Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether an out-of-state internet retailer, Barnesandnoble.com LLC (bn.com), which has no physical presence in New Mexico other than through stores owned by a sister corporation, Barnes & Noble Booksellers, Inc., is subject to New Mexico gross receipts tax on its sales to New Mexico residents without offending the federal Commerce Clause. The answer to this question depended on whether Booksellers engaged in activities in New Mexico on behalf of bn.com that were significantly associated with bn.com's ability to establish and maintain a market for its sales in New Mexico, thus creating a substantial nexus between bn.com and New Mexico. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Booksellers did engage in such activities, which included: (1) Booksellers' promotion of bn.com through sales of gift cards redeemable at bn.com and bearing bn.com's name; (2) Booksellers' policy of sharing customers' email addresses with bn.com; (3) Booksellers' implicit endorsement of bn.com through the companies' shared loyalty program and Booksellers' return policy; and (4) Booksellers' in-state use of Barnes & Noble logos and trademarks, which bn.com also used. Therefore, the Court held that Booksellers' in-state activities were sufficient to create a substantial nexus between bn.com and New Mexico, so that the state could tax bn.com's sales to customers in New Mexico without offending the federal Commerce Clause. View "N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't. v. Barnesandnoble.com, LLC" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, the federal district court found that Appellant Maggie Chapman violated the "assisting and facilitating" provision of the Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. 310.3(b). A consumer protection action was brought by the Federal Trade Commission and four states against several individual and corporate defendants who marketed and sold to consumers grant-related goods and services with false representations that the consumers were guaranteed or likely to receive grants. After the claims against the other defendants were settled or adjudicated by entry of summary judgment, the district court held a bench trial on the remaining claim against Ms. Chapman. Following the trial, the court found that Ms. Chapman violated the Telemarketing Sales Rule by providing substantial assistance to telemarketing defendants while knowing or consciously avoiding knowing of their deceptive telemarketing practices. The court accordingly ordered a permanent injunction and $1,682,950 in monetary damages against Ms. Chapman. The court also denied Ms. Chapman's post-judgment motion to alter or amend the judgment or, alternatively, for remittitur. Ms. Chapman appealed both the finding she violated the Telemarketing Sales Rule and the denial of her post-judgment motion. Not persuaded that the district court's underlying factual findings were clearly erroneous, and concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Chapman's post-judgment motion, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Chapman" on Justia Law

The Board of Supervisors of Fluvanna County filed a complaint against Davenport & Company asserting that Davenport, which served as the financial advisor to the Board, knowingly made false representations and used its fiduciary position to persuade the Board to hire Davenport as an advisor regarding the financing of the construction of a new high school. Davenport filed a demurrer to the complaint, which the circuit court granted on the basis that the separation of powers doctrine prevented the court from resolving the controversy because the court would have to inquire into the motives of the Board's legislative decision making. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board effectively waived its common law legislative immunity from civil liability and the burden of litigation, and therefore the circuit court erred in sustaining Davenport's demurrer on these grounds. View "Bd. of Supervisors of Fluvanna County v. Davenport & Co. LLC" on Justia Law

A fire destroyed a hydroponic tomato facility belonging to a new business, Sunnyland Farms, Inc. The day before the fire, Sunnyland's electricity had been shut off by its local utility, the Central New Mexico Electrical Cooperative (CNMEC), for nonpayment. Sunnyland's water pumps were powered by electricity, and without power, Sunnyland's facility had no water. Sunnyland sued CNMEC, alleging both that CNMEC had wrongfully suspended service, and if its electrical service had been in place, firefighters and Sunnyland employees would have been able to stop the fire from consuming the facility. After a bench trial, the court found CNMEC liable for negligence and breach of contract. The trial court awarded damages, including lost profits, of over $21 million in contract and tort, but reduced the tort damages by 80% for Sunnyland's comparative fault. It also awarded $100,000 in punitive damages. The parties cross-appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the contract judgment, vacated the punitive damages, held that the lost profit damages were not supported by sufficient evidence, affirmed the trial court's offset of damages based on CNMEC's purchase of a subrogation lien, and affirmed the trial court's rulings on pre- and post-judgment interest. Sunnyland appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals regarding the contract judgment, punitive damages, and interest, and reversed on the lost profit damages and the offset. The Court also took the opportunity of this case to re-examine the standard for consequential contract damages in New Mexico. View "Sunnyland Farms, Inc. v. Central N.M. Electric Cooperative, Inc." on Justia Law

Respondent Nissan North America, Inc. (Nissan) appealed a superior court decision that vacated decision of the New Hampshire Motor Vehicle Industry Board (Board) and ruled that RSA chapter 357-C rendered unenforceable a provision of a written settlement agreement between Nissan and petitioner, Strike Four, LLC, a Nissan dealer. Nissan also appealed the superior court's ruling that it was entitled to neither specific performance of the settlement agreement nor attorney's fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision, but vacated that court's dismissal of Nissan's claim for attorney fees. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Strike Four, LLC v. Nissan North America, Inc." on Justia Law

Indiana Boxcar, a holding company that owns several railroads, petitioned for review of the Board's determination that Indiana Boxcar was an "employer" for purposes of the Railroad Retirement Act and the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. 231, 351. To be an employer under those two Acts, a company such as Indiana Boxcar must be "under common control" with a railroad. Before this case, the Board repeatedly held that parent corporations like Indiana Boxcar were not under common control with their railroad subsidiaries. Under Board precedent, the term "common control" did not usually apply to two companies in a parent-subsidiary relationship. Here, however, the Board did not adhere to that precedent and did not reasonably explain and justify its deviation from its precedent. Therefore, the court held that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded to the Board. View "Indiana Boxcar Corp. v. RRRB" on Justia Law

The taxpayer in this case, a paper mill, requested a refund on taxes it paid on purchases of caustic soda, arguing that the chemical was used in the production of a product for resale and excluded from local and state taxation. An attorney for the tax collector denied the request, and gave no reason for the denial. The taxpayer made a second request for taxes inadvertently paid on caustic soda and sodium hydrosulfide, chemicals they argued, qualified for the tax exemption. The tax collector did not respond to the second request. The taxpayer then sent a third and fourth refund request, again for the purchase of raw materials. Again, the requests were denied with no grounds for the denial. The taxpayer then filed suit seeking the refunds it felt were due back from the tax collector. The district court found that the claims were untimely filed, and the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court granted the taxpayer's writ application to clarify the proper procedure and time period for appeals when the tax collector has failed to act on a refund claim for overpayment of taxes after one year, and to determine whether the taxpayer was required to use a "payment under protest" procedure in this case in order to obtain a refund. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts dismissing the tax refund claims, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Tin, Inc. v. Washington Parish Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

The primary question in this case was whether the Oregon Department of Revenue properly classified income resulting from the sale of Crystal Communication's assets as "business income." Crystal operated as a multistate business providing wireless cellular telecommunications services and, in the relevant tax years, sold its assets related to those services. It reported the gain from the asset sale as "nonbusiness income" and allocated that gain to Florida, its state of commercial domicile. On audit, the department reclassified the gain as apportionable "business income." Crystal challenged the reclassification, and the Tax Court granted summary judgment in favor of the department and entered judgment accordingly. Crystal appealed to this court. Finding no error in the classification, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Crystal Communications, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

CenturyTel operated as a multistate, unitary business that, until 2002, provided both wireless and wireline telecommunications services. In 2002, CenturyTel sold its assets related to its wireless services but continued to provide wireline services. As in "Crystal Communications, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue," (___ P3d ___ (decided March 7, 2013), CenturyTel reported the gain from the sale of its wireless assets as "nonbusiness income" and allocated that gain to its state of commercial domicile. On audit, the Department of Revenue reclassified the gain as apportionable "business income." CenturyTel challenged the department's reclassification, and the Tax Court, relying on its decision in "Crystal," granted summary judgment in favor of the department. CenturyTel appealed. Consistent with its decision in "Crystal," the Supreme Court affirmed the Tax Court's decision. View "CenturyTel, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

K&D Enterprises, through its manager, Mid-America, contracted to purchase an apartment complex. Prior to the closing, K&D Enterprises created a new company, Euclid-Richmond Gardens, and assigned its rights under the purchase agreement to that new company. Euclid-Richmond Gardens hired K&D Group, Inc., a property-management company, to manage the apartment. K&D Group hired former employees of Mid-America and assumed the operations of the complex. The Bureau of Workers' Compensation later conducted an audit and determined K&D Group was the successor in interest to the business operations of Mid-America, a determination that authorized the Bureau to base K&D Group's experience rating, in part, on Mid-America's past experience, which included a large workers' compensation claim. After K&D Group's administrative appeal was denied, K&D Group unsuccessfully filed a mandamus action in the court of appeals. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and issued the writ of mandamus, holding that K&D Group was not a successor in interest for purposes of workers' compensation law, and thus, the Bureau abused its discretion when it transferred part of Mid-America's experience rating to K&D Group. View "State ex rel. K&D Group, Inc. v. Buehrer" on Justia Law