Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from a medical helicopter accident in Arkansas. Employer was the owner and operator of the helicopter and provided air-ambulance services to the area. Nurse and EMT (collectively, Appellants) and Pilot (Appellee) were all employees of Employer. On the day of the accident, Appellants picked up the victim of an automobile accident in Arkansas, and Pilot piloted the helicopter toward the hospital. However, the helicopter crashed. Nurse and EMT brought a negligence suit against Pilot, alleging their injuries were caused by Pilot's negligent operation of the helicopter. The circuit court dismissed the suit based on the exclusive-remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. Appellants appealed, and the case was transferred to the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission. The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission concluded that, at the time of the accident, Pilot was performing his employer's duty to provide a safe work place for Appellants and was therefore entitled to immunity under the workers' compensation statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not err in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. View "Miller v. Enders" on Justia Law

Appellants in this case were three companies engaged in providing cable-television services to subscribers (collectively, "Charter"). In a consolidated petition for review, Charter challenged the Tax Division of Appellee Arkansas Public Service Commission's ad valorem assessments of its properties for the tax years 2006 through 2009. The Commission upheld the Tax Division's assessments, and the circuit court affirmed. Charter appealed, arguing (1) the assessments were erroneous because they included the valuation of intangible personal property, which it claimed was exempt from taxation, and (2) the assessment of intangible property was illegal because the tax Division failed to promulgate rules that would provide notice of the change to taxpayers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not err by assessing the value of Charter's intangible personal property because the relevant statutes require the assessment of a cable-television company's intangible personal property, and the exemption provision exempting the taxation of intangible personal property did not apply; and (2) the Court was precluded from addressing Charter's second issue on appeal. View "Falcon Cable Media LP v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law

This case involved provisions of the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The circuit court dismissed Appellant's complaint against Appellees, the city, the city administrator, and members of the board of directors, contending that the administrator violated the open-meetings provision of the FOIA when he presented to individual board members, in advance of a study session, a memorandum expressing his opinion on a proposed ordinance that might come before the board. The circuit court found in favor of Appellees. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court's conclusion that the administrator did not violate the open-meetings provision of the FOIA; and (2) reversed the circuit court's findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to its determination that the FOIA's open-meetings provision and criminal provision were unconstitutional. In so holding, the Court declined to grant Appellees' request to overrule Harris v. City of Fort Smith, in which the Court construed the open-meetings provision of the FOIA to give effect to the intent of the legislature that public business be performed in an open and public manner. View "McCutchen v. City of Fort Smith" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from issues involving the school-funding system and the disbursement of uniform rate of tax (URT) revenues to Arkansas's public-school districts. Appellees, school districts and their taxpayers ("School Districts"), filed a complaint seeking a declaration that any attempt by Appellants, the commissioner of the department of education and the state treasurer ("ADE"), to demand URT revenues in excess of the foundation-funding amount from Appellees was unconstitutional. The circuit court enjoined ADE from (1) seeking repayment of any portion of the URT revenues assessed for purposes of school funding from Appellees, and (2) withholding monies belonging to Appellees for the repayment of the URT revenues required for school funding from state or federal monies owed to the districts. The Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal and reversed on cross-appeal, holding that the circuit court (1) correctly found that ADE was not authorized by the legislature to recoup and redistribute any URT revenues received from the School Districts that were in excess of the foundation-funding amount; (2) did not err in finding that ADE lacked the authority to withhold monies from the School Districts; and (3) erred in finding that the revenues generated by the URT were state-tax revenues. View "Kimbrell v. McCleskey" on Justia Law

This was an appeal from a circuit court judgment affirming the classification of real property for tax purposes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court correctly found that the Arkansas Constitution and the Assessment Coordination Rules and Regulations allowed the land at issue to be classified as residential and not timber land; (2) ad hoc requirements were not imposed only on Appellants by Appellee Pope County Board of Equalization (BOE); (3) Appellants failed to demonstrate that they were similarly situated to any other taxpayer or landowner within the city limits, and therefore, Appellants' equal-protection claim that the circuit court erred in denying Appellants' petition without considering similarly situated property owners with similar property classified as timber and pasture within city limits was without merit; and (4) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a site visit by BOE's expert witness between the first day of trial and the second day of trial. View "McWilliams v. Pope County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Appellants appealed form the decision of the circuit court, which upheld an order of the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission granting relief to SEECO, Inc. in connection with a proposed drilling and production unit. The court of appeals affirmed in part, finding that the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence. However, the court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the portion of the appeal in which Appellants argued that the circuit court erred by not allowing them to present additional evidence to the Commission. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals opinion and affirmed in part and dismissed in part, holding (1) the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary and capricious; and (2) the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellants' appeal from the circuit court's order denying Appellants' request to present additional evidence to the Commission. View "Walls v. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm'n" on Justia Law

In this workers' compensation case, Employee filed a claim for benefits after receiving an injury to his left great toe. An ALJ found that Employee had sustained a compensable injury to his left great toe, either as an accidental "specific incident" injury or as an injury caused by rapid-repetitive motion. The Workers' Compensation Commission reversed and denied Employee's claim for benefits because he failed to prove that he sustained a compensable injury to his left great toe. The court of appeals reversed the Commission's decision on the ground that Employee had established a claim for rapid-repetitive injury. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and reversed the Commission, holding that the injury Employee suffered at work was caused by a specific incident, and therefore, his injury was compensable as a specific-incident injury. View "Pearson v. Worksource" on Justia Law

Appellant Voltage Vehicles appealed an order of the Arkansas Motor Vehicle Commission directing Voltage to repurchase six 2008 electric vehicles from two Arkansas dealers (collectively referred to as "Rainbow"). The order stemmed from a safety recall issued by Voltage regarding its vehicles, Rainbow's subsequent letter to Voltage and to the Commission notifying them of its desire to terminate the licensing agreement, and Voltage's refusal to repurchase the six vehicles Rainbow purchased from Voltage. The circuit court affirmed the Commission's order. Voltage appealed, arguing that the buy-back provisions of the Arkansas Motor Vehicle Commission Act did not require it to repurchase the vehicles in Rainbow's inventory because they were not for the "current model year and one year prior model year." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the Commission failed in its obligation to make sufficient findings of fact relevant to the contested issued of what constituted the current model year, the Court could not determine whether the Commission resolved that issue in conformity with the law. Remanded to make findings based on the correct termination date. View "Voltage Vehicles v. Ark. Motor Vehicle Comm'n" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a decision made by Appellee, Office of State Procurement (OSP), rejecting the protest submitted by Appellant, Fatpipe, Inc., of a contract award for the State's purchase of bandwidth equipment. Fatpipe sought judicial review of that decision. The circuit court granted OSP's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court dismissed Fatpipe's appeal, holding that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review the decision, as (1) Fatpipe was not among the class of entities entitled to lodge a protest against the contract award, and (2) OSP's decision, which merely determined that Fatpipe's protest could not be heard, was not subject to review under the APA.

A taxpayer class filed an illegal-exaction complaint. The case was remanded for the circuit court to ascertain a remedy consistent with the Supreme Court's decision that the taxpayers had proved a valid claim for illegal exaction of increased ad valorem library taxes for the 2007 ad valorem tax year. In this appeal, the taxpayers contended that the circuit court erred in applying the voluntary-payment rule to class members who paid the tax in question prior to the date the complaint for illegal exaction was filed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, holding that the order appealed was not a final order and did not contain specific factual findings of any danger of hardship or injustice that could be alleviated by an immediate appeal, and therefore, the Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal.