Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Wayne Morrow filed a permissive appeal to the Circuit Court's order denying his request for a judgment declaring that the $100,000 cap on damages in section 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, applied to Morrow, a municipal employee who was sued in his individual capacity. In 2009, Alice Yu sought to have Alabama Power Company restore electrical service in her name at a commercial building she was leasing. The premises had been without power for approximately eight months. The City of Montgomery sent Morrow to perform an electrical inspection of the premises and clear the premises for service before electrical service was restored. Keandarick Russell, a minor, was staying with his great-grandmother, who lived next door to the premises. Russell was playing on the concrete pad on which the air-conditioning system was located and was electrocuted when he came in contact with a chain-link fence adjacent to the premises. When the incident occurred, wires from an uncovered junction box at the electrical source had come in contact with a portion of the fence, and, as a result, the fence had become electrified. Russell was electrocuted when he touched the fence. Shameka Caldwell, as Russell's mother and next friend, filed a wrongful-death action against multiple defendants, including Morrow and Yu for two fictitiously named defendants. In the amended complaint, Caldwell alleged that Morrow had negligently, recklessly, and/or wantonly inspected the premises and had negligently, recklessly, and/or wantonly allowed electrical service to be restored to the premises. In his answer, Morrow asserted that he was entitled to State immunity, to State-agent immunity, and to qualified immunity. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the plain language of 11-47-190 did not limit the recovery on a claim against a municipal employee in his or her individual capacity, the $100,000 statutory cap on recovery would not apply to Caldwell's claims against Morrow. Therefore, the trial court properly denied Morrow's request for a judgment declaring that it would. View "Morrow v. Caldwell" on Justia Law

Daniel Senior Living of Inverness I, LLC, d/b/a Danberry at Inverness successfully appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals a circuit court decision to affirm the issuance by the State Health Planning and Development Agency ("SHPDA") a certificate of need (CON) to STV One Nineteen Senior Living, LLC, d/b/a Somerby at St. Vincent's One Nineteen on an "emergency" basis. The Supreme Court granted Somerby's petition for review of the Court of Appeals, and finding no reversible error, affirmed that court's decision. View "Daniel Senior Living of Inverness I, LLC v. STV One Nineteen Senior Living, LLC" on Justia Law

Calvin Kendrick and K & D Automotive, Inc. sued the City of Montgomery, the City's employees Eddie Hill, Jr., Nathaniel Bracy, and Scott Adams, Tony's Automotive, L.L.C. and Tony's Automotive's owner Tony D. Brooks and manager Ellen F. Brooks asserting various due-process claims after, on two occasions, the City declared vehicles parked at K&D Automotive to be public nuisances under the City nuisance ordinance and authorized Tony's Automotive to abate the nuisances by removing the vehicles from the premises. The trial court thereafter entered a summary judgment in favor of the City defendants and the Tony's Automotive defendants on those claims; however, Kendrick and K&D have established on appeal that a judgment as a matter of law was not warranted on counts 5, 7, 8, 9, and 11 of their amended complaint. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment as to those counts. Kendrick and K&D did not establish, however, that the trial court erred by entering a summary judgment in favor of the defendants on count 10, and that judgment was accordingly affirmed. View "K & D Automotive, Inc. v. The City of Montgomery" on Justia Law

Inmate Victor Russo appealed a circuit court's dismissal of his action against the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC). He challenged ADOC's implementation of a policy to charge a processing fee for money orders and cashier's checks deposited into an inmate's "prisoner money on deposit" account. The Supreme Court noted multiple fatal errors in Russo's pleadings, the sum of which was that Russo named ADOC as his sole adverse party, and that complaint "purported to effect an action against the State." As such, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear his case. The Supreme Court dismissed Russo's appeal. View "Russo v. Alabama Department of Corrections " on Justia Law

The Alabama Educational Television Commission petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to dismiss claims brought against them by Allan Pizzato and Pauline Howland and to strike Pizzato and Howland's second amended complaint. From 2000 until June 2012, Pizzato served as the executive director of Alabama Public Television ("APT") and Howland served as the deputy director and chief financial officer of APT. Sometime before June 2012, tension arose between Pizzato and the Commissioners. At its regular quarterly meeting in June 2012, the Commission voted to go into executive session to discuss Pizzato's "general reputation, character, and job performance." After the Commission returned to its regular meeting from the executive session, the Commissioners moved to terminate Pizzato's and Howland's employment, stating that "the Commission had decided to move APT in a new direction." Thereafter, Pizzato requested certain materials from the Commission pursuant to the Open Records Act. A month later, Pizzato sued the Commission and the Commissioners in their individual and official capacities, alleging violations of the Open Meetings Act, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. The Commissioners moved the circuit court to dismiss Pizzato's claims against them, arguing that Pizzato did not have standing to bring an Open Meetings Act claim, that the Open Meetings Act did not provide for the recovery of compensatory or punitive damages, and that the complaint failed to state a claim under the Open Meetings Act. Further, the Commissioners argued that Pizzato's claim was moot because the requested documents had been produced and that the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the request for a declaratory judgment because the allegations supporting that count failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. After a hearing, the circuit court denied the Commission and the Commissioners' motions, including the motion for a permissive appeal under Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P. The Commission and the Commissioners then petitioned the Supreme Court for mandamus relief. After review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court concluded the court erred in its decisions denying the Commissioners' motions. Because Pizzato and Howland had not established standing to bring their action against the Commission and the Commissioners under the Open Meetings Act, the claims asserted in both the first amended and second amended complaints should have been dismissed. Therefore, the Court granted the petition for mandamus relief and issued the writ. View "Pizzato v. Alabama Educational Television Commission" on Justia Law

Shelby Land Partners, LLC and Alabaster Land Company, LLC each own a 50% undivided interest in a parcel of undeveloped real property located within the municipal limits of the City of Alabaster. At the request of Shelby Land, the property was initially zoned as a "community business district," permitting only commercial uses. In 2009, Shelby Land petitioned the City to rezone the land to permit multifamily residential use in order to pursue the development of a low-income apartment complex for senior citizens on the property. The Alabaster City Council denied Shelby Land's rezoning application. Shelby Land and Alabaster Land then brought this action to appeal the denial of the rezoning request. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Shelby Land and Alabaster Land and ordered the City and the City Council to rezone the land to permit multifamily residential development. The City and the members of the City Council, who were sued in their official capacities, appealed. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "The City of Alabaster v. Shelby Land Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

In order to meet the 300 inhabitants required for incorporation under section 11-41-1, the petitioners included 51 people actually living in Caritas Village along with 296 people who had declared that they have designated Caritas Village as their place of residence pursuant to 12-13-23, Ala. Code 1975. The probate court determined that: (1) the proposed municipality had a population of less than 300; (2) the population of the proposed municipality did not constitute a body of citizens whose residences were contiguous and formed a homogeneous community; (3) the application was not signed by at least 15 percent of the qualified electors residing within the municipality limits; (4) there were not 4 qualified electors residing on each quarter of a quarter section of the platted or unplatted lands; (5) the application did not contain an accurate plat of the land to be included within the proposed corporate limits; (6) the place of residence by street and number of those living within the proposed municipality was not included; and (7) the petition did not accurately state the name of the proposed municipality. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the probate court erred in its determination, and whether the declarations of residency were indeed sufficient under 11-41-1. After careful consideration of the probate court record, the Supreme Court concluded petitioners' declarations were not sufficient to meet the statute's requirements, and therefore affirmed the probate court's decision. View "In re The incorporation of Caritas Village" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Bessemer Water Service (BWS) and Lake Cyrus Development Company, Inc. (LCDC) over a contract referred to as the "1998 water agreement." In "Bessemer I," the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had exceeded its discretion in holding that the 1998 water agreement was a valid binding contract and in awarding LCDC $224,979.83 because the agreement was entered into violation of section 39-2-2 and was therefore void. On appeal, the Attorney General intervened and filed a complain seeking to recover payments BWS made to LCDC under the 1988 water agreement. The trial court ultimately entered a judgment in favor of the Attorney General (for the benefit of BWS). LCDC thereafter filed a postjudgment motion requesting the trial court alter, amend or vacate its judgment, or in the alternative, order a new trial. The trial court denied LCDC's motion; that denial was brought before the Supreme Court in this case. After review, the Supreme Court held the trial court's denial of LCDC's motion should have been reversed. The case was then remanded for further proceedings. View "Lake Cyrus Development Company, Inc. v. Bessemer Water Service " on Justia Law

In this case, employees sued their employer alleging breach of contract, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and bad faith and the application of the doctrine of estoppel arising out of the defendants' recoupment of early retirement benefits they claimed the employees were not entitled to under the employer's retirement Plan. The employer filed a counterclaim seeking immediate repayment from the employees of the benefits, interest, and attorney fees arising out of the payment of the early-retirement benefits based on their fiduciary duty to the Plan. The factual underpinnings of the adjudicated claims were the same as those of the unadjudicated counterclaim of the defendants. The trial court's resolution of the employees' claims did not moot the defendants' counterclaim because the trial court had to decide whether immediate recoupment (less any amount already received through the actuarially reduced monthly benefits), interest, and attorney fees were owed the defendants for the early-retirement benefits received by the employees. The Supreme Court remanded the case to trial court to reconsider the facts relating to the recoupment of the benefits in determining the defendants' counterclaim, including determining whether the defendants were entitled to immediate recoupment, interest, and attorney fees. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court's certification of finality under Rule 54(b) was ineffective, and, because there was no final judgment, both the appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Fuller v. Birmingham-Jefferson County Transit Authority" on Justia Law

Hubert Norris appealed the grant of summary judgment to the Fayette County Commission and the dismissal of his petition for a writ of mandamus. Norris held the office of Sheriff of Fayette County for consecutive four-year terms beginning June 1974 until his resignation in May 1989. As sheriff, Norris participated in the county's supernumerary sheriffs' benefit program. During his fourth term in office, Norris resigned pursuant to a plea agreement in federal court. As part of the agreement, Norris pleaded guilty to multiple federal felonies, including racketeering, bribery, and tax evasion. Norris was convicted and sentenced to 37 months in prison. Norris later received a full pardon from the Alabama State Board of Pardons and Paroles, which restored all of his civil and political rights that had been forfeited by virtue of his conviction. Several years later, the then-Governor appointed Norris as supernumerary sheriff of Fayette County. The Commission petitioned to have Norris excluded from office. The Fayette Circuit Court issued the writ, and Norris appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Norris was precluded from serving as supernumerary sheriff after having received a pardon. Norris ran for and was reelected as Sheriff of Fayette County several years later. Norris served as sheriff, and he contributed to the supernumerary sheriffs' benefit program for each of those years. The State of Alabama again petitioned for a writ of quo warranto, alleging that Norris had unlawfully held his office, but this time the circuit court ruled in favor of Norris. Norris ended up serving out his term as sheriff. But toward the end of that term, the Commission sought a legal opinion from the attorney general regarding the county's obligation to pay Norris any supernumerary sheriff's benefits. Norris filed with then Governor Bob Riley a written declaration seeking to become a supernumerary sheriff for Fayette County at the end of his term as sheriff; Norris stated in that declaration that he met all the requirements to be appointed as a supernumerary sheriff. Governor Riley commissioned Norris as supernumerary sheriff of Fayette County. The Commission sought another legal opinion from the attorney general regarding whether Norris's appointment by Governor Riley affected the status of Norris with regard to his supernumerary benefits. The attorney general advised the Commission that, because Governor Riley had already appointed Norris as supernumerary sheriff, the question was moot. Months later Governor Riley's chief legal advisor purported to rescind Norris's appointment after learning of his felony conviction. Norris responded by filing a petition for a writ of mandamus compelling payment of past and future supernumerary sheriff's benefits. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the Commission, concluding as a matter of law that Norris had not served as sheriff for the requisite number of years as required by law, and that Governor Riley's appointment of Norris as supernumerary sheriff was void ab initio; the trial court therefore dismissed Norris's petition for a writ of mandamus. Because the trial court correctly held that, as a matter of law, Norris did not meet the statutory requirements to be appointed a supernumerary sheriff, Norris was not entitled to the mandamus relief he requested. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in entering a summary judgment in favor of the Commission and in dismissing Norris's petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Norris v. Fayette County Commission " on Justia Law