Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2005, Crossroads Investors, L.P. borrowed $9 million subject to a promissory note. The note was secured by a deed of trust recorded against an apartment building Crossroads owned in Woodland. Defendant Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) was the beneficiary of the deed. The note imposed on Crossroads a prepayment premium should Crossroads pay the unpaid principal before the note’s maturity date or should Crossroads default and Fannie Mae accelerate the loan. Crossroads defaulted on the note in late 2010. Fannie Mae served Crossroads with a notice of default, and accelerated the loan. In February 2011, Fannie Mae initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. In April 2011, Crossroads entered into a contract to sell the property to Ezralow Company, LLC (Ezralow) for $10.95 million. A few weeks later, Crossroads and Ezralow proposed to Fannie Mae that Ezralow would assume Crossroads’ obligations and pay off the loan on Fannie Mae’s agreeing to waive the prepayment premium. Fannie Mae refused to waive the prepayment premium and rejected the proposal. By June, Fannie Mae recorded a notice of trustee’s sale against the property, stating the total unpaid amount of Crossroad’s obligations was estimated at more than $10.5 million. The day before the property was scheduled to be sold, Crossroads filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection to protect its interest in the property. In its petition, Crossroads asserted it owed Fannie Mae $8.7 million. Fannie Mae sold the property after it was granted relief from the bankruptcy stay. Crossroads then sued Fannie Mae for wrongful foreclosure, breach of contract, fraud, and other tort and contract actions. Fannie Mae filed an anti-SLAPP motion, contending the actions on which Crossroads based its complaint were Fannie Mae’s statements in its papers filed in the bankruptcy proceeding. The trial court disagreed and denied the motion. This appeal challenged the trial court’s denial of Fannie Mae's special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order. "The principal thrust of Crossroads’ action was to recover for violations of state nonjudicial foreclosure law, not for any exercise of speech or petition rights by Fannie Mae. Even if protected activity was not merely incidental to the unprotected activity, Crossroads established a prima facie case showing it was likely to succeed on its causes of action." View "Crossroads Investors v. Federal National Mortgage Assn." on Justia Law

Defendant California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (Cal Fire) employed plaintiff Corey Baughn as a firefighter at its Mendocino Unit. In 2009, Cal Fire terminated him for sexually harassing a female subordinate employee. Baughn appealed his termination to the State Personnel Board. Before the Board considered the matter, the parties settled the dispute by written stipulation. Baughn agreed to withdraw his appeal; resign from Cal Fire; and not apply for, seek, or accept employment with Cal Fire again. In exchange, Cal Fire agreed to remove any reference to its disciplinary action from Baughn’s personnel file and to accept Baughn’s resignation. The Personnel Board approved the stipulation. Baughn then worked for the Ukiah Valley Fire District, first as a volunteer firefighter and then as a temporary employee. Ukiah Valley had an agreement with Cal Fire to assign Ukiah Valley personnel to a Cal Fire facility during the winter months. The unit chief of Cal Fire’s Mendocino Unit, Christopher Rowney, became aware that Baughn was working for Ukiah Valley. Rowney knew that as result of Baughn’s employment duties, Baughn would likely be present in Cal Fire facilities when the victim of Baughn’s earlier harassment would also be present. Concerned about this possibility, Rowney wrote a letter to Ukiah Valley’s fire chief ordering Baughn not to be present in any Cal Fire facility. Baughn sought permanent employment with Ukiah Valley. However, when Ukiah Valley’s governing board members learned of Rowney’s action, they pressured the chief to terminate Baughn, which the chief ultimately did. Baughn and his union, plaintiff CDF Firefighters (the Union), sued Cal Fire for breach of the written settlement stipulation between it and Baughn, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage. Cal Fire filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint as to the Union, but not as to Baughn. It contended the complaint arose from speech by Rowney that was protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. It also asserted the Union was not likely to succeed on the merits. The trial court denied the motion. Cal Fire appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that defendant failed to demonstrate plaintiffs’ action arose from conduct taken by defendant in furtherance of its right of speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. The Court reversed and remanded an award of attorney fees, finding that the trial court relied on an improper basis for awarding fees to plaintiff. View "Baughn v. Dept. of Forestry" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and appellants Rosemary Morgan and Michelle Luna (collectively plaintiffs) were the widow and daughter, respectively, of decedent Mike Morgan. Morgan suffered fatal injuries when defendant Thomas Durnin crashed head-on into Morgan's vehicle as Durnin was fleeing from a Beaumont Police Officer during a vehicle pursuit that lasted nearly 12 minutes. As relevant to this appeal, plaintiffs' operative complaint alleged a wrongful death cause of action against defendants City of Beaumont (City) and the Beaumont Police Department (BPD). The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding they were immune from liability pursuant to Vehicle Code section 17004.7. On appeal, plaintiffs argued the court erred in granting summary judgment because defendants failed to show by sufficient evidence that BPD as a matter of law promulgated a vehicle pursuit policy and provided the requisite training as required under section 17004.7. After review, the Court of Appeal was persuaded by plaintiffs' argument and agreed that defendants failed to proffer sufficient evidence to establish as a matter of law that BPD promulgated its vehicle pursuit policy as required under section 17004.7. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's decision. View "Morgan v. Beaumont Police Dept." on Justia Law

The San Diego Housing Commission (Commission) was a local public agency subject to the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (Act). The Commission and Service Employees International Union, Local 721 (Union) reached an impasse in negotiations over the effects of the Commission's decision to lay off two employees represented by the Union. The Union made a written request to the Public Employment Relations Board for the dispute to be submitted to a factfinding panel. The Board granted the request over the Commission's objection, and the Commission then filed suit seeking a declaration and writ of mandate to prohibit the Board from using factfinding procedures in this case, and to restrain the parties from using factfinding on matters unlrelated to the negotiation of an MOU. This appeal presented to the Court of Appeal whether the Act's provisions for impasse resolution through advisory factfinding applied to impasses arising during the negotiation of any bargainable matter or only to impasses arising during the negotiation of a comprehensive memorandum of understanding (MOU). The Court held that the factfinding provisions applied to impasses arising during the negotiation of any bargainable matter. As the trial court determined otherwise, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "San Diego Housing Com. v. Public Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

The County of Riverside (County) was a local public agency subject to the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (Act). The County implemented a new background check policy requiring information technology employees represented by the Service Employees International Union, Local 721 (Union) to pass a background check. An employee's failure to pass the background check provided grounds to discharge the employee. The County and Union entered negotiations over the effects of the policy, but were unable to reach an agreement. After the Union declared an impasse and the County declined the Union's offer to mediate the dispute, the Union submitted a request to the Board for factfinding. The Board granted the Union's request over the County's objection. The County filed a petition for writ of mandate and a complaint for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, breach of contract, and statutory and constitutional violations. The County claimed the Act's factfinding provisions applied only to impasses arising from negotiations for a new or successor MOU, not to discrete bargainable issues. The County further claimed the Act's factfinding procedures violated the County's constitutional right to establish compensation for its employees. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the factfinding provisions were constitutional because they did not divest a county or a city of its final decisionmaking authority. Further, the Court concluded the factfinding provisions applied to impasses arising during the negotiation of any bargainable matter. As the trial court reached a different decision on this point, the Court reversed the judgment and the related writ and orders and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Co. of Riverside v. Public Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the denial of his petition for writ of mandate which he sought to overturn the Commission's decision upholding his dismissal as the County’s labor relations manager. The court concluded that the trial court erred in finding that plaintiff had been given a fair hearing. In this case, the Commission's decision cannot be upheld because the Commission relied on information taken outside the hearing in reaching its decision sustaining plaintiff’s dismissal which plaintiff had no opportunity to refute. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. The court need not address plaintiff's remaining issues. View "Pinheiro v. Civil Service Comm. for the Cnty. of Fresno" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Legislature adopted Labor Code section 1782, which prohibits a charter city from receiving or using state funding or financial assistance for a public construction project if the city has a charter provision or ordinance that authorizes a contractor to not comply with the state prevailing wage laws. Several charter cities, the cities of El Centro, Fresno, Vista, Carlsbad and El Cajon (the Cities), filed a petition for an alternative or peremptory writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants the State of California, David Lanier in his official capacity as the Secretary of the State of California Labor & Workforce Development Agency, Christine Baker in her official capacity as the State of California Director of Industrial Relations and Julie A. Su in her official capacity as the State of California Labor Commissioner. Among other things, the Cities sought a writ of mandate to prevent the enforcement of section 1782. The trial court denied relief and entered a judgment in favor of defendants. In this case, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment upholding the constitutionality of section 1782 against the Cities' "home rule" challenge. View "City of El Centro v. Lanier" on Justia Law

The Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. (UMMP) appealed the trial court's denial of its petition for writ of mandate seeking to set aside under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) an ordinance prohibiting mobile medical marijuana dispensaries in the City of Upland. UMMP contended the City's adoption of the ordinance violated CEQA because the City did not first consider the ordinance's reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts. The City argued that the ordinance was not a "project" subject to CEQA, or was exempt under CEQA's "common-sense" exemption for projects that have no potential to cause a significant effect on the environment. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the ordinance was not a project under CEQA, and affirmed on that basis. View "Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of Upland" on Justia Law

A school district is entitled to levy fees on new residential construction. Government Code section 66020 applies to partial refunds of fees paid, such as the refund sought by appellant. At issue in this appeal is whether Civil Code section 3287, which provides for interest when damages are awarded, applies specifically to interest on a refund for a development fee paid to the District. The court concluded that section 3287 does not apply because section 66020, subdivision (e) more specifically sets forth the interest available on the development fee refund. Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that section 3287 did not apply in this case and properly sustained the school district's demurrer and dismissed the lawsuit. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Merkoh Assoc., LLC v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Petitioner California Cannabis Coalition, a California nonprofit corporation, and Nicole De La Rosa and James Velez (collectively, CCC), appealed after a trial court denied CCC’s petition for writ of mandate. CCC’s writ petition requested the trial court to order the City of Upland and city clerk, Stephanie Mendenhall, (collectively, the City) to hold a special election on CCC’s medical marijuana dispensary initiative (Initiative). CCC argued the trial court erred in ruling CCC’s Initiative could not be voted on during a special election under Article XIIIC (Article 13C), section 2 of the California Constitution, because the Initiative imposes a charge on medical marijuana dispensaries, which in effect was a general tax rather than a regulatory fee. CCC objected to the trial court requiring the Initiative to be placed on the next general election ballot, instead of presenting it to the voters earlier by holding a special election. CCC further argued the City council prematurely determined, before the election on the Initiative, that the Initiative constituted a tax rather than a regulatory fee. CCC sought a writ of mandate to compel the City to hold a special election on the Initiative. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded Article 13C, section 2 did not apply to CCC’s Initiative. "Article 13C, sections 1 and 2 refer to taxes imposed by local government. Article 13C is silent as to taxes imposed by initiative. Article 2, sections 8 and 11 of the California Constitution and Elections Code sections 1405 and 9214, on the other hand, provide the people with initiative powers and state procedures for holding elections on initiatives." The Court therefore denied the writ petition. View "CA Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland" on Justia Law