Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2003, Joshua Micone applied for Medicaid benefits for himself and his family. In his applications, Joshua did not report his wife Jennifer's interest in a family limited partnership. The Department of Public Health and Human Services approved Joshua's application, and the Micone family received Medicaid benefits from 2003 to 2006. Subsequently, the Department notified Joshua that his household was ineligible for benefits paid over the past three years because of Jennifer's interest in the partnership and demanded repayment. Joshua contested the demand of benefits paid. The State Board of Public Assistance upheld a hearing officer's findings that Jennifer's interest in the partnership was a countable and available resource. The district court affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that that the hearing officer did not violate Mont. Code Ann. 2-4-623 when he did not issue a decision within ninety days after the case was deemed submitted; and (2) the district court correctly determined that substantial credible evidence supported the Department's finding that Jennifer's interest in the partnership was an available resource.

Respondents North of the Border Tobacco, LLC (Tobacco) and Roll Your Own, LLC (RYO) appealed decisions of the Superior Court that enjoined them from allowing customers to use on-site cigarette-making machines to make rolled cigarettes with loose tobacco unless they make required escrow payments as required by law. An escrow fund was set up by the state to share the burden from damages for smoking-related health care costs. Respondents own tobacco shops that sell various tobacco products. At some point, for a rental fee, cigarette-making machines were installed for on-site customer use. The State filed suit in 2009 and sought an injunction against Respondents to stop selling or rolling cigarettes until they paid into the fund. Tobacco denied that it manufactured cigarettes and argued that it did not have to contribute to the fund. The trial court disagreed and issued the injunction. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to issue the injunction against Tobacco. However, the Court vacated the trial court's decision against RYO, holding that a preliminary injunction was premature prior to resolving several constitutional issues pertaining to RYO's business operations. Accordingly, the Court affirmed part, reversed part of the trial court's ruling, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellant Charter Communications and appellee Community Antenna, a smaller company, were competing cable services providers. For over a decade the parties had been litigating the issue of whether Charter was offering discounted rates to some but not all of its customers in violation of the West Virginia Cable Television Systems Act (Act) that prohibits unduly discriminatory rates for over a decade. On the parties' third time before the Supreme Court, at issue was a counterclaim filed by Community Antenna in the underlying lawsuit alleging that Charter was engaged in rate discrimination calculated to harm Community Antenna's business. The trial court concluded that Charter's buy-back plans constituted unduly discriminatory rates in violation of state law and that Charter tortiously interfered with Community Antenna's business relationships with its customers. The jury awarded Community Antenna compensatory and punitive damages. Charter appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there is a private cause of action under the Act against cable operators that illegally offer unduly discriminatory cable rates, (2) there was sufficient evidence that Charter's conduct was the proximate cause of harm to Community Antenna, and (3) the jury's award of damages was supported by the evidence.

BancInsure, Inc. appealed a declaratory judgment in favor of Columbian Financial Corporation and a former director, Carl McCaffree (collectively the Insureds). The insurance policy at issue here was a "claims-made" policy covered any claim made to BancInsure against any Columbian officer or director for a "Wrongful Act" as defined by the policy. A disputed provision of the policy pertained to the scope of coverage if Columbian was placed in receivership or otherwise ceased to engage in active banking business. The parties interpreted the provision differently. The Insureds contended that if Columbian went into receivership, the policy covered all claims made through the end of the original policy period, although only for Wrongful Acts committed before the receivership. BancInsure contended that the policy covered only claims made before the receivership. The operation of the disputed provision became relevant in August 2008 when the Kansas State Bank Commissioner declared Columbian insolvent and appointed the FDIC as its receiver. Soon thereafter, Columbianâs management sent BancInsure a letter to notify it of potential claims by the FDIC and others. The parties disputed many of the claims against Columbian which led to Columbian filing suit to the district court to determine which claims were covered under the policy. The sole issue on appeal to the Tenth Circuit was whether the district court had jurisdiction. Though no party disputed jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit found that there was no actual controversy between the parties when the district court below rendered its judgment. The court therefore lacked jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower courtâs decision and remanded to case with instructions to the court to vacate its judgment.

In November 2001, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued an anti-dumping duty order on certain hot-rolled carbon steel flat products from Thailand, found that the company was selling the subject merchandise at less than normal value and assigned a dumping margin of 3.86%. In 2006 the order was partially revoked, as to the company, but remained in effect with respect to other exporters and producers. Commerce received a complaint that dumping had resumed and initiated changed circumstances review (CCR), despite the company's assertion that it lacked authority to so. The Court of International Trade (CIT) dismissed the company's suit for an injunction in 2009. Commerce reinstated the order with respect to the company; CIT affirmed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that Commerce reasonably interpreted and acted on its revocation and CCR authority under 19 U.S.C. 1675(b, d) as permitting conditional revocation and reconsideration.

The under seal appellant ("Company 1"), a foreign company, appealed the district court's denial of its motion to quash the government's grand-jury subpoenas served on the under seal intervenor ("Company 2") where the subpoenas sought documents that Company 1 delivered to Company 2 in response to discovery requests that arose during the course of civil litigation between the two companies in district court. The court affirmed the denial of Company 1's motion to quash the government's subpoenas and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the subpoenas passed muster under Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Company 1 provided no basis for the court to craft a new procedural rule in support of its position. The court also held that there were no clearly erroneous rulings by the district court in resolving the factual issue regarding the nature of Company 2's interaction with the government and Company 1 failed to show that the issue merited any further investigation or an evidentiary hearing. The court rejected Company 1's remaining arguments and affirmed the district court's denial of Company 1's motion to quash.

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives revoked a Wisconsin pawn and gun shop's license to sell firearms after it rejected an appeal from a finding that the shop willfully violated record keeping requirements of the Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. 923. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. The appropriate standard for willfulness for revoking a firearms dealerâs license is purposeful disregard of, or plain indifference to, a known legal obligation; the dealer had notice of those obligations and disregarded them. The infrequency of errors, compared to the number of transactions, does not disprove willfulness.

Appellant submitted a request pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. 552, to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ("Board") seeking information related to the Board's March 14, 2008 decision to authorize the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to provide a temporary loan to The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. through an extension of credit to JPMorgan Chase & Co. The Board produced documents in response to appellant's request but withheld others pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 4, 5, 6, and 8. Appellee filed suit in district court to compel disclosure of the withheld documents and subsequently appealed the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the Board. At issue was whether the district court properly withheld documents under FOIA Exemption 5 or, in the alternative, Exemption 8, and granted summary judgment in favor of the Board. The court affirmed summary judgment and held that the withheld materials constituted "intra-agency memorandum or letters" under FOIA Exemption 5 and that disclosure of the type of information withheld here would, under the deliberative process privilege, impair the Board's ability to obtain necessary information in the future and could chill the free flow of information between the supervised institutions and the Board and Reserve Bank. The court also held that a document withheld under Exemption 5 pursuant to the attorney work product privilege was prepared in anticipation of litigation and therefore, the Board properly withheld the document. Accordingly, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Board.

The Montana Department of Revenue ("Department") appealed a judgment reversing the State Tax Appeal Board's ("STAB") conclusion that the Department had applied a "commonly accepted" method to assess the value of PacificCorp's Montana properties. At issue was whether substantial evidence demonstrated common acceptance of the Department's direct capitalization method that derived earnings-to-price ratios from an industry-wide analysis. Also at issue was whether substantial evidence supported STAB's conclusion that additional obsolescence did not exist to warrant consideration of further adjustments to PacifiCorp's taxable value. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Department's use of earnings-to-price ratios in its direct capitalization approach; that additional depreciation deductions were not warranted; and that the Department did not overvalue PacifiCorp's property. The court also held that MCA 15-8-111(2)(b) did not require the Department to conduct a separate, additional obsolescence study when no evidence suggested that obsolescence existed that has not been accounted for in the taxpayer's Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") Form 1 filing. The court further held that STAB correctly determined that the actual $9.4 billion sales price of PacifiCorp verified that the Department's $7.1 billion assessment had not overvalued PacifiCorp's properties.

AdSurfDaily, Inc., an internet marketing company incorporated and controlled by appellant, appealed a default judgment and final order of forfeiture after they withdrew their claims in this civil forfeiture action where federal agents seized $80 million of the company's bank account funds as part of an investigation of the company for wire fraud and money laundering. The government filed a complaint for forfeiture in rem against the funds and two pieces of real property that had been purchased with AdSurfDaily money. At issue was whether the district court violated appellants' due process rights when it failed to stay the forfeiture action pending the outcome of a parallel criminal proceeding and when the district court denied them an opportunity to challenge the forfeiture on the merits when it refused to reinstate their withdrawn claims. The court held that the district court did not violate appellants' due process rights when they never asked for a stay and where due process did not require the government to provide a person with the opportunity to challenge the seizure of property he had voluntarily forfeited. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to reinstate withdrawn claims when the withdrawal was the product of a free, deliberate choice.