Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A father appealed the termination of his parental rights to his daughter, an Indian child within the meaning of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). He challenged the superior court's findings that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made active efforts to prevent the breakup of his Indian family, arguing that OCS failed to investigate placement with his extended family members and did not provide him with adequate visitation and remedial services. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that OCS made active efforts, and accordingly affirmed OCS's decision.

Petitioner Sherman "Red" Smith built and operated a sawmill on 14 acres of land under a special-use permit from the U.S. Forest Service. He alleged that Alaska acquired title to the land and conveyed it to a third party without acknowledging his claim or compensating him for his improvements. The last disputed conveyance of the land took place in 1983. The superior court dismissed Petitioner's claim, finding it to be time-barred under any applicable statute of limitations. The superior court also ruled in favor of the State on two alternative grounds: first, concluding that sovereign immunity bars fraud actions against the State and second, determining that res judicata bars the relitigation of a claim the superior court previously dismissed in 2007. Petitioner appealed, arguing that statutes of limitations cannot bar claims brought for the vindication of constitutional rights. Because statutes of limitations do apply to constitutional claims, and because Petitioner did not allege harm amounting to a continuing violation, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's dismissal of Petitioner's claim as time-barred. The Court also affirmed the superior court's alternative finding that the 2007 dismissal of Petitioner's previous claim bars his current action.

Citizens sought a ballot initiative to eliminate the special regulations that govern real property transactions in a local economic development area. After the municipal clerk twice denied their petition for a ballot initiative, the sponsors sued for an order placing the initiative on the ballot. Finding the petition to be both contrary to existing law and misleading, the superior court upheld the municipal clerk's denial. The sponsors appealed. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the petition is neither contrary to existing law nor misleading, it reversed.

An adult woman diagnosed with a mental illness appealed her already completed 30-day involuntary commitment to Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API), arguing the evidence did not support the superior court’s findings that: (1) she was likely to cause harm to herself or others due to her mental illness; and (2) API was the least restrictive alternative placement for her. Because Alaska's existing case law provides that an evidentiary-based "weight of the evidence" challenge to a completed involuntary commitment is moot absent accompanying legal issues appropriate for decision under the mootness doctrine's public interest exception, the Supreme Court asked the parties to submit supplemental briefing on mootness. As a result, the Court addressed a question not directly raised in earlier cases: should the Court's application of the mootness doctrine in this context accommodate the importance of collateral consequences arising from an involuntary commitment? The Court answered that question "yes" and therefore reached the merits of this appeal. On the merits, the Court affirmed the superior court's involuntary commitment order.

In an October 2007 election, Kenai Peninsula Borough voters approved local initiatives establishing term limits for members of the Borough Assembly and the school board. But voters also reelected five incumbents who, by the terms of the initiatives, would be ineligible to serve an additional term. The Alliance of Concerned Taxpayers (ACT) filed a lawsuit against the Borough requesting a court declaration that the initiatives applied to candidates chosen in the October 2007 election and that the seats held by the five incumbents were vacant. The Borough argued that the initiatives were invalid. The superior court granted partial summary judgment to ACT and partial summary judgment to the Borough and, therefore, did not designate either as the prevailing party. ACT appealed the superior court's decision not to name a prevailing party and argued that ACT should have been named the prevailing party. After its review of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that ACT and the Borough both prevailed on distinct issues central to the case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court’s decision not to name a prevailing party or award attorney's fees and costs to either party.

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the validity of two 2005 Kenai Peninsula Borough (Borough) ordinances: one enacted by the Borough Assembly and the second enacted by voter initiative. The Borough Assembly enacted an ordinance in June 2005 that increased the sales tax rate from two percent to three percent. In an October 2005 election, Borough voters passed an initiative that required prior voter approval for all Borough capital projects with a total cost of more than one million dollars. The Alliance for Concerned Taxpayers (ACT) challenged the sales tax increase and sought to enforce the capital projects voter approval requirement. The superior court granted summary judgment to the Borough on both matters: on the sales tax issue, reasoning that a 1964 voter action allowed the increase and the 2006 referendum defeat ratified it; and on the capital projects voter approval issue, reasoning that Proposition 4 was an unconstitutional use of the initiative power to appropriate a public asset. ACT appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment on the sales tax issue and the capital project voter approval issue, concluding the 1964 voter authorization of a three-percent sales tax preserved the Borough's right to raise the rate to three percent, and that the 2006 defeat of the referendum to repeal the rate increase constituted a ratification of the increase. On the voter approval issue, the Court concluded that allowing voters to veto any capital improvement projects of over $1 million had the effect of diluting the Borough Assembly's exclusive control over the budget and was therefore an impermissible appropriation.

Appellant Ethel Kelly sued the Municipality of Anchorage (MOA) for negligence after she stepped into an uncovered valve box assembly pipe in a crosswalk and sustained injuries. MOA conceded that the valve box cover was missing, but denied it was responsible for this condition. MOA moved for summary judgment in superior court on grounds that it had no duty to Appellant since it neither caused nor had notice of the dangerous condition. Appellant filed an opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment to MOA. Appellant appeals. Because material issues of fact existed concerning whether MOA caused the defect and whether it had constructive notice of it, the Supreme Court vacated the superior court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The parents of a developmentally disabled adult woman appealed a superior court's decision to appoint a public guardian, rather than the parents, as the woman's legal guardian. The superior court found that the parents failed to take advantage of resources available for the daughter's development and did not support the daughter's contact with extended family. On appeal, the parents argued that they should have been appointed as guardians and that the appointment of a public guardian, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the parents were unfit to serve as guardians, violated their constitutional right to parent their child. Because the superior court did not abuse its discretion in appointing the public guardian, and because the superior court's action did not violate the parents' substantive due process rights under the 14th Amendment, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the superior court in all respects.

Two correctional officers allegedly injured inmate Respondent Paul Heisey within the jail. Respondent filed a complaint asserting several tort claims against the State and the two officers. Pursuant to a statute allowing the State to substitute as defendant for any State employee that is certified as acting within the scope of employment, the Attorney General certified the officers as acting within the scope of their employment and substituted the State as the Defendant. The State then filed a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. While the motion was pending, Respondent moved to amend his complaint to substitute state constitutional claims for the tort claims. The superior court granted the motion to amend, ruling that Respondent may have a damages claim for violation of his state constitutional rights under the circumstances of the case. In the same order, the superior court partially granted and partially denied the motion to dismiss. The State petitioned for review of the superior court's legal conclusions. The Supreme Court accepted the petition and requested briefing on three issues: (1) whether the Attorney General's certification was subject to judicial review; (2) whether the inmate's claims arose out of an assault or battery for which the State is immune; and (3) whether a state constitutional claim for damages exists under the circumstances of this case. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Attorney General's certification was subject to judicial review, that some of the inmate's claims arose out of an assault or battery for which the State is immune, and that a damages claim under the state constitution does not exist under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the Court vacated the superior court's order on the motion to amend and motion to dismiss, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellant Chana Boyko was a teacher who resigned in lieu of termination from the Anchorage School District after violating a "last chance agreement." She alleged the School District breached a resignation agreement in which it promised not to release negative information about her to prospective employers. Appellant sued, claiming that she was terminated as a result of disability discrimination and that the School District's comments made in violation of the resignation agreement breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and interfered with her prospective contractual relations. The superior court granted the School District summary judgment on all claims, concluding that the District had nondiscriminatory reasons for termination and that its comments were protected by statutory immunity. Appellant appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the claims of statutory immunity, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and interference with prospective contractual relations, because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding these claims. The Court affirmed summary judgment on the discrimination claim.