied their application, citing a rule that allows denial for any reason, including rule violations. The denial was communicated through a letter and a marked application. The Hauxwells challenged this denial, alleging it violated their constitutional rights and was arbitrary and capricious.The Hauxwells filed a petition for review with the district court for Frontier County, Nebraska, under the Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act (NGWMPA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). They argued that the denial was contrary to a court order staying penalties previously imposed by the NRD. The NRD moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the letter was not a final agency action or an order in a contested case, and thus not subject to judicial review under the APA. The district court dismissed the petition, finding that the letter did not arise from a contested case and was not a final order of the decision-making body.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the letter denying the Hauxwells' pooling application was not an "order" as defined under the NGWMPA. The court explained that the term "order" in the NGWMPA includes orders required by the act, a rule or regulation, or a decision adopted by the board of directors of a natural resources district. However, the letter in question did not meet these criteria, as it was not issued as part of any case or proceeding and was not required by any specific authority. Consequently, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. View "Hauxwell v. Middle Republican NRD" on Justia Law

Bryan and Ami Hauxwell, farmers using ground and surface water for irrigation, were involved in a dispute with the Middle Republican Natural Resources District (NRD) over alleged violations of the NRD’s rules and regulations. The NRD claimed the Hauxwells used ground water to irrigate uncertified acres, failed to install flowmeters, and used non-compliant flowmeters. The NRD issued a cease-and-desist order and penalties after a 2020 hearing, where the NRD’s general manager and counsel participated in the board’s deliberations.The Hauxwells challenged the 2020 findings in the district court for Frontier County, which ruled in their favor, citing due process violations and remanded the case. In 2021, the NRD issued a new complaint and held another hearing, excluding the general manager and counsel from deliberations. The board again found violations but deferred penalties to a later hearing. The district court dismissed the Hauxwells' challenge to the 2021 findings, stating it was not a final order as penalties were not yet determined.In 2022, the NRD held a hearing to determine penalties, resulting in restrictions on the Hauxwells' water use. The Hauxwells filed another petition for review, arguing that the 2020 due process violations tainted the subsequent hearings. The district court agreed, reversing the NRD’s 2022 findings and vacating the penalties.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in concluding that the 2020 due process violations tainted the 2021 and 2022 hearings. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case with directions to address the other claims in the Hauxwells' petition for review. The court emphasized that the NRD’s actions in 2021 and 2022 were separate and not influenced by the 2020 hearing’s procedural issues. View "Hauxwell v. Middle Republican NRD" on Justia Law

Petitioners Jason Fabrizius and Fabrizius Livestock LLC sought review of a USDA Judicial Officer's order that denied their appeal of two USDA ALJ orders. The ALJ found Fabrizius Livestock responsible for ensuring animals transported interstate had required documentation and issued a $210,000 fine against the company. Fabrizius Livestock, a Colorado corporation dealing in horses, often sold horses intended for slaughter and kept them in conditions that made them vulnerable to disease. The company sold horses across state lines without the necessary documentation, including ICVIs and EIA test results.The ALJ found Fabrizius liable for violations of the CTESA and AHPA regulations, including transporting horses without owner/shipper certificates and selling horses without ICVIs. The ALJ imposed a $210,000 fine, which included penalties for each violation. Fabrizius appealed to a USDA Judicial Officer, arguing that the regulation was unconstitutionally vague, they were not among the "persons responsible," they lacked adequate notice, the fine was arbitrary and capricious, and the fine was excessive under the Eighth Amendment. The Judicial Officer rejected these arguments and affirmed the ALJ's orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the regulation was not unconstitutionally vague and provided adequate notice. The court found that the term "persons responsible" reasonably included sellers like Fabrizius. The court also held that the $200,000 fine for the AHPA violations was not arbitrary or capricious, as the Judicial Officer had considered all relevant factors. Finally, the court found that the fine was not excessive under the Eighth Amendment, given the gravity of the violations and the potential harm to the equine industry. The court denied the petition for review. View "Fabrizius v. United States Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

The case involves the Michigan Farm Bureau and other agricultural entities challenging new conditions imposed by the Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy (EGLE) in a 2020 general permit for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs). The new conditions included stricter limits on phosphorus application, setback requirements, and a presumptive ban on waste application during certain months. The plaintiffs argued that these conditions exceeded EGLE’s statutory authority, were contrary to state and federal law, lacked factual justification, were arbitrary and capricious, unconstitutional, and invalid due to procedural failures under the Michigan Administrative Procedures Act (APA).Initially, the plaintiffs sought a contested-case hearing to challenge the permit but then filed for declaratory judgment in the Court of Claims. EGLE moved for summary disposition, arguing that the plaintiffs had not exhausted administrative remedies. The Court of Claims agreed, dismissing the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision but held that the plaintiffs could seek a declaratory judgment under MCL 24.264, provided they first requested a declaratory ruling from EGLE, which they had not done.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the 2020 general permit and its discretionary conditions were not "rules" under the APA because EGLE lacked the statutory authority to issue rules related to NPDES permits for CAFOs. Consequently, the Court of Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under MCL 24.264. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals but vacated its holding that the discretionary conditions were rules. The Court emphasized that EGLE must genuinely evaluate the necessity of discretionary conditions in individual cases and that these conditions do not have the force and effect of law. View "Michigan Farm Bureau v. Dept. Of Environment Great Lakes And Energy" on Justia Law

The case involves M&T Farms, a California general partnership between two farmers, who purchased crop insurance under the Whole-Farm Revenue Protection Pilot Policy (the “WFRP Policy”) from Producers Agriculture Insurance Company (“ProAg”), an insurer approved and reinsured by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC). M&T Farms and a third farmer sell farm commodities through a storefront, B&T Farms, which owns their business name and goodwill and is also a California general partnership. M&T Farms filed a claim seeking the full policy amount, which ProAg denied. The FCIC concluded that the WFRP Policy does not allow a partner who files taxes on a fractional share of farming activity conducted by a partnership to be eligible for WFRP coverage for the fractional share of that farming activity.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the FCIC. M&T Farms challenged the FCIC’s decision that a partnership “holding the business name and good will of [others] (i.e., marketing and selling the commodities produced)” is engaged in “farming activity” under section 3(a)(4) of the WFRP Policy, and that therefore, any entity reporting a fractional share of the partnership’s activity on its tax returns is ineligible for WFRP Policy coverage.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the WFRP Policy contained an ambiguity regarding the definition of “farming activity.” The FCIC’s conclusion that a partnership selling its partners’ products and holding their goodwill and business name was engaged in “farming activity” under section 3(a)(4) of the policy had a reasonable basis and was also reasonable as a matter of policy. Because the FCIC’s interpretation of “farming activity” in the WFRP Policy was reasonable, it survived APA arbitrary and capricious review. The court also held that the term “farming activity” in the WFRP policy was genuinely ambiguous, the FCIC’s conclusion had a reasonable basis, and the FCIC’s conclusion was entitled to controlling weight. View "M & T FARMS V. FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE CORPORATION" on Justia Law