Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In "Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court," (1 Cal.5th 151 (Property Reserve I- 2016)), the California Supreme Court reversed a Court of Appeals decision and remanded the matter for the appellate court to consider issues not addressed. The Department of Water Resources petitioned the trial court for orders authorizing it to enter onto various properties to conduct precondemnation studies and surveys. Before the trial court convened a hearing on the matter, the landowners requested to conduct discovery. The trial court denied the request, ruling the proceeding was exempt from discovery. The landowners also objected to the Department not naming allegedly indispensable parties. The trial court held the rules governing indispensable parties did not apply to this matter, but it ordered the parties to notify all the persons and entities the landowners claimed were indispensable parties. The landowners both petitioned for writ relief against, and appealed the trial court’s award of an entry order, challenging the constitutionality of the precondemnation entry statutes and attacking the court’s decisions to deny discovery and not order the joinder of indispensable parties. "Property Reserve I" resolved the constitutional issues, but the high court directed the Court of Appeal to address the landowners’ claims against the trial court’s rulings on discovery and indispensable parties. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in holding the proceeding was exempt from discovery, but the Court also found the landowners did not show prejudicial error. The Court also concluded the landowners’ contention regarding indispensable parties was moot, because the trial court gave the landowners all of the relief they sought and which the Court could have provided. View "Property Reserve, Inc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

At issue in this matter was a development by Sunroad Enterprises and Sunroad Centrum Partners L.P. (together, Sunroad) of an office, residential, and retail project in the Kearny Mesa area of San Diego. Since 1997 the City of San Diego (the City) Council has approved the area for development under a master plan and over the ensuing years has thrice assessed the project for environmental impacts as required by CEQA. In 2012, Sunroad obtained a permit from the City to begin certain phases of residential development, including constructing several multilevel buildings over parking and ground level retail space. By the next year, Sunroad modified its design plans, ostensibly to meet real estate market demands, and sought the City's approval of the modified plans through a process known as substantial conformance review (SCR). The City's staff found that the modified plans substantially conformed with the conditions and requirements of the previously issued development permit and there was no need for further environmental impact documentation under CEQA. San Diegans for Open Government and CREED-21 (together, plaintiffs) appealed the staff's decision to the City Planning Commission. Following a public hearing, the Planning Commission voted to uphold the SCR decision. The City denied plaintiffs' appeal to the City Council. Plaintiffs argued they were entitled to appeal the SCR decision to the City Council under CEQA and the San Diego Municipal Code (SDMC). The Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the judgment. View "San Diegans for Open Govt. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

In 2010, Carrizales was making a left turn at an Atwater intersection when she struck and killed Gonzales, a pedestrian in a crosswalk. Gonzales’s family sued Carrizales and the city for wrongful death, alleging Carrizales was negligent and the city was liable under Government Code section 8351 for the dangerous condition of the intersection. A jury found Carrizales not negligent and the city solely liable and awarded plaintiffs approximately $3.2 million in damages. The trial court denied a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, in which the city argued that the design immunity defense of section 830.6 shielded it from liability. The court of appeal reversed. The design immunity defense insulates the from liability for any dangerous condition of the intersection. The city made a discretionary decision to adopt permissive phasing as part of the 2001 plan for the intersection; plaintiffs conceded the 2001 plans were reasonable when adopted. View "Gonzales v. City of Atwater" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the Governor’s authority to concur in the decision of the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (18 U.S.C. 1166-1167; 25 U.S.C. 2701, to take 305 acres in Madera County into trust for the North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians for the purpose of operating a class III gaming casino. The Governor’s concurrence was necessary under federal law for the granting of permission to operate the casino. While the case was pending, the legislature ratified a compact previously negotiated and executed with North Fork by the Governor concerning the terms and conditions for gambling. Plaintiffs then initiated Proposition 48, a referendum by which, at the 2014 general election, the voters disapproved the ratification statute. North Fork alleged that the ratification statute was not subject to referendum. The complaint and cross-complaint were dismissed, so that the land remained in trust for North Fork, but the compact was not ratified, so gaming on the land was not approved. Subsequently, after federal litigation between North Fork and the state, a set of procedures designed to function as an alternative to a state-approved compact was approved by the Secretary of the Interior. The court of appeal concluded that the Governor’s concurrence is invalid in this situation. View "Stand up for California v. State of California" on Justia Law

In 2013, the juvenile court terminated reunification services for B.B. (Father) and appointed H.B.'s (the minor) maternal aunt as legal guardian. In 2016, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency filed a new petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 and sought to terminate the guardianship. Father petitioned for extraordinary relief for review of the juvenile court's order terminating the guardianship and setting a section 366.26 hearing to determine a new permanent plan for H.B. He contended the Agency erred when it filed a new section 300 petition instead of a petition under section 388 to terminate the guardianship. He argued this error was prejudicial because it denied him the opportunity to seek reunification services at a 60-day review hearing following termination of the guardianship. The Court of Appeal concluded any error was harmless and denied Father's writ petition. View "B.B. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

This action was brought by three members of the board of directors of the Friars Village Homeowners Association (FVHOA) against six other board members and the FVHOA manager but not against FVHOA itself (despite the fact the dispute focuses on the activities of the board and its governance of FVHOA and the Friars Village community). The Director defendants timely moved under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.163 to strike the complaint, which consisted of a single claim for declaratory relief. Director defendants argued the complaint was based on decisions and statements they made in duly noticed board meetings while conducting board business and, thus, involved acts or activities in furtherance of constitutionally protected activity within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied the motion. In so doing, it ruled that the "only relief" sought by plaintiffs was a "determination of what [was] required under the HOA governing documents" and, as such, that plaintiffs' declaratory relief cause of action did not arise out of director defendants' "speech/petition rights." The court therefore never reached the issue of whether plaintiffs could satisfy their burden under subdivision (b)(1) of section 425.16 to establish a probability of success on their claim. The Court of Appeal independently concluded the trial court erred when it found the gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint did not involve protected activity under section 425.16. Furthermore, the Court concluded plaintiffs could not show a probability they would prevail on their claim. Therefore, the Court reversed the order denying the special motion to strike of director defendants and directed the trial court to grant that motion with respect to each such defendant. View "Lee v. Silveira" on Justia Law

Eblovi was a proponent of a citizen-sponsored initiative appearing on the City of Half Moon Bay June 7, 2016 ballot as Measure F. Eblovi sought an order directing the interim city clerk to strike "Primary Argument Against Measure F" and "Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of Measure F.” Eblovi alleged that because Measure F was placed on the ballot by petition, by statute, only the city council had authority to submit an argument against the ballot measure. Elections Code 9282(a) states: For measures placed on the ballot by petition, the persons filing an initiative petition pursuant to this article may file a written argument in favor of the ordinance, and the legislative body may submit an argument against the ordinance. The Arguments had been submitted by five electors. Denying the motion, the court reasoned that section 9282(a) should be interpreted to favor permissive participation in the electoral process, not restrictive participation. The court of appeal affirmed, noting the “long-standing” interpretation of the word “may” in this context. View "Eblovi v. Blair" on Justia Law

Eden Township Healthcare District, established under the Local Health Care District Law (Health & Saf. Code 32000), was subject to a money judgment of $17 million, plus $2.5 million in prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs. More than a year after entry of the judgment, the District sought an order permitting it to pay the judgment in 10 annual installments under Government Code 970.6 and declaring that the post-judgment interest rate will be the same as the interest rate on “one-year United States Treasury bills” in each year. (section 984 (e)(2).) In support of its claim of hardship, as required by the statute, the motion demonstrated that the District lacked sufficient funds to pay the judgment, was unable to borrow additional money against its already encumbered assets, and might be forced into bankruptcy if required to sell assets to raise the funds necessary for a lump sum payment. The trial court granted the motion. The court of appeal affirmed the grant of installment payment relief, concluding that the District’s financial straits readily support a finding of “unreasonable hardship.” While the post-judgment interest rate established by section 984 is appropriate prospectively, there is no statutory basis for reducing the interest accrued prior to the trial court’s ruling under section 970.6. View "Sutter Health v. Eden Township Healthcare District" on Justia Law

The Palo Alto charter provided that impasses in negotiations regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment for the city’s police and firefighters would be submitted to binding interest arbitration. In 2011, the City Council voted to place on the ballot for the upcoming election a measure to repeal the binding interest arbitration provision. The firefighters’ union filed an unfair practice charge with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), alleging the city placed the measure before voters without consulting in good faith, as required by the Meyers-Milias Brown Act (Gov. Code 3500). A PERB administrative law judge (ALJ) found in the city’s favor. The decision was later reversed by PERB, which ordered the city to rescind its resolution. By that time, the measure repealing the binding interest arbitration provision had already been passed by the voters. The court of appeal found PERB’s conclusion that the union sufficiently requested to meet and consult with the city supported by substantial evidence. Constitutional issues raised by the city were meritless, but PERB’s order directing the city to rescind its resolution violated the doctrine of separation of powers by ordering a legislative body to take legislative action. View "City of Palo Alto v. Public Employment Relations Board" on Justia Law

"John Doe" and "Jane Roe" were students at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD) when they began a romantic relationship. A few months after their relationship ended, Jane made a complaint to UCSD's Office of Student Conduct (OSC) that John had sexually assaulted her. The investigator produced a report indicating it was more likely than not that John digitally penetrated Jane's vagina without consent but that there was insufficient evidence to support two other claims Jane had alleged against John: (1) John had sexual intercourse with Jane without her effective consent on January 31, 2014; and (2) John retaliated against Jane at an off campus party on May 14, 2014. After a meeting with the relevant dean in which John did not take responsibility for the alleged misconduct, UCSD held a student conduct review hearing regarding Jane's complaint where a student conduct review panel (Panel) heard testimony and considered evidence. Ultimately, the Panel found that John had violated UCSD's Student Conduct Code. In addition to other sanctions, the Panel recommended John be suspended from UCSD for one quarter. After considering the Panel's recommendation, the evidence, and statements from both John and Jane, the relevant dean suspended John for an entire year in addition to prescribing other sanctions. John appealed the Panel's decision as well as the sanctions to the council of provosts, but the council found the Panel's decision supported by the evidence and the sanctions were not too excessive. In fact, the council of provosts increased the length of John's suspension by a quarter. John petitioned for a writ of mandate in the superior court, arguing he was not afforded a fair hearing, substantial evidence did not support the Panel's decision, and both the dean and the Regents of the University of California (Regents) improperly increased his punishment in response to his appealing the Panel's decision and recommended sanctions. The superior court granted the petition, agreeing with John on all grounds and entered judgement requiring the Regents to set aside their findings and the sanctions issued against John. The Regents appeal the judgment, arguing the trial court erred in granting the petition for writ of mandamus. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed that the superior court erred in rendering judgment in favor of John. The judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law