Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant John Dilley appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee City of Missoula. The district court concluded the City acted within its legal authority when it purchased the Missoula Civic Stadium with tax increment financing (TIF) funds designated for urban renewal. The stadium was originally planned and developed by Play Ball Missoula, Inc. (Play Ball), a volunteer, non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of bringing a minor league baseball team to Missoula. In 2000, Play Ball and the City entered a development agreement that permitted Play Ball to finance and construct a stadium on blighted City property and later convey the facility to the City. Plaintiff, acting pro se, filed suit prior to the City's acquisition of the stadium, alleging the planned purchase using TIF funds was an "illegal payoff of private enterprise debt." On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erroneously failed to specify which provision under Title 7, Chapter 15, Part 42 of the Montana Code that permitted the "payoff." He also argued that the City could not make such an expenditure of TIF funds simply because the practice was not prohibited by statute. Finding that the City's use of TIF money to acquire the stadium was a proper exercise of its urban renewal posers, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in the City's favor.

Petitioner Billie L. Redding asked the Supreme Court to exercise supervisory control over the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, and to conclude it was error for the District Court to grant partial summary judgment to Defendants Timothy Janiak; Anderson ZurMuehlen & Co., P.C.; Ray E. Petersen; and Rick Ahmann. Petitioner's case arose from a series of real estate transactions by which she sold her property to Defendants for which she would receive payments from them which would serve as her monthly income. The scheme by which Defendants paid Petitioner and their other real estate clients collapsed in 2008 (as a Ponzi scheme), and they filed for bankruptcy. Petitioner sued, alleging: (1) unlawful sale of securities; (2) negligence; (3) negligent misrepresentation; (4) breach of fiduciary duty; (5) breach of contract; and (6) tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Petitioner sought damages in the amount of $4,635,485.51, plus additional amounts for punitive damages, emotional distress, loss of established course of life, and consequential damages. Petitioner moved for summary judgment on several issues, the only issue before the Court was whether the "investments" Petitioner made with Defendants qualified as "securities" under the state Securities Act. The district court found that Petitioner "did not engage in a common enterprise," an essential element of an investment contract (i.e. a security), because she "did not share the risks of the investment with other investors because she agreed upon a contractually set return on her investment." Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that supervisory control was appropriate in this case and that the real estate transactions in question here were indeed securities. Accordingly the Court granted Petitioner's request for a Writ of Supervisory Control.

In August of 2009, Samson Resources Company owned oil and gas leases covering 87.78 mineral acres in Roger Mills County, Oklahoma, including the Schaefer Lease. The Schaefer Lease covered 70 net acres in the Southwest Quarter of Section 28 and had a three-year primary term that ended on November 22, 2007. If drilling operations were commenced by the end of the primary term, the lease would continue so long as such operations continued. On August 2, 2007, Newfield sent a letter to Samson, proposing to drill a well in Section 28. The estimated cost of the well was over $8.5 million dollars. On August 9, 2007, Newfield filed an application with the Commission, seeking to force pool the interests of Samson and other owners in Section 28. Newfield sent an e-mail dated April 14, 2008, to Samson that informed Samson that Newfield had commenced operations prior to the expiration of the Schaefer Lease. Newfield's e-mail stated that Samson had underpaid well costs and that an election to participate with 87.78 acres would require prepayment of $1,411,982.45. Samson responded by e-mail on the same date, informing Newfield its intent was only to elect its 17.78 acres. On April 28, 2008, Samson filed an Application seeking to have its election to participate in the well limited to 17.78 acres rather than 87.78 acres. After an administrative hearing, the Administrative Law Judge determined that Samson's timely election to participate only covered 17.78 acres of its interest and that Samson accepted the cash bonus as to its remaining 70 acres. The Oil and Gas Appellate Referee reversed the ALJ's determination, finding that the ALJ improperly relied on actions which occurred prior to the issuance of the pooling order. The Commission issued Order No. 567706, which adopted the Referee's report, reversed the ALJ, and declared that Samson had elected to participate to the full extent of its 87.78 acre interest in the unit. The Commission found Samson made a "unilateral mistake" when it elected to participate to the full extent of its interest. Samson appealed the Commission's order to the Court of Civil Appeals, which affirmed. Before COCA issued its opinion affirming the Commission, Samson filed an action in the district court alleging actual fraud, deceit, intentional and negligent misrepresentation, constructive fraud, and breach of duty as operator. Samson also alleged Newfield's actions amounted to extrinsic fraud on the Commission, rendering Pooling Order No. 550310 invalid as to Samson's working interest attributable to the 70-acre Schaefer Lease. The trial court granted Newfield's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the petition to be an impermissible collateral attack on a valid Commission order. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court found that Samson's actions for damages sounding in tort were beyond the Commission's jurisdiction, and the district court in this case was the proper tribunal for Samson to bring its claims. The trial court's order granting Newfield's Motion to Dismiss was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

In this case the Supreme Court examined whether income received by a corporation's affiliated foreign reinsurance companies falls within the ambit of Indiana's gross premium privilege tax statute and is on that basis exempt from Indiana adjusted gross income tax. The corporation in this case was UPS, which protested the Indiana Department of Revenue's audit, which disallowed the exclusion from Indiana adjusted gross income the income of UPS's affiliates. The Indiana tax court granted UPS's motion for summary judgment, reasoning that because UPS was "subject to" the premium tax, it was exempt from the adjusted gross income tax. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the record did not establish that during the years in question UPS's affiliates were doing business within the state of Indiana, which was a necessary condition in order to be "subject to" the premium tax, UPS failed in its burden of establishing that it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Remanded.

A commercial website operator filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a determination of the reasonableness of the fee charged by the Rogers County Clerk for electronic copies of records and for a determination that the corporation was entitled to an electronic copy of the official tract index of county land records. Plaintiff County Records, Inc. is in the business of operating a website that provides land records to on-line subscribers, including the county clerk records for all 77 counties in Oklahoma. In April 2009, Plaintiff requested electronic copies of land records from the County Clerk's office including an electronic copy of the official tract index. The request for an electronic copy of the official tract index was denied based on Defendant's belief that she is legally prohibited from providing it to Plaintiff for its intended commercial sale of the information. The trial court granted summary judgment to the corporation and directed the Clerk to provide all the requested electronic copies at a "reasonable fee." Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that Plaintiff was not legally entitled to the tract index information in electronic form and the county clerk is prohibited by a specific provision in the Open Records Act from providing information from the land records for resale.

An employer petitioned the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board for reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund for payments it made to a disabled worker. The Fund opposed the petition. After a hearing, the Board granted the petition. The Fund asked the Board to reconsider its decision in December 2009. The hearing officer told the parties that he would inform them in writing by the end of January 2010 about what action the Board was taking on the reconsideration request. Instead, in April 2010 the hearing officer sent a prehearing conference summary indicating that the reconsideration request had been denied by operation of statute. The next day the Fund filed a notice of appeal and a motion to accept a late-filed appeal with the Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission. The Commission denied the Fund's request to file its appeal late and dismissed the appeal. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the Fund filed a timely appeal, it reversed the Commission's decision and remand for consideration of the Fund's appeal.

The Oklahoma Tax Commission assessed corporate income taxes against Vermont Corporation Scioto Insurance Company for 2001 through 2005, based on payments Scioto received from the use of Scioto's intellectual property by Wendy's restaurants in Oklahoma. In response, Scioto protested these assessments on the ground that it did not contract with the Wendy's restaurants in Oklahoma for use of the property in question and did not conduct any business whatsoever in Oklahoma. The Tax Commission denied Scioto's protest and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court previously granted certiorari. Upon review, the Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals opinion, reversed the Tax Commission's denial of Scioto's protest and remanded the case with instructions to sustain Scioto's protest.

Appellants in this case were nine Alabama municipalities and the Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Center Authority appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of Appellees, sixteen online travel service companies and related entities (the "OTCs"). The issue was whether the OTCs were liable for paying the municipalities a lodgings tax under the local lodgings-tax ordinances of the respective municipal plaintiffs. After considering the record in this case, the briefs of the parties, and the trial court's order, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's reasoning in its summary judgment order, and therefore affirmed the judgment in favor of the OTCs.

In 2006, Petitioner Chander Khurana was audited by the Mississippi State Department of Revenue (MSDR) and assessed taxes. Petitioner appealed the assessments to the Board of Review and eventually the full State Tax Commission, both of which affirmed the assessment. In 2007, Petitioner filed his appeal of the assessments to the Chancery Court; however he did not pay the taxes or post a bond at the time he filed his petition as required by statute. MSDR filed a motion for summary judgment and dismissal, arguing Petitioner failed to perfect his appeal. The chancellor denied the motion and ultimately affirmed the assessments. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court claiming the full Commission and chancery court acted arbitrarily and capriciously. MSDR cross-appealed, claiming the chancellor erred in denying its motion for summary judgment and dismissal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements of paying the tax or bond. Therefore, the chancery court did not have appellate jurisdiction over Petitioner's appeal, and should have granted MSDR's motion for summary judgment and dismissal. The Court reversed the judgment of the chancery court and rendered judgment for the Mississippi Department of Revenue. Because the chancery court should not have reached the merits of the case, the chancery court's order affirming the assessments was vacated. The order of the Commission remained in effect.

The New Hampshire Department of Revenue Administration (DRA) appealed a superior court order that reversed its decision assessing a real estate transfer tax against Petitioners Say Pease, LLC and Say Pease IV, LLC. Two International Group, LLC (TIG) is a real estate holding company. It owned a ground lease on property near Pease International Tradeport that it wanted to use to secure a mortgage loan. To obtain the loan, TIG’s prospective lender required that TIG, and all of its members, be "single purpose bankruptcy remote entities." To comply with the lender’s requirement, the members of Say Pease formed Say Pease IV, a new limited liability company (LLC) with the same members. Say Pease IV’s LLC agreement provides that it was "formed for the sole purpose of being a Managing Member and Member of [TIG]" and was not authorized "to engage in any other activity[,] business or undertaking so long as [TIG] shall be indebted under any mortgage or other securitized loan." Say Pease’s interest in TIG was transferred to Say Pease IV, and Say Pease IV replaced Say Pease as TIG’s managing member. As a result of these transactions, Say Pease IV owned a 47.5% interest in TIG as a sole purpose remote bankruptcy entity, Say Pease held no interest in TIG, and TIG obtained the loan. Based upon this transfer, DRA issued notices assessing the real estate transfer tax against Say Pease and Say Pease IV. After appealing unsuccessfully through DRA’s administrative appeal process, Say Pease and Say Pease IV appealed to the superior court. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the trial court reversed DRA's order, ruling that the transfer at issue was not a "[c]ontractual transfer," RSA 78-B:1-a, II (2003), and, therefore, the real estate transfer tax did not apply. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the parties did not employ a business entity as a shield for an otherwise taxable exchange of value for an interest in property. Instead, those that executed Say Pease IV’s LLC agreement sought to maintain TIG’s original ownership while placing it in a suitable financing vehicle; the promises exchanged related to the creation of the financing vehicle, Say Pease IV, not the subsequent property transfer. Thus, the substance of the transaction here failed to create a bargained-for exchange because there was no "exchange of money, or other property and services, or property or services valued in money for an interest in real estate."