Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Fourth Corner Credit Union applied for a master account from the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. The Reserve Bank denied the application, effectively crippling the Credit Union’s business operations. The Credit Union sought an injunction requiring the Reserve Bank to issue it a master account. The district court dismissed the action, ruling that the Credit Union’s stated purpose, providing banking services to marijuana-related businesses, violated the Controlled Substances Act. The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the amended complaint without prejudice. By remanding with instructions to dismiss the amended complaint without prejudice, the Court’s disposition effectuated the judgment of two of three panel members who would allow the Fourth Corner Credit Union to proceed with its claims. The Court denied the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s motion to strike the Fourth Corner Credit Union’s reply-brief addenda. View "Fourth Corner Credit Union v. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas" on Justia Law

Several carpenters, including one single-member LLC, an installer of cement siding, and a painter contended they were employees of Bourbeau Custom Homes, Inc. for the purposes of Vermont’s unemployment compensation system. Bourbeau challenged that classification, contending that it was not liable for unemployment taxes on monies paid to a carpenter operating as a single-member LLC because an LLC was not an “individual” under the unemployment tax statute and therefore not subject to the ABC test established by 21 V.S.A. 1301(6)(B). Second, Bourbeau argued the Employment Security Board erred in applying the ABC test with respect to all of the workers whose remuneration is the subject of this appeal. The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with Bourbeau on the first point and held that an LLC was not an “individual” for the purposes of assessing unemployment taxes. However, the Court affirmed the Board’s determination that the remaining four individuals were employees for purposes of Vermont’s unemployment compensation system. View "In re Bourbeau Custom Homes, Inc." on Justia Law

Casiopea Bovet, LLC appealed a judgment on the pleadings granted in favor of the California State Controller (Controller) on grounds that Casiopea could not claim escheated property under the Unclaimed Property Law as an assignee of Financial Title Company (Financial Title) because Financial Title was a suspended corporation, which lacked legal capacity to prosecute an action. Casiopea argued on appeal: (1) the penalty provisions of Revenue and Taxation Code section 23301 should not apply to a claim made pursuant to an assignment ordered under the Enforcement of Judgments Law as distinguished from a voluntary assignment under Civil Code section 954; (2) Casiopea, as an assignee, was an "innocent third party" and should be able to claim the property under equitable principles; and (3) the court abused its discretion in denying Casiopea's request for continuance or leave to amend its complaint. The Court of Appeal disagreed with each of these contentions and affirmed the judgment. View "Casiopea Bovet, LLC v. Chiang" on Justia Law

Plaintiff DirecTV, Inc. appealed a superior court decision denying a petition for property tax abatement for the tax years 2007, 2008, and 2009. The property at issue was located in New Hampton and used by DirecTV as a satellite uplink facility. On appeal, DirecTV argued that the trial court erred when it: (1) ruled that satellite antennas and batteries used to provide backup power constituted fixtures; and (2) determined the value of the property. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded after review that the antennas and batteries were not fixtures, and therefore, taxable as real estate. The Court reversed the superior court on that issue, vacated its decision on the valuation of the property, and remanded for further proceedings. View "DirecTV, Inc. v. Town of New Hampton" on Justia Law

Capacity manufactures “Trailer Jockey” semi-tractors. GFL became an authorized Capacity dealer under a 1995 franchise agreement. In 2013, Capacity notified GFL of its intent to terminate GFL’s franchise, alleging GFL had misrepresented the employment status of a former GFL employee who went to work for Capacity’s chief competitor and allowed the employee to continue accessing Capacity’s online parts ordering system while working for the competitor. GFL filed a protest with the state New Motor Vehicle Board, alleging there was no good cause for the termination, as required by the Vehicle Code. An ALJ concluded Capacity had not established good cause because GFL had not violated the express terms of its franchise agreement. The Board agreed. The Sacramento County Superior Court directed the Board to set aside its decision. While that case was pending GFL filed this suit in the Alameda County Superior Court, which concluded that GFL did not have standing because section 11726 only authorizes actions by “licensees” of the DMV and GFL did not possess such a license. The court of appeal reversed. GFL is a member of the class protected by the subdivision of section 11713.3 on which its cause of action is based; its claim is not defeated by its status as non-licensee. View "Guarantee Fork Lift, Inc. v. Capacity of Texas, Inc." on Justia Law

Third Circuit rejects "reverse" False Claims Act suit involving Small Business Administration.The SBA, a federal agency, provided $90 million to L Capital, a venture capital group, through the purchase of securities. L Capital invested $4 million in preferred shares of Simparel. The Certificate of Incorporation specified that Simparel must pay preferred shareholders accrued dividends if Simparel’s Board exercised its discretion to pay the dividends or if Simparel underwent liquidation, dissolution, or windup. The SBA was appointed as L Capital’s receiver after Simparel failed to comply with its funding agreement. Petras, Simparel’s Chief Financial Officer, claimed that this failure resulted in the SBA becoming a preferred shareholder, entitled to accrued dividends. The Simparel Board never declared dividends nor did Simparel undergo liquidation, dissolution, or windup. Petras claimed that the Simparel defendants engaged in fraudulent conduct—to which he objected—to avoid paying the contingent dividends: hiding Simparel’s deteriorating financial condition; failing to hold board meetings: and neglecting to send the SBA Simparel’s financial statements. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the “reverse FCA” claim. The Simparel defendants could not have “knowingly and improperly avoid[ed] or decrease[d] an obligation” to pay the accrued dividends at the time of their alleged misconduct because the obligation did not yet exist. View "Petras v. Simparel, Inc." on Justia Law

Creager Mercantile Co., Inc., a wholesale distributor of groceries and tobacco products, sells Blunt Wraps, a type of cigar wrapper made of thirty to forty-eight percent tobacco. Blunt Wraps are designed to be filled with additional tobacco or marijuana and then smoked. The Colorado Supreme Court was called on the determine whether Blunt Wraps could be taxed as “tobacco products,” as that term was defined in section 39-28.5-101(5), C.R.S. (2016). Because Blunt Wraps are a “kind” or “form” of tobacco, and are “prepared in such manner as to be suitable . . . for smoking,” the Court held Blunt Wraps fell within the plain language of the definition of “tobacco products” under section 39-28.5-101(5) and were taxable accordingly. View "Colo. Dept. of Revenue v. Creager" on Justia Law

The trial court granted the request of a wholesaler of veterinary prescription drugs to set aside a final order of the Oklahoma Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners (“Vet Board”) wherein the Board ordered the wholesaler to produce certain requested documents and fined it $25,000 for failure to do so. The Supreme Court found nothing in the Vet Act made wholesale distributors of veterinary prescription drugs, who are licensed and regulated by the Pharmacy Board through the Pharmacy Act, subject to the Vet Act and its investigative power. As such, the Vet Board was without statutory authority to investigate or sanction wholesalers who fell under the regulation of the Pharmacy Board, let alone fine a wholesaler $25,000 for failure to produce records that the Vet Board could have inspected in the regular course of the wholesaler's business. View "Farmacy, LLC v. Kirkpatrick" on Justia Law

The principal issue in this case was whether taxpayers could bring federal or state tort claims to challenge tax assessments, or instead must rely on the normal state tax appeals process. The taxpayers here are trucking companies that were assessed unemployment taxes after the Washington State Employment Security Department audited and reclassified their employment relationship with owner-operators who owned and leased out their own trucking equipment. The trucking companies, joined by their trade organization, Washington Trucking Associations, brought this suit asserting a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and a state common law claim for tortious interference with business expectancies. The superior court dismissed the suit, holding that the trucking companies must challenge the tax assessments through the state tax appeals process. The Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that the comity principle precluded the section 1983 claim only "to the extent that [Washington Trucking Associations] and the [trucking companies] seek damages based on the amounts of the assessments, but not to the extent that they seek damages independent of the assessment amounts." The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the superior court's dismissal of both the federal and state claims. View "Wash. Trucking Ass'ns v. Emp't Sec. Dep't" on Justia Law

Rocky Mountain Retail Management, LLC, d/b/a Rocky Mountain High, filed an application for a license to operate a medical marijuana center in the City of Northglenn. The Northglenn City Council, acting as the City’s medical marijuana local licensing authority, denied Rocky Mountain’s application after receiving evidence at two public hearings. Rocky Mountain sought judicial review of the City’s decision in the district court, arguing that the denial was not based on substantial evidence in the record and was therefore arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion. Rocky Mountain also asked the district court to declare certain licensing provisions of the Northglenn City Code unconstitutionally vague, including section 18-14-7(h), which sets forth factors a local licensing authority may consider before approving or denying a medical marijuana center license. The district court ruled that section 18-14-7(h) was unconstitutionally vague, and that the City’s denial of the license in reliance on that invalid provision was arbitrary and capricious. The City appealed. Because the phrase “number, type, and availability” in section 18-14-7(h) provided sufficient notice to applicants and reasonably constrained the exercise of the City’s discretion, the Colorado Supreme Court held section 18-14-7(h) was not void for vagueness. Furthermore, the Court held that the City’s decision to deny Rocky Mountain’s license application was supported by substantial evidence in the record, and therefore was not arbitrary and capricious. View "Rocky MountaIn Retail Mgmt. v. City of Northglenn" on Justia Law