Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Government Employees Insurance Company, GEICO General Insurance Company, GEICO Casualty Company, and GEICO Indemnity Company (collectively, GEICO), as relator, brought a qui tam action asserting statutory and common law claims for damages and civil penalties against Dr. Janice Cruz (and others) arising from her alleged involvement in an insurance fraud conspiracy. The trial court granted Cruz's motion to bind GEICO to certain interrogatory responses, then granted her summary judgment motion on the basis those responses established GEICO was unable to prove its case against Cruz. On appeal, GEICO argued the trial court erred by: (1) binding GEICO to its earlier interrogatory responses; (2) excluding additional evidence offered in opposition to the summary judgment motion; and (3) granting summary judgment on its statutory claim. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in binding GEICO to its interrogatory responses, and further, found multiple instances of issues of triable facts that should not have been disposed of through summary judgment. The Court accordingly reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "California ex rel. Gov. Employees Ins. Co. v. Cruz" on Justia Law

Two administrative rules set forth different overtime pay rates for agricultural workers who harvest fruit and for those who process fruit for market. Farmers and plaintiffs Jaswant Bains and Piara Gosal unsuccessfully sought a declaration that certain of their workers were not subject to the more generous of two wage orders issued by the Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (Department or DLSE). Plaintiffs argued on appeal: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction because they themselves failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and (2) the trial court erred in its conclusion on the merits. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Bains v. Dept. of Industrial Relations" on Justia Law

In 2011, defendant El Dorado County created a new classification (sheriff’s security officer) for employees providing court perimeter security, and placed the new classification in a general bargaining unit rather than the County’s law-enforcement bargaining unit because the sheriff’s security officers would not have peace officer authority. At the same time, the County deleted several positions (all of which were vacant) from the law-enforcement bargaining unit. One year later, plaintiff El Dorado County Deputy Sheriff’s Association, the exclusive representative of the County’s law-enforcement bargaining unit, demanded to bargain over the decision to create the new classification, even though the Association had actual notice of the decision before it was implemented. The County denied the Association’s request to meet and confer. The Association filed a petition for writ of mandate, alleging that the County did not provide advance notice of the creation of the sheriff’s security officer classification and violated its duty to meet and confer. The petition sought restoration of the status quo existing before creation of the new classification, which would require the County to nullify its action more than a year after it was taken and presumably terminate the 11 sheriff’s security officers already hired, so that the Association could demand to bargain over the decision and its effects. The trial court found the County had no duty to bargain over the decision because the work assigned to sheriff’s security officers is not work belonging to the law- enforcement bargaining unit. The trial court also found that, while the County had a duty to bargain over the effects of the decision, which included loss of overtime opportunities for members of the Association, the Association waived its right to bargain over the effects of the decision because it had actual advance notice of the change before the change was made and did not make a demand to bargain. On appeal, the Association contended that the trial court erred by finding that the Association waived its bargaining rights. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the law did not require an employer to give advance notice of the reasonably foreseeable effects of the decision; instead, the employer must give advance notice only of the decision. The Court agreed that the County violated a local rule by failing to give notice to and consult with the Association before deleting the positions. Deletion of the law-enforcement bargaining unit positions must be invalidated so that the County can comply with the local rules. View "El Dorado Deputy etc. Assn. v. Co. of El Dorado" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ralph White sought to remove Ann Johnston as mayor of the City of Stockton and to enjoin placing her name on the municipal election ballot of June 2012 for reelection as mayor. White contended Johnston was ineligible to sit as mayor and to run for reelection under section 606 of the Stockton City Charter. Because Johnston had served two terms as a council member prior to being elected mayor, White asserted she was ineligible to serve as mayor and to run for reelection. The trial court denied White’s petition for an alternative writ. Johnston’s name was placed on the June 2012 ballot, as was White’s, who also was running for mayor. Johnston received the most votes in the election and qualified for a runoff election. White did not qualify. That November, Johnston lost the general election. The trial court denied White’s petition for writ of mandate, finding section 606 was ambiguous because it did not clearly and plainly impose a cumulative term limit. It then found the City’s construction of section 606 as not imposing a cumulative limit was reasonable and not clearly erroneous in light of the official ballot pamphlet used when the voters adopted section 606 and the City’s consistent practice of not reading section 606 as imposing a cumulative limit. The City of argued, and the trial court found, the measure did not impose a cumulative limit. The Court of Appeal agreed with the City and affirmed the judgment. View "White v. City of Stockton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Robert Hughes, a retired sheriff’s deputy, had his case dismissed when the trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer to his amended petition for writ of mandate and administrative mandate. Hughes sought to compel the County of San Bernadino to complete the administrative appeal process of a disciplinary action. Hughes initiated the administrative appeal under the County’s civil service rules, but missed the scheduled hearing after suffering a heart attack. Hughes retired for medical reasons before the hearing could be rescheduled. The County declined to reschedule after Hughes retired, arguing he was no longer an employee entitled to an administrative appeal. Defendant San Bernardino Civil Service Commission (the CSC), after requesting briefing from Hughes and the County, ruled that it had no jurisdiction to continue with the appeal. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded Hughes was entitled to complete his administrative appeal as provided in the County's Personnel Rules. The trial court's order was reversed and the case remanded with directions to enter a new order overruling the County’s demurrer. View "Hughes v. County of San Bernardino" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a member of the police department, filed a writ petition seeking to overturn his dismissal due in part to his insubordination in refusing to submit to an interrogation. Plaintiff argued that he had a valid reason for refusing to submit to the October 13, 2010 interrogation - namely, that the Department violated the Police Officer’s Bill of Rights (POBRA), Gov. Code, 3303, subd. (c), by not properly advising him of the nature of the investigation “prior to” his interrogation. The court concluded that a public safety officer must be informed of the “nature of the investigation” reasonably prior to any interrogation. Notice is “reasonably prior to” an interrogation if it grants the officer sufficient time to meaningfully consult with any “representative” he or she elects to have present during the interview, although the employing department may postpone disclosure until the scheduled time of the interview - and briefly postpone the commencement of the interview to allow time for consultation - if it has reason to believe that earlier disclosure would jeopardize the safety of any interested parties or the integrity of evidence under the officer’s control. In this case, the undisputed facts indicate that plaintiff had sufficient time to meaningfully consult with his representative. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the writ petition. View "Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre" on Justia Law

Kathy Seacrist and her son, John McDonald sued Southern California Edison (Edison); the City of Palm Desert; J.R. Roberts; and Does 5 through 100. Seacrist owned a home near an Edison substation. Plaintiffs Seacrist and McDonald alleged stray electrical currents from the substation were causing them to suffer various medical issues. The Fourth Amended Complaint included seven causes of action against Edison: (a) negligence; (b) nuisance; (c) trespass; (d) strict liability/products liability; (e) strict liability/implied warranty of fitness; (f) strict liability/ultra hazardous activity; and (g) intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court sustained Edison’s demurrer without leave to amend, concluding “Plaintiffs claims are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the California Public Utilities Commission,” and thus, the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the dispute with Edison. The Court of Appeal held previously that the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) did not have exclusive jurisdiction over a case involving injuries resulting from stray electrical currents from a substation. On appeal, plaintiffs contended the trial court erred by sustaining Edison’s demurrer because the PUC did not have exclusive jurisdiction over claims related to injuries from stray electrical currents. Edison asserts, among other things, that controlling case law was wrongly decided. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment. View "Seacrist v. So. Cal. Edison" on Justia Law

Defendants-appellants AMG Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (AMG), and others, appealed an order granting a preliminary injunction in favor of plaintiff-respondent City of Corona (the City), requiring defendants to cease using and immediately remove a billboard, or outdoor advertising sign, that AMG erected in the City without a city or state permit. Defendants claimed the City was enforcing Ordinance No. 2729 against them in an impermissibly discriminatory manner, because the City has allowed another billboard operator, Lamar Advertising Company, to erect new billboards in the City, after the 2004 ordinance was enacted, while denying them the right to do so. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded AMG's claim was unsupported by any evidence in the record, and belied by the City’s evidence. Defendants also claimed the 2004 ordinance violated their equal protection rights, was an invalid prior restraint, and violated their free speech rights under the California Constitution. The Court found no constitutional violation or other error, and affirmed the order granting the preliminary injunction. View "City of Corona v. AMG Outdoor Advertising" on Justia Law

In consolidated California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) actions, several plaintiffs, including Highland Springs Conference and Training Center (Highland Springs) and Banning Bench Community of Interest Association (Banning Bench) successfully challenged the certification by defendant-respondent, City of Banning of an environmental impact report (EIR) for a 1,500-acre real estate development project known as the Black Bench project. In their writ petitions, filed in November 2006, Highland Springs and Banning Bench named “SCC/Black Bench, LLC, dba SunCal Companies” (SCC/BB), as the only real party in interest. SCC/BB appealed the April 2008 judgments entered in favor of plaintiffs on their writ petitions, but its appeal was dismissed in September 2008 after it failed to deposit the costs of preparing the record on appeal. By that time, SCC/BB was in default on two purchase money loans for the Black Bench property, and by the end of 2008 SCC/BB lost the property in foreclosure. In August 2008, Highland Springs and Banning Bench, along with two other plaintiffs, jointly moved to recover their attorney fees and costs incurred in the CEQA litigation from SCC/BB. In October 2008, the trial court awarded the moving plaintiffs over $1 million in attorney fees and costs. SCC/BB did not oppose the motion. In October 2012, the four plaintiffs, including Highland Springs and Banning Bench, jointly moved to amend the judgments to add SCC Acquisitions, Inc. (SCCA) as an additional judgment debtor, and make SCCA liable for paying the attorney fees and costs awards. The plaintiffs claimed that SCCA was the alter ego of SCC/BB, it would be unjust not to hold SCCA liable for paying the attorney fees and costs awards, and plaintiffs did not discover until 2012 that SCC/BB had been dissolved in 2010. Following initial and supplemental briefing, three hearings, and several rounds of evidentiary submissions, the trial court denied the motion to amend the judgments on the sole basis that plaintiffs failed to act with due diligence in bringing the motion. The court reasoned plaintiffs knew, or reasonably should have known, of SCCA’s alleged alter ego relationship to SCC/BB long before plaintiffs moved to amend the judgments in October 2012. Still, the court indicated the equities favored granting the motion and the court “likely” would have granted it had it been filed earlier. In this appeal, Highland Springs and Banning Bench claimed the motion to amend their judgments was erroneously denied. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed the motion to amend was erroneously denied based solely on plaintiffs’ delay in filing the motion, because SCCA made an insufficient evidentiary showing that it was prejudiced by the delay. SCCA did not meet its burden of proving the motion was barred by laches. The Court therefore reversed the order denying the motion and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court must determine whether the judgments in favor of Highland Springs and Banning Bench should be amended to add SCCA as an additional judgment debtor. View "Highland Springs Conference etc. v. City of Banning" on Justia Law

In an inverse condemnation action, the issue facing the Court of Appeal was a unique situation, where a state agency assumed control of a local flood control process, and it determined to provide less flood protection than historically provided by a local agency in order to protect environmental resources. Plaintiffs, whose properties suffered flooding damage when the lagoon level rose above eight feet msl, filed this action in 2007 for inverse condemnation. They alleged they suffered a physical taking from the Department’s actions, and a regulatory taking by the Commission retaining land use jurisdiction over the subdivision throughout this time instead of transferring it to the County. Plaintiffs also sought precondemnation damages and statutory attorney fees. The trial court found the Department and the Commission (collectively, the State) liable for a physical taking and awarded damages, but it concluded plaintiffs’ claim for a regulatory taking was barred. It rejected the State’s arguments that the statute of limitations barred plaintiffs’ complaint. It awarded plaintiffs attorney fees in the amount they incurred under a contingency agreement, but it denied plaintiffs any precondemnation damages. Both the State and plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment finding the state agency liable in inverse condemnation for a physical taking of plaintiffs’ properties, and not liable for a regulatory taking. The Court reversed the judgment to the extent the court found another state permitting agency liable in inverse condemnation. View "Pacific Shores v. Dept. of Fish and Wildlife" on Justia Law