Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (PRC) granted Green Cab, LLC d/b/a Green Cab Co., (Green Cab) a certificate of authority to provide taxi service within Bernalillo County and to the rest of the state. Albuquerque Cab Co. (ABQ Cab) and Yellow Checker Cab appealed the grant of that certificate. On appeal, ABQ Cab and Yellow Cab asserted that the PRC erred by: (1) not scheduling a hearing on whether Green Cab should be issued the certificate; (2) denying their motions to intervene as "interested persons" in the Green Cab proceedings; (3) granting Green Cab authority to operate a taxi service; and (4) issuing Green Cab temporary authority to operate a taxi service in Bernalillo County to all parts of the state. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court held that the PRC committed reversible error by not holding a public hearing in which ABQ Cab and Yellow Cab could participate as intervenors, contrary to the statutory requirements of the Motor Carrier Act. Because the PRC did not follow the required procedure, the Court did not address the remaining arguments regarding Green Cab’s temporary or permanent authority. View "Albuquerque Cab Co. v. NMPRC" on Justia Law

This appeal involves the transfer of the experience rating account for unemployment tax purposes from one employer to another pursuant to Idaho Code section 72-1351A(1)(a). After an investigation, the Department of Labor determined that the experience rating account of Diamond Z Trailer, Inc. (Diamond Z), which ceased operating in the spring of 2010, was transferred to Rule Steel Tanks, Inc. (Rule Steel), which hired the majority of the employees who were laid off by Diamond Z and which commenced marketing and manufacturing the same product that was manufactured by Diamond Z. Rule Steel appealed that determination. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rule Steel Tanks, Inc. v. Dept of Labor" on Justia Law

BV Beverage Company, LLC appealed the dismissal of its petition regarding the expiration of its liquor license. Idaho Alcohol Beverage Control (ABC) contended that BV Beverage's interest in its license expired by operation of law when BV Beverage's lessee failed to timely renew. BV Beverage argued that the agency’s procedures deprived it of adequate procedural due process. The district court dismissed BV Beverage's petition because there was no agency action to review; even if there was agency action, the action did not violate procedural due process because BV Beverage had actual knowledge of the expiration date of the liquor license. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "BV Beverage Company v. Idaho Alcohol Beverage Control." on Justia Law

Elizabeth Rollins purchased a beverage dispensary license (liquor license) in late 1990. She attempted to open a bar on a property she owned but was unsuccessful. Rollins appealed the superior court’s decision upholding the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board’s determination to deny her application for a waiver of the annual operating requirement for her liquor license. On appeal, Rollins argued that: (1) the Board’s decision was not supported by the evidence; (2) she was improperly assigned the burden of proof; (3) the hearing before the administrative law judge violated her right to due process; and (4) the Board’s selective enforcement of its statutes violated her right to equal protection. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Rollins properly bore the burden of proof on the issue of whether she was entitled to a waiver, that the record supported the Board’s decision, and that the Board proceedings did not violate her constitutional rights. View "Rollins v. Alaska Dept. of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Kia Motors Manufacturing Georgia, Inc. instituted a "Quick Start Program" run in conjunction with the Technical College System of Georgia. Krystal Coleman, Sabrina Robinson Bolston, Tim Durden, and Darrell Strawbridge each submitted a request to the Technical College System pursuant to the Open Records Act, seeking to inspect certain records concerning Kia's hiring practices. The College System refused on several grounds to make the requested records available for inspection, and Coleman, Bolston, Durden, and Strawbridge filed suit to compel their production. In 2012, while the lawsuit was pending, the General Assembly amended the Open Records Act, and among other revisions, it added an exemption for certain records concerning the Quick Start program from public inspection. The Technical College System and Kia then moved to dismiss the lawsuit, asserting that exemption from the revised Act. Without deciding the extent to which paragraph of the revised Act applied to the requested records, the trial court denied the motions to dismiss, concluding that it would be unconstitutional in any event to apply the revision in a pending lawsuit. The Technical College System and Kia appealed, and after review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded in this case the applicable revised parts of the Act applied and that its application was constitutional. The trial court's decision was reversed, and on remand, the trial court was mandated to determine which of the pertinent records were subject to the revised Act. View "Deal v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Tesoro Corporation challenged its income taxes assessed for 1994 through 1998. The state Department of Revenue (DOR) calculated Tesoro’s Alaska income by applying a three-factor apportionment formula to Tesoro’s worldwide income, including that of its non-Alaskan subsidiaries. An administrative law judge ruled Tesoro was a unitary business that could be subject to formula apportionment, and that DOR could permissibly assess penalties against Tesoro. Tesoro appealed to the superior court, which affirmed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Tesoro argued that only the income of its Alaska-based subsidiaries should have been subject to taxation in Alaska because Alaska’s tax scheme violates the Due Process and Interstate Commerce Clauses of the United States Constitution. Because Tesoro’s business was unitary, the Supreme Court rejected Tesoro’s challenge to the constitutionality of taxing all of its income under formula apportionment. Because Tesoro lacked standing to challenge the formula’s constitutionality, the Court did not reach the internal consistency issue Tesoro raised. Furthermore, the Court concluded that DOR permissibly imposed penalties on Tesoro. Therefore the Court affirmed the superior court decision that affirmed the administrative law judge’s decision and order. View "Tesoro Corporation v. Alaska Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether defendant professional corporations and a limited liability company were "health care providers" as defined by the state Medical Malpractice Act so as to be able to receive the Act's benefits. The Court of Appeals determined that though Defendants did not literally meet the Act's definition of "health care provider," it nonetheless held that Defendants were health care providers under the Act because a strict adherence to the plain language of the definition would conflict with legislative intent. Although the Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court's determination that the definition of "health care provider" literally excludes Defendants. The Supreme Court concluded that several provisions in the Act indicated that the Legislature intended professional medical organizations like Defendants to be covered by the Act. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals but on different grounds. View "Baker v. Hedstrom" on Justia Law

Magellan Pipeline Company, LP appealed a sales tax assessment levied by the state Department of Revenue and Regulation on its additive injection and equipment calibration services. The Hearing Examiner, Department Secretary and trial court all found Magellan's services were non-exempt from tax. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that under the plain language of the applicable statute, Magellan's services were exempt from sales tax. View "Magellan Pipeline Co v. Dept. of Revenue & Regulation" on Justia Law

A tour company claimed fraud and misconduct on the part of a borough in the course of a fraudulent conveyance trial concerning liability for property taxes. Specifically, the company argued that a police officer falsely testified at trial concerning a conversation he allegedly had with the company president regarding the company's obligation to pay borough taxes. The superior court denied relief under Rule 60(b)(3), finding that the company had failed to establish clear and convincing evidence of fraud. The company appealed, arguing that the superior court applied the incorrect legal standard and that the company presented clear and convincing evidence of fraud. The company also appealed various orders relating to discovery and the award of attorney's fees. Because the superior court applied the correct legal standard and did not abuse its discretion in finding that there was not clear and convincing evidence of fraud, the Supreme Court affirmed its denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the lower court's refusal to reopen discovery or awarding attorney's fees. View "Alaskan Adventure Tours, Inc. v. The City and Borough of Yakutat" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Victor Virgin Construction Corporation appealed a Superior Court remitting a jury award following an advisory jury finding of breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation by defendant New Hampshire Department of Transportation (DOT). DOT cross-appealed, asking that the award be further reduced. In 2008, Virgin bid on a DOT project to replace a stone box culvert located underneath Depot Road in Hollis. Virgin submitted the lowest bid and was awarded the contract. After completion of the project, DOT paid Virgin the sum agreed to in the contract with only a minor upward adjustment. Virgin sued DOT for both breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation. The trial court denied DOT's request to bifurcate the trial; subsequently the jury found in favor of Virgin. DOT then moved for a new trial or to set aside the jury's damages award. The trial court granted remittitur, but did no enter a finding of liability on the breach of contract claim, finding that the award could only be sustained on the negligent misrepresentation claim. Virgin then appealed, seeking the full amount of damages awarded by the jury. The Supreme Court found that Virgin's negligent misrepresentation claim for money damages was capped by statute, therefore it was not entitled to the full amount of damages originally awarded by the jury. That cap does not apply to breach of contract, however, and because the trial court did not include findings with regard to liability on the breach of contract claim, the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Victor Virgin Construction Corp. v. New Hampshire Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law