Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2008, plaintiff Harold Sturgeon successfully sued Los Angeles County. The suit concerned Los Angeles County's practice of paying fringe or "supplemental" benefits to the county's superior court judges, and how that, he argued, contravened article VI, section 19, of the state Constitution. An appellate court agreed, holding the duty of prescribing compensation for judges could not be delegated to a county. In immediate response to "Sturgeon I," the Legislature added section 68220 to the Government Code. Sturgeon then unsuccessfully challenged the new legislation on two grounds: (1) it still allowed counties the choice of whether to pay supplemental benefits at all; and (2) it left existing disparities in judicial benefits between the various counties intact. The same appellate panel that issued Sturgeon I rejected the attack on section 68220, reasoning there were sufficient "safeguards" in the statute's notice requirement to prevent counties from terminating benefits in a manner inconsistent with the "broad policies" set down by the Legislature, so the benefits could continue. The court in "Sturgeon II" also observed the new legislation was but an "interim measure." After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of Sturgeon's challenge to the Los Angeles County practice: "section 68220 requires those counties paying supplemental benefits as of July 1, 2008, to continue paying them on the same terms and conditions as were in effect on July 1, 2008, and to pay them to all judges of the county's superior court, not just those judges who held office as of July 1, 2008. Counties thus have no discretion under section 68220 to fix compensation – it has already been fixed by the Legislature. As so construed, the statute complies with article VI, section 19 of the California Constitution." View "Sturgeon v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

The California Department of Transportation (CalTrans) and Papich Construction Company, Inc. appealed a trial court’s issuance of a writ of mandate to vacate the award of a public works contract to Papich. DeSilva Gates Construction submitted the second-lowest bid (the first bidder was disqualified for a non-responsive bid), and included the names and description of work by all subcontractors slated to perform work exceeding one-half of one percent of the bid amount. DeSilva later sent a letter to CalTrans noting DeSilva had inadvertently supplied CalTrans with additional information on the subcontractor list "above and beyond what was required." DeSilva explained it had not listed "All Steel Fence" as a subcontractor in its bid because the value of the bid items it would perform was less than one-half of one percent of the bid and the information for All Steel Fence (submitted within 24 hours of the bid) was additional information that was not required. Papich challenged DeSilva’s bid as having changed the subcontractor list. CalTrans rejected DeSilva’s bid as nonresponsive. DeSilva protested CalTrans’s determination that its bid was nonresponsive and protested Papich’s bid. The trial court granted the writ on grounds CalTrans erroneously rejected DeSilva's bid, and erred by awarding the contract to Papich despite Papich’s failure to comply with a material requirement of the information for bids. On appeal, CalTrans and Papich argued DeSilva’s bid was nonresponsive. Appellants also argued CalTrans had discretion to waive Papich’s mistake in failing to acknowledge the addendum to the information for bids. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err. DeSilva’s disclosure of a subcontractor performing work amounting to only one-tenth of one percent of the total value of the contract was not required by the Public Contract Code or CalTrans’s information for bids. The additional information was accurate, albeit unnecessary, and did not render DeSilva’s bid nonresponsive. By contrast, CalTrans initially declared Papich’s bid to be nonresponsive and then waived Papich’s mistake and determined the bid to be responsive. The Court concluded CalTrans abused its discretion by awarding Papich the contract. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s issuance of the writ of mandate. View "DeSilva Gates Construction, LP v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Pacific Merchant Shipping Association (PMSA) petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandate compelling production of certain records, including “pilot logs,” held by the designated port agent of the Board of Pilot Commissioners for the Bays of San Francisco, San Pablo and Suisun. The Port Agent, who also served as president of the San Francisco Bar Pilots (a private pilots’ organization) opposed the petition on the basis that the pilot logs were not public records subject to the CPRA. The trial court granted PMSA’s petition in part and ordered the Port Agent to disclose the pilot logs. The Port Agent, Bar Pilots, and the Board petitioned the Court of Appeal to overturn the order, and the Court held that, “while the Port Agent is, for at least certain purposes, a public officer, PMSA has not established that the requested [pilot logs] are subject to the [California Public Records Act] CPRA.” Following this holding, PMSA submitted a new records request to the Port Agent, and Port Agent produced more than 1,000 square feet of oversized documents. PMSA then filed a motion for attorney fees and costs in this case, contending it was the prevailing party. The trial court ordered the Port Agent to pay PMSA’s fees. Both the Port Agent and the Board appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal dismissed the Board’s appeal for lack of standing and affirmed the fee award against the Port Agent. View "Pacific Merchant Shipping Assn. v. Board of Pilot Com." on Justia Law

A regulation promulgated by San Francisco’s Rent Board provides that notwithstanding any changes to the terms of a tenancy under section 827, a tenant may not be evicted for violating an obligation that was not included in the tenant’s original rental agreement unless the change is authorized by San Francisco’s rent control ordinance, is required by law, or is accepted by the tenant in writing. (Rule 12.20.) The issues this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on: (1) whether section 827 preempted Rule 12.20; (2) whether the Rent Board exceeded its powers when it adopted Rule 12.20; and (3) whether it exceeded its powers when it adopted Rule 6.15C, which limited the rent a master tenant may charge to a subtenant but provided that a violation of that limitation was not a basis for eviction. Plaintiff Margaret Foster lived for more than 40 years in an apartment in a multi-unit building now owned by defendant and cross-complainant John Britton and managed by defendant and cross-complainant W.J. Britton & Co., Inc. (collectively, “Britton”). After buying the building in 2011, Britton served the tenants, including plaintiff, with “House Rules.” The document setting forth the new “House Rules” stated that the rules superseded all previous house rules, that they went into effect 30 days from receipt, and that “Tenant accepts the House Rules by remaining in possession after they come into effect and paying rent each month. If Tenant does not accept the House Rules, Tenant may opt to give 30 days’ written notice to Landlord to terminate his or her tenancy and move out.” Plaintiff responded that the longstanding terms of her tenancy (that the House Rules effectively prohibited) included garbage service, two parking spaces, an assigned area in the back yard, specific storage spaces, and the use of her service porch for laundry and storage. She informed Britton she did not agree to any unilateral changes to her rental agreement. In the ensuing dispute, Britton took the position that section 827, subdivision (a) preempted Rule 12.20. The Court of Appeal concluded that section 827 did not preempt Rule 12.20 and that the Rent Board did not exceed its powers in adopting the challenged regulations. View "Foster v. Britton" on Justia Law

The Board of Trustees of the California State University appealed a writ of mandate directing it to vacate its certification of an environmental impact report (EIR) prepared with respect to plans for the expansion of the California State University East Bay campus. The trial court agreed with plaintiffs-respondents City of Hayward and two local community groups, Hayward Area Planning Association and Old Highlands Homeowners Association, that the EIR failed to adequately analyze impacts on fire protection and public safety, traffic and parking, air quality, and parklands. In the Court of Appeal's initial opinion, it concluded that the EIR was adequate in all respects except that its analysis of potential environmental impacts to parkland was not supported by substantial evidence. The California Supreme Court granted review, and subsequently transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its prior decision and reconsider the cause in light of "City of San Diego v. Board of Trustees of California State University' (61 Cal.4th 945 (2015)). After review of the parties’ supplemental briefing, the Court of Appeal reissued its opinion, and modified section 3(c) of the Discussion to reflect the holding of the Supreme Court in City of San Diego. View "City of Hayward v. Board Cal. State Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff County of San Bernardino loaned the San Bernardino County Redevelopment Agency $10 million. When the redevelopment agency was dissolved, $9 million of that money remained with the agency. When the Legislature dissolved redevelopment agencies, it provided that any agreement between the redevelopment agency and the municipal government that created the redevelopment agency is not an enforceable obligation. In this case, the County included payment of its loan to the former redevelopment agency as one of the enforceable obligations in a list sent to the Department of Finance. The Department of Finance rejected payment of the loan because the loan was an agreement, contract, or arrangement between the former redevelopment agency and the municipal government that created the redevelopment agency. The County petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandate against the Department of Finance, arguing that the County Loan was an enforceable obligation, for various reasons. The trial court rejected each reason and entered judgment for the Department of Finance. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Department of Finance and the trial court. Further, the Court rejected the County’s contentions on appeal that the determination of the Department of Finance: (1) violated the constitutional prohibitions on the state’s reallocation of tax revenues; (2) improperly concluded that the loan was not an enforceable obligation; and (3) was inequitable. View "County of San Bernardino v. Cohen" on Justia Law

In November 2009, County of Alameda voters approved Measures I and J levying special parcel taxes by the Albany Unified School District. Plaintiff-appellant Golden Gate Hill Development Company, Inc. was the owner of a parcel of real property in the City of Albany subject to the tax. In February 2014, appellant filed suit against the County and District seeking a refund of taxes paid under the Measures. Golden Gage Hill alleged the tax rates in the Measures were improper because different rates are imposed on residential and nonresidential properties, as well as nonresidential properties of different sizes. The complaint referenced a recent decision in this district, “Borikas v. Alameda Unified School Dist.” (214 Cal.App.4th 135 (2013)), which declared invalid a different parcel tax with similar rate classifications. Respondents moved to dismiss, contending the complaint failed to state a claim because, under Code of Civil Procedure section 860, et seq. (“the validation statutes”), appellant was required to present its claims in a “reverse validation action” within 60 days of passage of the Measures. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Because appellant has not shown there was a basis for its refund claim independent of the alleged invalidity of the Measures, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Golden Gate Hill Development Co. v. County of Alameda" on Justia Law

The 14th District Agricultural Association and its Board of Directors administers the Santa Cruz County Fairground which, since 1941, has been the venue for various events, including equestrian and livestock events and the annual county fair. The trial court denied a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief filed by appellants Citizens for Environmental Responsibility, Stop The Rodeo, and Eric Zamost, under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Appellants claimed the District violated CEQA by approving a notice of exemption (NOE) from environmental review for a rodeo held by real party in interest Stars of Justice, Inc., at the Fairground in October 2011. The exemption was pursuant to CEQA’s regulatory guidelines for a Class 23 categorical exemption for “normal operations of existing facilities for public gatherings.” Appellants contended the exemption was inapplicable because: (1) the rodeo project expressly included mitigation measures in the form of a Manure Management Plan, in effect acknowledging potential environmental effects; and (2) the unusual circumstances exception to categorical exemptions applied because storm water runoff flowed over the Fairground where cattle and horses defecate and into an already polluted creek. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Citizens for Environmental etc. v. State ex rel. 14th Dist." on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks extraordinary writ relief to compel respondent court to vacate its order granting real party in interest's petition for writ of mandate, brought pursuant to the California Public Records Act (CPRA), Gov. Code, 6250 et seq. The respondent court ordered the County to disclose without any redaction all electronically stored CHP 180 forms in the possession of the Los Angeles County Sheriff‟s Department during certain times. The court directed the respondent court to set aside its order and enter a new order denying real party in interest's petition for writ of mandate because the CHP 180 forms as requested are exempt from disclosure under section 6254, subdivision (k) as a matter of law. Section 6254, subdivision (k) prevents disclosure of records that are prohibited under federal or state law. In this case, the forms are exempt as disclosure of any personal information obtained from DMV records, without express consent from the vehicle owner, and are prohibited by federal law. View "County of L.A. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Damon Lane County Park in El Cajon, owned and controlled by the County of San Diego, is a 29-acre open space park with trails for hiking, walking and equestrian use. The park has information kiosks, but does not have any structures such as restrooms or a parking lot. Benjamin Casteen, then a high school student, used a rope swing tied to a tree at the park. The tree was located above a ravine. The rope broke, causing Casteen to fall into the ravine and onto debris located in the ravine. The debris in the ravine included cut down tree limbs and other brush left by the County's maintenance crews. Casteen suffered injuries to his head and face. Although Casteen did not remember the incident, his custom and practice before using a tree rope swing was to visually check the rope and branch it was hanging from, give the rope a big tug or yank to check for strength and then take a tentative short swing on the rope. The County had no policy requiring maintenance personnel to remove rope swings in the park. Casteen sued the County, asserting three causes of action all sounding in negligence on the part of the County for failing to warn about the rope swing, or to remove it completely. The County defended on immunity grounds, but was denied. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding the trial court improperly denied the County summary judgment motion because the undisputed material facts show the public entity was immune from liability under section Government Code section 831.7 for injuries suffered by Casteen while tree rope swinging and none of the exceptions in section 831.7 applied. View "County of San Diego v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law