Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (Department) issued a 15-day suspension of an off-sale general license held by the Garfield Beach CVS LLC Longs Drug Stores California LLC, doing business as CVS Pharmacy Store 9174 (CVS) after an administrative law judge found the store clerk sold alcohol to a minor decoy. The Alcohol Beverage Control Appeals Board (Appeals Board) reversed the suspension based on California Code of Regulations, title 4, section 141 (Rule 141) that allowed a law enforcement agency to use an underage decoy only "in a 'fashion that promotes fairness.'" In the Appeals Board's view, the suspension was unfair because the minor decoy did not respond about his age when the store clerk looked at his driver license and remarked, "I would never have guessed it, you must get asked a lot." The Department challenged the reversal of the license suspension, contending it correctly interpreted Rule 141 to require minor decoys to answer only questions about their ages. Based on the administrative law judge's finding in this case that the store clerk's remark constituted a statement rather than a question, the Department argued its decision was legally correct and supported by substantial evidence. The Appeals Board countered Rule 141 was ambiguous and resulted "in confusion and manifest unfairness." And CVS argued the Department's interpretation of Rule 141 unfairly allowed decoys to remain silent in the face of mistaken statements about age. According to CVS, affirming the license suspension would allow deceptive and misleading silence in the face of a store clerk's explicit mistake about the minor decoy's age. The Court of Appeal concluded Rule 141 was not ambiguous in requiring minor decoys to answer truthfully only questions about their ages. Because substantial evidence supported the administrative law judge's factual finding the decoy in this case was not questioned about his age, the Court determined as a matter of law that Rule 141 did not provide CVS with a defense to the accusation it sold an alcoholic beverage to an underage buyer. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Appeals Board's decision. View "Dept. of Alcoholic Bev. Control v. Alcoholic Bev. Control App. Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Leticia Bareno appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendants San Diego Miramar College (the College), San Diego Community College District, and San Diego Community College District Administrative Facilities Corporation. In early 2013, Bareno was disciplined by her employer, the College, in relation to her employment as an administrative assistant. Thereafter, Bareno required medical treatment and accompanying leave from work, and she requested medical leave from her supervisor. Bareno provided medical certification for this request for leave. After the time frame specified in Bareno's initial request for leave had ended, Bareno continued to be absent from work. Bareno had attempted to e-mail her supervisor a recertification of her need for additional medical leave, but the College claimed that Bareno's supervisor did not receive any such request from Bareno for additional leave. As a result, after Bareno continued to be absent from work for an additional five consecutive days, the College took the position that she had "voluntarily resigned." After Bareno learned that the College considered her to have voluntarily resigned, she attempted to provide the College with information regarding the medical necessity of the leave that she had taken. The College refused to reconsider its position. Bareno filed suit against all three defendants, alleging that in effectively terminating her employment, defendants retaliated against her for taking medical leave, in violation of the California Family Rights Act (CFRA). Defendants moved for summary judgment on Bareno's sole claim for retaliation under CFRA, and the trial court granted the motion. On appeal, Bareno argued that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there remain triable issues of material fact in dispute. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed, reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Bareno v. San Diego Community College Dist." on Justia Law

Bernice Espinoza appealed when her petition for writ of administrative mandate challenging the one-year suspension of her driver’s license by the Department of Motor Vehicles (Department) was denied. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the record supported the trial court’s implied findings that: (1) Espinoza was lawfully arrested on reasonable cause to believe she had been driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), (2) Espinoza refused to submit to and failed to complete a chemical test as required under the implied consent law; and (3) Espinoza was afforded a fair hearing before the Department. View "Espinoza v. Shiomoto" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Town of Apple Valley (Town) and real-party-in-interest and appellant Wal-mart Stores, Inc. (Walmart) appealed the grant of the motion for summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-respondent Gabriel Hernandez. This case involved a measure passed by the Town’s electorate in a special election (Initiative) that amended the general plan to allow for a 30-acre commercial development, which would include a Walmart Supercenter. Walmart provided a gift to Town to pay for the election and Town accepted the payment by adopting a memorandum of understanding (MOU) at a regular council meeting held on August 13, 2013. Hernandez argued the agenda for the Town’s council meeting failed to provide the proper notice of the actions to be taken at the meeting, e.g., that the Town council would vote to send the Initiative to the voters and approving the MOU that accepted the gift from Walmart to pay for the special election. Further, Hernandez alleged that although Walmart was not specifically named in the Initiative, it was clear from the other ballot materials that Walmart was identified within the meaning of article II, section 12 rendering the Initiative unconstitutional. The trial court granted the Motion finding the MOU and Initiative were void and invalid. The Court of Appeal concluded that the Motion was properly granted on the violation of the Brown Act, which invalidated the special election on the Initiative. Since it was likely that the matter would again be placed on the ballot or voted on by the Town council, the Court of Appeal also found that the Initiative as written did not violate article II, section 12. The award of costs was reversed as the memorandum of costs was filed late without a showing by counsel that such late filing was due to mistake of law, inadvertence, or surprise. The attorney fee award was affirmed. View "Hernandez v. Town of Apple Valley" on Justia Law

From 1980 through 2012, the City of Escondido (City) supplied water through a single water meter to a residential condominium homeowners association, and starting in 2006 billed for sewer services per gallon of water that flowed through that meter. The association used some of that water for its swimming pool and related bathroom facilities, which were connected to the City's sewer system. However, according to the association, upwards of 97 percent of the water was used for irrigating landscape common areas. In 2012 the City determined those landscape areas were not connected to the City's sewer system and at the association's request installed a separate, second water meter to supply water exclusively to that part of the property. The primary issue in this appeal was whether, from 2006 to before the second water meter was installed, the homeowners association was entitled to a refund under Government Code section 53082 of sewer service fees paid for the water used for irrigating the common area landscaping, for which no sewer services were provided. The Court of Appeal concluded section 53082 did not apply because liability for wrongfully collecting sewer service fees under this statute did not depend on a property owner's subjective or particular use of City-supplied water through a single water meter, but rather on whether the premises serviced by that meter are or are not connected to the sewer system. Here, during the period the property was supplied by a single water meter, the premises was, in fact, connected to the City's sewer system. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's order denying the association's petition for a writ of mandate. View "Cape Concord Homeowners Assn. v. City of Escondido" on Justia Law

The City, acting by and through its Department of Water and Power (DWP), challenges the dismissal entered after the superior court sustained the demurrer of real part in interest Department of Water and Power Management Employees Association (MEA) to the DWP's petition for writ of mandate. The court concluded that Government Code section 3509.5 does not apply to the City's Employee Relations Board (ERB) decisions because the plain language of the relevant statutory provisions indicates section 3509.5 does not apply to ERB decisions; the court does not readily infer the Legislature has acted to deprive a court of jurisdiction in the absence of an express indication it intended to do so; and the legislative history of sections 3509.5 and 3509 supports the conclusion that section 3509.5 was not intended to apply to the ERB. Therefore, the court reversed the order and remanded for further proceedings. View "City of LA v. City of LA Employee Relations Board" on Justia Law

California firefighters and their union sought to compel the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) to continue to enforce Government Code 20909, and allow eligible public employees to purchase at cost up to five years of nonqualifying service credit (airtime) to increase pension benefits paid in retirement, by increasing their service credit. The option was eliminated as of January 1, 2013 under the Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act (PEPRA), a reform measure designed to strengthen the state’s public pension system and ensure its ongoing solvency. (Government Code 7522.46, 20909(g)). Plaintiffs argued that elimination of the option violated the California Constitution contracts clause (Art. I, section 9), so that CalPERS lacked authority to refuse to consider applications for the credit. The trial court and court of appeal rejected the argument. Modification of the statute governing airtime service credit was wholly reasonable and carried “some material relation to the theory of a pension system and its successful operation.” Plaintiffs are entitled only to a “reasonable” pension, not one providing fixed or definite benefits immune from modification or elimination by the governing body, and did not establish that elimination of their right to purchase airtime credit cost them their right to a reasonable pension. View "Cal Fire Local 2881 v. California Public Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

In 1998, the Commission on State Mandates (Commission) concluded costs associated with eight activities required of local governments by the then-newly passed Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) were eligible for reimbursement. Fifteen years later, at the request of the Department of Finance (DOF), the Commission revisited that decision based on the passage of Proposition 83 in 2006. The Commission concluded that six of the duties it deemed state-mandated in 1998 were instead mandated by the ballot initiative and, therefore, the costs of those activities to local governments were no longer eligible for reimbursement. The Counties of San Diego, Los Angeles, Orange, Sacramento and San Bernardino (Counties) challenged the Commission's decision by filing a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in San Diego County Superior Court. The Counties appealed the trial court’s judgment upholding the Commission's decision. The Court of Appeal, in its review of the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions, reached the opposite conclusion of the trial court. It therefore reversed the trial court and remanded this matter for issuance of a writ of mandate directing the Commission to set aside the decisions challenged by this action. View "County of San Diego v. Commission on State Mandates" on Justia Law

Rebecca Gage was a deputy sheriff in Sacramento County who sustained a job-related injury and applied for industrial disability retirement. She also requested advance disability pension payments while her retirement application was processed. Although she eventually received such advance pension payments, Gage also sought penalties under section 5814 for an unreasonable delay. The workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) ruled section 5814 penalties were available for the unreasonable delay in payment of advance disability pension payments, but deferred the decision on whether the delay in this case was unreasonable. At issue in this case was whether the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) had jurisdiction to impose penalties under Labor Code section 5814 for the unreasonable delay or denial of advance disability pension payments, available under section 4850.4 to local peace officers who were disabled on the job. Because: (1) such payments qualified as compensation under section 3207; (2) section 5814 penalties were available for unreasonable delay or denial of the payment of compensation; and (3) no other provision of the Labor Code evinced a legislative intent to exclude such payments from the penalty provisions of section 5814, the Court of Appeals concluded the answer was yes. View "Gage v. WCAB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff San Joaquin County Correctional Officers Association (CCOA) appealed a judgment in favor of the County of San Joaquin (County) in this dispute over pensions payments, specifically, cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs), for CCOA members. Under the County Employees Retirement Law of 1937 (CERL), the County had the right to reduce any contributions it chose to make toward what would otherwise have been the employee’s half-share of COLA payments. Under the California Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act of 2013 (PEPRA), limits on any such government contributions take effect after 2018. After the County reduced the COLA contributions it had been making, CCOA contended, in effect, that PEPRA shielded its members from any such reductions until 2018. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that this was an incorrect interpretation of the law. "PEPRA was intended to rein in what was perceived by the Legislature to be overly generous retirement packages for public employees, but delayed the effective date of some provisions to ease the transition and allow some changes to be negotiated gradually. It was not designed to shield compensation packages that were already subject to reduction under prior laws, specifically, CERL." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court. View "San Joaquin County Correctional etc. v. County of San Joaquin" on Justia Law