Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

On July 12, 2010, Appellant was hired as a patient-care tech by Employer. On January 11, 2012, Employer terminated Appellant’s employment for Appellant's failure to become certified within eighteen months of being hired. The Department of Workforce Services denied Appellant’s subsequent application for unemployment benefits, finding that Appellant was discharged for failure to become certified. The Board of Review upheld the Department’s denial of benefits, concluding that Appellant’s actions were a willful disregard of her employer’s interests, and therefore, Appellant was discharged for misconduct in connection with her work. After noting that Appellant was on track to receive her testing date in advance of the eighteen-month deadline but for Employer’s failure properly to complete her application for testing, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board could not have reasonably reached its conclusion that Appellant’s actions were misconduct where the required element of intent was so lacking. Remanded. View "Garrett v. Dir., Dep't of Workforce Servs." on Justia Law

Appellant served as constable for a township in Greene County from 2008 to 2012. In 2011, Greene County set constable salaries at $25 per month. Appellant later submitted claims for reimbursement of expenses incurred while working as constable to Greene County. The County denied the claims. Appellant appealed the order denying his claims for expenses and also filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking to have the ordinance setting the salaries for constables declared arbitrary and capricious and therefore unconstitutional. The circuit court consolidated the actions, denied Appellant's claim for reimbursement of expenses, and found that the ordinance setting the salary for constables was constitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Appellant's claim for expenses and that the Greene County ordinance setting constable salaries at $25 per month was not unconstitutional. View "Graves v. Greene County" on Justia Law

In 1991, the cities of Carlisle and Lonoke requested a writ of mandamus to require Lonoke County to pay one-half of the judicial and clerk salaries and a portion of the expenses of the municipal courts in those cities pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-17-115 ("the 1987 statute"). The circuit court granted the writ. In 2007, the 1987 statute was amended with an effective date of 2012. In 2012, the City of Lonoke and the Lonoke District Court ("the City") sought a writ directing the County to obey they 1991 order as it related to funding the Lonoke District Court, alleging that the 2012 statute allowed the County to ignore the 1991 order and reduce its obligation to pay its proportionate share of the expenses for the district court. The circuit court issued a writ of mandamus and awarded attorney's fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court properly issued a writ of mandamus ordering the County to abide by the 1991 order; and (2) the circuit court erred in awarding fees. View "Lonoke County v. City of Lonoke" on Justia Law

A circuit court affirmed an administrative decision from the Arkansas Department of Human Serices Office of Appeals and Hearings which placed Appellant Jose Marrufo on the Arkansas Child Maltreatment Central Registry. On appeal, Appellant raised two issues: (1) because the Department failed to timely conduct an administrative hearing within the statutory time frame (180 days), the proceedings against him should have been dismissed; and (2) the administrative law judge erred in failing to consider his affirmative defense to placement on the Registry. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Marrufo v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs." on Justia Law

Employee was employer at Employer's aluminum-processing plant from 1957 to 1989. In 2009, Employee filed an occupational-disease claim for benefits with the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission, alleging that he suffered from cancer caused by his exposure to asbestos while working for Employer. A law judge found Employee's complaint was time barred. Rather than appeal the decision to the full Commission, Employee filed suit against Employer in circuit court. Employer filed a motion to dismiss based on the exclusive remedy afforded by the Workers' Compensation Act. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that, where a plaintiff's disease manifests after the statute of limitations has expired, a circuit court has authority to exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims. The Supreme Court granted Employer's requested writ of prohibition, holding that the Commission had exclusive jurisdiction to decide the issue in the first instance, and because Employee's claim was not submitted to the Commission, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to decide the case. View "Reynolds Metal Co. v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a claim for benefits associated with an injury he received during his employment. The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commissioned denied the claim based on a finding that Appellant tested positive for controlled substances after the injury and that he failed to rebut the statutory presumption that his injury was substantially occasioned by his drug use. Appellant appealed, arguing that the Commission's decision was not supported by substantial evidence and that the Commission lacked the authority to make credibility determinations contrary to those made by an ALJ. Currently before the Supreme Court was Defendant's motion to supplement the record with affidavits and depositions that Appellant attached to a brief he previously filed. The Supreme Court remanded to the Commission to settle the record to determine whether the documents were actually placed in the record. View "Prock v. Bull Shoals Boat Landing" on Justia Law

Appellant received an injury during his employment with Appellee. The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission denied Appellant's claim for benefits based on a finding that Appellant tested positive for illegal drugs after the injury and that he failed to rebut the statutory presumption that his injury was substantially occasioned by his drug use. Appellant appealed, contending (1) the Commission's decision was not supported by substantial evidence, and (2) the structure of the Commission was unconstitutional. Currently before the Supreme Court was Appellant's motion to supplement the record. The Court remanded to the Commission to settle the record with regard to certain affidavits and depositions. View "Edmisten v. Bull Shoals Landing" on Justia Law

Pulaski County issued an assessment and taxation of property owned by the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences (UAMS). On behalf of UAMS, Appellant (the University) filed a tax-exemption application seeking an exemption from ad valorem property taxes based on sovereign immunity. The county assessor's office and county equalization board denied the request. The county court also denied the exemption. On appeal, the circuit court denied the University's motion for summary judgment and subsequent motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court dismissed the University's interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the University failed to establish an exception to the general rule that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is neither reviewable nor appealable. View "Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark. v. Pulaski County" on Justia Law

Alpha Marketing brought this cause of action against the Arkansas Lottery Commission seeking declaratory relief that Alpha's registered trademarks of "Arkansas Lottery," "Arkansas Lotto," and "Lottery Arkansas" were valid and that it held exclusive rights to use them. Alpha also sought injunctive relief enjoining the Commission's alleged acts of trademark infringement and monetary damages. Alpha later amended its complaint, alleging ultra vires acts and an unconstitutional taking. The Commission filed a motion to dismiss Alpha's lawsuit on the basis that the Commission had sovereign immunity from the trademark-infringement claims. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commission was an entity of the State entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity; (2) Alpha's claims for injunctive, monetary, and declaratory relief were barred by the defense of sovereign immunity; (3) the exceptions for waiver; ultra vires, arbitrary, capricious, or bad-faith acts; and takings did not apply. View "Ark. Lottery Comm'n v. Alpha Mktg." on Justia Law

Appellant was employed by Employer when he suffered a compensable work-related brain injury. Appellant, who was permanently and totally disabled, filed a workers' compensation claim seeking benefits and also requested benefits for the nursing care services his mother was providing. The workers' compensation commission (Commission) found Appellant's injury was compensable but denied the requested nursing service benefits. Appellant subsequently made a second request for additional benefits in the form of nursing services at Timber Ridge Ranch, an assisted living facility. The Commission denied Appellant benefits, finding that the services at Timber Ridge were not nursing services as defined by the law. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission's findings and conclusions were not supported by substantial evidence and that the services provided at Timber Ridge qualified as nursing services under the applicable statutes. Remanded. View "Pack v. Little Rock Convention Ctr. & Visitors Bureau" on Justia Law