Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Mississippi Department of Revenue assessed taxes, penalties, and interest against Isle of Capri Casino, Inc. and its affiliated entities for tax years 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007. The Department based the assessment on the application of the license fees as a credit, claiming that only the tax liability of four Isle of Capri entities that actually held the licenses were eligible for offset, and could not benefit the affiliated group as a whole. Isle of Capri appealed the Department's assessment first to the Board of Review and then to the Board of Tax Appeals; both affirmed the assessment with minor changes. Isle of Capri appealed again, and the chancery court granted summary judgment in its favor. The Department subsequently appealed. Finding no error in the chancery court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mississippi Department of Revenue v. Isle of Capri Casino, Inc." on Justia Law

Starr, AIG's former principal shareholder, filed suit against the FRBNY for breach of fiduciary duty in its rescue of AIG during the fall 2008 financial crisis. The district court dismissed Starr's claims and Starr appealed. The suit challenged the extraordinary measures taken by FRBNY to rescue AIG from bankruptcy at the height of the direst financial crisis in modern times. In light of the direct conflict these measures created between the private duties imposed by Delaware fiduciary duty law and the public duties imposed by FRBNY's governing statutes and regulations, the court held that, in this suit, state fiduciary duty law was preempted by federal common law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Starr Int'l Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York" on Justia Law

Harman-Bergstedt, Inc. appealed the appellate court's decision to reverse an Industrial Claim Appeals Office decision disallowing respondent Elaine Loofbourrow's award of temporary disability benefits. The ICAO concluded that once respondent's treating physician placed her at maximum medical improvement, temporary total disability benefits could not be awarded for the injury for which she was initially treated. The appellate court concluded that under the circumstances of this case, such an independent medical exam was not a prerequisite to temporary total disability benefits. After its review of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court was correct in its decision: because a determination of maximum medical improvement has no statutory significance with regard to injuries resulting in loss of no more than three days (or shifts) of work time, respondent's award of temporary total disability benefits was not barred by her failure to first seek a division-sponsored independent medical examination. View "Harman-Bergstedt, Inc. v. Loofbourrow" on Justia Law

The New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (PRC) granted Green Cab, LLC d/b/a Green Cab Co., (Green Cab) a certificate of authority to provide taxi service within Bernalillo County and to the rest of the state. Albuquerque Cab Co. (ABQ Cab) and Yellow Checker Cab appealed the grant of that certificate. On appeal, ABQ Cab and Yellow Cab asserted that the PRC erred by: (1) not scheduling a hearing on whether Green Cab should be issued the certificate; (2) denying their motions to intervene as "interested persons" in the Green Cab proceedings; (3) granting Green Cab authority to operate a taxi service; and (4) issuing Green Cab temporary authority to operate a taxi service in Bernalillo County to all parts of the state. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court held that the PRC committed reversible error by not holding a public hearing in which ABQ Cab and Yellow Cab could participate as intervenors, contrary to the statutory requirements of the Motor Carrier Act. Because the PRC did not follow the required procedure, the Court did not address the remaining arguments regarding Green Cab’s temporary or permanent authority. View "Albuquerque Cab Co. v. NMPRC" on Justia Law

This appeal involves the transfer of the experience rating account for unemployment tax purposes from one employer to another pursuant to Idaho Code section 72-1351A(1)(a). After an investigation, the Department of Labor determined that the experience rating account of Diamond Z Trailer, Inc. (Diamond Z), which ceased operating in the spring of 2010, was transferred to Rule Steel Tanks, Inc. (Rule Steel), which hired the majority of the employees who were laid off by Diamond Z and which commenced marketing and manufacturing the same product that was manufactured by Diamond Z. Rule Steel appealed that determination. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rule Steel Tanks, Inc. v. Dept of Labor" on Justia Law

BV Beverage Company, LLC appealed the dismissal of its petition regarding the expiration of its liquor license. Idaho Alcohol Beverage Control (ABC) contended that BV Beverage's interest in its license expired by operation of law when BV Beverage's lessee failed to timely renew. BV Beverage argued that the agency’s procedures deprived it of adequate procedural due process. The district court dismissed BV Beverage's petition because there was no agency action to review; even if there was agency action, the action did not violate procedural due process because BV Beverage had actual knowledge of the expiration date of the liquor license. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "BV Beverage Company v. Idaho Alcohol Beverage Control." on Justia Law

Elizabeth Rollins purchased a beverage dispensary license (liquor license) in late 1990. She attempted to open a bar on a property she owned but was unsuccessful. Rollins appealed the superior court’s decision upholding the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board’s determination to deny her application for a waiver of the annual operating requirement for her liquor license. On appeal, Rollins argued that: (1) the Board’s decision was not supported by the evidence; (2) she was improperly assigned the burden of proof; (3) the hearing before the administrative law judge violated her right to due process; and (4) the Board’s selective enforcement of its statutes violated her right to equal protection. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Rollins properly bore the burden of proof on the issue of whether she was entitled to a waiver, that the record supported the Board’s decision, and that the Board proceedings did not violate her constitutional rights. View "Rollins v. Alaska Dept. of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Kia Motors Manufacturing Georgia, Inc. instituted a "Quick Start Program" run in conjunction with the Technical College System of Georgia. Krystal Coleman, Sabrina Robinson Bolston, Tim Durden, and Darrell Strawbridge each submitted a request to the Technical College System pursuant to the Open Records Act, seeking to inspect certain records concerning Kia's hiring practices. The College System refused on several grounds to make the requested records available for inspection, and Coleman, Bolston, Durden, and Strawbridge filed suit to compel their production. In 2012, while the lawsuit was pending, the General Assembly amended the Open Records Act, and among other revisions, it added an exemption for certain records concerning the Quick Start program from public inspection. The Technical College System and Kia then moved to dismiss the lawsuit, asserting that exemption from the revised Act. Without deciding the extent to which paragraph of the revised Act applied to the requested records, the trial court denied the motions to dismiss, concluding that it would be unconstitutional in any event to apply the revision in a pending lawsuit. The Technical College System and Kia appealed, and after review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded in this case the applicable revised parts of the Act applied and that its application was constitutional. The trial court's decision was reversed, and on remand, the trial court was mandated to determine which of the pertinent records were subject to the revised Act. View "Deal v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Tesoro Corporation challenged its income taxes assessed for 1994 through 1998. The state Department of Revenue (DOR) calculated Tesoro’s Alaska income by applying a three-factor apportionment formula to Tesoro’s worldwide income, including that of its non-Alaskan subsidiaries. An administrative law judge ruled Tesoro was a unitary business that could be subject to formula apportionment, and that DOR could permissibly assess penalties against Tesoro. Tesoro appealed to the superior court, which affirmed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Tesoro argued that only the income of its Alaska-based subsidiaries should have been subject to taxation in Alaska because Alaska’s tax scheme violates the Due Process and Interstate Commerce Clauses of the United States Constitution. Because Tesoro’s business was unitary, the Supreme Court rejected Tesoro’s challenge to the constitutionality of taxing all of its income under formula apportionment. Because Tesoro lacked standing to challenge the formula’s constitutionality, the Court did not reach the internal consistency issue Tesoro raised. Furthermore, the Court concluded that DOR permissibly imposed penalties on Tesoro. Therefore the Court affirmed the superior court decision that affirmed the administrative law judge’s decision and order. View "Tesoro Corporation v. Alaska Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether defendant professional corporations and a limited liability company were "health care providers" as defined by the state Medical Malpractice Act so as to be able to receive the Act's benefits. The Court of Appeals determined that though Defendants did not literally meet the Act's definition of "health care provider," it nonetheless held that Defendants were health care providers under the Act because a strict adherence to the plain language of the definition would conflict with legislative intent. Although the Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court's determination that the definition of "health care provider" literally excludes Defendants. The Supreme Court concluded that several provisions in the Act indicated that the Legislature intended professional medical organizations like Defendants to be covered by the Act. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals but on different grounds. View "Baker v. Hedstrom" on Justia Law