Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a dispute over the constitutionality of two Arkansas statutes that mandate the creation of certain county-funded employee positions to serve three of the seventeen judicial-district divisions within the Sixth Judicial Circuit serving Pulaski and Perry Counties. The funding for these positions was initially part of the 2023 budget, authorized by Pulaski County Ordinance No. 22-OR-45. However, Pulaski County Judge Barry Hyde later announced his decision not to fill some of the vacant positions within the Fifth Division. This led to a lawsuit by then-sitting Fifth Division Circuit Judge Wendell Griffen and his successor in office, Judge-elect LaTonya Austin Honorable, against Judge Hyde, seeking a judicial remedy to mandate the filling of these positions as appropriated in the 2023 budget.The case was first heard in the Pulaski County Circuit Court, where Judge Hyde contended that the two statutes in question are unconstitutional as special and local legislation under amendment 14 of the Arkansas Constitution. The circuit court ruled in favor of Judge Hyde, declaring the statutes unconstitutional because they apply only to specific divisions rather than all divisions in the Sixth Judicial Circuit. The court also dismissed arguments of estoppel raised by Judge-elect Honorable, finding that Pulaski County’s previous funding of these positions did not preclude it from now challenging the constitutionality of the statutes.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that both statutes violate amendment 14’s prohibition on local and special acts, as they arbitrarily apply specifically to the employment of certain personnel for the First, Fourth, and Fifth Divisions of the Sixth Judicial Circuit rather than uniformly across the district or the state. The court also rejected the argument of estoppel, stating that the County should not be punished for its previous compliance with the law and should not be estopped from bringing this constitutional challenge. View "Austin v. Hyde" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the City of Helena-West Helena and its Mayor, Christopher Franklin, and a resident, Greg Williams. The dispute arose when the Helena-West Helena City Council passed two ordinances, one increasing the conflict-of-interest limit for contracts signed with the City and the other raising the mayor's base pay. The then-mayor, Kevin Smith, vetoed both ordinances, citing the timing of the meeting as an attempt to circumvent the new city council. When Mayor Franklin took office, he attempted to rescind Smith's veto, stating that the ordinances should become law.The Phillips County Circuit Court had previously granted Williams's request for declaratory relief, ruling that the previous mayor's veto of the two city ordinances was proper. The court found that Smith had timely and properly executed a veto regarding the ordinances and that his veto was not overridden by a two-thirds vote of the City Council. As a result, the court declared all actions taken by the Council on December 30, including the passage of the two ordinances, null and void.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The court disagreed with the appellants' argument that Smith's veto was ineffective due to his failure to comply with the statutory requirements. The court found that Smith had complied with the statute by timely vetoing the Council's actions and filing a written statement of his reasons for the veto prior to the next regular Council meeting. The court also disagreed with the appellants' interpretation of the statute, stating that the statute does not affirmatively require that the mayor's reasons for the veto be presented to the Council in order to effectuate the veto. View "CITY OF HELENA-WEST HELENA v. WILLIAMS" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Union Pacific Railroad Company and its employee, Randy G. Franklin. Franklin, a long-time employee of Union Pacific, brought a gun to work and stored it in his locked vehicle, which was parked in Union Pacific's parking lot. This action was in compliance with Arkansas law, but violated Union Pacific's company policy that bans employees from carrying firearms onto its property. As a result, Union Pacific terminated Franklin's employment, which was later reduced to a lengthy suspension by an arbitration panel.Union Pacific filed a declaratory-judgment action in federal court, seeking a declaration that Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-5-117, which allows employees to store firearms in their vehicles on their employer's property, is preempted by the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) when applied to Union Pacific parking lots in Arkansas. Franklin counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that Union Pacific must allow him to bring his firearm onto railroad property, as long as the firearm is legally possessed for a lawful purpose and stored out of sight in his locked car.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas certified a question to the Supreme Court of Arkansas: whether the prohibitions in Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-5-117 are severable from the liability-immunity provisions in section 16-120-802(a) such that section 11-5-117 would still apply when the liability-immunity provisions of section 16-120-802(a) cannot apply.The Supreme Court of Arkansas answered the certified question in the affirmative. The court found that section 11-5-117, which protects the rights of employees to store firearms in their vehicles on their employer's property, is not dependent on the liability-immunity provisions of section 16-120-802. Therefore, even if the latter is preempted by FELA, section 11-5-117 is not likewise preempted. The court concluded that regardless of whether FELA preempts section 16-120-802(a), section 11-5-117 still applies. View "UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY V. FRANKLIN" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over a medical marijuana cultivation license issued by the Arkansas Medical Marijuana Commission to Bennett Scott “Storm” Nolan II. 2600 Holdings, LLC, an unsuccessful applicant for the same license, filed a lawsuit against the Commission and other state entities, alleging that Nolan's application did not meet the minimum merit selection criteria and that the Commission violated its own rules and the Arkansas Constitution in awarding the license to Nolan. Nolan was not initially named as a defendant or joined as a party in the lawsuit.The Pulaski County Circuit Court denied Nolan's multiple motions to join the lawsuit as an indispensable party under Rule 19(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure and granted summary judgment in favor of 2600 Holdings. The court ruled that the Commission had exceeded its discretion and violated the Arkansas Constitution and its own rules in awarding the license to Nolan.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the lower court's decision, finding that Nolan was indeed an indispensable party under Rule 19(a)(2). The court held that the lower court erred in not joining Nolan as an indispensable party to the litigation. As a result, the court vacated the order granting summary judgment to 2600 Holdings and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not address Nolan's remaining issues as they were deemed moot due to the reversal and remand. View "Nolan v. 2600 Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves the Arkansas Voter Integrity Initiative, Inc., and Conrad Reynolds (appellants) who filed a complaint against John Thurston, the Arkansas Secretary of State, the Arkansas State Board of Election Commissioners, and Election Systems and Software, LLC (appellees). The appellants claimed that the voting machines approved by the state did not comply with the Arkansas Code and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) because voters could not independently verify their selections on the ballot before casting their votes. They argued that the machines printed ballots with both bar codes and the voter's selections in English, but the vote tabulator only scanned the bar codes. Since most voters cannot read bar codes, the appellants claimed that voters were unable to verify their votes as required by state and federal law. They also alleged that the appellees committed an illegal exaction by using public funds for the purchase and maintenance of these machines and that Election Systems and Software, LLC violated the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and committed fraud by claiming that its machines complied with state and federal law.The Pulaski County Circuit Court dismissed the appellants' complaint. The court found that the voting machines complied with the Arkansas Code and HAVA. The court also denied the appellants' motion for recusal and their motion for a new trial. The appellants appealed these decisions.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the voting process complied with the Arkansas Code and HAVA. The court also found that the appellants failed to demonstrate evidence of bias or prejudice sufficient to warrant the recusal of the circuit court judge. Finally, the court found that the appellants were not deprived of their right to a jury trial and that the circuit court did not err by denying their motion for a new trial. View "ARKANSAS VOTER INTEGRITY INITIATIVE, INC., AND CONRAD REYNOLDS v. JOHN THURSTON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ARKANSAS SECRETARY OF STATE; THE ARKANSAS STATE BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS, IN ITS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AND ELECTION SYSTEMS AND SOFTWARE, LLC" on Justia Law

The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded a decision of the Phillips County Circuit Court, which had found in favor of Kit and Jole Wilson in their dispute with the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration (ADFA). The Wilsons had restored a building in Arkansas and were granted a historic-rehabilitation income-tax credit. The ADFA applied this credit to the Wilsons' 2015 tax return before apportionment, reducing their tax liability. The Wilsons protested, asserting that their tax liability should have been zero after applying the credit. The circuit court ruled in the Wilsons' favor, determining that the ADFA must apply the credit after apportioning the Wilsons’ tax due and that certain state codes conflicted with each other.However, the Supreme Court found that the ADFA correctly applied the tax credit before apportionment, in line with state law. The court also held that the state codes did not conflict with each other. The court concluded that the circuit court erred in its statutory interpretation and reversed its decision. View "STATE OF ARKANSAS, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND ADMINiSTRATION v. WILSON" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the denial of declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus petitions filed by Charles Sims, an inmate in the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC). Sims had sought a declaration that he was eligible for parole, contrary to the determination made by ADC. The court affirmed the circuit court's finding that Sims was ineligible for parole according to the Arkansas Code.Sims had pleaded guilty to first-degree murder in 1995 and was paroled in 2007. In 2010, he pleaded guilty to first-degree battery and kidnapping, and was sentenced to concurrent terms of 180 months' imprisonment to run concurrently with his remaining sentence for first-degree murder. ADC records applied section 16-93-609 to Sims’s sentence for battery and kidnapping, determining him ineligible for parole.The court held that Sims had failed to establish a justiciable controversy or that he had a legal interest in the controversy, two prerequisites for declaratory relief. The court also noted that parole eligibility determinations fall within the purview of ADC, not the judiciary. The court further held that the absence of a reference to the parole-eligibility statute in the judgment did not constitute a requirement for parole eligibility.The court also dismissed Sims's argument that section 5-4-501(d)(2) was inapplicable to him, holding that the court has applied the relevant sections when the prior conviction consisted of only one offense. The court concluded that Sims had not established a right to parole eligibility, and therefore had no basis for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. The court affirmed the circuit court's decisions, ruling it did not clearly err or abuse its discretion when it denied and dismissed Sims's petitions for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus. View "SIMS v. DEXTER PAYNE, DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that Petitioner had failed to state a ground for the writ.Petitioner pled guilty to rape and aggravated robbery and was sentenced as a habitual offender. In his habeas corpus petition, Petitioner alleged that he was innocent of the offense of rape, that the State maliciously applied the habitual offender statute in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that the Arkansas statute requiring that he serve 100 percent of his sentence was unconstitutional. The circuit court found that the claims were not cognizable in habeas and noted that parole eligibility falls within the domain of the executive branch. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err. View "White v. Payne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court holding that the Arkansas Racing Commission's (ARC) decision to award the Pope County casino license to Cherokee Nation Businesses, LLC (CNB) and Legends Resort and Casino, LLC (Legends) was a "legal nullity, void and of no effect," holding that the circuit court did not err.In this third iteration of appeals involving the issuance of the license Gulfside Casino Partnership (Gulfside) argued that the ARC's action was ultra vires because it was issued in violation of the clear language of amendment 100 to the Arkansas Constitution. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Gulfside, concluding that the casino license issued by the ARC jointly to CNB and Legends was an ultra vires action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its decision. View "Cherokee Nation Businesses, LLC v. Gulfside Casino Partnership" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Defendant's petition and amended petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus wherein Defendant alleged that the Arkansas Department of Correction illegally changed his discharge date, holding that the circuit court correctly denied the petition and amended petition.After being sentenced in 2007, Defendant was paroled in 2015. Defendant was taken into custody a year later. In his petition and amended petition Defendant alleged that after revocation of his parole and his return to prison, he was informed that his discharge date had been illegally moved. The circuit court denied the petition for failure to state a claim for relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's petitions for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus. View "Andrews v. Payne" on Justia Law