Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

An Alaska state trooper was discharged for having consensual sex with a domestic violence victim the morning after assisting in the arrest of the victim's husband. The Public Safety Employees Association (PSEA) filed a grievance under its collective bargaining agreement with the State. An arbitrator ordered that the trooper be reinstated with back pay after a three-day suspension, concluding that the State did not have just cause to discharge the trooper. The superior court upheld the arbitrator's order of back pay but decided that it could not enforce the ordered reinstatement because the Alaska Police Standards Council had by this point revoked the trooper's police certificate. The State appealed, arguing that the arbitrator committed gross error and that the order was unenforceable as a violation of public policy. The Supreme Court "generally will not disturb the results of a binding arbitration, even where [it] would reach a different conclusion were we to review the matter independently." The Court reasoned that because no statute, regulation, or written policy prohibited supervisors from engaging in progressive discipline of the trooper, in lieu of discharging him for his misconduct, the arbitrator's decision to impose discipline rather than uphold the termination did not violate any explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy. Because the arbitrator's award was neither unenforceable nor grossly erroneous, the Court affirmed the superior court's decision to uphold the arbitration award in part. View "Alaska v. Public Safety Employees Association" on Justia Law

As a condition of her employment, Employee signed an agreement to arbitrate claims with Employer. Employee later filed a complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (ICRC), alleging that Employer had discriminated against her because of her pregnancy. The ICRC subsequently filed a statement of charges with the Iowa Department of Inspections and Appeals (DIA). Employer filed a motion to dismiss the ICRC’s charges or, in the alternative, compel arbitration. The DIA denied Employer’s motion on the ground that ICRC was not a party to the arbitration agreement and, consequently, not bound by it. On judicial review, the district court remanded instructions for the ICRC to dismiss the matter pending arbitration by the parties, concluding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted state law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the FAA did not require arbitration of this proceeding because it was brought by an entity that was not bound to arbitrate under generally applicable principles of contract law, where the ICRC was not a party to the agreement and its interest was not derivative of Employee’s. View "Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Town of Malborough terminated the employment of Emily Chaponis as town assessor after the board of selectmen did not make a motion to reappoint her to a successive term of office. Chaponis filed a grievance through the Union, of which she was a member, alleging that the Town violated its collective bargaining agreement with the Union by discharging her without just cause. An arbitration panel ordered the Town to reinstate Chaponis to her position, concluding that the Town violated the agreement when it terminated Chaponis' employment without just cause. The trial court denied the Town's application to vacate the arbitration award. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arbitrators' award ordering the reinstatement of Chaponis' employment after the statutory expiration of her term of office contravened the mandates of the statutory scheme governing the term of office for municipal officers, and therefore, the award was unenforceable. Remanded. View "Town of Marlborough v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 818-052" on Justia Law

While employed with Employer, Employee agreed to arbitrate any disputes arising from his employment. Employee's employment was later terminated. Employee filed a charge of discrimination with the Utah Anti-Discrimination and Labor Division of the Utah Labor Commission (UALD), alleging that Employer discriminated against him, retaliated against him, and harassed him. The UALD dismissed Employee's discrimination claims. Employee appealed to the Utah Labor Commission. The district court subsequently granted Employer's motion to compel arbitration and ordered Employee to submit to arbitration. The Supreme Court vacated the order compelling arbitration, holding that the district court erred in compelling arbitration because the plain language of the arbitration clause in Employee's employment contract allowed him to pursue administrative remedies prior to submitting to arbitration. View "Zions Mgmt. Servs. v. Record" on Justia Law

The Providence School Board (Board) provided health insurance to active employees and retirees. In 2006, the Providence Teachers Union (Union) filed a grievance protesting a difference in the increase of premium costs for retirees compared with a more modest increase in premium costs for active employees. The Union argued that the Board's action violated three provisions of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the board and the union. An arbitrator ruled in the Union's favor, concluding that the Board violated the CBA by failing to include retirees and active employees in a single group when it calculated the healthcare premium rates. The trial justice vacated the arbitration award, concluding (1) the Union did not have standing to pursue a grievance on behalf of retirees, and (2) the issue of the calculation of the group premium rate was not arbitrable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) pursuant to Arena v. City of Providence and City of Newport v. Local 1080, the Union could not pursue this grievance on behalf of the retirees; and (2) because the Union had no standing to pursue this particular grievance, the grievance was not arbitrable. View "Providence Sch. Bd. v. Providence Teachers Union, Local 958" on Justia Law

Several union groups filed unfair labor practice complaints against Macomb County and the Macomb County Road Commission over a change in the method for calculating pension benefits. The groups argued the County lowered benefits without bargaining on the issue as required by Michigan labor law. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that disputes over terms or conditions of employment covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) are subject to arbitration through a grievance process. When the CBA grants the retirement commission discretion to use actuarial tables to establish pension benefits, the decision to change a long-standing method of calculating those benefits does not (by itself) constitute the clear and unmistakable evidence needed to overcome the CBA's coverage, nor does it create a new condition of employment that would trigger the need to bargain. As a result, none of the unfair labor practices alleged in this case could be sustained, and the remedy for this dispute should have gone through the grievance process called for in the CBA. View "Macomb County v. AFSCME Council 25 Locals 411 & 893 " on Justia Law

Michael Nadeau, an employee with the Bureau of Insurance, married a manager of a Bureau-regulated entity. The Bureau subsequently discharged Nadeau on the basis that his continued employment at the Bureau while married to a manager of a Bureau-regulated entity violated Me. Rev. Stat. 24, 209(1). Nadeau initiated the grievance process manadated by the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). After an arbitration hearing, the arbitrator concluded that the Bureau violated the CBA by discharging Nadeau without just cause and ordered his reinstatement. The Bureau petitioned the superior court seeking to vacate the arbitration award, contending that the award of reinstatement required the Bureau to violate section 209(1), which prohibits the Bureau from employing persons "connected with the management" of Bureau-regulated entities. The superior court reported the case to the Supreme Court. The Court declined to answer the reported question regarding the interpretation of section 209 after finding that the arbitration award did not violate public policy, the arbitrator did not exceed his powers, and the award was not subject to further judicial scrutiny on that basis. Remanded for entry of a judgment confirming the arbitration award. View "Dep't of Prof'l & Fin. Regulation v. State Employees Ass'n" on Justia Law

In 2002, county voters adopted an amendment to the county charter relating to the resolution by binding arbitration of collective bargaining impasses with the county's law enforcement employees and uniformed firefighters. In 2003, the county council adopted an ordinance implementing that charter provision. In 2011, the county council amended the 2003 ordinance to provide that binding arbitration did not require the council to appropriate funds or enact legislation necessary to implement a final written award in arbitration. An uncodified section of the 2011 council bill also provided that, if any part of the 2011 ordinance were held invalid, the entire county code section enacted by the 2003 ordinance, as amended through the 2011 ordinance, would be deemed repealed by operation of law, with the result that impasses would be addressed by a code section that did not authorize binding arbitration. Petitioners sought a declaratory judgment that the 2011 ordinance violated the 2002 charter amendment. The circuit court held the 2002 charter amendment violated the Maryland Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the 2002 charter amendment bound the county council; and (2) portions of the 2011 ordinance, as well as its uncodified section 3, violated the charter and were invalid. Remanded. View "Atkinson v. Anne Arundel County" on Justia Law

The Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery County Lodge 35, Inc. (FOP) filed a grievance under its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Montgomery County following the County's unilateral decision to discontinue a long-standing practice of allowing shop stewards to sit in on disciplinary interrogations for training purposes. The County filed a motion to dismiss the grievance, arguing that arbitration of the issue was preempted by the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBR). The arbitrator determined the grievance was not preempted and denied the motion to dismiss. Subsequently, the County filed a petition to vacate the arbitration award in the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the arbitrator's decision and granted summary judgment on behalf of the FOP. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the LEOBR was not implicated by the steward training grievance and, therefore, did not preempt its arbitration under the CBA. View "Montgomery Co. v. FOP Lodge 35" on Justia Law

Brentwood Homes, Inc. and the other appellants in this case (collectively "Brentwood Homes") appealed a circuit court's order denying a motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration in a lawsuit filed by Petitioner Fred Bradley that arose out of his purchase of a home in South Carolina. Although Brentwood Homes conceded the Home Purchase Agreement did not meet the technical requirements of the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act (the "UAA"), it claimed the court erred in denying the motion because the transaction involved interstate commerce and thus was subject to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because the essential character of the Agreement was strictly for the purchase of a completed residential dwelling and not the construction, the Court found the FAA did not apply. Furthermore, the existence of the national warranty and Bradley's use of out-of-state financing did not negate the intrastate nature of the transaction. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order denying Brentwood Homes' motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration as Brentwood Homes failed to offer sufficient evidence that the transaction involved interstate commerce to subject the Agreement to the FAA.