Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Comcast of Little Rock filed three petitions for review with the Arkansas Public Service Commission, asserting that Comcast's ad valorem tax assessment for the years 2006-08 erroneously included the value of its intangible personal property. The Commission's ALJ dismissed Comcast's petitions. Comcast subsequently filed a complaint for refund of taxes in the county court, asserting that it was entitled to a refund of taxes erroneously assessed against it and arguing that the Commission's tax division improperly included the value of Comcast's intangible personal property when calculating its assessments. The county court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction in the matter and dismissed the claims. The circuit court also dismissed Comcasts's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Comcast's challenge to its assessment; and (2) because Comcasts's claim did not challenge the validity of the underlying tax, but rather alleged that the assessment was carried out in an illegal fashion, the suit did not come within Arkasnas's illegal-exaction provision, and therefore, Comcast's avenue of relief for its assessment grievance lay with the Commission.

This appeal was the second of two appeals involving the same issue, the first of which was Curry v. Pope County, 2011 Ark. 407. At issue in the appeal was Ark. Const. amend. 79, which prohibits an increase in the assessed value on a principal place of residence after the taxpayer's sixty-fifth birthday unless that taxpayer has made substantial improvements on that residence. Appellant Howard Curry appealed a circuit court's order finding that improvements made to his property prior to his sixty-fifth birthday were "substantial improvements" within the meaning of amendment 79 and that Appellees, the Pope County Equalization Board and the county tax assessor, would be allowed to include these improvements in the assessment of Appellant's property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in labeling the changes Appellant made to his property before he turned age sixty-five as substantial improvements, and (2) the assessor did not err in assessing Appellant's property at a higher amount than the assessment value in place when Curry turned age sixty-five due to the timing of the date of assessment value in relation to the date of property owners' birthdays.

Howard Curry's property appraisal increased on two different occasions after his sixty-fifth birthday. After the second assessment, Curry unsuccessfully petitioned the Equalization Board of Pope County to reduce the appraisal on his property. Curry then filed a petition in the county court, stating that the valuation was arbitrary and unreasonable and that the property was incorrectly assessed under Ark. Const. amend. 79, which prohibits an increase in the assessed value on a principal place of residence after the taxpayer's sixty-fifth birthday, unless that taxpayer has made substantial improvements on that residence. The county court ruled only on the assessment value and did not rule on the amendment 79 issues. Curry appealed and also filed a petition for declaratory relief and an injunction. The two cases were merged for trial. The circuit court ruled on the assessment, which was higher than the assessment in place on Curry's sixty-fifth birthday, and found that the improvements Curry made to his residence before he turned age sixty-five were "substantial improvements" within the language of the amendment. In the first of Curry's two appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed for the reasons stated in the second appeal, Curry v. Pope County, 2011 Ark. 408.

Robert Robinette was arrested for suspicion of driving while intoxicated. After Robinette received notice of suspension of his driving privileges, Robinette requested an administrative hearing before the Department of Finance and Administration's Office of Driver Services (DFA). After a hearing the hearing officer allowed the suspension. Robinette appealed, alleging that (1) the notice was deficient because rather than stating that a hearing be requested within seven "calendar" days, the notice stated seven days, thus violating Ark. Code Ann. 5-65-402 or -403; and (2) the omission of the term "calendar" rendered the notice, and any action to suspend his license, void. The circuit court denied Robinette's motion for summary judgment and sustained the decision of the DFA. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order, holding that because Robinette was granted the opportunity to be heard, he did not demonstrate any prejudice resulting from want of strict compliance in the notice provided him, and therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Robinette's summary-judgment motion.

After approving a fall wild turkey hunting season, the Arkansas Game & Fish Commission (AGFC) amended its codes approving the season and closed wild turkey hunting for the season. Appellant David Clark filed a complaint in the circuit court, requesting a temporary injunction directing AGFC not to implement the action until a full hearing on the merits had been held and a permanent injunction directing AGFC not to close the season until it gave the public proper notice and opportunity to be heard. The circuit court denied Clark's request for a temporary injunction and later dismissed Clark's amended complaint, concluding that the claim was moot because the dates for which the season would have been open had passed. As to future seasons, the court held that the issue was not ripe for review. Clark appealed, but Clark's counsel failed to make the necessary financial arrangements with the court reporter as represented in his notice of appeal. On this basis, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as the notice of appeal did not substantially comply with Ark. R. App. P. 3(e).

After a separation in the legal ownership of Mountain Pure and Gold Star Dairy, Mountain Pure was required to install a new representative sampling point and wastewater-flow-measurement system pursuant to a compliance order. Mountain Pure installed a new sampling point and sewer meter. Little Rock Wastewater (LRW) determined the sampling point and meter had been improperly installed and required corrective measures. LRW informed Mountain Pure that unless it was in compliance with the ordinances, legal action would be taken. A show-cause hearing was then held, in which the hearing officer found that Mountain Pure had violated its permit, compliance order and applicable ordinances. Mountain Pure appealed, and the circuit court affirmed the administrative decision. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the administrative decision was not arbitrary and capricious and that it was supported by substantial evidence. Affirmed.

The Harrisburg School District No. 6 and the Board of Education (the District) appealed an order from the circuit court that granted Appellee Byron Neal's motion for summary judgment. Mr. Neal was elected to one of five positions on the District's board of directors. His term did not expire until September, 2014. In February, 2010, the Weiner School District faced declining enrollment, and as a result, the Harrisburg and Weiner Districts entered into an agreement for an administrative annexation of the two districts. Mr. Neal was present at the February, 2010 meeting of the Harrisburg board of directors and voted in favor of the annexation. In March, an interim school board was formed from the annexed districts. The Harrisburg District chose its interim board members by selecting four of its five members to serve. Mr. Neal lost his position. In June, Mr. Neal filed his complaint with the circuit court to stop the District from removing him as a board member. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the District argued that state law gave it the authority to agree on how the board of directors would be staffed, and therefore the circuit court erred in granting Mr. Neal summary judgment. The Supreme Court found no error by the circuit court and affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Mr. Neal.

Three questions of law were certified to the Supreme Court from the federal district court. The certified questions arose from a complaint from Petitioner Hempstead County Hunting Club, Inc. (Hempstead). Hempstead contended that Respondent Southwestern Electric Power Company (SWEPCO) violated multiple public utilities statutes in the construction of its "Turk Plant." The first question from the federal court involved whether Hempstead was required to bring its claims before the state Public Service Commission (PSC) before suing in federal court. The Supreme Court concluded that under Arkansas law, Hempstead was first required to bring its claims before the Arkansas PSC. A court review of its claims should be precluded until Hempstead exhausted its administrative remedies. As a result, the Supreme Court did not address the remaining two certified questions.

The Second Injury Fund appealed the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) finding that the Fund was not entitled to a statutory offset for Appellee Cleveland Osborn's Veterans Administration (VA) benefits. The Supreme Court found that the Commission made its decision based on the "plain language" of the statute: "the legislature intended for the amount of workers' compensation benefits payable to an injured worker to be reduced 'dollar-for-dollar' by the amount of benefits that the worker has previously received for the same medical services under any of the listed group plans." Veterans Administration benefits are not listed as one of the "group plans" in the statute. The Court found that the Fund was not entitled to the offset.

Appellant, the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department (ASHTD), appealed an order from the circuit court that reversed its denial of a billboard permit to Appellee Lamar Advantage Holding Company (Lamar). Lamar sought a hearing with ASHTD, and the hearing officer affirmed ASHTDâs denial, citing several reasons, most notably, the billboardâs conflict with âComprehensive Zoningâ that governed the area where the billboard would be placed. Lamar appealed to the circuit court, which reversed the hearing officerâs decision. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit courtâs decision, finding that âsubstantial evidence existedâ to support the denial of the permit because of the comprehensive zoning set for the billboardâs proposed setting. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.