Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on a challenge to the State Liquor Control Board's spirits distribution licensing fee structure brought by Association of Washington Spirits and Wine Distributors (Association). Specifically, the Association challenged the Board's decision to exempt distillers who distribute their own manufactured spirits and others acting as distributors pursuant to certificates of approval from contributing to a shortfall of $104.7 million in licensing fees imposed on persons holding spirits distributor licenses. The Association asked the Supreme Court to hold that the distillers must contribute proportionately to eliminating the shortfall. The Court rejected the Association's arguments, holding that the Board acted within its authority and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously. Additionally, the Board did not violate the privileges and immunities clause of article I, section 12 of the Washington State Constitution. View "Ass'n of Wash. Spirits & Wine Distribs. v. Liquor Control Bd." on Justia Law

Both CarMax Auto Superstores West Coast, Inc., and the South Carolina Department of Revenue (appealed the court of appeals' decision, reversing and remanding a decision of the Administrative Law Court (ALC) upholding the Department's use of an alternative apportionment formula to calculate CarMax West's income tax for tax years 2002-2007. When a party seeks to deviate from a statutory formula, the proponent of the alternate formula bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the statutory formula does not fairly represent the taxpayer's business activity in South Carolina and (2) its alternative accounting method is reasonable. The Supreme Court affirmed (as modified), and declined to remand at both parties' request. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' finding that the ALC erred in placing the burden of proof on CarMax West. Furthermore, while there was substantial evidence in the record to support the ALC's finding that the Department's alternative accounting method was reasonable, the Department failed to prove the threshold issue that the statutory formula did not fairly represent CarMax West's business activity within South Carolina. View "Carmax Auto v. South Carolina Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Gunderson was a New Hampshire resident who worked as a self-described "export buyer’s agent:" he purchased specific motor vehicles from retail dealers across the country and exported them to buyers in foreign countries. Prior to exporting the vehicles, petitioner obtained title to the vehicles in New Hampshire and held himself out as the owner. Petitioner was then paid to transfer ownership of the vehicles to the foreign purchasers. Petitioner neither owned a retail motor vehicle sales location nor operated a lot to display vehicles, but performed his services as an export buyer’s agent from his Moultonborough home. The vehicles are never listed online or in any publications or classified advertising. In 2012, petitioner purchased two luxury vehicles from out-of-state retail dealers for the purpose of selling them in China and Russia. When petitioner applied for titles for the vehicles, however, the New Hampshire Bureau of Title and Anti-Theft denied the applications and the New Hampshire Department of Safety determined that he needed to obtain a state-issued motor vehicle dealer’s license to export motor vehicles. Petitioner appealed a court order finding that he was a "Retail Vehicle Dealer" as defined by RSA 259:89-a (2014), and that he had to obtain a license in accordance with RSA 261:103-a (2014) to engage in his motor vehicle business. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Gunderson v. New Hampshire Dept. of Safety" on Justia Law

The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board fined an uninsured employers Titan Enterprises, LLC, Titan Topsoil, Inc. and CCO Enterprises (collectively, "Titan," all owned by Todd Christanson) a substantial amount because they had operated for a significant period of time without carrying statutorily required workers’ compensation insurance. On appeal, the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed part of the Board’s decision, but it reversed the Board on the amount of the fine and remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings. The employer then asked the Commission for an award of attorney’s fees as a successful party on appeal. The State, Division of Workers’ Compensation, which had initiated the Board proceedings, opposed the award on the basis that it, too, had been successful on a significant issue. The Commission awarded the employer full fees of approximately $50,000. The Division petitioned for review of the fee award, and the Supreme Court granted review. Because the Commission failed to consider the Division’s partial success in the appeal, it reversed the Commission’s decision and remanded for further proceedings.View "Alaska Div. of Workers' Comp. v. Titan Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

WTS Acquisition Corporation purchased Ameritemps, Inc. and then transferred the assets to its wholly owned subsidiary, RFFG, LLC. RFFG continued operating the business under the Ameritemps name. The Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation notified RFFG that it had determined that RFFG was a successor employer for workers’ compensation purposes and that it intended to calculate RFFG’s workers’ compensation premium rate based on Ameritemps’ experience rating. RFFG filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Bureau had abused its discretion when it determined RFFG to be the successor in interest to Ameritemps. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in concluding that the decision of the Bureau was supported by the evidence and was not an abuse of discretion.View "State ex rel. RFFG, LLC v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Comp." on Justia Law

In 2011, San Diego County updated its general plan wherein it issued a program environmental impact report (PEIR), and adopted various related mitigation measures. The Sierra Club sought, in a petition for writ of mandate, to enforce one mitigation measure adopted by the County, the Climate Change Mitigation Measure CC-1.2: the preparation of a climate change action plan with "more detailed greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions reduction [GHG] targets and deadlines" and "comprehensive and enforceable GHG emissions reductions measures that will achieve" specified quantities of GHG reductions by the year 2020. However, the Sierra Club alleged that instead of preparing a climate change action plan that included comprehensive and enforceable GHG emission reduction measures that would achieve GHG reductions by 2020, the County prepared a climate action plan (CAP) as a plan-level document that expressly "does not ensure reductions." The County also developed associated guidelines for determining significance (Thresholds). The court granted the petition, concluding that the County's CAP did not comply with the requirements of Mitigation Measure CC-1.2 and thus violated CEQA. The court found that the CAP did not contain enforceable GHG reduction measures that would achieve the specified emissions reductions. The County appealed, asserting: (1) the statute of limitations barred the claim that the mitigation measures were not enforceable; (2) the CAP met the requirements of Mitigation Measure CC-1.2; and (3) that the trial court erred in finding that a supplemental EIR was required. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed.View "Sierra Club v. Co. of San Diego" on Justia Law

Engine Manufacturers Association (EMA) challenged certain regulations adopted by the California Air Resources Board (CARB) requiring engine manufacturers to obtain a sample of emissions of in-use heavy-duty engines equipped with on-board diagnostic (OBD) systems that are nearing the end of their certified useful life and conduct a series of tests on these engines “to assure that engines certified for sale in California are equipped with OBD systems that properly function . . . .” The regulations at issue contained provisions requiring CARB to order the recall and repair of all engines that have been determined to be equipped with a non-conforming OBD system where certain conditions exist. EMA sought a judicial declaration that the challenged regulations were in excess of CARB’s statutory authority and therefore invalid. The trial court granted EMA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and declared the challenged regulations invalid. CARB appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed: the Legislature granted CARB broad authority to adopt regulations designed to reduce air pollution caused by motor vehicle emissions as expeditiously as possible, subject to cost-effectiveness and feasibility limitations. The challenged regulations fall within the scope of authority conferred by the Legislature unless manufacturer in-use testing of OBD systems on heavy-duty engines was prohibitively costly. The question of prohibitive cost could not be settled on the pleadings. The remaining question, whether the regulations were reasonably necessary to effectuate the statutory purpose, was not properly raised in EMA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court remanded remand the matter to the trial court with directions to deny EMA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.View "Engine Manufacturers Assn. v. CA Air Resources Bd." on Justia Law

The main issue on appeal in this case was whether the purchase of electricity and natural gas utility services qualifies for a sales tax exemption. Appellant-taxpayer American Airlines, Inc., ("AA") was denied a refund for the sales tax it paid on its purchases of electricity and natural gas utility services during the 2006 calendar year. The Account Maintenance and Compliance Division of the Oklahoma Tax Commission denied the request. Appellant timely protested the denial. The Oklahoma Tax Commission, by order, adopted the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations of the administrative law judge finding taxpayer failed to prove the denial was incorrect. Upon review, the Supreme Court held the Services Exemption (68 O.S. Supp. 2006, section 1357 (28)) provided an exemption for electricity and natural gas utility services used by AA during 2006 in aircraft repair and maintenance activities. The remaining issue concerned the appropriate methodology for determining the amount of the sales tax refund AA should have received on its 2006 purchases of utility services. The adopted Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations did not make a specific finding concerning an appropriate methodology. The Court remanded the case back to the Oklahoma Tax Commission for further proceedings.View "American Airlines, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission" on Justia Law

Cable One, Inc., is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Phoenix, Arizona. In 2005, Cable One received business income from four types of activities in Idaho: cable television services, internet access services, advertising services, and cable modem leasing. In its Idaho income tax return for that year, it included revenues earned from all of those activities except revenues from providing internet access services to Idaho customers. It excluded those revenues on the ground that providing such services to customers in Idaho constituted Arizona sales, although it also excluded such revenues from its 2005 Arizona income tax return on the ground that they came from Idaho sales. In 2008, the Idaho Tax Commission issued a notice of deficiency determination asserting a tax and interest deficiency on Cable One for the 2005 tax year. Cable One petitioned for redetermination, which the Tax Commission denied. Cable One then filed a complaint in the district court, which tried the matter de novo, and ruled in favor of the Tax Commission. Cable One then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court.View "Cable One, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission" on Justia Law

Petitioner Mahindra & Mahindra, Ltd. Appealed a superior court decision to affirm a default judgment by the New Hampshire Motor Vehicle Industry Board in favor of respondents Holloway Motor Cars of Manchester, LLC, Peters Auto Sales, Inc., and Crest Chevrolet, Inc. (collectively "dealers"). Mahindra argued that "there is no dispute that [it] was never properly served by the [dealers] in this matter," and argues that the trial court erred in finding that it waived its right to insist on proper service pursuant to the Hague Service Convention. The dealers contended they were not bound by the requirements of the Hague Service Convention in this case and that, regardless of the convention's applicability, Mahindra waived its challenge to service and jurisdiction. The Supreme Court agreed with Mahindra, and found that the trial court erred as a matter of law. View "Mahindra & Mahindra, Ltd. V. Holloway Motor Cars of Manchester, LLC" on Justia Law