Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The primary question in this case was whether the Oregon Department of Revenue properly classified income resulting from the sale of Crystal Communication's assets as "business income." Crystal operated as a multistate business providing wireless cellular telecommunications services and, in the relevant tax years, sold its assets related to those services. It reported the gain from the asset sale as "nonbusiness income" and allocated that gain to Florida, its state of commercial domicile. On audit, the department reclassified the gain as apportionable "business income." Crystal challenged the reclassification, and the Tax Court granted summary judgment in favor of the department and entered judgment accordingly. Crystal appealed to this court. Finding no error in the classification, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Crystal Communications, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

CenturyTel operated as a multistate, unitary business that, until 2002, provided both wireless and wireline telecommunications services. In 2002, CenturyTel sold its assets related to its wireless services but continued to provide wireline services. As in "Crystal Communications, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue," (___ P3d ___ (decided March 7, 2013), CenturyTel reported the gain from the sale of its wireless assets as "nonbusiness income" and allocated that gain to its state of commercial domicile. On audit, the Department of Revenue reclassified the gain as apportionable "business income." CenturyTel challenged the department's reclassification, and the Tax Court, relying on its decision in "Crystal," granted summary judgment in favor of the department. CenturyTel appealed. Consistent with its decision in "Crystal," the Supreme Court affirmed the Tax Court's decision. View "CenturyTel, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

K&D Enterprises, through its manager, Mid-America, contracted to purchase an apartment complex. Prior to the closing, K&D Enterprises created a new company, Euclid-Richmond Gardens, and assigned its rights under the purchase agreement to that new company. Euclid-Richmond Gardens hired K&D Group, Inc., a property-management company, to manage the apartment. K&D Group hired former employees of Mid-America and assumed the operations of the complex. The Bureau of Workers' Compensation later conducted an audit and determined K&D Group was the successor in interest to the business operations of Mid-America, a determination that authorized the Bureau to base K&D Group's experience rating, in part, on Mid-America's past experience, which included a large workers' compensation claim. After K&D Group's administrative appeal was denied, K&D Group unsuccessfully filed a mandamus action in the court of appeals. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and issued the writ of mandamus, holding that K&D Group was not a successor in interest for purposes of workers' compensation law, and thus, the Bureau abused its discretion when it transferred part of Mid-America's experience rating to K&D Group. View "State ex rel. K&D Group, Inc. v. Buehrer" on Justia Law

The Isabella County Prosecuting Attorney filed a complaint for a temporary restraining order, a show-cause order, a preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction, seeking to enjoin the operation of Compassionate Apothecary, LLC (CA), a medical-marijuana dispensary that was owned and operated by Brandon McQueen and Matthew Taylor. McQueen was a registered qualifying patient and a registered primary caregiver for three qualifying patients under the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act (MMMA). Taylor was the registered primary caregiver for two qualifying patients. They operated CA as a membership organization. The prosecuting attorney alleged that McQueen and Taylor’s operation of CA did not comply with the MMMA, was contrary to the Public Health Code (PHC), and, thus, was a public nuisance. The court denied the prosecuting attorney’s requests for a temporary restraining order, a show-cause order and injunction, concluding that the operation of CA was in compliance with the MMMA because the patient-to-patient transfers of marijuana that CA facilitated fell within the act’s definition of the “medical use” of marijuana. The prosecuting attorney appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that defendants’ operation of CA was an enjoinable public nuisance because the operation of CA violated the PHC, which prohibits the possession and delivery of marijuana. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals reached the correct result because the act does not permit a registered qualifying patient to transfer marijuana for another registered qualifying patient’s medical use. Accordingly, the prosecuting attorney was entitled to injunctive relief to enjoin the operation of defendants’ business because it constituted a public nuisance. View "Michigan v. McQueen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Allstate Sweeping, LLC (Allstate) is owned and operated by two white women: Martha Krueger and Barbara Hollis. In January 2006 it began performing pressure-washing services at Denver International Airport (DIA) under a contract with the City and County of Denver (Denver). Although the contract term was through July 2008, it was terminated by Denver July, 2007. Defendant Calvin Black, a contract-compliance technician at DIA, was assigned to monitor Allstate’s contract. Black is an African-American male. Allstate claimed that it was subjected to gender- and race-based discrimination and to retaliation for its complaints of discrimination. It filed suit in the federal district court in Colorado against Denver and four DIA employees, including Black, claiming violations of 42 U.S.C. 1981, 42 U.S.C. 2000d (Title VI), and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants except Black, holding that there were genuine issues of fact regarding whether Black was motivated by racial and gender bias and whether Black created a hostile work environment in such a way as to make plaintiff’s contract "unprofitable and its owners miserable." It did not address Allstate’s retaliation claim. Black appealed the denial of his motion for summary judgment, contending that he was entitled to qualified immunity and that the Tenth Circuit had jurisdiction to review the denial under the collateral-order doctrine. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s determinations because such sufficiency determinations are not reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. The Court did, however, have jurisdiction to review the legal sufficiency of the claim that Black made Allstate’s owners "miserable" and to review the sufficiency of the evidence of the retaliation claim (which the district court did not consider). The Court reversed the denial of summary judgment on those claims. View "Allstate Sweeping, LLC v. Black" on Justia Law

Pictometry International Corporation was engaged in the business in selling specialized aerial photographic services. Pictometry contracted with the department of information technology to license the department of environmental protection (DEP) to use certain aerial photographic images and associated data that were owned and copyrighted by Pictometry. Stephen Whitaker requested that the DEP provide him with the images and data. The DEP indicated that it would provide copies of the images for a fee provided for in the licensing agreement. Whitaker filed a complaint against the DEP with the freedom of information commission (commission). The commission determined that, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (act), the DEP was required to provide Whitaker with the images at minimum cost but was not required to provide the associated data. The trial court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the commission improperly ordered the DEP to provide copies of the images without first determining whether it was feasible for the DEP to provide such copies and whether doing so would pose a public safety risk; and (2) if the commission determined on remand that Whitaker is entitled to copies of the images, Whitaker was required to pay a $25 per image fee. View "Pictometry Int'l Corp. v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Miller Trucking, LLC, Ben Miller, and Miriam Miller ("the Miller plaintiffs) appeal a summary judgment in favor of APAC Mid-South, Inc. (APAC), Oldcastle Materials, Inc., and Steve Reynolds (defendants). The facts of this appeal were based on contracts between the Alabama Department of Transportation ("ADOT") and APAC and between APAC and Miller Trucking. ADOT hired APAC to provide aggregate materials for distribution to counties, and APAC, in turn, hired Miller Trucking to haul the aggregate materials to the counties purchasing the aggregate materials from the State. At issue in this appeal were adjustments to the compensation of APAC paid Miller Trucking based on the cost of fuel during the time of the contract. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of defendants and remanded the case for further proceedings. A genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a 2008 APAC-Miller Trucking contract and a 2009 hired-truck qualification agreement were modified to include fuel-price-adjustment agreements and, if so, what the terms of those agreements were. View "Miller Trucking, LLC, et al. v. APAC Mid-South, Inc., et al. " on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Campus Village Apartments, LLC appealed denial of its motion to dismiss the complaint of Plaintiff-Appellee Auraria Student Housing at the Regency, LLC. Regency's complaint alleged that Campus Village conspired with the University of Colorado at Denver to monopolize student housing in and around the university's campus. Regency moved to dismiss, averring that the Tenth Circuit lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of the district court's denial of Campus Village's motion to dismiss was not a final order. In response, Campus Village argued that the Tenth Circuit indeed had jurisdiction over this case under the "collateral order doctrine." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the district court did not err in denying Campus Village's motion to dismiss; the court's order was not an appealable final order. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit dismissed Campus Village's appeal. View "Auraria Student Housing v. Campus Village Apartments, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellants Hobson Fabricating Corp. (Hobson) and SE/Z Construction, LLC (SE/Z) appealed a district court decision in their case against the State of Idaho, Department of Administration, Division of Public Works (DPW) regarding costs and attorney fees. Prior to the district court's decision, the parties had settled all of their claims but for costs and attorney fees. The district court declared that all parties had prevailed in part and were to bear their own costs and fees. Hobson and SE/Z appealed the decision, arguing that the district court abused its discretion and should have found that they were the overall prevailing party. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order that the Contractors and DPW bear their own costs and fees and its order that Hobson pay the individual defendants' costs. View "Hobson Fabricating Corp v. SE/Z Construction" on Justia Law

The petitioners, Bretton Woods Telephone Company, Inc., Dixville Telephone Company, Dunbarton Telephone Company, Inc., and Granite State Telephone, Inc., four exempt incumbent rural local exchange carriers (RLECs), appealed an order of the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission (PUC) that denied their motion to rescind or declare null and void registrations of competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) authorized by the PUC to engage in business as telephone utilities in the service territories of RLECs. Citing RSA 374:26 and RSA 374:22-g, among other statutes, the petitioners alleged that the PUC, before issuing the registrations, had failed to provide notice, hold hearings, and determine whether allowing such competition would be consistent with the public good. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in "Appeal of Union Tel. Co.," the petitioners specifically argued that federal law did not preempt these requirements. The PUC ultimately denied the petitioners' request and ruled that section 253(a) of the Telecommunications Act preempted RSA 374:26 and RSA 374:22-g, II. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that section 253(a) preempted state and local laws, regulations, and requirements that "prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service." View "Appeal of Bretton Woods Telephone Company, Inc." on Justia Law