Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Maryland Economic Development Corporation (MEDCO) is a public corporation established by the legislature to aid in promoting the economic development of the State. This litigation arose from MEDCO's involvement in the development of a technology development center. MEDCO sought a loan with Bank to finance the center. MEDCO executed a leasehold deed of trust with Bank requiring MEDCO to pay all recording costs and fees in connection with filing the loan documents. MEDCO subsequently presented the deed of trust for recording in Montgomery County, claiming an exemption from the recordation tax based on Md. Code Ann. Econ. Dev. 10-129(a), which granted MEDCO a tax exemption "from any requirement to pay taxes or assessments on its properties or activities." The county transfer office denied the exemption and required MEDCO to pay recordation tax. The county department of finance denied MEDCO's recordation tax refund claim. The tax court denied MEDCO's petition for appeal. The circuit court reversed, and the court of special appeals reversed the circuit court. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, based on the plain language of section 10-129(a), the legislature intended to exempt MEDCO from paying the recordation tax at issue in this case. View "Md. Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

Former employees (Plaintiffs) of a failed bank taken into receivership by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) sued Banco Popular de Puerto Rico (BPPR), a bank that subsequently acquired the failed bank's deposits and certain assets on claims for severance pay. The FDIC intervened, asserting that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the claims because Plaintiffs either failed to file administrative claims with the FDIC or failed to challenge in federal court the FDIC's disallowance of their administrative claims. BPPR moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not liable for any severance claims for at least three different merits-based reasons. The district court granted summary judgment for BPPR and did not address the question of whether it had jurisdiction. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated entry of summary judgment for Defendants and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that Plaintiffs' failures to comply with the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act administrative claims process triggered the statutory bar, and Plaintiffs could not avoid the jurisdictional bar by failing to name the FDIC as a defendant. View "Acosta-Ramirez v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico" on Justia Law

Meritor Bank failed in 1992 after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) breached a capital agreement with Meritor. The Federal Circuit affirmed that the government was liable for breach of contract, and awarding $276 million in “lost value” damages. On remand, the Claims Court applied 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(11), the statute governing the distribution of a receivership surplus by the FDIC acting in its capacity as a receiver, and held that current Meritor shareholders are the proper recipients of the $276 million award. The court also denied a motion to intervene filed by McCarron, a former Meritor employee, on the grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and issue and claim preclusion. Intervenors, former shareholders who owned shares of Meritor at the time of its failure but later sold their shares, appealed from an order directing the FDIC-Receiver to distribute the receivership surplus to current shareholders. McCarron appealed denial of his motion to intervene. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Slattery v. United States" on Justia Law

FHFA, the regulator and conservator of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae (the Enterprises), issued a "directive" preventing the Enterprises from buying mortgages on properties encumbered by liens made under so-called property-assessed clean energy (PACE) programs. Plaintiffs contended that FHFA was acting as a regulator, and not a conservator. As a regulator, plaintiffs contended that FHFA must issue a regulation to effectuate its order. The court concluded that FHFA's decision to cease purchasing mortgages on PACE-encumbered properties was a lawful exercise of its statutory authority as conservator of the Enterprises. Because the courts have no jurisdiction to review such actions, the court vacated the district court's order and dismissed the case. View "County of Sonoma, et al v. FHFA, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's dismissal of their action brought under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. 2331 et seq., against UBS, alleging that plaintiffs were direct or indirect victims of terrorist attacks in Israel facilitated by UBS's furnishing of United States currency to Iran, which the U.S. Department of State had listed as a state sponsor of terrorism. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (FAC) for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. On appeal, plaintiffs contended principally that the FAC alleged a chain of causation between transfers of funds to Iran by UBS and plaintiffs' injuries at the hands of various terrorist groups sponsored by Iran, sufficient to establish traceability for purposes both of standing and of stating a claim under the ATA. The court concluded that the FAC was sufficient to show Article III standing but insufficient to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Rothstein v. UBS AG" on Justia Law

In 2007, Tellado heard a Spanish-language radio advertisement for mortgage refinancing, called the number, and spoke in Spanish to arrange refinancing of an existing mortgage. Bloom, a closing agent acting as a representative of IndyMac, conducted the closing at the Tellados’ home. The loan documents, including the notice of the right to cancel, were in English. Oral communications between Bloom and the Tellados, were conducted through the Tellados’ daughter, who served as an interpreter for verbal instructions and Bloom’s explanations of the loan documents. IndyMac subsequently failed and was placed in FDIC receivership. In 2009, the Tellados sent a notice of cancellation under Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. 201-7. The district court held that IndyMac had failed to provide proper notice and that the three-day cancellation period had never begun; it ordered refund to the Tellados of all payments, termination of the security interest, and payment of a $10,000 penalty. The Third Circuit reversed; the claim is precluded by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(13)(D) because the claim is predicated upon an act or omission of IndyMac. Tellados failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under FIRREA. View "Tellado v. Indymac Mortg. Serv." on Justia Law

Borrowers obtained secured loans from InBank. Their promissory notes established that InBank would calculate annual interest rates by adding a predetermined amount, usually one percent, to a variable index rate set by InBank at “its sole discretion,” which could change up to once per day. InBank stated that it would set the rate “at or around the U.S. prime rate.” Borrowers compared loan statements and found that the rate was neither consistent across customers nor close to the prime rate. After borrowers filed suit, the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation took control of InBank and appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver. MB Financial purchased InBank accounts. The borrowers filed an amended class action against MB, claiming violations of the Interest Act, 815 ILCS 205/1, and the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1. The court granted a motion to substitute the FDIC as defendant, then dismissed. The Seventh Circuit held that dismissal was proper for failure to exhaust remedies under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(3)-(d)(13). The claims relate to InBank’s alleged acts and omissions, not MB’s, and there is no support for an assumption of liability argument.View "Farnik v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs controlled Mutual Bank. In an effort to save the bank from insolvency, at the request of FDIC-Corporate, they raised about $30 million mostly in the form of note purchases. In 2008, FDIC-Corporate requested another $70 million, which they were unable to raise. In 2009, regulators issued warnings about the bank. The bank’s board voted to redeem the notes and create deposit accounts for plaintiffs, essentially returning their money. Before FDIC-Corporate responded to a request for required approval, 12 U.S.C. 1821(i), the bank was declared insolvent and FDIC was appointed as receiver. Mutual Bank’s branches opened as branches of United Central Bank the next day. The plaintiffs filed proofs of claim, seeking to redeem the notes and obtain depositor-level priority in post-insolvency distribution scheme. FDIC Receiver rejected the claims and the plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that they had been misled into investing in the bank and prevented from getting their money back. The district court dismissed as moot. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing the claim as an unauthorized request for “money damages,” 5 U.S.C. 702. The plaintiffs did not first seek administrative review of what was essentially a challenge to the FDIC’s regulatory decision not to act on the redemption approval request. View "Veluchamy v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

During routine examinations, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) raised an issue with Frontier State Bank Oklahoma City's use of a "leverage strategy" whereby the bank funded long-term investments with short-term borrowing in order to generate profits from the "spread" between long-term and short-term interest rates. The FDIC's enforcement staff obtained a cease-and-desist order from the FDIC Board which required the Bank mitigate the risks associated with its leverage strategy. Frontier appealed the Board's mitigation order to the Tenth Circuit. The FDIC argued that the Court lacked authority to review the order's leverage capital requirements, and defended the order as a reasonable exercise of the FDIC Board's authority. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Board's order was not arbitrary or capricious, and denied its petition for review. View "Frontier State Bank Oklahoma v. FDIC" on Justia Law

In these three consolidated appeals, the court must decide issues about the enforceability of German bonds issued during the period between World War I and World War II. The court concluded that the district court had jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1302-1311, over the complaint against Germany filed by Sovereign Bonds regarding its Agra bonds issued in the territory that later became East Germany; all the bonds were subject to the 1953 Validation Treaty and must be validated before they could be enforced in American courts; the complaint filed by World Holdings to enforce its validated bonds was untimely; and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied discovery to Sovereign Bonds on the issue of validation. View "World Holdings, LLC v. Federal Republic of Germany" on Justia Law