Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Relator challenged several personal liability assessments that the Commissioner of Revenue made against him based on unpaid petroleum and sales taxes owed by Twin Cities Avanti Stores, LLC (Avanti). On appeal, Relator asserted that the tax court erred by granting summary judgment to the Commissioner because (1) there were disputed, material questions of fact regarding his personal liability for the unpaid petroleum and sales taxes, and (2) the court abused its discretion in not allowing additional discovery to explore an estoppel defense. The Supreme Court reversed the tax court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner and remanded for a trial, holding that there was a material dispute of fact whether Relator had the requisite control over the company's finances to be held personally liable for Avanti's tax liability. View "Stevens v. Comm'r of Revenue" on Justia Law

Taxpayer World Publications distributes a free weekly newspaper in central Vermont called The World. Once a month, the newspaper includes a coupon book, produced and printed by taxpayer, that features coupons for local businesses. The Commissioner of Taxes concluded that the coupon books are not "component parts" of the newspaper, and therefore the cost of printing the coupon books is "not exempt from sales and use tax." The superior court affirmed. World Publications appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed too. View "World Publications, Inc. v. Vermont Department of Taxes" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Doctors Eitan and Vered Sobel, owners of a medical office building in Rutland, appealed the superior court's grant of summary judgment for defendant, City of Rutland. Plaintiffs sued the City for damages, claiming the City Tax Assessor (the Assessor) was negligent in providing allegedly inaccurate property tax estimates on the proposed, but not yet built, office. Plaintiffs also sought to enjoin the City from enforcing the tax assessment on the office building ultimately constructed. On appeal, they argued that the court erred in concluding that their negligence claim was barred by municipal immunity and that they failed to establish equitable estoppel against the City. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the City Assessor was immune from suit, and that plaintiffs could no establish estoppel with the facts of this case. Finding no error with the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City, the Supreme Court affirmed that decision. View "Sobel v. City of Rutland" on Justia Law

SPI Club, Inc. operates two nightclubs in Atlanta, and in July 2010, the City issued an alcohol license for each club. Daniel Corporation contended that SPI Club failed to open either club for business within nine months of the issue of these licenses, and in April 2011, Daniel sued City officials, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel these officials to recognize an automatic forfeiture of the licenses. The trial court found that SPI Club had, in fact, opened the clubs for business within the required time, and it denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. Daniel appealed, and after review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Daniel Corp. v. Reed" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a contractor's bid was responsive to the Delaware Department of Transportation's (DelDOT) Request for Proposals (RFP). The contractor's bid did not include required paint certifications. In addition, the bid reflected the contractor's plan to use new steel beams, rather than refurbish the existing ones, as required by the RFP. The contractor chose to submit a bid that did not conform to the project specifications. The Supreme Court concluded that the contractor therefore did so at its own risk. DelDOT's decision that the bid was non-responsive was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's entry of summary judgment in DelDOT's favor. View "Julian v. Delaware Dep't. of Transportation" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the Boeing Company’s 2005 sale, to Spirit AeroSystems, Inc. of facilities in Wichita, Kansas, and Tulsa and McAlester, Oklahoma. Boeing terminated the Division's entire workforce of more than 10,000. The next day, Spirit rehired 8,354 employees, who had been selected by Boeing’s managers. Although older employees predominated in the workforce both before and after the sale, a lower percentage of older workers than younger ones were rehired. The plaintiffs sued, seeking to be declared a class of about 700 former Boeing employees who were not hired by Spirit. The Employees alleged, among other things, that Boeing, Onex, and Spirit violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). In two separate orders, the district court granted summary judgment on the Employees’ Title VII and ADA claims, and their ERISA and ADEA claims. The court denied the Employees’ motion for reconsideration. Upon review of the Employees' claims on appeal, the Tenth Circuit found no error in the district court's judgment and affirmed the grant of summary judgment. View "Apsley v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law

Mason-Dixon Resorts, L.P. made a direct appeal to the Supreme Court to challenge a Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board decision that awarded a Category Slot Machine 3 slot machine license to intervenor Woodlands Fayette, L.L.C. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "[w]e have no doubt that there may have been other applicants for this remaining Category 3 license, including appellant, whose facilities may not have been appropriate for the award of a license. Our task, however, is not to determine for ourselves which of the facilities was the best one, but instead to pass upon the specific claims raised, under the standard review established by the Act. . . . finding no error warranting relief, we affirm the Board's Order." View "Mason-Dixon Resorts v. PA Gaming Control Board" on Justia Law

The IRS issued a Notice of Deficiency (NOD) to Alex and Liset Meruelo a few days before the three-year statute of limitations expired. Alex was a partner in a partnership. The Meruelos petitioned the tax court challenging the deficiency contained in the NOD and subsequently moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the IRS issued the NOD prematurely, making it invalid. The tax court held that the NOD was valid and not premature and that the items were affected items. The parties later reached an agreement as to all issues, except the validity of the NOD. The tax court then entered a final decision holding that the Meruelos were liable for $1,387,006 in additional income tax and $277,401 in penalties. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that (1) a NOD issued when no partnership-level proceeding or final partnership administrative adjustment have been issued is valid; (2) a NOD issued when the normal three-year statute of limitations has not expired is valid; and (3) therefore, the tax court had jurisdiction. View "Meruelo v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Alltel Entities (collectively Petitioners Alltel Communications, Inc. and its regional subsidiaries), were included in the definition of "telephone company" for the purpose of increased license fees in S.C. Code Ann. section 1220-100 (2000). Pursuant to cross motions for summary judgment, the Administrative Law Court (ALC) granted summary judgment in favor of Petitioners, finding that they were not telephone companies for purposes of section 12-20-100. Alternatively, the ALC found that if the statute were ambiguous, Petitioners would prevail under the rule that an ambiguity in a taxing statute must be construed in favor of the taxpayer. Though the court of appeals recognized that the application of section 12-20-100 to Petitioners was not "absolutely clear," it reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the matter to the ALC for additional fact finding. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the ALC's grant of summary judgment in favor of Petitioners. The term "telephone company" was not a defined term and its application to Petitioners was "doubtful." The presence of an ambiguity in a tax assessment statute requires that a court resolve that doubt in favor of the taxpayer.

Petitioner Qwest Corporation sought review of an order of the Federal Communications Commission which denied Qwest’s petition for regulatory forbearance pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 160(a). Qwest filed a petition with the Commission in March 2009 seeking relief from certain regulations pertaining to telecommunications services in the Phoenix, Arizona, metropolitan statistical area (MSA). The Commission denied the petition, citing insufficient evidence of sufficiently robust competition that would preclude Qwest from raising prices, unreasonably discriminating, and harming consumers. Qwest challenged the Commission’s decision only as it pertained to Qwest’s mass-market retail services. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit denied Qwest's petition: "We are not a 'panel of referees on a professional economics journal,' but a 'panel of generalist judges obliged to defer to a reasonable judgment by an agency acting pursuant to congressionally delegated authority.'" The Court found the Commission's order was not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."