Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

First Union National Bank of Florida (First Union) appealed a judgment in favor of the Lee County Commission (Commission) and Philip Summers. Mr. Summers executed a mortgage on property he owned within the County on which he built a summer home. The home was ultimately subject to a tax sale by the County. The trustee for Mid-State Trust IV sued the Commission and Mr. Summers in 2009 seeking the excess redemption proceeds from the tax sale of the Summers property. The trustee later filed a motion to substitute First Union as the real party in interest. The trial court eventually entered a judgment finding that Mr. Summers was entitled to the excess funds from the tax sale because he was the last "owner" as defined by state law against whom the taxes were assessed. Upon careful consideration of the trial courtâs record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision.

The Town of Boligee appealed a circuit court judgment that denied it a declaration that certain acts by the Greene County Water & Sewer Authority (the Authority) were not properly authorized. In 2008, the Town brought suit complaining that the Authority's excavation, tree cutting and installation of water pipelines in Boligee's right-of-way were unlawful because the Authority did not obtain the town's permission first. The Town also sought tort damages to recover for all of the allegedly unauthorized excavation work. In 2003, the Town Council and the Authority had discussed building the pipeline, but ultimately voted against it. However, the Mayor signed a written agreement permitting the Authority to start construction. The trial court ruled that the Mayor had the authority to bind Boligee to the agreement, and dismissed its tort claims. Upon review of the trial record, the Supreme Court found that although the Mayor is authorized to enter into and execute the type of contract at issue in this case, the Mayor was only allowed to do so to the extent directed by the Town council. The Court found the Mayor acted without authorization, and accordingly reversed the trial court's judgment. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Grandparents, E.R.G and D.W.G., challenged the constitutionality of the state Grandparent Visitation Act. The Grandparents and E.H.G. and C.L.G (the Parents) had a very close relationship. The failure of a business shared by the father and the grandfather caused financial difficulties for both families, and eventually the relationships between all involved disintegrated. Desirous to maintain relationships with their grandchildren, the Grandparents petitioned the circuit court for visitation under the Act. The Parents argued in their response to the Grandparents' petition that the Act was unconstitutional on both its face and as it applied to them. Upon careful consideration of the briefs submitted by the parties and the applicable legal standards, the Supreme Court held the Act was unconstitutional. "Because the Act authorizes a court to award visitation to a grandparent whenever doing so is 'in the best interests of the minor child,'" the Act could potentially override a parent's decision to deny the grandparent visitation without regard for the fundamental right of a fit parent to direct the upbringing for of his or her child.

The Greens at Auburn, The Greens at Auburn Land Development and the Loachapoka Water Authority (LWA) all appealed a partial summary judgment in favor of the Water Works Board of the City of Auburn (AWWB). As Auburn grew westward and southward, the city limits expanded to include certain portions of the territory to which LWA is authorized to provide service. Several disputes have arisen between AWWB and LWA concerning which entity will provide service in their overlapping areas. In 2009, AWWB filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that it could provide water services to several discrete locations within the disputed areas. The Greens companies petitioned to intervene in the suit because they held interests in the disputed areas. In June 2010, the trial court entered a partial summary judgment in favor of AWWB on a majority of claims asserted in its complaint, including to those claims pertaining to The Greens at Auburn. In the same order, the court dismissed an LWA counterclaim, and certified the partial summary judgment as final. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found that the trial court exceeded its discretion by certifying the partial summary judgment as final. The Court set the certification aside and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs Leroy Bandy and David Russell appealed a circuit court judgment in favor of the City of Birmingham. In 2009, Plaintiffs challenged the results of the City Council and Board of Education elections on the basis that a change in a local ordinance governing the election was unconstitutional. Plaintiffs argued that only the legislature could make changes to the local laws pertaining to elections. Plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent the swearing in of the newly elected council members. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the City had the authority to change its election procedure by ordinance rather than through the state legislature. Upon careful consideration of the briefs submitted and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the trial court properly entered its judgment in favor of the City. The Court affirmed the trial courtâs decision.

In 1993, Defendant James Knight was convicted on theft and burglary charges. He was sentenced under the state Habitual Felony Offender Act (HFOA) to life in prison for theft and to fifteen years for burglary, both sentences served concurrently. In 2000, the legislature amended the HFOA to make certain sentences less severe. In 2009, Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of his life sentence under the new HFOA. The judge who sentenced Defendant had since left office. Another judge was assigned pursuant to a standing administrative order that was entered in 2007. Without requiring an answer from the State, the court summarily dismissed Defendantâs motion. Defendant appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals contending, among other things, that the judge was not the "sentencing judge" and that the administrative order did not appoint the judge to decide his motion as required by law. The appellate court was not persuaded by Defendantâs argument and affirmed the lower courtâs decision. The issue for review by the Supreme Court was whether the administrative order gave the judge who decided Defendantâs reconsideration motion authority over his case. Upon review of the administrative order, the Court found that the order does not select the judge for any given case. The order provided that motions for reconsideration would be assigned to the judge holding the sentencing judgeâs seat. The circuit clerk did not assign a judge to hear Defendantâs motion. Therefore, the judge that dismissed Defendantâs motion acted without authority. The Court reversed the lower courtâs decision and remanded the case for further consideration.