Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The main issue on appeal in this case was whether the purchase of electricity and natural gas utility services qualifies for a sales tax exemption. Appellant-taxpayer American Airlines, Inc., ("AA") was denied a refund for the sales tax it paid on its purchases of electricity and natural gas utility services during the 2006 calendar year. The Account Maintenance and Compliance Division of the Oklahoma Tax Commission denied the request. Appellant timely protested the denial. The Oklahoma Tax Commission, by order, adopted the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations of the administrative law judge finding taxpayer failed to prove the denial was incorrect. Upon review, the Supreme Court held the Services Exemption (68 O.S. Supp. 2006, section 1357 (28)) provided an exemption for electricity and natural gas utility services used by AA during 2006 in aircraft repair and maintenance activities. The remaining issue concerned the appropriate methodology for determining the amount of the sales tax refund AA should have received on its 2006 purchases of utility services. The adopted Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations did not make a specific finding concerning an appropriate methodology. The Court remanded the case back to the Oklahoma Tax Commission for further proceedings.View "American Airlines, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission" on Justia Law

Cable One, Inc., is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Phoenix, Arizona. In 2005, Cable One received business income from four types of activities in Idaho: cable television services, internet access services, advertising services, and cable modem leasing. In its Idaho income tax return for that year, it included revenues earned from all of those activities except revenues from providing internet access services to Idaho customers. It excluded those revenues on the ground that providing such services to customers in Idaho constituted Arizona sales, although it also excluded such revenues from its 2005 Arizona income tax return on the ground that they came from Idaho sales. In 2008, the Idaho Tax Commission issued a notice of deficiency determination asserting a tax and interest deficiency on Cable One for the 2005 tax year. Cable One petitioned for redetermination, which the Tax Commission denied. Cable One then filed a complaint in the district court, which tried the matter de novo, and ruled in favor of the Tax Commission. Cable One then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court.View "Cable One, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission" on Justia Law

Petitioner Mahindra & Mahindra, Ltd. Appealed a superior court decision to affirm a default judgment by the New Hampshire Motor Vehicle Industry Board in favor of respondents Holloway Motor Cars of Manchester, LLC, Peters Auto Sales, Inc., and Crest Chevrolet, Inc. (collectively "dealers"). Mahindra argued that "there is no dispute that [it] was never properly served by the [dealers] in this matter," and argues that the trial court erred in finding that it waived its right to insist on proper service pursuant to the Hague Service Convention. The dealers contended they were not bound by the requirements of the Hague Service Convention in this case and that, regardless of the convention's applicability, Mahindra waived its challenge to service and jurisdiction. The Supreme Court agreed with Mahindra, and found that the trial court erred as a matter of law. View "Mahindra & Mahindra, Ltd. V. Holloway Motor Cars of Manchester, LLC" on Justia Law

Respondent, the City of Concord (City) appealed a superior court decision granting summary judgment in favor of petitioner Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC d/b/a FairPoint Communications - NNE (FairPoint), in its equal protection challenge to the City’s taxation of FairPoint’s use and occupation of public property, and striking the tax levied against FairPoint. In order to provide telecommunications services throughout the City, FairPoint maintained poles, wires, cables, and other equipment within the City’s public rights-of-way. For the 2000 to 2010 tax years, the City imposed a real estate tax upon FairPoint for its use and occupation of this public property. Prior to 2010, the City did not impose a right-of-way tax upon Comcast, which used the City’s rights-of-way to provide cable services pursuant to a franchise agreement. The City began imposing the tax upon Comcast in 2010 in response to a ruling by the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) that, notwithstanding the franchise agreement, Comcast was subject to the tax. Prior to 2008, the City did not impose the same tax upon Public Service of New Hampshire (PSNH) because it was unaware that PSNH had used and occupied the rights-of-way. Similarly, the City did not tax certain other users of its rights-of-way for their use and occupation of public property during the relevant tax years because it was not aware of their usage. FairPoint brought an action challenging, in relevant part, the constitutionality of the City’s right-of-way tax assessments against it for the 2000 through 2010 tax years. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In granting FairPoint’s motion, and denying the City’s motion, the trial court ruled, as an initial matter, that "intentionality" was not a required element of FairPoint’s equal protection claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that FairPoint’s equal protection claim was one of "selective enforcement," and not an equal protection challenge to the tax scheme itself. Thus, because the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard in ruling that the City selectively imposed the tax upon FairPoint, the Court vacated the trial court’s rulings and remanded for further proceedings. View "Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC v. City of Concord" on Justia Law

The respondents, two developers and an architectural firm, Stevens & Wilkinson of South Carolina, Inc. (S&W), entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the City of Columbia as part of a larger project team to develop a publicly-funded hotel for the Columbia Metropolitan Convention Center. The City eventually abandoned its plan under the MOU, and the respondents brought suit on several causes of action including breach of contract and equitable relief. The City moved for summary judgment arguing the MOU was not a contract and therefore the contract claims failed. The circuit court agreed and, rejecting the equitable claims as well, granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The respondents appealed and the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court reversed. Because the MOU was comprised of agreements to execute further agreements, there was no meeting of the minds on numerous material terms which had not yet been defined. Accordingly, the court of appeals was reversed with respect to that portion of the court's judgment; the Supreme Court held the MOU was unenforceable as a matter of law. The Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court and reinstated its judgment in favor of the City. View "Stevens & Wilkinson of South Carolina, Inc. v. City of Columbia" on Justia Law

In April 2003, the City of Columbia entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Stevens & Wilkinson of South Carolina, Inc. (S&W) and several other parties, to develop a publicly-funded hotel adjacent to the Columbia Metropolitan Convention Center. As architect, S&W was to complete sufficient preliminary design work to determine a guaranteed maximum price for the project, which would be used by the City to obtain municipal bond funding to cover the cost of the hotel. Pursuant to the MOU, the construction company was to pay S&W directly. On June 26, 2003, the City received a letter stating S&W would complete its preliminary design on July 10, 2003, and would then stop working until the bond financing for the hotel was finalized. Realizing this could delay the start of construction, S&W offered to continue working the remaining ninety days until the anticipated bond closing date of October 13, 2003, but required assurance it would be compensated for the work it performed during this time frame. It provided an estimate requiring $650,000 and $75,000 per week after that. On July 30, the City approved "$650,000 for interim architectural design services for a period of 90 days prior to bond closing." The bond closing did not occur as scheduled, but S&W nevertheless continued to work. S&W submitted an invoice to the City for $697,084.79 for work that took place from July 10 to December 15, 2003. By letter dated December 17, 2003, S&W informed the construction company that the City had voted that day "to advance [$705,000.000] to the design team for design services and expenses. Because under the MOU the construction company was to pay S&W, not the City, the construction company agreed to reimburse the City for the funds paid to S&W after the bond closing. The City paid S&W's invoice. S&W continued to work on the project, but in March 2004, the City abandoned its plans under the MOU and ended its relationship with S&W. S&W received no further compensation and sued the City for breach of contract under the MOU and the July 2003 agreement. The City argued there was no separate agreement and the payment of interim fees was merely an advance on fees under the MOU and furthermore, the MOU provided that S&W was to be paid by the construction company, not the City. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of S&W, finding a contract existed between it and the City. On certiorari, the City conceded a contract exists, but argued the contract terms have been satisfied. The Supreme Court found the City's arguments were unpreserved and affirmed as modified. View "Stevens & Wilkinson of South Carolina, Inc. v. City of Columbia" on Justia Law

This dispute arose from violations issued by the Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration. At issue was whether the word "corporation" includes limited liability companies (LLCs) for purposes of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (the Mine Act), 30 U.S.C. 801 et seq. The court concluded that the terms "corporation" and "corporate operator" in the Mine Act are ambiguous. Applying Chevron deference, the court concluded that the Secretary's interpretation is reasonable where, most importantly, construing section 110(c) to include agents of LLCs is consistent with the legislative history. Therefore, the court held that an LLC is a corporation for purposes of the Mine Act and that section 110(c) can be used to assess civil penalties against agents of an LLC. Because substantial evidence supported the ALJ's decision to hold petitioners personally liable for the order at issue, the court affirmed on this issue. Finally, the order underlying their civil penalties was not duplicative. Accordingly, the court affirmed the ALJ's decision. View "Sumpter, et al. v. Secretary of Labor, et al." on Justia Law

Schlumberger Limited conducts its business in Alaska through a wholly owned subsidiary, Schlumberger Technology Corporation. Schlumberger Technology's primary business is oilfield services, but it also owns all of Schlumberger Limited's associated companies incorporated in the United States and operates all of Schlumberger Limited’s domestic businesses. Schlumberger Technology files a consolidated federal tax return for all of Schlumberger Limited’s domestic subsidiaries. For tax years 1998-2000, Schlumberger Technology filed Alaska corporate income tax returns that included only the domestic subsidiaries working in the oilfield services business. In September 2003, a Department of Revenue auditor concluded that Schlumberger Limited was engaged in a unitary business with Schlumberger Technology. Based on these conclusions, the Department issued a notice of assessment for additional corporate income taxes of $429,739 plus interest. Schlumberger Technology argued on appeal of the assessment that under the Internal Revenue Code, domestic corporations were taxed on their worldwide income, but entitled to claim a tax credit against their United States income tax liability for taxes paid to foreign countries. Foreign corporations, on the other hand, are taxed differently. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on the application of Alaska's Net Income Tax Act (ANITA). ANITA incorporates certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, unless the federal provisions are "excepted to or modified by other provisions" of the act. ANITA required a corporation to report its income and the income of certain affiliates and to exclude "80 percent of dividend income received from foreign corporations." The Internal Revenue Code had a different formula; it required a foreign corporation to report only income "effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States." Schlumberger Technology argued that since ANITA has no explicit exception for Internal Revenue Code (section 882), this sourcing rule was incorporated by reference. Thus, Schlumberger Technology argued that the foreign dividends paid to Schlumberger Limited should not have been included in its taxable income under ANITA. In response, the State argued that the provisions of ANITA applied to all business income of the taxpayer, not just income derived from sources in the United States. Upon review of the matter, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the Internal Revenue Code provision in question here was not adopted by reference because it was inconsistent with the formula provided by ANITA. The Court affirmed the decision of the Department of Revenue. View "Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. Alaska Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Ralls, an American corporation whose owners are Chinese nationals, purchased four American limited liability companies (Project Companies) previously formed to develop windfarms in north-central Oregon. CFIUS determined that Ralls' acquisition of the Project Companies threatened national security and issued temporary mitigation orders restricting Ralls' access to, and preventing further construction at, the Project Companies' windfarm sites. The President also concluded that the transaction posed a threat to national security. On appeal, Ralls challenged CFIUS's final order and the Presidential Order, which prohibited the transaction and required Ralls to divest itself of the Project Companies. The court concluded that the Presidential Order deprived Ralls of constitutionally protected property interests without due process of law; the court remanded to the district court with instructions that Ralls be provided the requisite process which should include access to unclassified evidence on which the President relied and an opportunity to respond; and the court left it to the district court to address the merits of Ralls' remaining claims in the first instance since the CFIUS Order claims were dismissed on a jurisdictional ground and given the scant merits briefing. View "Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Investments, et al." on Justia Law

Expedia (and several other hotel booking websites, collectively, "Petitioners") has been subject to approximately 80 underlying lawsuits by states, counties, and municipalities (collectively, taxing authorities) for purportedly failing to collect the right amount of local occupancy taxes from its hotel customers. Expedia tendered most of the suits to its insurer, Zurich, although some were tendered late. Zurich refused to defend Expedia on a number of grounds, including late tender and that the underlying suits may be excluded from the policies' coverage. The trial court declined to make a determination of Zurich's duty to defend Expedia, instead ordering discovery that Expedia claimed was prejudicial to the underlying actions. Petitioners sought adjudication of their summary judgment motion concerning their respective insurers' duty to defend them in cases brought by local taxing authorities. They further requested a stay of discovery in the coverage action that could prejudice them in the underlying litigation. Upon review of the matter, the Washington Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by delaying adjudication of Zurich's duty to defend Expedia. Accordingly, the Court vacated the trial court's order. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine Zurich's duty to defend Expedia in each of the 54 underlying cases subject to Expedia's motion. The trial court was furthermore ordered to stay discovery in the coverage action until it could make a factual determination as to which parts of discovery are potentially prejudicial to Expedia in the underlying actions. View "Expedia, Inc. v. Steadfast Ins. Co." on Justia Law