Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued the State to challenge a demand for payment made by the State under Delaware's escheat law, 12 Del. C. 1101, et seq. The State countersued, seeking a declaration that the sums demanded from plaintiff were proper and authorized under the Statute. Both parties moved for partial judgment on the pleadings. The court found that the rebates at issue fit comfortably within two of the "specifically enumerated" items of property listed in section 1198(11) and therefore granted the State's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and denied plaintiff's cross-motion. Although the pleadings did not paint a clear picture of the form in which the rebates were issued by plaintiff to its customers, plaintiff's counsel conceded at oral argument that the rebates were issued as either negotiable "checks" or "credits." As such, the rebates consisted of specifically enumerated items of property under section 1198(11), and the State's claims could not be barred by any statute of limitations.

Petitioner National Labor Relations Board (the Board or NLRB) sought enforcement of its order against Respondent Contemporary Cars, Inc. (Contemporary). In 2008, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (the Union) filed a petition with the Board seeking certification as the representative of Mercedes-Benz service technicians employed at Contemporary. The Board held a hearing, determined the proposed bargaining unit was appropriate under two different theories, and directed that an election occur. Contemporary requested that the Board review the Regional Director’s decision regarding the bargaining unit. Despite only having two members, the Board summarily denied the request. Members of the bargaining unit voted in for representation by the Union, and the Regional Director certified the Union. To preserve its right to challenge the validity of the bargaining-unit determination in a court of appeals, Contemporary refused to bargain. The Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board. Contemporary conceded the violation, and in 2009, the two-member Board issued an order finding Contemporary in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). Contemporary filed a petition for review of the NLRB’s order with the federal district court. The NLRB cross-petitioned seeking enforcement. The circuit court granted Contemporary's motion to hold the case in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision in "New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB" (130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010)). In 2010, the NLRB issued an order setting aside its previous two-member decision to "take further action as appropriate." The original two members plus an obligatory third member issued a new order, again affirming the Regional Director's bargaining-unit decision. The NLRB subsequently filed a petition for enforcement of its order with the Eleventh Circuit. Upon review, the Court found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Contemporary's due process challenge raised on appeal of the 2010 NLRB order. Furthermore, Contemporary did not meet its burden of demonstrating the Board's determination lacked substantial evidentiary support. Therefore, the Court granted the NLRB's petition.

Plaintiffs-Appellants James and Sandra Lindquist sued the City of Pasadena alleging the City violated their state and federal constitutional rights by exercising "unbridled discretion" in connection with the denial of a zoning waiver. Plaintiffs operated a used-car dealership in Pasadena. In 2003, the Pasadena City Council enacted an ordinance adopting licensing standards for used-car dealers criminalizing the sale of used cars without a license and imposing a number of requirements that dealers must meet as a condition of receiving a license. Two of those requirements were the subject of this appeal: (1) new license locations are required to be a minimum of one-thousand feet from any existing license; and (2) no new licenses could be issued within 150 feet of a residential area. After the ordinance was passed, Plaintiffs considered purchasing two lots to expand their existing dealership. City officials told them that neither lot qualified for a license, but Plaintiffs purchased the lots anyway. Plaintiffs later learned that their competitors purchased a nearby lot, had applied for a license, and were denied for different reasons than those given to Plaintiffs. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling that Plaintiffs' equal protection claim failed to state a claim for relief. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to the City after determining Plaintiffs failed to create a genuine issue of fact with respect to their equal protection claim. Upon review, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Plaintiffs could not show that the City Council acted irrationally when it denied their license appeal. Furthermore, the Court found that Plaintiffs failed to preserve their unbridled discretion claim for further review. As such, the Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City.

McLane Southern, Inc. is a Mississippi wholesaler of tobacco products that sells smokeless tobacco to retail establishments in Louisiana. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether the company was liable for excise taxes pursuant to the state Tobacco Tax Law. Finding that the law imposes an excise tax on smokeless tobacco products be paid by the dealer who first sells, uses, consumes, handles or distributes the product in Louisiana, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Wright Brothers Construction Company, Inc. and GIBCO Construction petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate its order that denied their motion to transfer their case to another circuit court. In 2008, Rogers Whited was involved in a two-vehicle accident at a quarry located in Jefferson County. Both Whited and the driver of the other vehicle were employed by GIBCO, who, along with Wright Brothers, was engaged in a project at the quarry. In 2010 Whited filed a complaint against Wright Brothers, GIBCO, and Sharon Gilbert, the owner and president of GIBCO, in the Walker Circuit Court seeking damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by the accident. In May 2010 Wright Brothers moved to transfer the action to Jefferson County, stating that Whited alleged in his complaint that he was a resident of Blount County, that the accident occurred in Jefferson County, and that therefore Jefferson County, not Walker County, was the proper venue for Whited's action. In June, Whited filed his response in opposition to Wright Brothers' motion, stating that he was a resident of Walker County, not Blount County. Contemporaneously with that response in opposition, Whited also filed an amendment to his complaint stating that his statement that he was a resident of Blount County was a "clerical error." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the proper venue for this case was Jefferson County, and that the trial court had "an imperative duty to transfer the case and refused to do so." Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted Wright Brothers' petition and issued the writ.

Jim Walter Resources, Inc. (JWR) sought a petition for a writ of mandamus to direct the Tuscaloosa County Probate Court to record certain filings without the payment of a recording tax. Walter Energy, JWR's parent company, acquired Western Coal Corporation of Canada. As part of the acquisition, Walter entered into a credit agreement with Morgan Stanley, which required Walter's subsidiaries to execute contingent guaranties of Walter's financing debt in the event Walter defaulted. JWR secured its guaranty of Walter Energy's financing debt by executing mortgages on its real and leasehold properties. Also as part of the credit agreement, JWR was required to record the mortgages in the probate offices in the counties in which the properties were located. When JWR sought to record the mortgages and related UCC filings in Tuscaloosa, the Tuscaloosa County Probate Court refused to record the documents unless JWR paid the recordation tax. The probate judge maintained that there was no statutory requirement that under Alabama law that the debt being secured be the mortgagor's debt, and as such, because JWR was recording its financing statements for Walter's debt, JWR was still responsible for paying the tax. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that JWR's liability was contingent on Walter's default, and JWR's contingent guaranty did not constitute an unqualified promise to pay Walter's indebtedness under the credit agreement. The Court found the contingent guaranty was not within the scope of the applicable statute, and accordingly, the Court granted JWR's petition and issued the writ.

Petitioner-Appellant Jean Mathia is the widow of Doyle Mathia, who was a limited partner in Greenwich Associates. Greenwich was a partnership that incurred losses that were passed through to the couple’s income tax returns for the years 1982–84. After an investigation of numerous related tax shelters, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed these losses. Petitioner was assessed more than $150,000 in taxes following lengthy administrative and judicial proceedings involving the partnership. Petitioner appealed to the United States Tax Court to challenge the assessments as untimely, and to assert that the government bore the burden of proof in establishing timeliness. The Tax Court denied the appeal. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Petitioner contended the tax assessments were untimely because the relevant statute of limitations had run. The Tenth Circuit concluded that Petitioner's contention turned on whether Mr. Mathia entered into a settlement agreement under the tax code that resolved his partnership tax liability on an individual basis. The Court agreed with the tax court that he entered into no such agreement which would have qualified under the tax code as a settlement of Mr. Mathia's liability as an individual partner. Therefore, the Court concluded the assessments were timely and properly applied by the IRS.

Plaintiff HVC Inc. was a trustee of the Honda Lease Trust. During the audit period at issue, several car dealerships entered into thousands of leases with customers (lessees) pursuant to lease plan agreements between the dealerships, the trust, and the servicer of the trust. Under the leases, the lessees were responsible for submitting the vehicle registration renewal application and renewal fees to the department of motor vehicles on behalf of the trust. Upon receipt of the renewal application and fee, the department sent the vehicle registration card to the trust, and the trust forwarded the vehicle registration card to the appropriate lessee. After conducting a sales and use tax audit for the audit period from April 1, 2001 through October 31, 2004, Defendant Pamela Law, the then commissioner of revenue services, issued a deficiency assessment against Plaintiff, concluding that the renewal fees constituted taxable gross receipts of the trust and, therefore, were subject to the sales tax. The trial court rendered summary judgment partially in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the renewal fees paid by the lessess qualified as Plaintiff's gross receipts subject to sales tax under Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-408(1).

Franklin Electric formed two new subsidiaries and started new unemployment experience accounts with a low introductory contribution rate for each one, which equaled about half the experience rating of Franklin Electric. The Department of Workforce Development later canceled the subsidiaries' experience accounts, and all experience balances and liabilities reverted to Franklin Electric. The Department also demanded back payments, interest, and a ten percent penalty. A liability administrative law judge (LALJ) affirmed the Department's determination that the three entities were a single employer but waived the penalty imposed by the Department. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted transfer and vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and affirmed the determination of the LALJ, holding (1) the new subsidiaries were not new employers because they were not distinct and segregable from Franklin Electric; (2) Franklin Electric's experience rating should have applied to contributions made by the subsidiaries; and (3) because there was no evidence suggesting improper conduct on the part of Franklin Electric, the penalty was not appropriate.

The Mississippi Tax Commission (Commission) assessed a contractorâs tax against Walter Akins, d/b/a Akins Construction Company. Akins challenged the assessment administratively. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Akins appealed to the Chancery Court. The chancellor dismissed his complaint for failure to comply with Mississippi Code Section 27-77-7 (Rev. 2005), which required a taxpayer seeking judicial review to pay the amount ordered before filing the petition or attach a security bond, for double the amount in controversy, with the petition to appeal. Akins appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that he was deprived of his right to due process because the appeal provisions codified in Section 27-77-7 are unconstitutional. Finding that the statute does meet constitutional standards and that Akins failed to pay the tax or post a bond in order to grant jurisdiction to the chancery court, the Court affirmed the chancellor's decision.