Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The "Agreement Regarding Real Property (TOT)" (TOT Agreement) was an agreement between the City of Oceanside and S.D. Malkin Properties, Inc. For its part, Malkin agreed to develop, in two phases, a 360 room luxury hotel on land owned by the successor to the city's former redevelopment agency; the city agreed to pay Malkin a total subsidy of $11,335,250,5 from transient occupancy taxes (TOT) generated by the hotel. Under the TOT Agreement, the hotel would be developed in two phases, and, for the first four years after each phase was complete, 100 percent of TOT's generated by each phase would be paid to Malkin. Thereafter smaller percentages of TOT's generated by the hotel would be paid to Malkin. The city council put the TOT Agreement, and items closely related to the hotel development, on its agenda for its September 10, 2014 meeting. According to plaintiff and appellant San Diegans for Open Government (SDOG), there was no serious opposition to the hotel project at the city council meeting. At the meeting, the city council adopted a resolution approving the TOT Agreement and the subsidy report. SDOG filed an amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief and a petition for writ of mandate against the city in 2015, alleging violations of the Brown Act, the subsidy reporting provisions of Gov. Code section 53803, and the California Constitution. The trial court heard the matter on the merits on October 23, 2015 and found in the city's favor. Thereafter, it entered judgment in favor of the city, and SDOG filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, SDOG again asserted the city violated the Brown Act and section 53803. Finding no violation, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. View "San Diegans for Open Government v. City of Oceanside" on Justia Law

The Outdoor Advertising Act, Bus. & Prof. Code, 5200 et seq., regulates advertising displays adjacent to interstate or primary highways in California. Plaintiffs obtained an outdoor advertising permit from Caltrans and began leasing out a billboard for general commercial advertising. The primary issue on appeal is whether section 5270 precludes application of county or city billboard ordinances with respect to a billboard that was placed in an area that was unincorporated at the time of its placement. The court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that in light of the entire statutory scheme, section 5270 does not preempt county- or city-enacted limitations on billboards in unincorporated areas that are stricter than the limitations set forth in the Act. The court also concluded that the trial court correctly found the billboard at issue was illegal because it was not lawfully erected in 1987 under the Los Angeles County Code, and therefore is prohibited under the Santa Clarita Municipal Code; plaintiffs failed to raise a disputed issue of fact regarding estoppel or laches; and the award of attorney fees was allowed under the statutes. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of the City. View "D'Egidio v. City of Santa Clarita" on Justia Law

Plaintiff William O. Jamison owned large parcels of land near Sierraville in Sierra County, commonly referred to as Alpers Ranch. Plaintiff grazed cattle on the land for about seven months each year. The trial court enjoined the state Department of Transportation (Caltrans) from removing an obstruction plaintiff placed against a ditch culvert within a state highway right-of-way without an encroachment permit. But after review of this matter, the Court of Appeals concluded the trial court erred in granting the injunction, as no evidence supported an exception to the statutory bar prohibiting injunctions that prevent the execution of a public statute by public officers for public purposes. View "Jamison v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

This case presented an issue of statutory interpretation of the scope of the geographic restrictions of the Charter Schools Act of 1992, as amended by the Legislature in 2002. Specifically, the issue was whether the comprehensive statutory scheme governing charter schools permitted an authorized charter school to locate a resource center outside the geographic boundaries of the authorizing school district but within the same county. The 2002 amendments generally required charter schools to operate within the geographic boundaries of the authorizing school district, with limited exceptions. One such exception was for a resource center, meeting space, or other satellite facility located in an adjacent county, provided certain conditions were met. Shasta Secondary Home School (SSHS) operated a nonclassroom-based charter school, providing educational support for students who are home schooled. SSHS operates two resource centers in Redding which provide educational services, labs, a meeting place for the student and his or her facilitator, work spaces, and some optional classes. In 2013, SSHS opened a third resource center in a room at the East Cottonwood Elementary School- within Shasta County, but outside the boundaries of the Shasta Union High School District. Instead, it was within the boundaries of plaintiff Anderson Union High School District (AUHSD). AUHSD brought suit, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, contending the location of this resource center violated the Charter Schools Act, as well as the charter of SSHS. AUHSD claimed it was harmed by the location of the resource center because it had lost funding when students within its district chose to go to SSHS. The trial court denied both injunctive and declaratory relief, finding the geographic and site limitations of the Charter Schools Act did not apply to resource centers. The Court of Appeals concluded the language of the Charter Schools Act did not support that interpretation, and reversed. View "Anderson Union High Sch. Dist. v. Shasta Secondary Home Sch." on Justia Law

In September 2012, appellant California Public Records Research, Inc. (CPRR) filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint challenging fees charged for copies of official records by the Yolo County Clerk Recorder’s Office. CPCR alleged Yolo County and County Clerk/Recorder Freddie Oakley (collectively, County) failed to perform a mandatory duty to limit copy fees, in violation of Government Code section 27366, article XIIIC of the California Constitution (Proposition 26) and California common law. The County moved for summary judgment on the grounds that section 27366 authorized the Board of Supervisors to exercise discretion in setting fees, there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Board abused its discretion, and fees were reasonably related to the cost of producing copies. The County also argued that CPRR’s causes of action for negligence and money had and received were barred by the Government Claims Act, and that the petition for writ of mandate was moot, as the County had voluntarily reduced copy fees from $10.00 for the first page and $2.00 for each subsequent page ($10.00/$2.00) to $7.35 for the first page and $2.00 for each subsequent page ($7.35/$2.00). The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment in the County’s favor. CPRR appealed, challenging the trial court’s interpretation of section 27366 and insisting the County abused its discretion in setting copy fees. CPRR also argued the trial court improperly reconsidered and reversed an earlier order overruling the County’s demurrer to CPRR’s causes of action for negligence and money had and received, thereby exceeding its jurisdiction. Finding no reversible error in the grant of summary judgment in favor of the County, the Court of Appeals affirmed. View "CA Public Records Research v. Co. of Yolo" on Justia Law

Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. (UMMP) appealed a trial court judgment denying its petition for writ of mandate, which challenged the City of San Diego's enactment of an ordinance adopting regulations for the establishment and location of medical marijuana consumer cooperatives in the City. UMMP argued that the City did not comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) when enacting the ordinance. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded that the ordinance did not constitute a "project" within the meaning of CEQA, and accordingly the City was not required to conduct an environmental analysis prior to enacting the ordinance. View "Union of Med. Marijuana Patients v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

In 2002 the Enterprise Rancheria of Maidu Indians of California (Enterprise Tribe) submitted a request to the United States Department of the Interior (Department) to acquire a site in Yuba County for the purpose of establishing a casino/hotel resort complex. Pursuant to statute, the Secretary was authorized to acquire land, within or without an existing reservation, for the purpose of providing land for Indians. Land so acquired after October 17, 1988, could not, with some exceptions, be used for gaming. The exception at issue here was where the Secretary “after consultation with the Indian tribe and appropriate State and local officials, including officials of other nearby Indian tribes, determines that a gaming establishment on newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the Indian tribe and its members, and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community, but only if the Governor of the State in which the gaming activity is to be conducted concurs in the Secretary’s determination.” The Governor indicated his official concurrence with the Assistant Secretary’s determination. Plaintiff Auburn Tribe owned and operated the Thunder Valley Resort and Casino, approximately 20 miles from the Yuba County site. The Auburn Tribe filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief, alleging: (1) the Governor was required to comply with California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) before concurring in the Secretary’s decision to take lands into trust for the Enterprise Tribe; and (2) the Governor performed a legislative act when he concurred with the Secretary and when he negotiated and executed the compact with the Enterprise Tribe, in violation of the constitutional mandate of separation of powers. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded the CEQA did not apply here, and that the Governor’s concurrence did not violate the separation of powers clause. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "United Auburn Indian Community of Auburn Rancheria v. Brown" on Justia Law

The State seeks extraordinary writ relief to compel respondent court to vacate its order directing the State to produce unredacted records containing information derived from CHP 180 forms in the possession of the California Highway Patrol (CHP). The court agreed with the State's contention that CHP 180 forms contain personal information exempt from disclosure under the California Public Records Act (CPRA), Gov. Code, 6250 et seq., as set forth in County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court. Therefore, the court directed respondent court to set aside its June 24, 2016 order and enter a new order directing the State to produce all electronically stored data derived from CHP 180 forms in the possession of the CHP, redacting all personal information exempt from disclosure under the CPRA. View "State of Cal. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Nominal plaintiffs Claudia Covarrubias, Veronica Alvarado, Rebecca Rivas, and Lucila Gomez sued Michael Cohen, in his capacity as the Director of the Department of Finance (the Department), in order to compel the Department to approve the City’s continued payments of set-asides from “tax increment” (the increase above the tax base level attributed to redevelopment) to the fund for subsidized housing in the City’s redevelopment project area that was previously mandated under redevelopment law. Plaintiffs argued these came within the definition of “ ‘[e]nforceable obligations’ ” of the City’s former redevelopment agency because the entirety of the set-asides to be paid over the life of a redevelopment project was due ab initio, and thus survived the abolishment of tax increment in the “ ‘Great Dissolution’ ” in 2012. The trial court ruled that the strictly statutory obligation to make set-asides accrued on an annual basis and accordingly expired when the Great Dissolution took place; the set-asides therefore were no longer enforceable obligations of the redevelopment agency. It entered judgment in favor of both the defendants and the real parties in interest. Finding no issue with that judgment, the Court of Appeals affirmed. View "Covarrubias v. Cohen" on Justia Law

In 2013, City of Los Angeles planning officials approved Kalnel’s proposed project to tear down a two-story, three-unit apartment building in the Venice area. After the City decided to halt the project, Kalnel petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate seeking to overturn the City's decision. The trial court denied the petition and Kalnel appealed. The court dismissed the appeal in part as to Kalnel's cause of action based on the Housing Accountability Act (HAA), Gov. Code, 65590, because Kalnel did not seek appellate review by way of a writ petition as required by that statute. The court affirmed as to the remaining causes of action because there is substantial evidence that the proposed project violated the visual and scenic elements requirement of the California Coastal Act, Pub. Resources Code, 30000, et seq., and because the Coastal Act takes precedence over statutes awarding density and height increase bonuses for proposed residential developments that include affordable housing units. View "Kalnel Gardens v. City of L.A." on Justia Law