Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Harley-Davidson, Inc. and several of its subsidiaries sued the Franchise Tax Board for a tax refund. The trial court sustained the Board's demurrer to Harley-Davidson's commerce clause challenge to Revenue and Taxation Code provisions that allowed intrastate unitary businesses to choose annually whether to compute their tax using the combined reporting method or the separate accounting method but required interstate unitary businesses to compute their tax using only the combined reporting method. After review of the Board's arguments on appeal, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer because the statutory scheme facially discriminated on the basis of an interstate element in violation of the commerce clause. The Court reversed the judgment in that respect and remanded to the trial court to determine in the first instance whether the taxation scheme withstands strict scrutiny (that is, whether it "'advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.'") On a separate issue, the trial court determined after a bench trial that two Harley-Davidson subsidiaries were taxable by California during the tax years 2000 through 2002. Harley-Davidson argued the trial court erred by finding those subsidiaries bore a sufficient nexus to this state to overcome due process and commerce clause limitations on taxing foreign entities. The Court of Appeal disagreed on this and affirmed the judgment. View "Harley-Davidson v. Franchise Tax Bd." on Justia Law

Aladdin, a licensed bail agent, sought to enjoin GPS from engaging in bail agent activities in violation of state licensing and regulatory requirements. The superior court dismissed Aladdin’s claim for false advertising under the federal Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a) and granted a defense motion for summary judgment on claims alleging violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law, Business and Professions Code 17200. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that Aladdin lacked standing to maintain a UCL claim; undisputed evidence showed that the commercial activities of GPS associated with its processing of credit or debit card transactions for cash bail payments do not require GPS to obtain a bail bond license, so that GPS is not in violation of the UCL; and Aladdin’s complaint failed to state a Lanham Act claim, as a matter of law. View "Two Jinn, Inc. v. Gov't Payment Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

Marion’s Quality Services, Inc. was a Nebraska corporation doing business as It’s a Kidz World Child Care Center (Center) and as Deb’s Learning Place Family Child Care Home II (Home). In 2012, the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), a state agency responsible for the enforcement of the Child Care Licensing Act, revoked Marion’s licenses to operate the Center and the Home. Marion’s submitted an administrative appeal, and the cases were consolidated. After an administrative appeal hearing, DHHS upheld the revocation of the license for the Home but reversed the revocation of the Center’s license. In lieu of revocation of the license, DHHS imposed an alternative penalty in the form of additional probation and a civil penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court’s ruling upholding DHHS’ findings regarding the Center’s license was supported by competent evidence and was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; and (2) the district court’s ruling upholding DHHS’ findings regarding the Home’s license was supported by competent evidence, conformed to the law, and was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unreasonable. View "Marion’s Quality Servs., Inc. v. Neb. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on a challenge to the State Liquor Control Board's spirits distribution licensing fee structure brought by Association of Washington Spirits and Wine Distributors (Association). Specifically, the Association challenged the Board's decision to exempt distillers who distribute their own manufactured spirits and others acting as distributors pursuant to certificates of approval from contributing to a shortfall of $104.7 million in licensing fees imposed on persons holding spirits distributor licenses. The Association asked the Supreme Court to hold that the distillers must contribute proportionately to eliminating the shortfall. The Court rejected the Association's arguments, holding that the Board acted within its authority and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously. Additionally, the Board did not violate the privileges and immunities clause of article I, section 12 of the Washington State Constitution. View "Ass'n of Wash. Spirits & Wine Distribs. v. Liquor Control Bd." on Justia Law

Both CarMax Auto Superstores West Coast, Inc., and the South Carolina Department of Revenue (appealed the court of appeals' decision, reversing and remanding a decision of the Administrative Law Court (ALC) upholding the Department's use of an alternative apportionment formula to calculate CarMax West's income tax for tax years 2002-2007. When a party seeks to deviate from a statutory formula, the proponent of the alternate formula bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the statutory formula does not fairly represent the taxpayer's business activity in South Carolina and (2) its alternative accounting method is reasonable. The Supreme Court affirmed (as modified), and declined to remand at both parties' request. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' finding that the ALC erred in placing the burden of proof on CarMax West. Furthermore, while there was substantial evidence in the record to support the ALC's finding that the Department's alternative accounting method was reasonable, the Department failed to prove the threshold issue that the statutory formula did not fairly represent CarMax West's business activity within South Carolina. View "Carmax Auto v. South Carolina Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Gunderson was a New Hampshire resident who worked as a self-described "export buyer’s agent:" he purchased specific motor vehicles from retail dealers across the country and exported them to buyers in foreign countries. Prior to exporting the vehicles, petitioner obtained title to the vehicles in New Hampshire and held himself out as the owner. Petitioner was then paid to transfer ownership of the vehicles to the foreign purchasers. Petitioner neither owned a retail motor vehicle sales location nor operated a lot to display vehicles, but performed his services as an export buyer’s agent from his Moultonborough home. The vehicles are never listed online or in any publications or classified advertising. In 2012, petitioner purchased two luxury vehicles from out-of-state retail dealers for the purpose of selling them in China and Russia. When petitioner applied for titles for the vehicles, however, the New Hampshire Bureau of Title and Anti-Theft denied the applications and the New Hampshire Department of Safety determined that he needed to obtain a state-issued motor vehicle dealer’s license to export motor vehicles. Petitioner appealed a court order finding that he was a "Retail Vehicle Dealer" as defined by RSA 259:89-a (2014), and that he had to obtain a license in accordance with RSA 261:103-a (2014) to engage in his motor vehicle business. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Gunderson v. New Hampshire Dept. of Safety" on Justia Law

The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board fined an uninsured employers Titan Enterprises, LLC, Titan Topsoil, Inc. and CCO Enterprises (collectively, "Titan," all owned by Todd Christanson) a substantial amount because they had operated for a significant period of time without carrying statutorily required workers’ compensation insurance. On appeal, the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed part of the Board’s decision, but it reversed the Board on the amount of the fine and remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings. The employer then asked the Commission for an award of attorney’s fees as a successful party on appeal. The State, Division of Workers’ Compensation, which had initiated the Board proceedings, opposed the award on the basis that it, too, had been successful on a significant issue. The Commission awarded the employer full fees of approximately $50,000. The Division petitioned for review of the fee award, and the Supreme Court granted review. Because the Commission failed to consider the Division’s partial success in the appeal, it reversed the Commission’s decision and remanded for further proceedings.View "Alaska Div. of Workers' Comp. v. Titan Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

WTS Acquisition Corporation purchased Ameritemps, Inc. and then transferred the assets to its wholly owned subsidiary, RFFG, LLC. RFFG continued operating the business under the Ameritemps name. The Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation notified RFFG that it had determined that RFFG was a successor employer for workers’ compensation purposes and that it intended to calculate RFFG’s workers’ compensation premium rate based on Ameritemps’ experience rating. RFFG filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Bureau had abused its discretion when it determined RFFG to be the successor in interest to Ameritemps. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in concluding that the decision of the Bureau was supported by the evidence and was not an abuse of discretion.View "State ex rel. RFFG, LLC v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Comp." on Justia Law

In 2011, San Diego County updated its general plan wherein it issued a program environmental impact report (PEIR), and adopted various related mitigation measures. The Sierra Club sought, in a petition for writ of mandate, to enforce one mitigation measure adopted by the County, the Climate Change Mitigation Measure CC-1.2: the preparation of a climate change action plan with "more detailed greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions reduction [GHG] targets and deadlines" and "comprehensive and enforceable GHG emissions reductions measures that will achieve" specified quantities of GHG reductions by the year 2020. However, the Sierra Club alleged that instead of preparing a climate change action plan that included comprehensive and enforceable GHG emission reduction measures that would achieve GHG reductions by 2020, the County prepared a climate action plan (CAP) as a plan-level document that expressly "does not ensure reductions." The County also developed associated guidelines for determining significance (Thresholds). The court granted the petition, concluding that the County's CAP did not comply with the requirements of Mitigation Measure CC-1.2 and thus violated CEQA. The court found that the CAP did not contain enforceable GHG reduction measures that would achieve the specified emissions reductions. The County appealed, asserting: (1) the statute of limitations barred the claim that the mitigation measures were not enforceable; (2) the CAP met the requirements of Mitigation Measure CC-1.2; and (3) that the trial court erred in finding that a supplemental EIR was required. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed.View "Sierra Club v. Co. of San Diego" on Justia Law

Engine Manufacturers Association (EMA) challenged certain regulations adopted by the California Air Resources Board (CARB) requiring engine manufacturers to obtain a sample of emissions of in-use heavy-duty engines equipped with on-board diagnostic (OBD) systems that are nearing the end of their certified useful life and conduct a series of tests on these engines “to assure that engines certified for sale in California are equipped with OBD systems that properly function . . . .” The regulations at issue contained provisions requiring CARB to order the recall and repair of all engines that have been determined to be equipped with a non-conforming OBD system where certain conditions exist. EMA sought a judicial declaration that the challenged regulations were in excess of CARB’s statutory authority and therefore invalid. The trial court granted EMA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and declared the challenged regulations invalid. CARB appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed: the Legislature granted CARB broad authority to adopt regulations designed to reduce air pollution caused by motor vehicle emissions as expeditiously as possible, subject to cost-effectiveness and feasibility limitations. The challenged regulations fall within the scope of authority conferred by the Legislature unless manufacturer in-use testing of OBD systems on heavy-duty engines was prohibitively costly. The question of prohibitive cost could not be settled on the pleadings. The remaining question, whether the regulations were reasonably necessary to effectuate the statutory purpose, was not properly raised in EMA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court remanded remand the matter to the trial court with directions to deny EMA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.View "Engine Manufacturers Assn. v. CA Air Resources Bd." on Justia Law