Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This case was related to certain documents produced in discovery and filed in the bankruptcy court, containing allegations that Father M and D, two priests who were not parties to the Portland Archdiocese's bankruptcy case, had sexually abused children. The bankruptcy court held that the discovery documents at issue could be disclosed to the public, because the public's interest in disclosure of these discovery documents outweighed the priests' privacy interest under Rule 26(c) and that the documents filed in court could be disclosed because they did not contain "scandalous" allegations for purposes of 11 U.S.C. 107(b). The court affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling as to the release of discovery documents disclosing Father M's name under Rule 26(c), because the public's serious safety concerns could not be addressed if Father M's name was redacted. But because the record did not reflect the existence of any similar significant public interest that required the disclosure of Father D's name, the court held that Father D's name must be redacted from any discovery documents that were released. Finally, because of the mandatory duty to keep scandalous material confidential at the request of a party under section 107(b), the court reversed the decision to release the punitive damages memorandum and attached documents.

The primary issue in this Chapter 7 bankruptcy case was whether the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Tenth Circuit had jurisdiction to review on "order for relief" entered by a bankruptcy judge for the District of Delaware. The Delaware judge entered the order after venue was transferred to the District of Colorado. The parties agreed that the order should be vacated on the ground that it is void because it was issued after the transfer was complete. However, the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel concluded that it did not have jurisdiction because the governing statute provides that an appeal of a decision by a bankruptcy judge "shall only be taken only to the district court for the judicial district in which the bankruptcy judge is serving." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and affirmed its decision.

The Florida Department of Revenue (Florida DOR) and the Virginia Department of Social Services (Virginia DSS) appealed the district court's decision affirming an order of the bankruptcy court holding the agencies in contempt and awarding debtor compensatory and punitive damages for the agencies' alleged violations of the automatic stay and discharge injunction issued by the bankruptcy court. The court held that state sovereign immunity shields the the Florida DOR and the Virginia DSS from debtor's claims for violations of the automatic stay. The court also held that, although sovereign immunity did not bar debtor's claims for violations of the discharge injunction, neither the Florida DOR nor the Virginia DSS violated the discharge injunction. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to vacate the bankruptcy court's order and dismiss the action.

Plaintiff-Appellant Lesa Kensmoe appealed a district court order granting F/S Manufacturing a renewal by affidavit of its 1998 judgment against her. In 1998, F/S Manufacturing obtained a default judgment in the amount of $450,894.78 against Appellant. In 2008, F/S Manufacturing's judgment against Plaintiff was cancelled of record. On March 8, 2010, almost two years after the 1998 judgment was cancelled, F/S Manufacturing filed an affidavit attempting to renew the judgment. After being informed the judgment could not be renewed because it had expired, F/S Manufacturing filed a motion requesting that the district court order the clerk of court to renew the judgment by affidavit. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's order, finding that North Dakota law did not permit a cancelled judgment's renewal after the prescribed statute of limitations.

"The Dawses' struggle with the IRS has a lengthy provenance." Decades ago, Donald and Phyllis Dawes pled guilty for failing to file their 1981 through 1983 tax returns. They also failed to pay their taxes from 1986 through 1988, and 1990. All this led to the IRS to seek and win a declaratory judgment that the Dawses fraudulently conveyed certain assets in an effort to avoid their creditors and that those conveyances were null and void. The IRS proceeded to execute this judgment to take possession of these assets, but before it could do so, the Dawses filed for Chapter 12 bankruptcy protection. "And that brings us to the latest installment of this epic": with permission of the bankruptcy court, the Dawses sold several tracts of land. The sale created income tax liabilities. The Dawses submitted a bankruptcy reorganization plan in which they proposed to treat their newly incurred tax liabilities as general unsecured claims. The IRS opposed the plan "vigorously" but was unsuccessful at the bankruptcy and federal district court. The IRS brought its complaint to the Tenth Circuit, asking to "undo its earlier losses." Upon careful consideration of the lengthy record below, the Tenth Circuit found that the taxes at issue here were incurred by the Dawses after they petitioned for bankruptcy. "So it is that the Dawses must pay the tax collector his due." The post-petition income tax liabilities at issue were not eligible for treatment as unsecured claims under the Bankruptcy Code. The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower courtsâ decisions and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The United States has a $60 million judgment against the defendant, who fled the country, for Medicare and Medicaid fraud. The government served a writ of garnishment (28 U.S.C. 3205) against his interest in a Georgia company, which paid secured creditors, liquidated its assets, and placed slightly more than $4 million in escrow for the claim. Creditors of the Georgia company claimed $175,000. The district court ruled in favor of the government because the creditors had not obtained a writ. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, reasoning that the creditors' claim was against the Georgia company, not against the defendant, and that the defendant's equity interest in the company (which was reachable by the government) may have been subordinate to the interests of creditors. The court noted many unanswered questions about the creditors' interest in the company.