Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, diagnosed with Insulin Treated Diabetes Mellitus (ITDM), seeks the first class medical certificate necessary to serve as a commercial airline pilot. Plaintiff holds a third class medical certificate authorizing him to pilot non-commercial flights in the United States. The FAA contends it did not issue a final order regarding plaintiff's first class medical certificate application; it purportedly ruled solely on his independent request for a third class medical certificate and specifically indicated the first class certificate remained under review. The court concluded, however, that the specific facts presented here establish a constructive denial of plaintiff's application for a first class certificate. The court held that where, as here, an agency has clearly communicated it will not reach a determination on a petitioner’s submission due to petitioner’s recalcitrance but simultaneously refuses to deny the petitioner’s submission on those grounds, it has engaged in final agency action subject to the court’s review. Although plaintiff's case is subject to judicial review, the court noted that there is a complete absence of a relevant administrative record to review. Accordingly, the court remanded to the FAA to offer reasons for its denial of plaintiff's application for a first class medical certificate. View "Friedman v. FAA" on Justia Law

Tulsa Airports Improvement Trust (TAIT) sought reimbursement for amounts it paid to a third-party contractor in furtherance of a noise abatement program funded primarily by grants from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Because its petition for review of agency action was not timely filed, The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the action. View "Tulsa Airports Improv. Trust v. FAA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Signal Aviation Services, Inc. (Signal) appealed a superior court grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant City of Lebanon (City) in this action by Signal for, among other things, breach of contract. The City cross-appealed a portion of the trial court’s order interpreting the contract. Signal leased 8.91 acres at the Lebanon Municipal Airport (airport) as assignee of a Lease and Operating Agreement (LOA). The City owned the airport and was the lessor under the LOA. The LOA granted Signal the nonexclusive right and obligation to provide fixed based operator (FBO) services at the airport. In granting this nonexclusive right, the City agreed in paragraph 3M(2) of the LOA that “[a]ny other operator of aeronautical endeavors or activities will not be permitted to operate on the Airport under rates, terms [or] conditions which are more favorable than those set forth in this Agreement.” In 2006, the City increased the assessed value of the land leased by Signal, not including the improvements, resulting in a corresponding increase in Signal’s property tax liability. Signal applied for an abatement of taxes for the years 2006 and 2007. The City’s assessors denied abatement, and Signal appealed to the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA). The BTLA dismissed the appeals because Signal failed to present evidence of the property’s market value. Signal did not appeal that decision, bringing instead this suit, claiming, among other things, breach of contract. Its writ alleged that the City “materially breached its obligations under the [LOA] by providing more favorable and disproportionate tax assessments and taxation schemes under agreements with other entities at the Airport providing commercial aeronautical services there.” After review, the Supreme Court affirmed, having concluded that paragraph 3M(2), so far as it concerned taxation, merely obligated the City to require all other operators to pay all lawfully levied or assessed taxes. View "Signal Aviation Services, Inc. v. City of Lebanon" on Justia Law

EPIC seeks review of the FAA's decision not to promulgate the FAA’s dismissal of its petition for rulemaking and the FAA’s omission of privacy provisions in the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). EPIC's petition relates to the Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, 49 U.S.C. 40101, which was enacted to regulate, inter alia, unmanned aircraft - i.e. drones. The court rejected EPIC's contention that "reasonable grounds" justify its untimely petition 60 days after the FAA's explicit dismissal. The court also rejected EPIC's argument that the FAA's February 23, 2015 NPRM constituted, in effect, the dismissal of its petition, triggering the 60-day clock. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "Electronic Privacy Information Center v. FAA" on Justia Law

The Textron Lycoming engine, manufactured in 1969, was installed on a Cessna aircraft in 1998. It was overhauled in 2004, with a carburetor in accordance with Lycoming’s type-certificated design. Sikkelee was piloting the aircraft when it crashed shortly after taking off. Sikkelee died. His estate sued, claiming that the aircraft lost power as a result of a malfunction or defect in the carburetor. The court held that Sikkelee’s claims, which were premised on state law standards of care, fell within the preempted “field of air safety.” An amended complaint incorporated federal standards of care by alleging violations of FAA regulations. Before trial, the court concluded that the federal standard of care was established in the type certificate. Reasoning that the FAA issues a type certificate based on its determination of compliance with pertinent regulations, it held that the FAA’s issuance of a type certificate for the engine meant that the federal standard of care had been satisfied as a matter of law. The court granted Lycoming partial summary judgment and certified an immediate appeal. The Third Circuit reversed, concluding that federal statutes and FAA regulations reflect that Congress did not intend to categorically preempt aircraft products liability claims. Subject to traditional principles of conflict preemption, including concerning specifications included in a type certificate, aircraft products liability cases may proceed using a state standard of care. View "Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a foreign alien from Venezuela, seeks review of the TSA's determination that petitioner was a risk to aviation and national security, and denial of his application for FAA-certified flight school training. The Vara Declaration confirms that the internal agency materials express TSA’s reasoned, contemporaneous explanation for its decision. The internal agency materials, as illuminated by the Vara Declaration, offer a clear and reasonable statement of the grounds upon which TSA relied in denying petitioner’s application for flight training. Furthermore, the Declaration and the internal agency materials to which it refers are not impermissible post hoc rationalizations. Because petitioner and the court have a written statement explaining the grounds and rationale for TSA's action, and because the court found the agency action against petitioner was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, the court concluded that there is no need to remand the case for further review. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Olivares v. TSA" on Justia Law

Flytenow developed a web-based service through which private pilots can offer their planned itineraries to passengers willing to share the pilots’ expenses. The FAA issued a Letter of Interpretation, concluding that pilots offering flight-sharing services on Flytenow’s website would be operating as “common carriers,” which would require them to have commercial pilot licenses. Flytenow’s members, licensed only as private pilots, thus would violate FAA regulations if they offered their services via Flytenow.com. The court concluded that the FAA's Interpretation is consistent with the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions and does not violate Flytenow’s constitutional rights under the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause, and is not unconstitutionally vague. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA" on Justia Law

The Department of Transportation Airport Division (DOT-A), which leases Dillingham Airfield on the island of O’ahu from the United States Army, imposed landing fees on commercial users, including Petitioners. In 2012, DOT-A asserted that Petitioners owed DOT-A $264,995 in unpaid landing fees. Petitioners filed a complaint seeking the following relief: the return of landing fees paid under protest; injunctive relief preventing DOT-A from imposing additional fees against Petitioners; and a declaration that an administrative rule of DOT-A was invalid to the extent it established the rate of landing fees at the airfield. The circuit court denied injunctive relief and entered judgment on the merits in favor of DOT-A. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that DOT-A is not precluded from setting and imposing landing fees at the airfield through a DOT-A procedure that references the Hawaii Administrative Rules for the landing fee rates. View "Pofolk Aviation Haw., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp. for State of Haw." on Justia Law

AFA petitioned for review of the FAA's Notice N8900.240, which is an internal guidance document issued to FAA aviation safety inspectors concerning the use and stowage of portable electronic devices aboard commercial and other aircraft. AFA seeks to invoke the court's jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. 46110(a), but the FAA claims that this court lacks jurisdiction because the Notice does not constitute final agency action. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider AFA's challenge because the disputed Notice does not reflect final action by the FAA where it does not determine any rights or obligations, or produce legal consequences. The Notice does not purport to amend any FAA regulation and it does not otherwise carry the force of law. View "Assoc. of Flight Attendants v. Huerta" on Justia Law

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) prohibited Ege, a pilot for Emirates Airlines, from flying to, from, or over the United States. Ege had experienced travel problems and had submitted an online inquiry to the DHS’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program. He believes the TSA’s prohibition is based on his alleged inclusion on the “No-Fly List,” a subset of the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) used by the TSA to “deny boarding of individuals on commercial aircraft operated by U.S. carriers or flying to, from, or over the United States.” He sought removal from the No-Fly List or, at a minimum, a “meaningful opportunity to be heard.” The D.C. Circuit dismissed his petition for lack of standing and lack of jurisdiction. Neither the TSA nor the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the only two rnamed agencies, has “authority to decide whose name goes on the No-Fly List.” The Terrorist Screening Center, which is administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation), is “the sole entity with both the classified intelligence information” Ege wants and “the authority to remove” names from the No-Fly List/TSDB. View "Ege v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law