Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In the summer of 2011 the Legislature enacted legislation primarily within the Health and Safety Code, that barred any new redevelopment agency obligations, and established procedures for the windup and dissolution of the obligations of the nearly 400 redevelopment agencies then existing. This case stemmed from a dispute arising out of a process the Court of Appeal called the “Great Dissolution.” Defendant Department of Finance disapproved two items included in the “Recognized Obligation Payment Schedule” (ROPS) of plaintiff City of Pasadena. It was determined that these were not enforceable obligations of the Pasadena redevelopment agency. Both obligations were set to expire in 2014; the first involved reimbursement for pension bonds and the other for subsidized housing bonds. The Department previously had approved these two items in ROPS I and II. The City filed this suit seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against defendant Ana Matosantos in her official capacity as director of the Department. The trial court granted the City’s application for a preliminary injunction, finding that the City had some likelihood of prevailing on the merits, and had a significant risk of irreparable harm otherwise. The trial court ordered defendant Auditor-Controller of Los Angeles County (L.A. Auditor-Controller) to sequester the funds for the two disapproved obligations pending a trial on the merits, and to refrain from distributing them to the taxing entities that are otherwise entitled to the remainder of the property tax proceeds payable to the successor agency. Defendant Matosantos alone filed the notice of appeal in this case. On plenary review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court was incorrect to yoke declaratory and injunctive relief together. The Court vacated the order with directions either to dismiss the action (with or without leave to amend) or to construe the City’s pleading as one for traditional mandate and proceed accordingly. View "City of Pasadena v. Cohen" on Justia Law

After his father left Jayden with his paternal grandmother with an eye infection and no provision for support, the Department of Health and Human Services petitioned the juvenile court alleging that Jayden comes within the jurisdiction of the court because of the father’s untreated substance abuse problem and history of domestic violence, and the mother’s prostitution and substance abuse. The court sustained the petition and placed Jayden with his paternal aunt and uncle. Reunification services were offered to both parents, but father failed to use the offered services, and mother only partially engaged in services. After several months of services both parents expressed a desire to waive reunification services. Their reunification services were terminated at the six-month review hearing based on the Department’s recommendation. Neither parent appealed this decision. When Jayden was placed with his paternal aunt and uncle, they expressed an interest in adopting Jayden. Several months later, based on an assessment that the paternal aunt and uncle were meeting Jayden’s needs and aiding him in his speech and motor skills development, a permanency plan suggested that Jayden remain with them to be adopted. However, on the day of the scheduled selection and implementation hearing, Jayden’s counsel requested ex parte that the court change its order requiring a noticed petition to move Jayden from his placement with his paternal aunt and uncle because the Department had developed concerns about the caregivers and no longer believed the placement was in Jayden’s best interest. The court continued the selection and implementation hearing to investigate other potential relative placements to ensure that the Department could locate a suitable home for Jayden. At the continued selection and implementation hearing, counsel for the Department said Jayden was going to be placed in an adoptive home that same day. Jayden’s counsel was supportive of terminating parental rights and of removing him from his aunt and uncle’s home. Father’s counsel entered “general objections,” and specifically objected to the finding that the child was likely to be adopted and the recommendation that father’s parental rights be terminated. Mother’s counsel objected to the termination of mother’s parental rights and to the court’s finding of Jayden’s adoptability. On appeal, the parents contended: (1) the Department and the juvenile court erroneously removed Jayden from his prospective adoptive parents without complying with the statutory procedures; (2) there was insufficient evidence Jayden was adoptable; and (3) the juvenile court violated parents’ rights to effective assistance of counsel and a fair hearing and abrogated its duty to make an independent decision when it denied mother’s request for a continuance of the hearing in light of the Department’s failure to provide an updated assessment of potential adoptive placements to the court. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the parents' allegations and affirmed the juvenile court’s orders. View "In re Jayden M." on Justia Law

Real party in interest Frank Quintero was appointed to fill a vacant position on the city council for real party in interest the City of Glendale. Petitioners submitted an application for leave to sue in quo warranto to the Attorney General, arguing that the appointment violated the City Charter. The court affirmed the Attorney General's denial of the application because the Attorney General did not abuse her discretion in determining that it was not in the public interest to authorize the initiation of a quo warranto action. View "Rando v. Harris" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Court of Appeal centered on whether an election held by the City of San Diego to authorize the levying of a special tax complied with articles XIII A, XIII C and XIII D of the California Constitution. In the election at issue, the City did not permit the City's registered voters to vote on the special tax. Instead, the City passed an ordinance that specifically defined the electorate to consist solely of: (1) the owners of real property in the City on which a hotel is located, and (2) the lessees of real property owned by a governmental entity on which a hotel is located. The Court concluded the election was invalid under the California Constitution because such landowners and lessees were neither "qualified electors" of the City for purposes of article XIII A, section 4, nor did they comprise a proper "electorate" under article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (d). Furthermore, the Court concluded the election was invalid under the San Diego City Charter because City Charter section 76.1 required the approval of two-thirds of the "qualified electors" voting in an election on a special tax, and section 6 of the City Charter defined "[q]ualified [e]lectors" as those persons who are registered to vote in general state elections under state law. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment validating the special tax and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to enter judgment against the City. View "City of San Diego v. Shapiro" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court in this case to enter judgment validating the authorization of a bond issuance for the purposes of the 2008 voter-approved Safe, Reliable, High-Speed Passenger Train Bond Act. Questions regarding the project the Authority sought to build was the one voters approved in 2008. Furthermore, the Authority left substantial financial and environmental questions unanswered with regard to the final funding plan required for each corridor or useable segment of the project. In its review, the Court of Appeal concluded: (1) contrary to the trial court’s determination, the High-Speed Passenger Train Finance Committee properly found that issuance of bonds for the project was necessary or desirable; and (2) The preliminary section 2704.08, subdivision (c) funding plan was intended to provide guidance to the Legislature in acting on the Authority’s appropriation request. Because the Legislature appropriated bond proceeds following receipt of the preliminary funding plan approved by the Authority, the preliminary funding plan has served its purpose. "A writ of mandamus will not lie to compel the idle act of rescinding and redoing it." View "Cal. High-Speed Rail v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Grossman submitted a request under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) (Gov. Code, 6250) and the San Francisco Sunshine Ordinance for documents relating to San Francisco Ethics Commission regulations governing complaints alleging violations of the ordinance. Grossman requested drafts of Sunshine Ordinance regulations, a September 2012 staff report about the regulations, and all documents relating to “[t]he preparation, review, revision and distribution of all prior drafts and final versions of the Draft Amendments and Staff Report, including, without limitation, emails, memoranda, notes, letters or other correspondence or communications to or from the San Francisco City Attorney, any Deputy City Attorney or any other person in the Office of the San Francisco City Attorney.” The Commission produced more than 120 documents, six of which were partially redacted, but withheld other documents as protected by the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product doctrine, including: 15 requests from commission staff to the city attorney’s office for legal advice about proposed regulations and nine responses by the city attorney’s office, providing advice about the proposed regulations. Grossman successfully sought a writ of mandate, arguing that the Sunshine Ordinance compels disclosure of the documents, even if they would otherwise be protected by privilege. The court of appeal ruled in favor of the commission. The city’s charter incorporates the attorney-client privilege and supersedes any contrary ordinance provision. View "St. Croix v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

CODE appealed the superior court's denial of a petition for writ of mandamus to set aside an environmental impact report (EIR) certification and project approval on the grounds that Mitigation Measure 4.8-8 was ineffective and respondents failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Pub. Resources Code, 21000 et seq. The EIR concerned North Sky River and Jawbone's application to rezone and for a conditional use permit for mobile concrete batch plants in order to build and operate a wind farm in the Tehachcapi Wind Resource Area. The court concluded: (1) as a matter of law, the County's EIR described a legally feasible mitigation measure; (2) as a matter of law, the County was not required to respond to late comments; (3) substantial evidence supported the Board's conclusion that MM 4.8-8 mitigated significant impacts on aviation safety; and (4) the Board was not required to consider either CODE's proffered mitigation measure or the EIR's "environmentally superior alternative." Accordingly, the court affirmed the superior court's order denying CODE's petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Citizens Opposing A Dangerous Environ. v. Co. of Kern" on Justia Law

In 1996 when the Legislature established defendant California High-Speed Rail Authority, it declared the need for an intercity rail system operating at high speeds to complement the existing infrastructure of highways and airports. At the heart of the dispute in this case is the Authority's decision that trains travelling between those destinations should travel through the Pacheco Pass rather than further north at the Altamont Pass. Petitioners challenged the adequacy of the revised final program environmental impact report/environmental impact statement (PEIR/EIS) and the approval of the Pacheco Pass network alternative as the route for the high-speed train (HST) system to connect the San Francisco Bay Area and the Central Valley. They contended the revised final PEIR violates the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) because it: (1) provided an inadequate where to elevate the track along the San Francisco Peninsula; (2) used a flawed revenue and ridership model; and (3) had an inadequate range of alternatives, specifically because it rejects an alternative proposed by an expert consulting company (Setec). The Authority moved to dismiss, arguing that federal law preempted any CEQA remedy. The Court of Appeal found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Town of Atherton v. Cal. High-Speed Rail Auth." on Justia Law

The Eastern Municipal Water District (EMWD) hired general contractor S.J. and Burkhardt, Inc. (SJB) for a public works construction project in 2006. Safeco Insurance Company (Safeco) executed performance and payment bonds for the project. Plaintiff Golden State Boring & Pipe Jacking, Inc. (GSB) was a subcontractor for the project, completing its work by September 2006, but it did not receive payment. In March 2008, SJB sent a voluntary default letter to Safeco. In July 2008, GSB sued SJB, EMWD, and Safeco for the unpaid amounts under the contract, separately seeking payment from Safeco under its payment bond. EMWD filed a cross-complaint to interplead retained sums. Safeco made a motion for summary judgment on the cause of action for payment under the bond on the ground that GSB’s claim was untimely. The trial court granted the motion, finding that there had been three cessations of labor that triggered GSB’s duty to file a stop notice in order to secure payment under Safeco's payment bond. At a subsequent court trial on the contract claims, GSB was awarded judgment against SJB, and Safeco was awarded judgment on the interpleader action. GSB appealed the summary judgment ruling, arguing: (1) the trial court erroneously overruled its objections to evidentiary matters presented in support of Safeco’s summary judgment; and (2) the court erred in finding the action was untimely. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Golden State v. Eastern Municipal Water Dist." on Justia Law

Nearly 15 years after the Orange County Assessor established the base year value used to assess real property taxes against plaintiff William Jefferson & Co., Inc.'s property, the company appealed to defendant Assessment Appeals Board claiming the Assessor made a clerical error in valuing the property. The Appeals Board conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied the appeal on the ground plaintiff had waited too long to challenge the Assessor's base year value determination. The Appeals Board found plaintiff based its appeal not on a clerical error but on the Assessor's error in judging the property's value, and therefore plaintiff failed to comply with Revenue and Taxation Code sections 51.5, subdivision (b), and 80, subdivision (a)(3), which required plaintiff to appeal within four years of the Assessor's base year value determination. Plaintiff filed suit seeking to compel the Appeals Board to grant its appeal and direct the Assessor to change the property's base year value. However, plaintiff failed to address the Appeals Board's determination that it lacked jurisdiction to grant plaintiff's appeal, instead relying on the Assessor's allegedly erroneous property valuation. The trial court granted the Appeals Board summary judgment because plaintiff challenged the merits of the Assessor's valuation and therefore had to bring this action against the County of Orange and not the Appeals Board. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Wm. Jefferson & Co. v. Assessment Appeals Bd." on Justia Law