Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A healthcare worker was sprayed in the eye with fluids from an HIV-positive patient. She received preventive treatment and counseling. Her employer initially paid workers' compensation benefits; it later filed a controversion based on its doctor's opinion that the employee was able to return to work. The employee asked for more benefits, but the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board denied her claim. The employee appealed, but the Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board's decision. Because the Supreme Court agreed with the Commission that substantial evidence supported the Board's decision, the Court affirmed the Commission's decision.

The Office of Rate Review, a division of the State Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS), set a Medicaid payment rate for North Star Hospital based on a 2005 home office cost report that did not reflect a substantial increase in costs incurred by North Star in 2006. While making its determination, the Office of Rate Review had access to an unaudited version of a 2006 home office cost report that reflected these increased costs. The Office of Rate Review refused to grant North Star's request for an interim rate pending the audit of the 2006 report or to reconsider the rate once it received the audited 2006 report. In response, North Star administratively challenged the Office of Rate Review's rate determination. The DHSS Commissioner concluded that the Office of Rate Review's refusal to consider data from the unaudited 2006 report was proper and that the Office of Rate Review was not required to grant North Star a temporary rate preceding completion of the audit of the 2006 report. The Commissioner also concluded that DHSS did not have jurisdiction to determine whether 7 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 150.170(b)(12) was in conflict with AS 47.07.070, which requires that the rate be based upon reasonable costs. North Star appealed the decision to the superior court and the superior court reversed, concluding that because the audited 2006 home office cost statement was overdue at no fault of North Star, it was error for the Office of Rate Review to refuse to grant North Star's request for a temporary rate in order to consider the audited version of the 2006 report. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision.

This appeal presented the question of whether the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights (the Commission) must interview one or more witnesses identified by a complainant before dismissing a complaint for lack of substantial evidence to support a discrimination claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the statutory duty to impartially investigate implied that the Commission must make a reasonable effort to interview at least some of the witnesses identified by a complainant where it appears that they may have relevant information. The Court also concluded that this duty was not satisfied under the facts of this case because the Commission did not interview any of the witnesses identified by the complainant even though they potentially had relevant information.

Appellants Richard and Durena Tracy appeal the superior court’s dismissal of their state law negligence and federal constitutional claims against the State of Alaska, Department of Health and Social Services, Office of Children’s Services (OCS). This case arose from Child in Need of Aid (CINA) proceedings to protect their granddaughter, Annie. The Tracys also appealed the superior court’s denial of summary judgment in their favor and its award of attorney’s fees against them. The Tracys are the biological grandparents of "Annie" and now her adoptive parents. When Annie was five, a kindergarten teacher erroneously suspected Annie had been victim to sexual abuse by Richard. OCS investigated the allegation, all the while Richard was not permitted contact with Annie until the investigation was complete. When the allegations were deemed groundless by an OCS expert, Richard and Durena sued OCS for damages stemming from the fees and expenses they incurred defending themselves from the OCS investigation. Ultimately the Tracys lost that battle, and the district court granted OCS's request for attorney fees. Affirming the superior court's dismissal of the Tracys' claims, the Supreme Court vacated the award of attorneys' fees against the Tracys. The Court found that because there was no bad faith nor asserted with improper motive, the superior court should not have given OCS an award of fees.

Eight days after relinquishing her parental rights to twin children, their mother filed a motion requesting that the superior court order the Department of Health and Social Services, Office of Children's Services (OCS) to release the children's annual Permanent Fund Dividends (dividends) to her. The superior court granted the motion. The guardian ad litem (GAL) and OCS opposed her motion. The superior court ordered OCS to provide proof of compliance with 15 AAC 23.223(i). OCS filed copies of the address change forms and an affidavit of the OCS employee who completed the forms stating OCS had complied with the Department's regulation. The superior court concluded OCS's filing did not comply with the regulation's "evidence of the change in legal custody" requirement and ordered OCS to release the dividends to the mother. The GAL sought reconsideration, which the superior court denied. The Supreme Court granted the GAL's petition for review. OCS and the GAL argued that the fact the Department paid the dividends to OCS suggests the Department itself thought the change of address forms were sufficient to comply with 15 AAC 23.223(i) and the superior court should have deferred to the Department's determination. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed: the superior court (and all of the parties in the superior court proceeding) knew of OCS's custody of the children because the superior court itself signed the custody order. "There was and could be no dispute that OCS actually was entitled to redirect and hold the children's dividends, regardless of the information provided to the Department." The Court reversed the superior court's decision.

"Jade" is the biological daughter of Roy and Sheila. Jade is an Indian child as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Between 1998 and 2007, the Office of Children's Services (OCS) received at least 12 reports of drug abuse and child neglect in the family. Before Jade's birth in September 2004, the couple's older children were transferred to OCS custody for two years. Roy and Sheila attempted to complete drug treatment programs but were unsuccessful. Sheila relapsed while pregnant with Jade; her discharge report from the treatment program indicated she tested positive for cocaine in August 2005 and stopped attending treatment sessions or contacting drug counselors in October 2005. Roy was discharged for positive drug tests and missing treatment. Since being taken into OCS custody in July 2008, Jade has lived in five separate placements. In its termination order, the superior court found that termination of parental rights was in Jade's best interests and that OCS made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. Roy contested three of the superior court's findings: that OCS made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family; that termination was in Jade's best interests; and that good cause existed to deviate from the ICWA placement preferences. Sheila did not appeal the superior court's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record supported the superior court's conclusions with regard to OCS's efforts to keep the family together, and that it was in Jade's best interests to terminate Roy's parental rights.

M.K. is a 34-year-old mentally ill Alaska Native woman who lived in a rural village. In 1999, when M.K. was 22, her father A.K. sexually assaulted her. M.K. reported the crime to police, but soon changed her story and A.K. was not tried at that time. A.K. continued to live with the family for four years until advances in DNA evidence led to his case being reopened, and to A.K. being charged and convicted in 2003 of the sexual assault. M.K.'s mother remained married to A.K., who has since been released from prison and was on probation and prohibited from living with M.K. M.K.'s mother had no plans to divorce A.K., and testified that she is not sure whether A.K. will return to live with the family when his probation ends. The Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) petitioned for guardianship of M.K. in July 2008 based on M.K.'s mental illness and her inability to manage her own care. The court visitor completed a report, and a hearing was held over several days, following which the superior court appointed the Office of Public Advocacy (OPA) as M.K.'s full guardian. M.K. objected to this decision. The superior court treated her written objection as an implicit motion for reconsideration and denied it. M.K. appealed, arguing that the superior court erred in its application of the guardianship statutes in her case, in its best interest finding that OPA should be appointed in place of M.K.'s mother, and in appointing OPA as a full (as opposed to partial) guardian. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision.

A father appealed various procedural actions taken by the superior court in his divorce and custody proceeding. Appearing pro se, he alleged that the court’s expedited procedures violated his due process rights and reflected judicial bias. He also argued that the court abused its discretion in its award of attorney’s fees. Because the court’s procedures did not violate the father’s due process rights and the father has not shown that the court was biased against him, the Supreme Court affirmed the procedural decisions of the superior court. But because the superior court did not follow the established process for the award of attorney’s fees, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s attorney’s fees order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In 2008, Alaska's Board of Certified Real Estate Appraisers imposed professional sanctions on appraiser Appellee-Cross-Appellant Kim Wold for violations of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP). The Board relied in large part on the views of a distinguished expert in Alaskan real estate appraisal who performed a "desk review" of Appelle's work. The expert concluded that the appraiser committed numerous violations of the USPAP. Though the Supreme Court reviewed the Board's findings with great deference, it concluded that none of the Board's findings of USPAP violations were supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record. The Court thus affirmed the superior court's reversal of the Board's findings of USPAP violations, and reversed the single violation that the superior court affirmed.

An employer petitioned the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board for reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund for payments it made to a disabled worker. The Fund opposed the petition. After a hearing, the Board granted the petition. The Fund asked the Board to reconsider its decision in December 2009. The hearing officer told the parties that he would inform them in writing by the end of January 2010 about what action the Board was taking on the reconsideration request. Instead, in April 2010 the hearing officer sent a prehearing conference summary indicating that the reconsideration request had been denied by operation of statute. The next day the Fund filed a notice of appeal and a motion to accept a late-filed appeal with the Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission. The Commission denied the Fund's request to file its appeal late and dismissed the appeal. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the Fund filed a timely appeal, it reversed the Commission's decision and remand for consideration of the Fund's appeal.