Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Alaskan Crude Corporation operates an oil and gas unit known as the "Arctic Fortitude Unit." Alaskan Crudeâs unit agreement with the Department of Natural Resources set work obligation deadlines that Alaskan Crude was required to meet to continue operating the Unit. In July 2008 the Commissioner found that Alaskan Crude had failed to meet its work obligations, gave notice that Alaskan Crude was in default under its unit agreement, and specified that the Unit would be terminated if Alaskan Crude did not cure the default by a new set of deadlines. Alaskan Crude appealed the Commissionerâs decision to the superior court, arguing that a pending judicial decision in a separate appeal qualified as a force majeure under the unit agreement, preventing Alaskan Crude from meeting its work obligations. It also argued that the Commissionerâs proposed default cure was an improper unilateral amendment of Alaskan Crudeâs unit agreement. The superior court affirmed the Commissionerâs findings and decision and Alaskan Crude appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that: (1) the pending judicial decision in Alaskan Crudeâs separate appeal did not trigger the force majeure clause of the unit agreement; and (2) the Commissionerâs proposed default cure was not a unilateral amendment of Alaskan Crudeâs unit agreement. Thus the Court affirmed the decision of the superior court upholding the decision of the Commissioner.

Six weeks after the Regulatory Commission of Alaska approved the 2007 Access Charge Rates long distance telephone companies pay to local telephone companies, an association of local telephone companies realized that five of the rates the Regulatory Commission approved were based upon an erroneous spreadsheet the association included in its rate filings. The association requested that the Regulatory Commission correct the rates. The Regulatory Commission corrected the rates prospectively, but concluded retrospective application was barred by the Supreme Court's case law on retroactive ratemaking. The superior court agreed that retrospective application of the adjusted rates was impermissible, and the association appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in "Matanuska Electric Association, Inc. v. Chugach Electric Association, Inc." (prohibiting retroactive ratemaking in "second look" cases), but held that the Regulatory Commission has the authority to implement corrections of some procedural mistakes starting when notice of a mistake is given. The Court remanded to the Regulatory Commission to determine the type of error that occurred in this case and whether the error should be corrected retrospectively.

An elderly woman requiring long-term medical care gave $120,000 to her son in February 2007. The mother believed that the gift would not prevent her from receiving Medicaid coverage if she lived long enough to exhaust her remaining assets. She relied on a provision in Alaska's Medicaid eligibility manual that suggested prospective Medicaid beneficiaries could give away a portion of their assets while retaining sufficient assets to pay for their medical care during the period of ineligibility that Medicaid imposes as a penalty for such gifts. But by the time the mother applied for Medicaid in September 2008, the Alaska legislature had enacted legislation with the retroactive effect of preventing the kind of estate planning the mother had attempted through her gift. The State temporarily denied the mother's application. The son appealed pro se on behalf of his mother, who died in 2009. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Alaska legislature's retroactive change to the Medicaid eligibility rules was valid. The Court thus affirmed the State's temporary denial of the mother's application.

Parents requested that the Anchorage School District evaluate their child for eligibility for special education services. While awaiting the results of the eligibility assessment, the parents arranged for private tutoring. The school district did not assess the childâs eligibility within the statutorily-required time, and the parents requested a due process hearing. They also arranged for their child to be privately evaluated to determine whether he was eligible for special education services. The school district subsequently completed its evaluation and determined the child to be ineligible for services. At the due process hearing, the parents alleged that the school district committed procedural violations under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), including impermissibly delaying the evaluation. They sought reimbursement for the cost of their childâs private evaluation and tutoring. An independent hearing officer presided over the due process hearing and ultimately agreed with the district that the child was ineligible for services. The hearing officer ordered the school district to pay the cost of the private eligibility assessment and to partially pay the cost of the tutoring. The superior court upheld the award of the private eligibility assessment, but reversed the award of the private tutoring cost. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the school district argued that the parents should not be reimbursed for the evaluation or the tutoring; the parents argued they are entitled to full reimbursement for both expenses. The central question the Court addressed was: where a child is ultimately determined to be ineligible for special education services, does the IDEA provide relief for procedural violations that occur during the process of evaluating the childâs eligibility for services? The Court affirmed the superior courtâs decision, upholding the independent hearing officerâs award of the private assessment cost, but reversing the hearing officerâs award of the private tutoring expenses.

The superior court interpreted a statutory preference for the purchase of state land in a manner that disqualified Appellant Melvin Gillis, from which he appealed. Appellant is a professional sport hunting and fishing guide. He obtained a 25-year lease of five acres of state land in April 1989. Appellant built a lodge on the land, and the operation of the lodge and his guiding business were his principal sources of income. In 2005, the state Department of Natural Resources (DNR) conveyed lands, including the land Appellant leased, to Aleutians East Borough. DNR also transferred its interest in Appellant's lease to the Borough. Appellant offered to purchase the land in November 2005. The Borough Assembly rejected Appellant's offer but proposed a new lease agreement. Appellant did not execute the proposed lease, and in 2007 he claimed he was eligible to purchase the land under state law. The Borough then filed a declaratory judgment action, asking the superior court to determine whether Appellant qualified for a preference right to purchase the land. The issue on appeal was whether the applicable statute required an applicant to enter land while it was under federal ownership as a condition of the preference right. The superior court concluded that the plain meaning of the statute required an applicant to enter land when it was under federal ownership before the federal government conveyed the land to the state. The court entered summary judgment in favor of the Borough and DNR. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's interpretation of the applicable statute and its summary judgment decision.

Appellant Robert Stevens was charged with and convicted of violating local borough noise and adult entertainment ordinances. The borough later protested the continued operation of his bar under its Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (ABC Board) liquor license. The ABC Board sustained the protest and denied Appellant's continued operation. Appellant requested an adjudicatory hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) to review the ABC Board's decision. The ALJ recommended the ABC Board uphold its initial decision and enforce the denial of continued operation under the license. Appellant appealed to the superior court which affirmed the ABC Board's decision. Appellant appealed again to the Supreme Court, who found the evidence in the ABC Board's and ALJ's record sufficient to overcome a challenge that the borough behaved in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner in protesting Appellant's operation under his liquor license. The Court affirmed the superior court's decision.

An Alaska state trooper was terminated in part due to dishonesty. The Public Safety Employees Association (PSEA) filed a grievance on behalf of the discharged trooper and then invoked arbitration. An arbitrator reinstated the trooper, ruling that the State did not have cause to terminate him. The superior court upheld the arbitrator's ruling. The State appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the arbitrator committed gross error and that the reinstatement of the trooper was unenforceable. Upon review of the arbitrator's decision and subsequent superior court ruling, the Supreme Court held that the arbitrator's award in this case was not enforceable as a violation of public policy: "the State should be free to heighten its enforcement of ethical standards. . . We are [. . . ] troubled by the arbitrator's suggestion that the State's past lenience toward minor dishonesty requires it to be permanently lenient." Because the arbitrator's award was neither unenforceable nor grossly erroneous, the Court affirmed the superior court and the arbitration decision.

In 2005 the Department of Revenue denied Permanent Fund Dividends (PDFs) to Appellants In and Peggy Harrod and their children. The Harrods appealed to the superior court where they argued that the Department lacked the authority to adopt residency requirements for the dividend program, that the denial of their applications violated the U.S. and State constitutions, and that their 2002 and 2003 dividend applications were wrongfully denied. The superior court affirmed the denial of the dividends. From 1997 to 2000, the Harrods resided outside of Alaska and did not apply for PDFs. In 2001 they unsuccessfully applied. Because they had been absent from Alaska for more than five years, a presumption arose that they did not intend to return and remain in state. The DOR applied the presumption and the Harrods did not rebut it. The presumption was applied in the Harrods' 2002 and 2003 applications, and the DOR found that despite returning in state on infrequent or short trips, the Harrods had not remained in-state for five years. Having reviewed the parties' arguments and the record on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision.

In 2003, Officer Lee Virg-In used a taser twice on J.N., an 11-year-old girl. She had been driving an ATV in the streets of Kotzebue with another younger passenger. J.N. ran several stop signs and was otherwise driving dangerously. The Officer used his overhead lights and siren to signal J.N. to stop, but she refused, first trying to escape on the ATV and later on foot. According to J.N., she was never aggressive or threatening when the Officer eventually caught up with her. Sandra Russell, J.N.'s mother, filed a complaint against Officer Virg-In, alleging that his use of the taser constituted excessive force. Ms. Russell also sued the City of Kotzebue. The Officer defended the reasonableness of his actions and argued he was immune from suit. The superior court dismissed J.N.'s claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that it was error to grant the Officer qualified immunity "because if a police officer used a taser multiple times on an 11-year-old girl who was suspected of traffic violations, was compliant and was not posing a threat to the officer or others, that conduct would be so egregious that any reasonable officer would have known the conduct was an excessive use of force." The Court reversed the superior court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The State provided prisoner Dewell Pearce extensive medical care during his incarceration. Around the time of his release from custody, Mr. Pearce won a medical malpractice judgment against the State. The State paid part of the judgment, but relying on a reimbursement statute, withheld the medical care costs associated with conditions unrelated to the malpractice claim. The State then sought a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to reimbursement from Mr. Pearce for treatment of the unrelated conditions. The superior court ruled that the statute in question did not authorize the State to seek reimbursement from former prisoners no longer in custody. The State appealed. Upon review of the superior court record and the applicable statute, the Supreme Court found that the superior court misinterpreted the law. The Court reversed the superior court's ruling and vacated the judgment. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.