Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This dispute arose from violations issued by the Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration. At issue was whether the word "corporation" includes limited liability companies (LLCs) for purposes of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (the Mine Act), 30 U.S.C. 801 et seq. The court concluded that the terms "corporation" and "corporate operator" in the Mine Act are ambiguous. Applying Chevron deference, the court concluded that the Secretary's interpretation is reasonable where, most importantly, construing section 110(c) to include agents of LLCs is consistent with the legislative history. Therefore, the court held that an LLC is a corporation for purposes of the Mine Act and that section 110(c) can be used to assess civil penalties against agents of an LLC. Because substantial evidence supported the ALJ's decision to hold petitioners personally liable for the order at issue, the court affirmed on this issue. Finally, the order underlying their civil penalties was not duplicative. Accordingly, the court affirmed the ALJ's decision. View "Sumpter, et al. v. Secretary of Labor, et al." on Justia Law

Schlumberger Limited conducts its business in Alaska through a wholly owned subsidiary, Schlumberger Technology Corporation. Schlumberger Technology's primary business is oilfield services, but it also owns all of Schlumberger Limited's associated companies incorporated in the United States and operates all of Schlumberger Limited’s domestic businesses. Schlumberger Technology files a consolidated federal tax return for all of Schlumberger Limited’s domestic subsidiaries. For tax years 1998-2000, Schlumberger Technology filed Alaska corporate income tax returns that included only the domestic subsidiaries working in the oilfield services business. In September 2003, a Department of Revenue auditor concluded that Schlumberger Limited was engaged in a unitary business with Schlumberger Technology. Based on these conclusions, the Department issued a notice of assessment for additional corporate income taxes of $429,739 plus interest. Schlumberger Technology argued on appeal of the assessment that under the Internal Revenue Code, domestic corporations were taxed on their worldwide income, but entitled to claim a tax credit against their United States income tax liability for taxes paid to foreign countries. Foreign corporations, on the other hand, are taxed differently. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on the application of Alaska's Net Income Tax Act (ANITA). ANITA incorporates certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, unless the federal provisions are "excepted to or modified by other provisions" of the act. ANITA required a corporation to report its income and the income of certain affiliates and to exclude "80 percent of dividend income received from foreign corporations." The Internal Revenue Code had a different formula; it required a foreign corporation to report only income "effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States." Schlumberger Technology argued that since ANITA has no explicit exception for Internal Revenue Code (section 882), this sourcing rule was incorporated by reference. Thus, Schlumberger Technology argued that the foreign dividends paid to Schlumberger Limited should not have been included in its taxable income under ANITA. In response, the State argued that the provisions of ANITA applied to all business income of the taxpayer, not just income derived from sources in the United States. Upon review of the matter, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the Internal Revenue Code provision in question here was not adopted by reference because it was inconsistent with the formula provided by ANITA. The Court affirmed the decision of the Department of Revenue. View "Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. Alaska Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Ralls, an American corporation whose owners are Chinese nationals, purchased four American limited liability companies (Project Companies) previously formed to develop windfarms in north-central Oregon. CFIUS determined that Ralls' acquisition of the Project Companies threatened national security and issued temporary mitigation orders restricting Ralls' access to, and preventing further construction at, the Project Companies' windfarm sites. The President also concluded that the transaction posed a threat to national security. On appeal, Ralls challenged CFIUS's final order and the Presidential Order, which prohibited the transaction and required Ralls to divest itself of the Project Companies. The court concluded that the Presidential Order deprived Ralls of constitutionally protected property interests without due process of law; the court remanded to the district court with instructions that Ralls be provided the requisite process which should include access to unclassified evidence on which the President relied and an opportunity to respond; and the court left it to the district court to address the merits of Ralls' remaining claims in the first instance since the CFIUS Order claims were dismissed on a jurisdictional ground and given the scant merits briefing. View "Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Investments, et al." on Justia Law

Expedia (and several other hotel booking websites, collectively, "Petitioners") has been subject to approximately 80 underlying lawsuits by states, counties, and municipalities (collectively, taxing authorities) for purportedly failing to collect the right amount of local occupancy taxes from its hotel customers. Expedia tendered most of the suits to its insurer, Zurich, although some were tendered late. Zurich refused to defend Expedia on a number of grounds, including late tender and that the underlying suits may be excluded from the policies' coverage. The trial court declined to make a determination of Zurich's duty to defend Expedia, instead ordering discovery that Expedia claimed was prejudicial to the underlying actions. Petitioners sought adjudication of their summary judgment motion concerning their respective insurers' duty to defend them in cases brought by local taxing authorities. They further requested a stay of discovery in the coverage action that could prejudice them in the underlying litigation. Upon review of the matter, the Washington Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by delaying adjudication of Zurich's duty to defend Expedia. Accordingly, the Court vacated the trial court's order. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine Zurich's duty to defend Expedia in each of the 54 underlying cases subject to Expedia's motion. The trial court was furthermore ordered to stay discovery in the coverage action until it could make a factual determination as to which parts of discovery are potentially prejudicial to Expedia in the underlying actions. View "Expedia, Inc. v. Steadfast Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case began as a dispute between the parties regarding whether plaintiff owed tax under the now-repealed Single Business Tax Act (SBTA) related to plaintiff's contributions to its Voluntary Employees' Beneficiary Association (VEBA) trust fund for 1997 through 2001. In this case, the issue for the Supreme Court to decide was what actions a taxpayer must take under MCL 205.30 of the Revenue Act to trigger the accrual of interest on a tax refund. The Court held that in order to trigger the accrual of interest, the plain language of the statute requires a taxpayer to: (1) pay the disputed tax; (2) make a “claim” or "petition" for a refund; and (3) "file" the claim or petition. "Although a "claim" or "petition" need not take any specific form, it must clearly demand, request, or assert a right to a refund of tax payments made to the Department of Treasury that the taxpayer asserts are not due. Additionally, in order to "file" the claim or petition, a taxpayer must submit the claim to the Treasury in a manner sufficient to provide the Treasury with adequate notice of the taxpayer’s claim." View "Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case were David and Barbara Green, their three children, and the businesses they collectively owned and operated: Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Mardel, Inc. As owners and operators of both Hobby Lobby and Mardel, the Greens organized their businesses with express religious principles in mind. As was particularly relevant to this case, one aspect of the Greens’ religious principles was a belief that human life begins when sperm fertilizes an egg. In addition, the Greens believed it was immoral for them to facilitate any act that caused the death of a human embryo. Plaintiffs brought an action to challenge portions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) whereby employment-based group health plans covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) were required provide certain types of health services for women that implicated contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling (without cost-sharing by plan participants or beneficiaries) - all "abortifacients" that went against plaintiffs' religious beliefs. Plaintiffs filed suit to challenge the contraceptive-coverage requirement of the ACA under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act. Plaintiffs simultaneously moved for a preliminary injunction on the basis of their RFRA and Free Exercise claims. The district court denied that motion. Plaintiffs appealed the denial of the injunction. After review by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court held that Hobby Lobby and Mardel were entitled to bring claims under RFRA, established a likelihood of success that their rights under statute were substantially burdened by the contraceptive-coverage requirement, and established an irreparable harm. However, the case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings on two remaining factors governing the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction. View "Hobby Lobby Stores, et al v. Sebelius, et al" on Justia Law

Daily Services, owned by Mason, provided short-term temporary employment services. Mason also owned I-Force, which provided longer-term temporary employment services. After losing coverage under the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation group insurance rating plan, I-Force unsuccessfully applied for self-insurance status. I-Force owed $3 million in premiums. Unable to make payments, I-Force closed. Daily acquired some of its customers and began offering longer-term temporary employment services. Ohio law provides the employer with notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Bureau may file a judgment or lien against it and allows the Bureau to deem one company the successor of another for purposes of an experience rating to calculate premiums, and, if an employer “wholly succeeds another in the operation of a business,” to transfer the obligation to pay unpaid premiums. The Bureau decided that Daily wholly succeeded I-Force, but did not provide notice of its assessment or an opportunity to be heard before it filed judgments and liens against Daily for more than $54 million. A state court vacated the judgments. The Bureau tried again and provided prior notice, but filed a lien before hearing an appeal. The court again vacated. The Bureau’s efforts to recover continue. Daily sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of procedural due process. The district court concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, recognizing that under the Supreme Court decision Parratt v. Taylor, a state may sometimes satisfy due process without providing notice or an opportunity to be heard pre-deprivation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Parratt doctrine does apply, and Daily did not plead that Ohio provided inadequate post- deprivation remedies . View "Daily Services, LLC v. Valentino" on Justia Law

The FTC filed suit against BurnLounge, a multi-level marketing business, alleging violation of section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1). The court agreed with the district court that BurnLounge was an illegal pyramid scheme in violation of the FTCA, in light of Webster v. Omnitron International, Inc., because BurnLounge's focus was recruitment, and because the rewards it paid in the form of cash bonuses were tied to recruitment rather than the sale of merchandise. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the FTC's expert's testimony because it was relevant and reliable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order granting a permanent injunction against BurnLoundge's continued operation. View "FTC v. BurnLounge, Inc." on Justia Law

Zagami, LLC owned the Landmark Americana Tap and Grill in the Borough of Glassboro. In 2006, Zagami applied to the Borough for a renewal of its liquor license. Luis Perez, a citizen residing in Glassboro, opposed the renewal. In a letter to the Glassboro Borough Council, Perez complained of several serious infractions allegedly committed by Zagami, including serving alcohol to minors and bribing public officials with free meals and drinks. As a result of those allegations, the Council scheduled a liquor license renewal hearing and invited Perez and Zagami to participate. At the hearing, Perez testified that, among other things, Landmark flouted fire-safety regulations, served alcohol to visibly intoxicated patrons, and encouraged bouncers to physically harm rowdy customers. Zagami disputed the allegations, calling them unsubstantiated. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Council voted to renew Zagami’s liquor license. A year later, Zagami filed a defamation complaint against Perez for statements that he made during the liquor license renewal hearing. Perez filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that his remarks were made in the course of a quasi-judicial proceeding and thus were entitled to absolute immunity. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and the Appellate Division denied leave to appeal. The Supreme Court granted Perez’s motion for leave to appeal to this Court and summarily remanded the matter to the Appellate Division for consideration on the merits. On remand, the Appellate Division found that Perez’s statements during the liquor license proceeding were entitled to absolute immunity and dismissed the defamation complaint with prejudice. Perez filed a complaint against Zagami in 2010 for malicious use of process., alleging Zagami had instituted its defamation complaint as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) designed to punish Perez for speaking out against Zagami at the liquor license renewal hearing and to discourage his participation in future public proceedings. Zagami filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, and Perez filed a cross-motion to amend his complaint to include as defendant the law firm retained by Zagami during the defamation suit. Finding that Zagami’s defamation suit was supported by probable cause, the trial court granted Zagami’s motion to dismiss the malicious use of process claim and denied Perez’s cross-motion to amend the complaint. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed both determinations of the trial court. The panel determined that Zagami’s defamation suit was not supported by probable cause and that Zagami should have been aware that Perez’s statements were privileged at the time it filed suit. Accordingly, the panel reversed the trial court’s grant of Zagami’s motion to dismiss the malicious use of process claim. The Supreme Court granted certification to review only whether the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (CRA) permitted a private right of action against an individual who was not acting under color of law. The Court concluded that a private CRA cause of action only may be pursued against persons acting under “color of law”; the Attorney General, however, is authorized to file CRA actions against persons whether or not they acted under "color of law." View "Perez v. Zagami, LLC" on Justia Law

A state agency issued a request for proposals for legal services. A law firm delivered its proposal after the submission deadline, but the procurement officer accepted the proposal and forwarded it to the evaluation committee. After the agency issued a notice of intent to award that law firm the contract, a second law firm protested, alleging that the evaluation committee made scoring errors and that consideration of the late-filed proposal was barred by a relevant regulation and the request for proposals. The procurement officer sustained the protest, rescinded the original award, and awarded the second law firm the contract. The first law firm then protested, claiming: (1) the second law firm’s protest should not have been considered because it was filed after the protest deadline; (2) the first law firm’s proposal was properly accepted because the delay in submission was immaterial; and (3) the second law firm’s proposal was nonresponsive because that firm lacked a certificate of authority to transact business in Alaska. The procurement officer rejected that protest and the first law firm filed an administrative appeal. The administrative agency denied the appeal, and the first law firm appealed the agency decision to the superior court, which affirmed the administrative agency ruling. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the administrative agency acted reasonably in accepting the second law firm’s late-filed protest and deeming that firm’s proposal responsive notwithstanding its lack of a certificate of authority. Furthermore, the Court concluded the agency’s interpretation that its regulation barred acceptance of the first firm’s late-filed proposal is reasonable and consistent with statute. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court’s decision upholding the final agency decision. View "Davis Wright Tremaine LLP v. Alaska, Dept. of Administration" on Justia Law