Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

After approving a fall wild turkey hunting season, the Arkansas Game & Fish Commission (AGFC) amended its codes approving the season and closed wild turkey hunting for the season. Appellant David Clark filed a complaint in the circuit court, requesting a temporary injunction directing AGFC not to implement the action until a full hearing on the merits had been held and a permanent injunction directing AGFC not to close the season until it gave the public proper notice and opportunity to be heard. The circuit court denied Clark's request for a temporary injunction and later dismissed Clark's amended complaint, concluding that the claim was moot because the dates for which the season would have been open had passed. As to future seasons, the court held that the issue was not ripe for review. Clark appealed, but Clark's counsel failed to make the necessary financial arrangements with the court reporter as represented in his notice of appeal. On this basis, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as the notice of appeal did not substantially comply with Ark. R. App. P. 3(e).

After a separation in the legal ownership of Mountain Pure and Gold Star Dairy, Mountain Pure was required to install a new representative sampling point and wastewater-flow-measurement system pursuant to a compliance order. Mountain Pure installed a new sampling point and sewer meter. Little Rock Wastewater (LRW) determined the sampling point and meter had been improperly installed and required corrective measures. LRW informed Mountain Pure that unless it was in compliance with the ordinances, legal action would be taken. A show-cause hearing was then held, in which the hearing officer found that Mountain Pure had violated its permit, compliance order and applicable ordinances. Mountain Pure appealed, and the circuit court affirmed the administrative decision. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the administrative decision was not arbitrary and capricious and that it was supported by substantial evidence. Affirmed.

The Harrisburg School District No. 6 and the Board of Education (the District) appealed an order from the circuit court that granted Appellee Byron Neal's motion for summary judgment. Mr. Neal was elected to one of five positions on the District's board of directors. His term did not expire until September, 2014. In February, 2010, the Weiner School District faced declining enrollment, and as a result, the Harrisburg and Weiner Districts entered into an agreement for an administrative annexation of the two districts. Mr. Neal was present at the February, 2010 meeting of the Harrisburg board of directors and voted in favor of the annexation. In March, an interim school board was formed from the annexed districts. The Harrisburg District chose its interim board members by selecting four of its five members to serve. Mr. Neal lost his position. In June, Mr. Neal filed his complaint with the circuit court to stop the District from removing him as a board member. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the District argued that state law gave it the authority to agree on how the board of directors would be staffed, and therefore the circuit court erred in granting Mr. Neal summary judgment. The Supreme Court found no error by the circuit court and affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Mr. Neal.

Three questions of law were certified to the Supreme Court from the federal district court. The certified questions arose from a complaint from Petitioner Hempstead County Hunting Club, Inc. (Hempstead). Hempstead contended that Respondent Southwestern Electric Power Company (SWEPCO) violated multiple public utilities statutes in the construction of its "Turk Plant." The first question from the federal court involved whether Hempstead was required to bring its claims before the state Public Service Commission (PSC) before suing in federal court. The Supreme Court concluded that under Arkansas law, Hempstead was first required to bring its claims before the Arkansas PSC. A court review of its claims should be precluded until Hempstead exhausted its administrative remedies. As a result, the Supreme Court did not address the remaining two certified questions.

The Second Injury Fund appealed the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) finding that the Fund was not entitled to a statutory offset for Appellee Cleveland Osborn's Veterans Administration (VA) benefits. The Supreme Court found that the Commission made its decision based on the "plain language" of the statute: "the legislature intended for the amount of workers' compensation benefits payable to an injured worker to be reduced 'dollar-for-dollar' by the amount of benefits that the worker has previously received for the same medical services under any of the listed group plans." Veterans Administration benefits are not listed as one of the "group plans" in the statute. The Court found that the Fund was not entitled to the offset.

Appellant, the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department (ASHTD), appealed an order from the circuit court that reversed its denial of a billboard permit to Appellee Lamar Advantage Holding Company (Lamar). Lamar sought a hearing with ASHTD, and the hearing officer affirmed ASHTDâs denial, citing several reasons, most notably, the billboardâs conflict with âComprehensive Zoningâ that governed the area where the billboard would be placed. Lamar appealed to the circuit court, which reversed the hearing officerâs decision. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit courtâs decision, finding that âsubstantial evidence existedâ to support the denial of the permit because of the comprehensive zoning set for the billboardâs proposed setting. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellant Harrill & Sutter, PLLC, filed a complaint in Saline County Circuit Court alleging a violation of the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Appellant had filed a medical-malpractice action against three doctors that worked for the University of Arkansasâ Medical Center. Mariam Hopkins was a partner of Anderson, Murphy and Hopkins, LLP, and was hired to represent the doctors. Appellant subsequently filed a FOIA request seeking Ms. Hopkinsâ file. Appellant argued that because Ms. Hopkins represented public employees, her file was also public record. Ms. Hopkins disputed that her file was subject to FOIA, and refused to allow Appellant the right to inspect it. Appellant filed suit with the circuit court and named the doctors, Ms. Hopkins, and her firm as defendants. At trial, Appellant moved to ânonsuitâ all of its claims. The court granted the motion, but no written order to that effect was ever entered on the record. The final opinion of the court reflected the fact that Appellant withdrew its FOIA request. It did not mention whether the nonsuit was granted, nor did it explicitly dismiss Appellantâs claims. Under state law, an order that fails to adjudicate all of the claims as to all parties is not a final order. The Supreme Court can only review final orders from the lower courts. With no final order before it, the Supreme Court dismissed this appeal.

Appellee, the City of Russelville (City), filed a complaint in November, 2008, that sought to condemn a property which fronts a public roadway in order to improve the surrounding drainage and flood control mechanisms. The property was owned by Appellant, the Lois Marie Combs Revocable Trust (Trust). The circuit court issued an eminent domain order to take possession of the property in December 2009 and a jury awarded the Trust compensation for the taking in June 2010. The Trust asked the court to award it the mandatory attorneyâs fees as set out in the state law that governs condemnation proceedings. The court ruled that the Trust had not brought the case and it was, therefore, not entitled to fees. The Trust appealed this decision to the Supreme Court alleging that any award of attorneyâs fees as a result of an eminent domain or condemnation action balances on the land use categorization of the property at the time it was condemned. Attorney fees had been, previously, awarded in similar cases where the government taking was deemed to involve the improvement of public waterworks. The Trust argued that the improvement of a roadwayâs drainage and flood control mechanism was analogous to a waterworks project and it was, therefore, entitled to attorney's fees. The Supreme Court disagreed finding that the primary reason for this eminent domain action by the City was for road improvement and not the improvement of the City's supply of drinking water. Subsequently, the Court held that the lower court correctly denied the Trustâs motion for attorneyâs fees.