Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Business Law
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Miller Trucking, LLC, Ben Miller, and Miriam Miller ("the Miller plaintiffs) appeal a summary judgment in favor of APAC Mid-South, Inc. (APAC), Oldcastle Materials, Inc., and Steve Reynolds (defendants). The facts of this appeal were based on contracts between the Alabama Department of Transportation ("ADOT") and APAC and between APAC and Miller Trucking. ADOT hired APAC to provide aggregate materials for distribution to counties, and APAC, in turn, hired Miller Trucking to haul the aggregate materials to the counties purchasing the aggregate materials from the State. At issue in this appeal were adjustments to the compensation of APAC paid Miller Trucking based on the cost of fuel during the time of the contract. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of defendants and remanded the case for further proceedings. A genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a 2008 APAC-Miller Trucking contract and a 2009 hired-truck qualification agreement were modified to include fuel-price-adjustment agreements and, if so, what the terms of those agreements were. View "Miller Trucking, LLC, et al. v. APAC Mid-South, Inc., et al. " on Justia Law

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Defendant-Appellant Campus Village Apartments, LLC appealed denial of its motion to dismiss the complaint of Plaintiff-Appellee Auraria Student Housing at the Regency, LLC. Regency's complaint alleged that Campus Village conspired with the University of Colorado at Denver to monopolize student housing in and around the university's campus. Regency moved to dismiss, averring that the Tenth Circuit lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of the district court's denial of Campus Village's motion to dismiss was not a final order. In response, Campus Village argued that the Tenth Circuit indeed had jurisdiction over this case under the "collateral order doctrine." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the district court did not err in denying Campus Village's motion to dismiss; the court's order was not an appealable final order. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit dismissed Campus Village's appeal. View "Auraria Student Housing v. Campus Village Apartments, LLC" on Justia Law

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Appellants Hobson Fabricating Corp. (Hobson) and SE/Z Construction, LLC (SE/Z) appealed a district court decision in their case against the State of Idaho, Department of Administration, Division of Public Works (DPW) regarding costs and attorney fees. Prior to the district court's decision, the parties had settled all of their claims but for costs and attorney fees. The district court declared that all parties had prevailed in part and were to bear their own costs and fees. Hobson and SE/Z appealed the decision, arguing that the district court abused its discretion and should have found that they were the overall prevailing party. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order that the Contractors and DPW bear their own costs and fees and its order that Hobson pay the individual defendants' costs. View "Hobson Fabricating Corp v. SE/Z Construction" on Justia Law

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The petitioners, Bretton Woods Telephone Company, Inc., Dixville Telephone Company, Dunbarton Telephone Company, Inc., and Granite State Telephone, Inc., four exempt incumbent rural local exchange carriers (RLECs), appealed an order of the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission (PUC) that denied their motion to rescind or declare null and void registrations of competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) authorized by the PUC to engage in business as telephone utilities in the service territories of RLECs. Citing RSA 374:26 and RSA 374:22-g, among other statutes, the petitioners alleged that the PUC, before issuing the registrations, had failed to provide notice, hold hearings, and determine whether allowing such competition would be consistent with the public good. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in "Appeal of Union Tel. Co.," the petitioners specifically argued that federal law did not preempt these requirements. The PUC ultimately denied the petitioners' request and ruled that section 253(a) of the Telecommunications Act preempted RSA 374:26 and RSA 374:22-g, II. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that section 253(a) preempted state and local laws, regulations, and requirements that "prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service." View "Appeal of Bretton Woods Telephone Company, Inc." on Justia Law

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Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (Alyeska), the agent for the owners of the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), leases the TAPS right-of-way from the Alaska Department of Natural Resources (Department). Alyeska appealed the Department's 2002 appraisal of the TAPS lease price to Michael Menge, the Commissioner of the Department, and then to the superior court. Both affirmed the Department's appraisal. Alyeska appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing: (1) the Department misinterpreted AS 38.35.140(a); (2) the Department was required to adopt its interpretation of AS 38.35.140(a) as a regulation under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA); and (3) the appraisal improperly included submerged lands within the right-of-way when the Department failed to establish that the State holds title to those lands. Finding no misinterpretation, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

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East Midtown Plaza Housing Company, a limited-profit housing company organized under the Mitchell-Lama Law, sought to withdraw from the Mitchell-Lama program and become a private cooperative apartment complex. A vote was taken on a revised privatization plan, and the proposal would have been approved if the votes were tallied using a one-vote-per-share rule, but not if counted under a one-vote-per-household formula as directed by the certificate of incorporation and City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD). Following the vote, East Midtown filed a proposed second amendment stating that the plan had been adopted by the affirmative vote of at least two thirds of the outstanding shares of East Midtown. The Attorney General refused to accept the amendment. East Midtown responded by commencing this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding seeking to compel the Attorney General to accept the second amendment declaring the plan effective and to direct HPD to recognize that the plan achieved the necessary two-thirds shareholder vote. Supreme Court denied the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the courts below correctly held that the vote should be calculated using the one-vote-per-apartment formula, and therefore, the necessary two-thirds approval was not met. View "E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co. v. Cuomo " on Justia Law

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Cordero Mining LLC (Cordero) sought review of a Decision and Order of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued on December 5, 2011, which found that Cordero violated section 105(c) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 by terminating employee Cindy L. Clapp. Cordero requested that judgment be entered in its favor and that the Tenth Circuit (a) vacate the ALJ's finding that Cordero violated the Act, (b) vacate the ALJ's orders that Ms. Clapp be reinstated, that she be paid back-pay, that Cordero's files remove reference to her termination, and that a copy of the decision and order be posted, and (c) vacate the penalties imposed by the ALJ. The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission denied review of the ALJ's decision. The Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review and affirmed the order of the ALJ. "[A]fter reviewing the record as a whole, we find substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding of discrimination and decision to award full back pay. In addition, the penalty imposed was not excessive or an abuse of discretion." View "Cordero Mining LLC v. FMSHR" on Justia Law

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Relator challenged several personal liability assessments that the Commissioner of Revenue made against him based on unpaid petroleum and sales taxes owed by Twin Cities Avanti Stores, LLC (Avanti). On appeal, Relator asserted that the tax court erred by granting summary judgment to the Commissioner because (1) there were disputed, material questions of fact regarding his personal liability for the unpaid petroleum and sales taxes, and (2) the court abused its discretion in not allowing additional discovery to explore an estoppel defense. The Supreme Court reversed the tax court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner and remanded for a trial, holding that there was a material dispute of fact whether Relator had the requisite control over the company's finances to be held personally liable for Avanti's tax liability. View "Stevens v. Comm'r of Revenue" on Justia Law

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Taxpayer World Publications distributes a free weekly newspaper in central Vermont called The World. Once a month, the newspaper includes a coupon book, produced and printed by taxpayer, that features coupons for local businesses. The Commissioner of Taxes concluded that the coupon books are not "component parts" of the newspaper, and therefore the cost of printing the coupon books is "not exempt from sales and use tax." The superior court affirmed. World Publications appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed too. View "World Publications, Inc. v. Vermont Department of Taxes" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, Doctors Eitan and Vered Sobel, owners of a medical office building in Rutland, appealed the superior court's grant of summary judgment for defendant, City of Rutland. Plaintiffs sued the City for damages, claiming the City Tax Assessor (the Assessor) was negligent in providing allegedly inaccurate property tax estimates on the proposed, but not yet built, office. Plaintiffs also sought to enjoin the City from enforcing the tax assessment on the office building ultimately constructed. On appeal, they argued that the court erred in concluding that their negligence claim was barred by municipal immunity and that they failed to establish equitable estoppel against the City. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the City Assessor was immune from suit, and that plaintiffs could no establish estoppel with the facts of this case. Finding no error with the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City, the Supreme Court affirmed that decision. View "Sobel v. City of Rutland" on Justia Law