Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Ernest Hemingway Home and Museum appealed the district court's post-trial order denying it declaratory and injunctive relief. The Museum challenged the jurisdiction of the USDA to regulate the Museum as an animal exhibitor under the Animal Welfare Act (AWA), 7 U.S.C. 2131 et seq. The court concluded that the Museum's exhibition of the Hemingway cats (descendants of Hemingway's polydactyl cat, Dexter), which roamed freely on the Museum's grounds, substantially affected interstate commerce where the Museum invited and received thousands of admission paying visitors from beyond Florida, many of whom were drawn by the Museum's reputation for and purposeful marketing of the Hemingway cats and where the exhibition of the Hemingway cats was integral to the Museum's commercial purpose. Therefore, Congress had the power to regulate the Museum and the exhibition of the Hemingway cats via the AWA. View "907 Whitehead Street, Inc. v. Secretary of the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, et al" on Justia Law

Dawson Farms challenged the RMA's denial of its crop-insurance claim alleging loss due to "tuber rot" in stored potatoes. A final agency review affirmed the RMA's denial of Dawson Farms' claim, finding that the insurance adjuster's sampling of the stored potatoes followed adequate sample procedures. Dawson Farms appealed the final agency decision to the district court, which affirmed. The court believed that, in light of the nature of the hearing officer's finding under review, the deputy director's statements made it reasonably discernable that the deputy director applied the correct legal standard and considered the record for the proper purpose of reviewing the hearing officer's decision for substantial evidence. The hearing officer based his conclusion largely on the testimony of an expert in potato pathology. The court also believed that, to the extent the deputy director's determination was a rejection of the hearing officer's finding that the adjuster had a duty to resample, the issue under review was a question of law. Consequently, the court found no abuse of discretion or arbitrary and capricious action by the deputy director. Further, the agency determination was supported by substantial evidence. View "Dawson Farms v. Risk Management Agency" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, cattle producers, appealed the district court's dismissal of their Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), complaint, alleging that a government employee negligently caused illness and death within their cattle herd by mandating a toxic plant mixture on pasture land enrolled in a conservation program. The district court held that the allegations of negligence involved the employee's exercise of protected discretion and therefore fell within the discretionary function exception to the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity. The court held that the employee's selection of a seeding plan was discretionary but that it was not the type of discretionary action Congress intended to shield from suit. View "Herden, et al. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1978, Hages acquired a ranch in Nevada occupying approximately 7,000 acres of private land and approximately 752,000 acres of federal lands under grazing permits. Their predecessors had acquired water rights now located on federal lands, 43 U.S.C. 661. Hages had disputes with the government concerning release of non-indigenous elk onto federal land for which Hages had grazing permits, unauthorized grazing by Hages’ cattle, and fence and ditch maintenance. After a series of incidents, in 1991, Hages filed suit alleging takings under 43 U.S.C. 1752(g), and breach of contract. After almost 20 years, the Claims Court awarded compensation for regulatory taking of water rights; physical taking of water rights; and range improvements. The court awarded pre-judgment interest for the takings, but not for the range improvements. The Federal Circuit vacated in part. The regulatory takings claim and 43 U.S.C. 1752 claim are not ripe. To the extent the claim for physical taking relies on fences constructed 1981-1982, it is untimely. To the extent the physical takings claim relies on fences constructed 1988-1990, there is no evidence that water was taken that Hages could have put to beneficial use. Hages are not entitled to pre-judgment interest for range improvements because Hages failed to identify a cognizable property interest.

The National Chicken Council, National Meat Association, and National Turkey Federation petitioned for review of EPA's interpretation of a provision in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. The EPA interpreted the provision to mean that certain ethanol plants fired with natural gas and/or biomass were deemed to be in compliance with a reduction requirement indefinitely rather than for a certain period. Petitioners argued that by permitting qualifying ethanol plants to generate Renewable Identification Numberss indefinitely without having to ensure their ethanol met the emissions-reduction requirement, the ethanol plants would produce more ethanol, which would lead to an increase in the demand for corn, which would lead to an increase in the price of corn. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's petition for review for lack of standing, as Petitioners failed to show that a favorable ruling would redress their claimed injuries.

This case stemmed from FNS's permanent denial of an application from J&K to participate in the government's food stamp program, SNAP. The court held that the imposition of permanent ineligibility to participate in SNAP, as oppose to assessing a monetary penalty, was not arbitrary and capricious where J&K's ineligibility to participate in SNAP was based on its owner's involvement in a prior food stamp trafficking violation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiffs, owners of two dairy operations, appealed the dismissal of their constitutional challenges to two provisions of the Milk Regulatory Equity Act of 2005 (MREA), 7 U.S.C. 608c. Plaintiffs alleged that the provisions, which subjected certain large producer-handlers of milk to contribution requirements applicable to all milk handlers, constituted a bill of attainder and violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Because the court found that the MREA did not apply with specificity to affected persons, the court need not address whether it satisfied either of the remaining elements of a bill of attainder. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claim. In regards to plaintiffs' remaining arguments, the court held that mere disparity of treatment was not sufficient to state an equal protection violation. The court also found that the government provided an explanation that was not only rational on its face but also had been consistently recognized by the courts as legitimate. Further, plaintiffs failed to plead the threshold requirement of a due process claim: that the government had interfered with a cognizable liberty or property interest. Finally, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow plaintiffs to file a supplemental complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

A client complained to the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyard Administration about the broker purchasing his own stock for customers. Following a remand, the USDA imposed a 16-month suspension on his registration under the Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. 181-229. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The judicial officer adequately considered the nature of the violations in relation to the remedial purposes of the PSA. The suspension was not too harsh, given the circumstances of the violation.

Plaintiffs, 134 farmers whose crops suffered as a result of the federal Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) use of the herbicide Oust, sued the federal government and Oust's manufacturer (DuPont). Both the jury and the district court allocated 60% of the fault to DuPont and 40% to the federal government. Both the government and DuPont appealed: the court resolved the government's appeal in this opinion and DuPont's appeal in a memorandum disposition filed simultaneously with this opinion. The court held that it lacked subject mater jurisdiction over plaintiffs' Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2402, claims because plaintiffs filed their lawsuit one day after the FTCA's statute of limitations had run. Therefore, the court held that the district court erred by not dismissing the claims against the federal government.

Plaintiffs, California grape growers who purchased grapevines covered by the USDA's patents, brought this action to challenge the validity and enforceability of the USDA's patents on three varieties of grapes, as well as the conduct of the California Table Grape Commission (Commission) and the USDA in licensing and enforcing the patents. The court held that the district court correctly held that the USDA was a necessary party to plaintiffs' declaratory judgement claims based on the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. 1 et seq. The court also held that the waiver of sovereign immunity in section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., was broad enough to allow plaintiffs to pursue equitable relief against the USDA on its patent law claims. The court further held that plaintiffs' claims were sufficient to overcome any presumption of regularity that could apply to a certain USDA employee who was one of the co-inventors of each of the three varieties of grapes. The court finally held that because plaintiffs failed to point to anything other than the issuance of a patent for the Sweet Scarlet grapes that would provide a plausible basis for finding that Sweet Scarlet grapes form a relevant antitrust market, the court upheld the district court's decision dismissing plaintiffs' antitrust claim.