Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. (lender) and Sears, Roebuck and Co. (retailer) appealed a superior court decision affirming the determination of the Vermont Department of Taxes (Department) that the parties, who had partnered to operate a private label credit card program through retailers’ stores, were not entitled to sales tax refunds related to bad debts. The Department denied lender’s refund requests because it was not a registered vendor under Vermont law that remitted the sales tax it sought to recover, and denied retailer’s deductions because it did not incur the bad debt at issue. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that because they acted in combination to facilitate the sales giving rise to the bad debts, they were not barred from obtaining relief. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Dept. of Taxes" on Justia Law

In an effort to benefit from a growing customer base in Hamilton County, Ed Martin Toyota requested, and Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. planned to approve, that Ed Martin relocate from its Anderson, Madison County location, where it operated for several years, to the Fishers area. Prior to the move, Toyota informed its other new motor vehicle dealerships in the region, including Andy Mohr Toyota, Butler Toyota, and Tom Wood Toyota (“Dealers”), and it filed the relocation plan with the Auto Dealer Services Division of the Office of the Indiana Secretary of State (“Division”). Those three dealerships protested the relocation. The Auto Dealer Services Division dismissed their action for lack of standing—affirmed by the trial court, concluding the dealerships were outside the “relevant market area,” as defined by the Indiana Dealer Services Act. Finding that the Division's interpretation of that statutory definition was reasonable, the Supreme Court affirmed the Division's decision. View "Andy Mohr West v. Ind. Secretary of State, Auto Dealer Services Div." on Justia Law

The City of Eugene sued to collect from Comcast of Oregon II, Inc. (Comcast) a license fee that the city, acting under a municipal ordinance, imposes on companies providing “telecommunications services” over the city’s rights of way. Comcast did not dispute that it used the city’s rights of way to operate a cable system. However it objected to the city’s collection effort and argued that the license fee was either a tax barred by the Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA), or a franchise fee barred by the Cable Communications and Policy Act of 1984 (Cable Act). The city read those federal laws more narrowly and disputed Comcast’s interpretation. The trial court rejected Comcast’s arguments and granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Eugene v. Comcast of Oregon II, Inc." on Justia Law

The Texas Optometry Act prohibits commercial retailers of ophthalmic goods from attempting to control the practice of optometry; authorizes the Optometry Board and the Attorney General to sue a violator for a civil penalty; and provides that “[a] person injured as a result of a violation . . . is entitled to the remedies. In 1992, Wal-Mart opened “Vision Centers” in its Texas retail stores, selling ophthalmic goods. Wal-Mart leased office space to optometrists. A typical lease required the optometrist to keep the office open at least 45 hours per week or pay liquidated damages. In 1995, the Board advised Wal-Mart that the requirement violated the Act. Wal-Mart dropped the requirement and changed its lease form, allowing the optometrist to insert hours of operation. In 1998, the Board opined that any commercial lease referencing an optometrist’s hours violated the Act; in 2003, the Board notified Wal-Mart that it violated the Act by informing optometrists that customers were requesting longer hours. Optometrists sued, alleging that during lease negotiations, Wal-Mart indicated what hours they should include in the lease and that they were pressured to work longer hours. They did not claim actual harm. A jury awarded civil penalties and attorney fees. The Fifth Circuit certified the question of whether such civil penalties, when sought by a private person, are exemplary damages limited by the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 41. The Texas Supreme Court responded in the affirmative, noting that “the certified questions assume, perhaps incorrectly, that the Act authorizes recovery of civil penalties by a private person, rather than only by the Board or the Attorney General.” View "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Forte" on Justia Law

This matter involved the interpretation and application of the Uniform Local Sales Tax Code (ULSTC). Yesterdays of Lake Charles, Inc. (Yesterdays) and Cowboy’s Nightlife, Inc. (Cowboy’s) were cash-based bars or nightclubs located adjacent to each other in Calcasieu Parish. The clubs were audited in 2009, by the Calcasieu Parish School System Sales and Use Tax Department ("Collector) for years 2005 through 2008, on the basis that the clubs had violated their duties as tax collection agents for the Calcasieu Parish School System. The trial court found ambiguity in the language of the ULSTC requiring the plaintiff nightclubs to “keep and preserve suitable records” of all sales and expenditures. The trial court then found the tax collector had failed to show that the records actually kept by the clubs, in this case, bank statements and deposit slips, were not "suitable records" within the meaning of the ULSTC. The trial court further found the tax collector’s assessment was arbitrary and that the tax collector had failed to establish that its methodology for auditing the taxpayer was proper. Accordingly, the trial court: (1) ordered the tax collector to refund amounts paid under protest by the clubs; (2) determined that prescription had run on the sales taxes for the years 2005 and 2006 for one of the clubs, aside from those taxes admittedly withheld by the clubs; and (3) denied the tax collector’s motion for new trial and awarded attorney fees to the clubs. After its review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment ordering a refund of the taxes and interest paid under protest by the clubs. Furthermore, the Court reversed the trial court’s award of attorney fees. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and the matter was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Yesterdays of Lake Charles, Inc. v. Calcasieu Parish Sales & Use Tax Dept." on Justia Law

Senor Iguana's, Inc. appealed the cancellation of its liquor license. The district court found that Iguana's failed to pay the license renewal fee before the end of a grace period, so the license expired by operation of law. Iguana's argued on appeal that the license constituted a property right and that because the Alcohol Beverage Control bureau failed to provide notice and a hearing before cancelling the license, Iguana’s was denied its constitutional and statutory rights. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Senor Iguana's v. ISP - ABC" on Justia Law

Nelson Industrial Steam Company (“NISCO”) was in the business of generating electric power in Lake Charles. In order to comply with state and federal environmental regulations, NISCO introduces limestone into its power generation process; the limestone acts as a “scrubbing agent.” The limestone chemically reacts with sulfur to make ash, which NISCO then sells to LA Ash, for a profit of roughly $6.8 million annually. LA Ash sells the ash to its customers for varying commercial purposes, including roads, construction projects, environmental remediation, etc. NISCO appealed when taxes were collected on its purchase of limestone over four tax periods. NISCO claimed its purchase of limestone was subject to the “further processing exclusion” of La. R.S. 47:301(10)(c)(i)(aa), which narrowed the scope of taxable sales. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted NISCO’s writ application to determine the taxability of the limestone. The trial court ruled in the Tax Collectors' favor. After its review, the Supreme Court found that NISCO’s by-product of ash was the appropriate end product to analyze for purposes of determining the “further processing exclusion’s” applicability to the purchase of limestone. Moreover, under a proper “purpose” test, the third prong of the three-part inquiry enunciated in "International Paper v. Bridges," (972 So.2d 1121(2008)) was satisfied, "as evidenced by NISCO’s choice of manufacturing process and technology, its contractual language utilized in its purchasing of the limestone, and its subsequent marketing and sale of the ash." Therefore the Court reversed the trial court and ruled in favor of NISCO. View "Bridges v. Nelson Industrial Steam Co." on Justia Law

Aster Zeru Gebrekidan filed an application for discretionary appeal to challenge her conviction and fine for violating a City of Clarkston ordinance that prohibited certain retailers of packaged alcoholic beverages from allowing on their premises any form of electronic or mechanical game machine or coin-operated device that may be used for entertainment or amusement purposes. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Gebrekidan’s application to decide whether the State’s detailed statutory scheme regulating coin operated amusement machines (COAMs) and COAM businesses in Georgia, preempted the City’s ordinance under the Uniformity Clause of the Georgia Constitution. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State’s COAM Laws preempted the City’s ordinance at least insofar as the ordinance applied to COAMs as defined by the state statutes. The Court therefore reversed Gebrekidan’s conviction and fine. View "Gebrekidan v. City of Clarkston" on Justia Law

Defendant, cross-complainant and appellant Luna Crest Inc. opened a medical marijuana dispensary within the city limits of plaintiff, cross-defendant and respondent City of Palm Springs (City). The Palm Springs Municipal Code required a permit to operate a marijuana dispensary in the City, which Luna did not obtain. Luna sought a preliminary injunction against the continued enforcement of the permitting requirement, which the trial court denied. Luna argued on appeal that the City ordinance requiring a permit was preempted by federal law and, therefore, invalid and unenforceable. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "City of Palm Springs v. Luna Crest" on Justia Law

The People filed a complaint charging defendants with causing, aiding, and abetting the illegal delivery of marijuana. The trial court granted an injunction barring defendants from further developing or marketing their marijuana delivery app. At issue on appeal is whether Proposition D, L.A. Mun. Code, 45.19.6, which City voters enacted in 2013 to regulate medical marijuana businesses, generally prohibits the delivery of marijuana by vehicles. The court concluded that the City established a likelihood of proving defendants’ app caused, aided, or abetted the violation of Proposition D because, outside of the narrow exception for designated primary caregivers, it prohibits the vehicular delivery of medical marijuana to qualified participants, identification card holders, or primary caregivers in the City. Further, defendants’ opposition to the City’s unfair competition allegations necessarily fails because the City has demonstrated a likelihood of success on its claim that defendants facilitated a violation of Proposition D. In this case, defendants made no showing at all concerning the balance of hardships, much less that the balance tipped sharply in their favor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "People v. Nestdrop, LLC" on Justia Law