Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Oregon Attorney General brought this action against defendants, Living Essentials, LLC and Innovation Ventures, LLC, alleging that they had made representations about their products that violated two different provisions of the Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA). The trial court ruled for defendants, explaining that the relevant provisions of the UTPA required the State to prove that the misrepresentations were “material to consumer purchasing decisions,” and that the State had not done so. The Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. The Oregon Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for review to consider whether the lower courts correctly construed the statute. After such review, the Supreme Court concluded, contrary to the trial court and the Court of Appeals, that the UTPA provisions at issue contained no “material to consumer purchasing decisions” requirement. The Supreme Court also rejected defendants’ argument that, without such a requirement, the provisions facially violated the free speech provisions of the State and federal constitutions. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded to that court for further proceedings. View "State ex rel Rosenblum v. Living Essentials, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the superior court entering a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of certain amendments to the New Shoreham General Ordinance, entitled Motorized Cycle Rental, holding that the hearing justice did not err in her decision granting in part Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction.Plaintiffs, businesses in the Town of New Shoreham that rented mopeds, filed a complaint against the Town requesting declaratory and injunctive relief and alleging that the Town had attempted to amend the ordinance at issue in contravention of a settlement agreement reached by the parties and in contravention of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 31-19.3-5. the hearing justice granted Plaintiffs' motion to enjoin preliminarily enforcement of the amendments. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief on their allegations of error. View "Finnimore & Fisher Inc. v. Town of New Shoreham" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was on active duty with the United States Army. He bought a car from Select Cars of Thornburg in Fredericksburg, Virginia, and financed his purchase with a loan from United Auto Credit Corporation. The loan financed not only the car’s cost but also the cost of Guaranteed Asset Protection. Guaranteed Asset Protection is like extra insurance, covering any amount still due on the car loan after auto insurance is paid out if the car is totaled or stolen. Plaintiff’s claims arise from this single loan. This loan, Plaintiff alleged, violated the Military Lending Act because the loan agreement mandated arbitration and failed to disclose certain information. The district court dismissed the case, holding that the loan was not covered by the Act at all.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a statutory provision must be given the ordinary meaning it had when it was enacted. Relevant dictionaries, carefully considered, sometimes shed light on that ordinary meaning. Yet here, dueling dictionaries provide more than one linguistically permissible meaning.  But by examining the relevant phrase in its statutory context. This context shows that while “the express purpose” can be used in different senses, it is best read in Section 987(i)(6) to mean the specific purpose. This loan was offered for the specific purpose of financing Plaintiff’s car purchase. And that satisfies Section 987(i)(6)’s relevant condition and the Act is inapplicable. View "Jerry Davidson v. United Auto Credit Corporation" on Justia Law

In November of 2020, the people of Georgia, through the results of a ballot question posed in the general election, amended the State Constitution to allow for a specific waiver of sovereign immunity. This new waiver allowed citizens to sue the State for declaratory relief ("Paragraph V"). To the extent that citizens obtain a favorable ruling on their claim for declaratory relief, they could then also seek injunctive relief to “enforce [the court’s] judgment.” To take advantage of this new waiver of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, however, the Constitution provided that such actions had to be brought “exclusively” against the State. When a plaintiff’s suit violated this exclusivity provision, the Constitution required the suit be dismissed. In the underlying appeal, the plaintiffs’ suit named a defendant for whom a waiver was not provided by Paragraph V. Accordingly, the Constitution required the suit to be dismissed. The Georgia Supreme Court therefore vacated the trial court’s grant of an interlocutory injunction, reversed the denial of the State’s motion to dismiss, and remanded this case with direction that it be dismissed. View "Georgia, et al. v. Sass Group, LLC et al." on Justia Law

During an investigation into possible violations of California overtime laws by appellant Nor-Cal Venture Group, Inc. (Nor-Cal), respondent Labor Commissioner for the State of California (Commissioner) subpoenaed Nor-Cal's business records. The Commissioner ultimately issued a wage citation to Nor-Cal, seeking over $900,000 in penalties and unpaid wages for alleged misclassification of about 40 restaurant managers. Nor-Cal challenged the wage citation in an “informal” adjudicatory hearing, and while that adjudication was pending, Commissioner issued a subpoena directing Nor-Cal’s “Person(s) Most Knowledgeable” on certain topics to testify at a deposition. When Nor-Cal refused, Commissioner filed a petition to a trial court to compel Nor-Cal to comply. The trial court agreed with Commissioner and ordered Nor-Cal to comply with the deposition subpoena. On appeal, Nor-Cal challenged the trial court’s order, arguing: (1) the California Government Code did not contemplate parties to adjudicatory informal hearings taking depositions for the purpose of discovery; and (2) because, under the trial court’s reasoning, only Commissioner could issue deposition subpoenas during the pendency of an informal adjudication, the trial court’s order permitting non-reciprocal discovery violated due process. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order, finding that while Commissioner had broad power to issue investigative subpoenas to a company for suspected violations of the law, "that broad power ends upon initiation of adjudicative proceedings against the company." View "Garcia-Brower v. Nor-Cal Venture Group" on Justia Law

In May 2020 Rehm expressed concern that Haven was not doing enough to protect her and other employees from COVID. Dillett, Haven’s Director of Operations and co-owner, did not appreciate Rehm’s suggestions. Rehm sent a staff-wide email criticizing Dillett’s handling of COVID health risks. Dillett fired her. After Rehm complained to the NLRB, Dillett threatened legal action. An ALJ found that Haven had unlawfully terminated and threatened Rehm, National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1). The Board ordered Haven to compensate Rehm for lost pay and expenses, offer to rehire her, notify her that it had removed references to her unlawful termination from her employee file, post notices of employee rights, and file a sworn certification of compliance.The Seventh Circuit summarily enforced that order in September 2021. Haven did not comply. In December 2022, the Seventh Circuit directed Haven to respond to the Board’s contempt petition. Haven disregarded a subsequent “show cause” order. The Seventh Circuit entered a contempt order, requiring Haven to pay a fine of $1,000, plus a fine of $150 per day for every day of the next week that Haven fails to comply, beginning on February 28, 2023. The daily fine will increase by $100 each day that Haven fails to comply beyond the next week. The court will forgive the fines if Haven files a sworn statement within seven days demonstrating full compliance. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Haven Salon + Spa, Inc" on Justia Law

The Washington Department of Revenue issued instructions to Lakeside Industries Inc. regarding the valuation of Lakeside’s self-manufactured asphalt products. This valuation determined the amount of use tax that Lakeside had to pay to use its asphalt in public road construction projects. Lakeside did not follow DOR’s instructions and, instead, petitioned for judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), ch. 34.05 RCW. The Washington Supreme Court held that the APA’s general review provisions did not apply to Lakeside’s nonconstitutional tax challenge. To obtain judicial review of DOR’s tax reporting instructions, Lakeside had to follow the specific procedures for tax challenges set forth in Title 82 RCW (Title 82). Therefore, Lakeside’s APA petition for judicial review was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Lakeside Indus., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

This case centered upon how Appellee Synthes USA HQ, Inc. should apportion its income between Pennsylvania and other states in order to calculate its Pennsylvania corporate net income tax. The two issues presented were: (1) does the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) have the authority to represent the Commonwealth in this litigation, where it asserted an interpretation of the relevant tax provision contrary to the reading forwarded by the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue (“Department”); and (2) whether the allocation of a corporation's sales of services between Pennsylvania and other states for purposes of calculating the corporation’s income that was taxable in Pennsylvania. After review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth Attorneys Act permitted the OAG to take a position on behalf of the Commonwealth that was inconsistent with the position adopted by the Department, but the Court ultimately rejected the OAG’s reading of the relevant tax provision in favor of the interpretation presented by the Department. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court remanding this case to the Board of Finance and Revenue for calculation and issuance of a tax refund by the Department to Synthes for the 2011 tax year. View "Synthes USA HQ v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

This direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court centered on the efforts of Appellee John Myers to obtain a refund of 38 cents in sales tax he paid on purchases he made with redeemed coupons at BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. (BJ’s). The parties petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to interpret Section 33.2(b) of the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue Code, which excluded “from the taxable portion of the purchase price, if separately stated and identified." A vendor owes the state sales tax on the full price of the item unless it can establish a “new purchase price” of the item, which may be established where “both the item and the coupon are described on the invoice or cash register tape.” The Pennsylvania Department of Revenue Board of Appeals (BOA) relied on Section 33.2, which permitted amounts represented by coupons to establish a new purchase price “if both the item and the coupon are described on the invoice or cash register tape.” The BOA concluded that the coupons were not adequately described on the receipts, and nothing indicated which items the coupons were related. A unanimous three-judge panel of the Commonwealth Court reversed the Board’s order and found Appellee was entitled to a refund of overpaid sales tax. The Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court, finding none of the receipts at issue here satisfied subsection 33.2(b)(2)’s description requirement. Because it was Appellee’s burden to prove that he was entitled to a refund of sales tax, he did not meet his burden. View "Myers v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

This insurance coverage dispute between a public entity joint insurance fund (JIF) and Star Insurance Company (Star), a commercial general liability insurance company, turned on whether the JIF provided “insurance” to its members or, instead, the JIF members protect against liability through “self-insurance.” That distinction was pertinent here because Star’s insurance policy included a clause under which its coverage obligations began only after coverage available through “other insurance” has been exhausted; the clause, however, did not mention “self-insurance.” Star argued the JIF provided insurance and therefore Star’s coverage was excess to the JIF; the JIF disagreed, contending that because its members were instead “self-insured,” Star’s coverage was primary. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that under the plain language of N.J.S.A. 40A:10-48, a JIF “was not an insurance company or an insurer under New Jersey law, and its “authorized activities . . . do not constitute the transaction of insurance nor doing an insurance business.” By the statute’s plain terms, JIFs cannot provide insurance in exchange for premiums, as insurance companies typically do; instead, JIF members reduce insurance costs by pooling financial resources, distributing and retaining risk, and paying claims through member assessments. Therefore, JIFs protect members against liability through “self-insurance.” “Self-insurance” is not insurance. The Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the JIF and denial of summary judgment to Star. View "Statewide Insurance Fund v. Star Insurance Company" on Justia Law