Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, the commissioner of labor, applied to the superior court for a warrant to inspect the premises of Defendant, a fire company, to investigate whether the fire company was in compliance with the requirements of Connecticut's Occupational Safety and Health Act. The trial court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the commissioner's warrant application, concluding that the fire company did not fall within the act's definition of a covered employer, which by statutory definition was "the state and any political subdivision thereof" because the fire company was an independent corporation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the fire company did not fall within the core definition of a political subdivision of the state.

Plaintiff Silver Dollar Liquor, L.L.C. ("Silver Dollar") owns the Silver Dollar Liquor Store located within District 6 of Red River Parish. Silver Dollar filed a declaratory judgment action against Defendant Red River Parish Police Jury ("Police Jury"), seeking to have Section 3-18 declared invalid because there has never been a local option election in District 6 pursuant to La. R.S. 51:191. The Police Jury answered that it had authority under La. R.S. 26:493 to regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages. Relying on La. R.S. 26:493, the appellate court found in favor of the Police Jury, holding Section 3-18 to be valid. Finding the appellate court's decision created a split in the circuits, the Supreme Court granted Silver Dollar's certiorari application to resolve the split. Upon review, the Court surmised the heart of this case involved the interpretation and applicability of La. R.S. 51:191, which requires a local-option election in order to authorize a Sunday-closing law; and La. R.S. 26:493, which delegates to political subdivisions the power to regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages. After review, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision.

The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case pertained to a "class-of-one" equal protection lawsuit against a county government based on its demand that a property owner correct a nuisance. Kansas Penn Gaming, LLC alleged that after it and Cherokee County became involved in litigation concerning a casino development agreement, the County health department targeted Kansas Penn for a regulatory enforcement action. In particular, the County sent Kansas Penn a notice stating that the unkempt condition of its property violated state and local nuisance laws and regulations and warning that failure to clean up the property would lead to an enforcement action. Although the County never brought an enforcement action against Kansas Penn, Kansas Penn sued the County and some of its officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983. In its complaint, Kansas Penn alleged the notice of nuisance violated its right to equal protection by arbitrarily and maliciously singling it out for selective enforcement. Because the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that Kansas Penn failed to state a claim for relief under the standard set forth by "Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly," the Court affirmed dismissal of the complaint.

The Industrial Commission of Ohio found that Angela Benedetti, Inc. (ABI) violated two newly added specific safety requirements that resulted in an injury to an ABI employee. ABI filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in permitting the injured employee to amend his specific safety requirement violations application and in finding violations of the specific safety requirements. The court of appeals upheld the Commission's order and denied the writ. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing with the reasoning provided by the court of appeals but not given in this opinion.

This case arose when the FTC alleged deceptive advertising claims against defendants based on two purported weight loss products, a Chinese Diet Tea and a Bio-Slim Patch. On appeal, defendants challenged both the power of the district court to award monetary relief and the means by which the district court calculated the award. The court held that the district court had the power to award restitution pursuant to Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 53(b). The court also held that the district court did not err in ordering defendants to disgorge the full proceeds from its sale of the products in question. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Tellabs Operations, Inc. appealed an administrative agency's decision in its taxpayer's refund action from the circuit court. Tellabs unsuccessfully petitioned for a refund of allegedly overpaid sales taxes to the City of Bessemer. The case was originally filed in Montgomery Circuit Court. Bessemer filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to change venue to Jefferson Circuit Court. Without holding a hearing on the motion, the circuit court transferred the appeal to Jefferson Circuit Court. In its motion for reconsideration, Tellabs argued the Montgomery Court erred in transferring the appeal. The court responded that it had lost jurisdiction, and Tellabs' only remedy was to petition the Supreme Court. Upon review of the circuit court records, the Supreme Court concluded that the Montgomery Circuit Court erred in transferring the appeal to the Jefferson Court. The Supreme Court vacated the transfer order and remanded the case for further proceedings in Montgomery Circuit Court.

Appellant Robert Stevens was charged with and convicted of violating local borough noise and adult entertainment ordinances. The borough later protested the continued operation of his bar under its Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (ABC Board) liquor license. The ABC Board sustained the protest and denied Appellant's continued operation. Appellant requested an adjudicatory hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) to review the ABC Board's decision. The ALJ recommended the ABC Board uphold its initial decision and enforce the denial of continued operation under the license. Appellant appealed to the superior court which affirmed the ABC Board's decision. Appellant appealed again to the Supreme Court, who found the evidence in the ABC Board's and ALJ's record sufficient to overcome a challenge that the borough behaved in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner in protesting Appellant's operation under his liquor license. The Court affirmed the superior court's decision.

This case arose when Leiferman Enterprises LLC (Leiferman) unilaterally suspended negotiations with the International Union of Painters and Allied Trades District Council 82 (Union) regarding the renewal of the two parties' collective-bargaining agreement. The NLRB eventually filed a complaint but, during the litigation's pendency, a secured creditor forced Leiferman into receivership. During the receivership, the secured creditor sold Leiferman to Auto Glass Repair and Windshield Replacement Service (WRS), agreeing to indemnify WRS against any potential Board liability. At length, the Board found Leiferman liable for certain unfair labor practices and imposed that liability on WRS, which it determined to be a liable successor-in-interest under Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB. The Board subsequently petitioned the court to enforce its order and Leiferman cross-petitioned for review of the order. The court held that the record, reviewed as a whole, contained substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusion that WRS was Leiferman's Golden State successor-in-interest and therefore, the court enforced the Board's order and denied WRS's petition for review.

In 2008, Olmsted County changed the property tax classification of farmland owned by Frederick Farms from agricultural-homestead to agricultural-nonhomestead property. The tax court denied Frederick Farms' petition to change the classification of the property back to agricultural homestead for taxes payable in 2009 and later. Frederick Farms appealed, arguing that it was operating a joint family farm venture with its sole shareholder, James Frederick, and that the County must classify the property as agricultural homestead because it was used by the joint family farm venture. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the tax court, concluding (1) that a joint family farm venture must own or lease, and not merely use, the property in order for a participant of the joint family farm venture to claim an agricultural-homestead classification; and (2) because the family farm corporation, not the joint family farm venture, owned the land in question, Frederick Farms was not entitled to claim an agricultural-homestead classification as a participant in a joint family farm venture.

The primary issue in this Chapter 7 bankruptcy case was whether the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Tenth Circuit had jurisdiction to review on "order for relief" entered by a bankruptcy judge for the District of Delaware. The Delaware judge entered the order after venue was transferred to the District of Colorado. The parties agreed that the order should be vacated on the ground that it is void because it was issued after the transfer was complete. However, the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel concluded that it did not have jurisdiction because the governing statute provides that an appeal of a decision by a bankruptcy judge "shall only be taken only to the district court for the judicial district in which the bankruptcy judge is serving." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and affirmed its decision.