Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Six tribal councils, joined by two other associations, filed an action against the State of Alaska, Department of Natural Resources (DNR) in the superior court seeking a declaratory judgment that the 2005 Bristol Bay Area Plan (BBAP, the Plan) was unlawful. DNR’s motion to dismiss under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) was denied and the superior court held that: (1) the BBAP is a regulation that must be promulgated under the Alaska Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and (2) Alaska Appellate Rule 602(a)(2) does not bar the Tribes’ claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Appellate Rule 602(a)(2) did not bar the Tribe's claims and the that BBAP is not a regulation.

There was one issue for the Supreme Court's resolution in this, the fifth appeal in this case. After the last remand, the superior court entered a judgment awarding the class a principal refund of $12.4 million with prejudgment interest exceeding $62 million. The question presented on appeal was whether one of the Court's previous decisions in this case, "Carlson III," incorrectly decided that the rate of prejudgment interest for unconstitutional commercial fishing license and limited entry permit fee overpayments was the statutorily imposed punitive interest rate for underpaid and overpaid taxes under Title 43 of the Alaska Statutes. Because the statute establishing prejudgment interest for underpayment and overpayment of taxes did not apply to the refund of overpayment of the commercial fishing fees involved in this case, and because the Court's earlier incorrect holding on this issue resulted in a manifest injustice, the Court concluded that its earlier decision on this issue must be overruled. Accordingly, the Court remanded this case for a new prejudgment interest calculation.

The Bethel Superior Court entered an order terminating an incarcerated father's parental rights to three of his five children. The father appealed, arguing that the superior court erred by finding that the State made active efforts to prevent the breakup of his family and finding that it was in the children's best interests for his parental rights to be terminated. Because the superior court's active efforts and best interests findings were supported by the record and not clearly erroneous, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's ruling terminating the father's parental rights.

In this appeal, the Supreme Court considered the long-standing "emergency aid" exception to the general requirement that a search warrant be obtained prior to police entry into a residence. With this opinion, the Court established that the Alaska Constitution's standards for justifying the doctrine's application goes beyond those required by the federal Constitution, and adopted the standards the State court of appeals first implemented in "Gallmeyer v. State." The Court then considered whether the court of appeals correctly applied the doctrine when it reversed the trial court's ruling that the doctrine excused the warrantless police entry in Defendant Robert Gibson, III's case. Because the police had a reasonable belief of an emergency to justify a warrantless entry into the residence, the Supreme Court concluded the court of appeals did not, and reversed the appellate court's decision.

"Martha" and "William" are the parents of six children. They appealed the superior court’s order adjudicating their two youngest children as children in need of aid and placing the children in the custody of the Office of Children’s Services (OCS). Martha and William argued that the superior court abused its discretion in making various evidentiary rulings and contended that it was clearly erroneous for the superior court to find that the children were in need of aid and that continued custody by the parents would be contrary to the children’s best interests. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision to adjudicate the children as in need of aid and to keep them in the custody of OCS for a period not to exceed 18 months.

Appellant Shirley Shea underwent a medical procedure in 1984 that resulted in intermittent soreness in her legs, back, and pelvic region. She began working for the State of Alaska in 1993, which required her to sit at a desk for prolonged periods of time. Shea’s pain began to worsen and in 2001, it forced her to leave her job. Appellant filed for both nonoccupational and occupational disability benefits, claiming that the periods of prolonged sitting at work aggravated her condition. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Appellant's medical records indicated that prolonged sitting at work was one of the factors contributing to her chronic pain. The ALJ concluded that because Appellant's prolonged sitting at work was "simply one among many contributing factors" to her chronic pain, it was not "of particular causal significance" to her condition. Appellant appealed to the superior court, which upheld the ALJ's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that Appellant must prove only that her employment was a substantial factor (not the substantial factor) in causing her disability. The Court remanded the case back to the ALJ for a reevaluation of the evidence.

Appellant Ryan Nelson agreed to perform an errand for his employer, a subcontractor, on the Appellant's day off. While on in the errand, the Appellant was injured at the job site. His employer filed a "notice of controversion" on the basis that Appellant was intoxicated at the time of the injury and his injuries were proximately caused by his intoxication. Appellant sued the general contractor and the Municipality of Anchorage (the owner of the job site) for negligence. The defendants asked the superior court to dismiss the action under the exclusive remedy provision of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act. The superior court granted summary judgment to the general contractor and the Municipality. Appellant appeals, arguing that lack of a workers' compensation remedy permits him to bring a common law negligence action or, alternatively, that the exclusivity provision of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act denied him due process. He also argued as a matter of statutory construction, that the Municipality could not be a project owner. Because the worker has not shown that the employer’s controversion of benefits left him to his common law remedies, the Supreme Court determined Appellant's statutory construction and constitutional claims were not ripe. The Court also held that the Municipality could be a project owner.

A property owner appealed a judgment that allowed foreclosure on a borough property tax lien, arguing that the boroughâs foreclosure was legally flawed and that the boroughâs attorney should have been sanctioned for maintaining the foreclosure against his property. Because the superior court did not err in concluding there were no legal flaws in the foreclosure, and because therefore there was no basis to sanction the boroughâs attorney, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in all respects.

Appellant Alaskan Crude Corporation operates an oil and gas unit known as the "Arctic Fortitude Unit." Alaskan Crudeâs unit agreement with the Department of Natural Resources set work obligation deadlines that Alaskan Crude was required to meet to continue operating the Unit. In July 2008 the Commissioner found that Alaskan Crude had failed to meet its work obligations, gave notice that Alaskan Crude was in default under its unit agreement, and specified that the Unit would be terminated if Alaskan Crude did not cure the default by a new set of deadlines. Alaskan Crude appealed the Commissionerâs decision to the superior court, arguing that a pending judicial decision in a separate appeal qualified as a force majeure under the unit agreement, preventing Alaskan Crude from meeting its work obligations. It also argued that the Commissionerâs proposed default cure was an improper unilateral amendment of Alaskan Crudeâs unit agreement. The superior court affirmed the Commissionerâs findings and decision and Alaskan Crude appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that: (1) the pending judicial decision in Alaskan Crudeâs separate appeal did not trigger the force majeure clause of the unit agreement; and (2) the Commissionerâs proposed default cure was not a unilateral amendment of Alaskan Crudeâs unit agreement. Thus the Court affirmed the decision of the superior court upholding the decision of the Commissioner.

Six weeks after the Regulatory Commission of Alaska approved the 2007 Access Charge Rates long distance telephone companies pay to local telephone companies, an association of local telephone companies realized that five of the rates the Regulatory Commission approved were based upon an erroneous spreadsheet the association included in its rate filings. The association requested that the Regulatory Commission correct the rates. The Regulatory Commission corrected the rates prospectively, but concluded retrospective application was barred by the Supreme Court's case law on retroactive ratemaking. The superior court agreed that retrospective application of the adjusted rates was impermissible, and the association appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in "Matanuska Electric Association, Inc. v. Chugach Electric Association, Inc." (prohibiting retroactive ratemaking in "second look" cases), but held that the Regulatory Commission has the authority to implement corrections of some procedural mistakes starting when notice of a mistake is given. The Court remanded to the Regulatory Commission to determine the type of error that occurred in this case and whether the error should be corrected retrospectively.