Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The primary issue in this appeal was whether boroughs have the implied or incidental authority to record a real property lien to secure payment of garbage-collection fees. In 2007 Virgilio and Rosemarie Sabado hired had a fire-damaged house on their property in Kodiak torn down. The contractor opened a commercial garbage account with the Kodiak Island Borough (Borough) and paid a deposit for placement of a construction dumpster near the property. Approximately $5,000 in garbage-service charges accrued. The Borough applied the deposit to this amount and began sending the contractor monthly bills for the balance. No payment was made and the account became delinquent. In October 2008 the Sabados sold the property to Cedric Cutler, who was unaware of the garbage account with the Borough. In December the Borough sent the contractor a letter advising him that a lien could be placed on the property if the account remained unpaid. No payment was made, and in January 2009 the Borough recorded a lien against the property. The Borough then sent lien-notice letters to the contractor and the Sabados, who were still listed as the property owners in the Borough’s tax files. In February 2010 the Borough petitioned to foreclose outstanding tax and garbage-service liens for years 2009 and prior. Cutler learned of the foreclosure proceeding and filed an answer and counterclaim, asserting the lien against his property was invalid and seeking damages for wrongful recording of a nonconsensual common law (NCCL) lien. Cutler appeals the superior court’s summary judgment ruling and default judgment entry with respect to the other garbage-service liens. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that boroughs did not have the authority to record liens to secure payment for garbage collection fees. View "Cutler v. Kodiak Island Borough" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the court concerned whether monetary damages are available to a prisoner for violations of the terms of a judicial decree approving the "Cleary Final Settlement Agreement." In 2004 appellee Corrections Corporation of America contracted with the State to house Alaska inmates at Corrections Corporation's Red Rock Correctional Center in Arizona. Byran Perotti was an Alaska inmate at Red Rock. He filed a complaint against Corrections Corporation alleging that Corrections Corporation violated provisions of its contract with the State, as well as various State Department of Corrections policies. He asserted standing as a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the State and Corrections Corporation. He based his argument on his status as a Cleary class member and the provisions of the Cleary Final Settlement Agreement, which settled the class action involving various inmate claims against the State of Alaska, Department of Corrections (DOC). Perotti's complaint sought liquidated damages under the DOC-Corrections Corporation contract, as well as compensatory damages, nominal damages, and punitive damages. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Cleary Final Settlement Agreement did not contemplate the award of monetary damages to enforce its provisions. Therefore the Court affirmed the superior court's decision granting Corrections Corporation's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all of Perotti's claims. View "Perotti v. Corrections Corporation of America" on Justia Law

A mother appealed the termination of her parental rights to her young son. The mother had a long history of substance abuse and relinquished parental rights to her older daughter in 2008 because she was unable to care for her. During the 18 months following the child’s removal, the mother continued to abuse drugs until she was incarcerated. At that point, she entered an intensive residential substance abuse program at the prison, which she successfully completed two weeks prior to the termination trial. In appealing the superior court’s order terminating her parental rights, the mother argued to the Supreme Court that the court erroneously: (1) denied her motion to continue the termination proceedings; (2) determined that termination was in the best interests of the child; and (3) failed to consider legal guardianship as an alternative to termination. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Hannah B. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Judith R. challenged the superior court's order terminating her parental rights to her son, "Dexter." The court terminated her rights based on her longstanding, unremedied mental illness. In its ruling on the record, the court sua sponte, directed the parties to consult with Dexter's therapist about the advisability of allowing continued contact between Judith and Dexter following termination of Judith's parental rights, but the court's written order made no mention of post-termination contact. On appeal, Judith challenged the superior court's finding that termination of her parental rights was in Dexter's best interests and the court's failure to issue a "detailed order regarding post-termination visitation." Because the court's best interests finding was supported by substantial evidence and because the court was not required to address post-termination contact in its termination order, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Judith R. v. Dept. of Health & Social Svcs." on Justia Law

In 1999, the Alaska Board of Fisheries (the Board) made a use finding in the Chitina subdistrict for the first time, changing it from a "personal use" to a "subsistence" fishery. The Board reversed this decision in 2003, returning Chitina to a personal use fishery. The Alaska Fish and Wildlife Conservation Fund (AFWCF) and the Chitina Dipnetters Association, Inc., after asking the Board to reconsider its 2003 finding in both 2005 and 2008, brought this suit to challenge the Board's negative customary and traditional use finding for Chitina. They claimed that the regulation used by the Board to make such a finding was unconstitutional on its face and as applied. The superior court held that the regulation was valid and constitutional, but remanded for the Board to fully articulate the standard being used in its application of the regulation. It also instructed the Board not to consider "the per capita consumption of wild food in the home community of various users" upon remand. On remand, the Board codified a definition of "subsistence way of life," allowed the parties to submit evidence, and upheld its previous classification. Because 5 AAC 99.010(b) was consistent with its authorizing statutes, was reasonable and not arbitrary, did not violate the Alaska Constitution's equal access provisions, and was constitutionally applied when the Board made its customary and traditional use finding for the Chitina fishery in 2003, the Supreme Court affirmed that portion of the superior court's rulings. Because there was no indication that the Board actually relied on the per capita consumption of wild foods in the users' home communities when applying 5 AAC 99.010(b) and because that information could have been relevant to the subsistence inquiry, the Supreme Court reversed that portion of the superior court's ruling. View "Alaska Fish & Wildlife Conservation Fund v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game" on Justia Law

Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (Alyeska), the agent for the owners of the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), leases the TAPS right-of-way from the Alaska Department of Natural Resources (Department). Alyeska appealed the Department's 2002 appraisal of the TAPS lease price to Michael Menge, the Commissioner of the Department, and then to the superior court. Both affirmed the Department's appraisal. Alyeska appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing: (1) the Department misinterpreted AS 38.35.140(a); (2) the Department was required to adopt its interpretation of AS 38.35.140(a) as a regulation under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA); and (3) the appraisal improperly included submerged lands within the right-of-way when the Department failed to establish that the State holds title to those lands. Finding no misinterpretation, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

The Department of Natural Resources restricted the non-winter use of large vehicles on the Rex Trail. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether these restrictions were within the Department's authority. Because the Department has broad authority to manage public lands in general and specific authority to manage rights-of-way such as the Rex Trail, and the restrictions did not violate any statutory limitations on this authority, the Supreme Court concluded that they were authorized. View "Caywood v. Alaska Dept. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

The question raised before the Supreme Court in two consolidated appeals was whether this certain provisions of the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA) applied to a person convicted in a single proceeding of two (or more) sex offenses. James Ward was convicted of two sex offenses in a single criminal proceeding. In a separate and unrelated single proceeding, Michael Boles was also convicted of two sex offenses. They argued that the pertinent statute, AS 12.63.020(a)(1)(B), was ambiguous, because it could be read to require convictions in more than one proceeding. They therefore reasoned that the rule of lenity requires that the ambiguity be resolved in their favor and thus that the statute be read to require them to register for 15 years, not life. They asserted that the Department of Public Safety, in requiring them to register for life, misread the statute. The men filed separate administrative appeals, which were assigned to two different superior court judges. One judge, reasoning that the statute is unambiguous, affirmed the Department's ruling regarding Ward. The other judge, reasoning that the statute is ambiguous and must therefore be read favorably to offenders, reversed the Department's ruling regarding Boles. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Department did not err; the statute, in requiring persons "convicted of . . . two or more sex offenses" to register for life, is unambiguous and cannot reasonably be read to condition lifetime registration on two or more separate convictions for sex offenses, or on any sequential or chronological separation between convictions. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court order that affirmed the Department's decision regarding Ward and reversed the superior court order that reversed the Department's decision regarding Boles. View "Ward v. Alaska Dept. of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Before 2009, the Alaska Board of Game employed a controversial scoring system in order to distribute permits to subsistence hunters in a popular caribou and moose hunting area between Anchorage and Fairbanks. In 2009, the Board amended its regulations to abolish the scoring system and replace it with two separate subsistence hunts: a community harvest hunt for groups and a separate hunt for individuals. A local tribe was subsequently granted a community harvest permit pursuant to the new rules. An individual resident brought suit challenging the new system, alleging violations of the Alaska Administrative Procedure Act, his due process rights, the Board’s governing statutes, and several provisions of the Alaska Constitution. The tribe intervened on the side of the State and a private organization intervened on the side of the individual. In July 2010, the superior court granted summary judgment and enjoined the community harvest hunt as unconstitutional. The superior court later awarded attorney’s fees to the individual and private organization. The tribe appealed both decisions to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court concluded that the underlying appeal was moot because the challenged regulation had been substantively changed since 2009. Accordingly, the case was dismissed. View "Nene v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game" on Justia Law

After a van driven by Ralph Kermit Winterrowd II was damaged in a collision with a moose, the Alaska Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) proposed suspending Winterrowd’s driver’s license because he did not provide proof of liability insurance. Winterrowd opposed suspension and then filed suit to enjoin DMV’s suspension action. Treating Winterrowd’s opposition as a request for hearing, DMV scheduled an administrative licensing hearing. On motion by DMV, the superior court dismissed Winterrowd’s complaint. DMV suspended Winterrowd’s license after he failed to attend the licensing hearing. Winterrowd appealed the dismissal of his superior court complaint. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, because Winterrowd had not exhausted his administrative remedies at the time when the court dismissed his complaint. View "Winterrowd v. Alaska Dept. of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law