Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The superior court issued a 30-day involuntary commitment order after finding that Mark V. was gravely disabled and “entirely unable to fend for himself independently in the community.” Mark argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove he could not live independently. Although Mark’s appeal was technically moot, his claim raised an important question that satisfied the public interest exception: Where does family and community support fit within the involuntary commitment process and which party bears the burden of proving or disproving that a respondent has that support? The Supreme Court held that the respondent’s inability to function with outside support, when relevant, was part of the petitioner’s burden of proving that there was no less restrictive alternative to commitment. But the Court found in this case that the State’s evidence satisfied this burden, and the Court therefore affirmed the 30-day commitment order. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Mark V." on Justia Law

A superior court ordered the Child Support Services Division (CSSD) to audit the child support and spousal support accounts of a divorced couple. The audits revealed that the agency had collected too much child support from the ex-wife and that the ex-husband owed her the overpayment as well as arrearages in spousal support. The ex-wife’s attorney filed an attorney’s lien on money in the ex-husband’s possession that the attorney claimed was owed to his client, then filed a separate action to enforce the lien. The ex-husband paid the money to CSSD, which turned it over to the ex-wife.The superior court granted summary judgment to the ex-husband on the attorney’s lien claim, concluding that the lien was invalid because the ex-husband was required to pay the money for the overpayment and the spousal support arrearages directly to CSSD. The attorney appealed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the attorney’s lien satisfied the requirements of the governing statute, AS 34.35.430(a)(3). Therefore the Court reversed the superior court’s summary judgment order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Law Offices of Steven D. Smith, P.C. v. Ceccarelli" on Justia Law

Jasmine was born in February 2009 to Clementine and Jermaine. The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took emergency custody of the child after receiving reports that her mother’s conduct had placed her at risk of harm. OCS then investigated the child’s father, who lived out of state, and determined that the child would be safe in his care. At the temporary custody hearing, the superior court granted Jermaine's motion to dismiss the case and ordered the child released from OCS custody. Clementine appealed, arguing that the court should have granted her request for a continuance and held an evidentiary hearing on the father’s conduct and that the court erred by dismissing the petition without first making findings on the allegations it contained. The Supreme Court concluded that the mother had no right to an evidentiary hearing on the father’s conduct and that the superior court did not err by dismissing the petition when OCS declined to pursue it. View "Clementine F. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

Timothy G. alleged he was abused by his stepfather repeatedly between 1997 and 2006. In 2006, Timothy reported the abuse to his mother. She took Timothy and his four siblings to a shelter, sought a protective order against the stepfather, and instituted divorce proceedings. The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) then substantiated the report of harm, removed the children from their mother’s care, and placed them in foster care. In 2012, Timothy filed a complaint naming OCS and his stepfather as defendants. He sought compensatory damages from OCS, claiming that “[a]s a direct and proximate consequence of [OCS’s] breach of [its] dut[y] of care, [he] suffered physical injury, psychological and emotional injury and distress, psychological torment, torture and sexual abuse, pain and suffering, and resultant loss of earning capacity.” Timothy alleged that OCS had investigated at least ten reports of harm involving him and his siblings, but had taken no action. In response to OCS' motion to dismiss, Timothy G. asserted that the statute of limitations had been tolled on his claim because he was mentally incompetent following those years of abuse. The superior court held an evidentiary hearing on this issue and concluded that Timothy had failed to prove that he was incompetent. On appeal, Timothy argued that the superior court should have ruled in his favor if he produced more than a scintilla of evidence to support his assertion. But the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court applied the proper burden of proof and the proper test for competency, and that the court did not clearly err in finding that Timothy did not prove his incompetence. View "Timothy G. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

Under an Alaska Department of Revenue regulation, all appeals of oil and gas property tax valuation must be heard by the State Assessment Review Board (SARB), while appeals of oil and gas property taxability must be heard by the Department of Revenue (Revenue). Three municipalities challenged this regulation, arguing that it contradicted a statute that grants SARB exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals from Revenue’s “assessments” of oil and gas property. The superior court upheld the regulation as valid, concluding that it was a reasonable interpretation of the statute. But after its review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the regulation was inconsistent with the plain text, legislative history, and purpose of the statute; therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s judgment. View "City of Valdez v. Alaska" on Justia Law

After a work-related injury left appellant Laurie Vandenberg (a nurse) with a permanent partial impairment, she applied for reemployment benefits. The rehabilitation specialist assigned to her case used two job descriptions to describe one of her former jobs because the specialist did not think that a single job description adequately described that former job. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board decided that only one job description was needed and that appellant retained the physical capacity to perform the functions of that job description; it therefore denied her reemployment benefits. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board’s decision. Appellant appealed, arguing that the Board erred in selecting only one job description because the job description it selected did not adequately describe the job she held. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the Commission’s decision. View "Vandenberg v. Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

After a work-related injury left appellant Laurie Vandenberg (a nurse) with a permanent partial impairment, she applied for reemployment benefits. The rehabilitation specialist assigned to her case used two job descriptions to describe one of her former jobs because the specialist did not think that a single job description adequately described that former job. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board decided that only one job description was needed and that appellant retained the physical capacity to perform the functions of that job description; it therefore denied her reemployment benefits. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board’s decision. Appellant appealed, arguing that the Board erred in selecting only one job description because the job description it selected did not adequately describe the job she held. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the Commission’s decision. View "Vandenberg v. Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

Wasilla landowner, appellant Ray Pursche appealed the tax foreclosure against his property, arguing that the property was exempt from local property taxes because it was originally transferred to his predecessor by federal patent. He claimed that the federal patent made this property beyond state court jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the tax foreclosure, finding that after a patent issues, property disputes must generally be resolved in state court. Land once owned by the federal government was subject to local property taxes after it was conveyed to a private party. View "Pursche v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough" on Justia Law

John and Xong Chao Beeson owned and lived in the Palmer West Subdivision in the City of Palmer. Since they moved to the property in 1985, the Beesons have experienced several flooding incidents on their land, which they attributed to water backing up against Helen Drive, a two-lane road adjacent to their property originally built by Matanuska-Susitna Borough but controlled by the City since 2003. After the City installed a water line under Helen Drive and repaved the road surface in 2005, the flooding became more severe and caused serious damage to the Beesons’ home. The Beesons brought an inverse condemnation claim against the City, arguing that the City was liable for the damage to their property. After a three-day bench trial the superior court found that the City’s road reconstruction project was not a substantial cause of the flooding and therefore the City could not be liable in inverse condemnation. The superior court also granted attorney’s fees to the City. The Beesons appealed both rulings. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision with respect to the inverse condemnation claim and remanded for further proceedings regarding attorney’s fees. View "Beeson v. City of Palmer" on Justia Law

Federal law required electric utilities to purchase power generated by cogeneration facilities that met certain standards. A facility must be certified that it meets the standards. It may self-certify, by filing a form describing the project and asserting that it believes it meets the standards, or it may request a formal determination that it meets the standards. The Regulatory Commission of Alaska implemented this certification scheme on the state level, but the determination whether a facility qualifies fell within exclusive federal jurisdiction. The main issue this case presented for the Alaska Supreme Court's review was whether a self-certification constituted a federal determination that a facility meets the standards and whether the Commission must defer to this self-certification. The Court concluded that a self-certification did not constitute a federal determination and that the Commission’s broad discretion to implement the federal scheme meant it had the power to require a developer to formally certify its projects. View "Alpine Energy, LLC v. Matanuska Electric Association" on Justia Law