Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

On May 8, 2014, petitioner City of San Diego (City) denied the application of Jeri Dines, the real party in interest, for leave to file a late claim filed pursuant to the California Government Claims Act. Dines did not file a petition with the trial court for an order relieving her from the claims presentation requirements until November 13, 2014 (i.e., more than six months after the City denied her application). Dines alleged former City Mayor Bob Filner inappropriately touched her. However, citing section 915.2, subdivision (b) of the Act that extends by five days the period for a recipient of a mailed notice to respond to the notice, the trial court granted her petition, concluding section 915.2, subdivision (b), gave her an additional five days to file her section 946.6 petition. The City filed a petition for writ of mandate to the Court of Appeal, challenging the trial court's order. The City argued section 915.2, subdivision (b), was inapplicable to, and did not extend, the Act's section 946.6's six-month limitations period for filing a petition with the court. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the City and granted the requested relief. View "City of San Diego v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Newhall, a retail water purveyor, challenged a wholesale water rate increase adopted in February 2013 by the Agency. The trial court found the Agency's rates violated article XIII C of the California Constitution (Proposition 26), which defines any local government levy, charge or exaction as a tax requiring voter approval, unless (as relevant here) it is imposed “for a specific government service or product provided directly to the payor that is not provided to those not charged, and which does not exceed the reasonable costs to the local government of providing the service or product.” The court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the challenged rates did not comply with this exception because the Agency based its wholesale rate for imported water in substantial part on Newhall’s use of groundwater, which was not supplied by the Agency. The court concluded that the wholesale water cost allocated to Newhall did not, as required, bear a fair or reasonable relationship to Newhall's burdens on, or benefits received from, the Agency’s activity. View "Newhall Cnty. Water Dist. v. Castaic Lake Water Agency" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a qui tam suit on behalf of himself and the State under the California False Claims Act (CFCA), Gov. Code, 12650 et seq., alleging that ClubCorp had defrauded the State by failing to escheat the unclaimed initiation deposits of ClubCorp’s members and former members. The trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss, concluding that plaintiff's qui tam action was based on business practices ClubCorp had previously disclosed in publicly available filings with the SEC and thus precluded by CFCA's public disclosure bar. The court concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing the qui tam complaint as barred by the public disclosure provision in former subdivision (d)(3)(A) where an SEC filing is not one of the disclosures identified in that subdivision as barring a qui tam action. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "State of California ex rel. Bartlett v. Miller" on Justia Law

Mother Kimberly L. appealed a trial court's orders terminating her parental rights to Albert A. (A.A.) and Veronica A. (V.A.). Mother argued: (1) the juvenile court’s jurisdictional orders finding the children were dependents within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1), were not supported by substantial evidence; (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion by terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing; (3) the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying mother’s request to continue the permanency hearing to allow her time to file a petition under section 388 requesting additional reunification services; (4) the juvenile court’s orders finding the children were likely to be adopted were not supported by substantial evidence; and (5) the juvenile court erred by concluding legally sufficient notice was provided to relevant Indian tribes pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act. In the published portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded mother waived her claim of error regarding the jurisdictional orders by not appealing the dispositions. Mother was absent from the continued jurisdictional hearing and was not entitled to notice of her right to appeal under California Rules of Court, rule 5.590(a). Because the Court concluded the juvenile court did not provide mother with timely and adequate notice of her right to challenge the orders setting a permanency hearing, as mandated by rule 5.590(b), mother did not waive her claim of error respecting the termination of reunification services. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by terminating reunification services or by denying a request to continue the permanency hearing because mother did not comply with her case plan and did not visit with the children. However, the Court agreed with mother that the juvenile court erred by not considering legal impediments to the children being adopted by their paternal grandmother when it found the children were likely to be adopted, and we agree with mother and CFS that the ICWA notice was inadequate. Therefore, the orders terminating parental rights was reversed and the case remanded for the juvenile court to consider legal impediments to the children being adopted, for CFS to provide new ICWA notice, and for the juvenile court to determine whether that notice was sufficient. View "In re Albert A." on Justia Law

Adrian was a full-time student at UCSC, living in an off-campus apartment. He commuted to the university on his bicycle, traveling on the Great Meadow Bikeway, a paved bike path that runs through part of the UCSC campus. Constructed in 1973, the purpose of the Bikeway is bicycle transportation to and from the central campus that is separate from automobile traffic. There have been several bicycle accidents on the Bikeway. After Adrian was fatally injured in a bicycle accident on the Bikeway, his family sued, alleging that the Regents of the University of California were liable for Adrian’s death due to the dangerous condition of the Bikeway. The trial court granted the Regents summary judgment on the ground that the action was barred under the recreational trail immunity provided by Government Code section 831.4.2 The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the causes of action for dangerous condition of public property and wrongful death are barred as a matter of law because the Regents have absolute immunity from claims arising from Adrian’s accident. View "Burgueno v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal." on Justia Law

The California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA) prepared and certified a programmatic environmental impact report (EIR) for a seven-year program to eradicate an invasive pest, the light brown apple moth (LBAM), but “at the last minute” approved instead a seven-year program to control LBAMs based on new information that eradication was no longer attainable. The EIR did not evaluate control as a reasonable alternative to eradication, and there was no supplemental environmental review in connection with the last-minute change. In two appeals, consolidated for the Court of Appeal's review, challenged trial court decisions that denied petitions for writ of administrative mandamus that asserted California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) violations and challenging the program approved by the California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA) and its former Secretary A.G. Kawamura. Appellants contended the EIR violated CEQA by making assumptions unsupported by substantial evidence and by inadequately addressing environmental impacts, a reasonable range of alternatives, and cumulative impacts. Appellants also contended the CDFA’s “last-minute” approval of a control program instead of the eradication program rendered the environmental review deficient in failing to provide an accurate and stable project description, inadequately discussing alternatives, and improperly “segmenting” the project by reviewing a seven-year program but approving a seven-year program that will have to continue beyond seven years. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that, even before the new information came to light that eradication was no longer attainable, the EIR violated CEQA by giving the project’s “objective” an artificially narrow definition (“eradication of LBAMs”) and thereby omitting analysis of pest control as a reasonable alternative to the eradication program. The EIR acknowledged the project’s “purposes” included protecting California native plants and agricultural crops from damage. "The EIR’s omissions leave the record devoid of evidence to prove CDFA’s claim that the last-minute change was legally acceptable because the adopted control program was narrower than the EIR’s eradication program." The trial court judgments were reversed and the cases remanded for further proceedings. View "North Coast Rivers Alliance v. Kawamura" on Justia Law

The Alameda County Waste Management Authority imposed a $9.55 annual charge on all households for disposal of household hazardous waste, by enactment of an ordinance entitled “An Ordinance Establishing a Household Hazardous Waste Collection and Disposal Fee.” Crawley challenged the Ordinance via a petition for a writ of mandate or administrative mandamus, arguing that the fee constituted an assessment under article XIII D of the California Constitution, requiring approval by a majority of the electorate pursuant to section 4. In the alternative, Crawley contended the fee was not imposed in compliance with the requirements of article XIII D, section 6. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal without leave to amend, rejecting Crawley’s assertion that the fee is not incidental to property ownership and concluding that the fee falls within an exemption to the constitutional requirements. View "Crawley v. Alameda Cnty, Waste Mgmt. Auth." on Justia Law

Real-party-in-interest Newport-Mesa Unified School District denied petitioner John Caldecott’s request to produce certain documents made pursuant to the California Public Records Act. Caldecott worked for defendant as Executive Director of Human Resources. During his tenure, Caldecott filed a complaint with School District against its superintendent, Fred Navarro. Five to six weeks later Navarro terminated Caldecott without cause, which decision School District’s board approved. Caldecott alleges this was in retaliation for his complaints about Navarro’s alleged wrongful conduct. Caldecott filed a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court. After its in camera review of the documents, the court denied the petition, ruling that Caldecott already possessed the documents, making his request moot. The court denied the petition on the further ground the documents were connected to his claim of a hostile work environment, making the documents exempt from disclosure under the CPRA. Caldecott’s petition to the Court of Appeal requested the same documents. He argued the court erred by finding his request was moot. Caldecott also asserted there were several other bases for his complaint against defendant, dealing with alleged improprieties including hiring, salaries, and audit practices, not just a personal claim of a hostile work environment. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the public interest in disclosure of the documents outweighed any privacy interests and the CPRA required their production. The Court granted the petition and remanded the matter to the superior court to conduct an in camera review of the requested documents to determine if any are protected by the attorney-client privilege. The documents were ordered to be redacted to delete the identities of and personal information about unrelated third parties. View "Caldecott v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2014, defendant-respondent City of Rancho Mirage passed Ordinance 1084, which amended the City’s municipal code that provided rules and regulations for renting private homes as short-term vacation rentals. Among other things, it required that a person over the age of 30 sign a contract agreeing to be the responsible person for the rental and ensuring that all of the occupants follow the rules and regulations regarding vacation rentals, in order to minimize the negative secondary effects on the surrounding residential neighborhoods. Plaintiff-appellant Brian Harrison owned a condominium in the City. Harrison filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction alleging that Ordinance 1084 violated California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh Act), which prohibited a business establishment from discriminating in housing or other accommodations on the basis of age. The City filed a demurrer contending that the Unruh Act did not apply to legislation by the City. After hearing the matter, the trial court granted the City’s demurrer without leave to amend. Harrison argued on appeal that the trial court erred by sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend because his Complaint stated sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for a violation of the Unruh Act. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Harrison v. City of Rancho Mirage" on Justia Law

M.J. and C.C. appealed orders entered following the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in the juvenile dependency case of their minor children, thirteen-year-old D.C., ten-year-old Ce.C., and nine-year-old F.C. In early 2015, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency petitioned the juvenile court on behalf of the children following allegations of sexual abuse in the household. The minors lived with M.J. and C.C., an unmarried couple who had adopted them after a previous dependency case involving the minors. The Agency alleged C.C. had sexually abused D.C., including by having sexual intercourse with her and forcing her to orally copulate him. The Agency further alleged M.J. had allowed C.C. back into the family home following D.C.'s disclosure of abuse, despite Agency intervention and an Agency safety plan. The Agency concluded D.C. had been sexually abused, or there was a substantial risk D.C. would be sexually abused, and there was a substantial risk that Ce.C. and F.C. would be abused or neglected. M.J. argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support the court's dispositional order removing the minors from her custody, and the court erred by not complying with the notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). C.C. argued the evidence was insufficient to support the court's jurisdictional findings; the court erred by approving provisions in his case plan requiring him to admit to sexual abuse of D.C.; and the court erred by limiting his educational rights over Ce.C. and F.C. C.C. also joins in M.J.'s contentions. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the juvenile court erred by finding ICWA inapplicable to this case without providing notice to the tribes in which C.C. claimed potential membership. The Court therefore vacated the court's ICWA finding and remanded with directions to provide such notice. In all other respects, the Court disagreed with M.J. and C.C.'s contentions and affirmed. View "In re D.C." on Justia Law