Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

After conducting a compliance examination of CalCon Mutual Mortgage Corporation (“CalCon”) the Wyoming Department of Audit, Division of Banking (“Division”) determined that CalCon had violated the Wyoming Residential Mortgage Practices Act in six separate brokering transactions by receiving application fees and “yield spread premiums” exceeding those previously disclosed to its customers. The Division requested that CalCon refund the application fees and yield spread premiums to the borrowers. CalCon objected and requested a contesting case hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”). The OAH determined that CalCon had violated the Act. The State Banking Commissioner subsequently issued a final order directing CalCon to reimburse the fees. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commissioner properly interpreted Wyo. Stat. Ann. 40-23-114 in determining that CalCon was required to provide a written explanation of increased application fees and yield spread premiums in the transactions at issue. View "Calcon Mut. Mortgage Corp. v. State ex rel. Wyo. Dep't of Audit, Div. of Banking" on Justia Law

Appellant Lebanon Valley Farmers Bank (LVFB) is a Pennsylvania chartered bank, and a subsidiary of Fulton Financial Corporation, which merged with Keystone Heritage Group, Inc. The merger made Fulton the parent company of Lebanon Valley National Bank, which merged with Farmers Bank as part of the transaction, thereby forming LVFB. Prior to the merger, both Farmers Bank and National Bank were "institutions" subject to the Shares Tax. For the 2002 tax year, LVFB filed a Bank Shares Tax return, which included National Bank's pre-merger value in its calculation of its six-year average share value, as required by the combination provision. However, in 2005, LVFB filed a petition with the Board of Appeals, seeking a refund of the portion of its 2002 tax payment attributable to National Bank’s pre-merger share value. It claimed disparate treatment because the combination provision was inapplicable when mergers involved out-of-state banks or banks less than six years old. The Commonwealth Court has held, under the plain language of the statute, the combination provision applied only to combinations of "institutions" (i.e., banks with Pennsylvania locations). The trial court held LVFB, as the survivor of the merger of two Pennsylvania banks, should have reported a taxable share value which averaged the combined share value of each constituent institution over the past six years and was, therefore, not entitled to a refund. However, the court ordered the Commonwealth "to provide meaningful retrospective relief" to cure LVFB’s non-uniform treatment. The Commonwealth Court affirmed the Board of Finance and Revenue's classification of the merged LVFB and the 2002 tax assessment. After careful review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Commonwealth Court's decision and reversed for further proceedings. View "Lebanon Valley Farmers Bank v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit considered appeals by Illinois and Illinois counties and a Wisconsin county of district court holdings that those governmental bodies cannot levy a tax on sales of real property by Fannie Mae (Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation). Although both are now private corporations, the relevant statutes provide that they are “exempt from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by any State … or local taxing authority, except that any real property of the corporation shall be subject to State … or local taxation to the same extent as other real property,” 12 U.S.C. 1723a(c)(2), 12 U.S.C. 1452(e). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A transfer tax is not a tax on realty. After 2008 Fannie Mae owned an immense inventory of defaulted and overvalued subprime mortgages and is under conservatorship by the Federal Housing Finance Agency. The states essentially requested the court to “pierce the veil,” in recognition of the fact that if the tax is paid, it will be paid from assets or income of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, but their conservator is the United States, and the assets and income are those of entities charged with a federal duty. View "Milwaukee Cnty v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n" on Justia Law

The City of Springfield enacted two local ordinances that imposed new legal duties on (1) property owners to maintain property during the foreclosure process and provide a $10,000 cash bond per foreclosure to the City, and (2) mortgagees to attempt a settlement through negotiations before foreclosing. In dispute was the definition of "owner" in the first ordinance, which included mortgagees who were not in possession and had begun the foreclosure process. The ordinance imposed the duties on the mortgagees whether the mortgagors were still in possession. Six banks sued in state court, seeking to have the ordinances invalidated as inconsistent with and preempted by comprehensive state laws governing foreclosure and property maintenance and as inconsistent with state and federal constitutional guarantees. The case was removed to federal district court, which concluded that the ordinances were valid. The banks appealed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals certified dispositive state law questions to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court because the outcome of the case depended on unresolved questions of Massachusetts law and raised significant policy concerns better suited for resolution by that state court. View "Easthampton Savings Bank v. City of Springfield" on Justia Law

Two petitions for a writ of mandamus came before the Supreme Court. Both sought review of orders that found plaintiffs lacked of standing and, in turn, found the trial courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. In case no. 1111567, U.S. Bank National Association ("U.S. Bank"), sought a writ to require the Walker Circuit Court to dismiss an action filed by Walker County. In case no. 1111370, MERSCORP, Inc. ("MERSCORP"), and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") sought a writ to require the Barbour Circuit Court to dismiss an action filed by Barbour Probate Judge Nancy Robertson. Upon careful consideration of the underlying trial court cases, the Supreme Court concluded that these cases did not fall within the subject-matter-jurisdiction exception to the general rule that the Supreme Court would not engage in mandamus review of a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss. The Court therefore denied the request for mandamus relief in both of the cases. View "Robertson v. MERSCORP, Inc." on Justia Law

The Federal Depository Insurance Corporation (FDIC), acting as receiver of the New Frontier Bank, used proceeds from the sale of cattle belonging to a limited liability company (LLC) to pay down a loan of one of the two LLC members. According to the complaint, the FDIC had no authority to do so because the payment was contrary to the members' agreement. Ignoring the separate entity status of an LLC, the other LLC member brought suit in its own name against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for what it claimed to be the FDIC's wrongful disbursement of the proceeds. The LLC sued the government under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. The district judge dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. The Tenth Circuit agreed dismissal was appropriate, the Appellate Court concluded dismissal should have been for lack of jurisdiction as to the member's claims and as to the LLC's claim because the United States Court of Federal Claims had exclusive jurisdiction. View "ECCO Plains, LLC., et al v. United States" on Justia Law

The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) placed two credit unions, U.S. Central Federal Credit Union and Western Corporate Federal Credit Union (WesCorp), into conservatorship. Then, as liquidating agent, NCUA sued 11 defendants on behalf of U.S. Central, alleging federal and state securities violations.In a separate matter, NCUA sued one defendant on behalf of U.S. Central and WesCorp, alleging similar federal and state securities violations. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas consolidated the cases. All defendants moved for dismissal, arguing that NCUA’s claims were time-barred. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the "Extender Statute" applied to NCUA’s claims. Defendants moved for an interlocutory appeal for the Tenth Circuit to determine whether the Extender Statute applied to NCUA's claims. Finding that it did, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "National Credit Union Admin. v. Nomura Home Equity Loan, et al" on Justia Law

This case concerned the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), a government program created to help distressed homeowners with delinquent mortgages. At issue was whether Wells Fargo was contractually required to offer plaintiffs a permanent mortgage modification after they complied with the requirements of a trial period plan (TPP). Following the Seventh Circuit, the court held that Wells Fargo was required to offer the modification. The district court should not have dismissed plaintiffs' complaints when the record showed that Wells Fargo had accepted and retained the payments demanded by the TPP, but neither offered a permanent modification, nor notified plaintiffs they were not entitled to one, as required by the terms of the TPP. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a recipient of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, appealed from the district court's judgment sua sponte dismissing his amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff sought an Order to Show Cause, a temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from levying against his SSI benefits to enforce a child support order. At issue was whether 42 U.S.C. 659(a) authorized levy against SSI benefits provided under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq., to satisfy the benefits recipient's child support obligations. The court concluded that SSI benefits were not based upon remuneration for employment within the meaning of section 659(a); section 659(a) did not preclude plaintiff's claims; and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the exception to federal jurisdiction for divorce matters did not preclude the district court from exercising jurisdiction over the matter. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment to the extent the district court dismissed plaintiff's claims against the agency defendants and remanded for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the portion of the judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims against Bank of America because his complaint had not alleged facts establishing that the bank was a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983. View "Sykes v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission served administrative subpoenas on Worth, a precious metal wholesaler, Mintco, a precious metal dealer, and DSD, a depository that stores precious metals, seeking documents relating to purchases and sales of precious metals, in connection with its investigation into whether those companies violated the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. 1. The companies handed over the requested documents, but redacted the names and contact information of the individual customers, retailers, and intermediaries, asserting that they (the companies) were covered by the Right to Financial Privacy Act, which requires that customers of a “financial institution” be given notice and the opportunity to object before any disclosures, 12 U.S.C. 3401, 3402(2), 3405. The district court held that the RFPA does not apply to the companies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the nature of the businesses is readily distinguishable from that of the other entities listed in the RFPA’s definition of “financial institution.” View "Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v. Worth Bullion Grp. Inc., " on Justia Law