Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The City of Tracy brought this action as the successor agency to its former redevelopment agency (and also in its own right) against Michael Cohen as director of the Department of Finance (the Department) to challenge administrative determinations that invalidated the transfer of funds from the former redevelopment agency (before its dissolution) to the City because this action was pursuant to a 2011 sponsor agreement, and that directed return of a portion of the funds (constituting bond proceeds) to the successor agency and another portion (constituting former tax increment) to the Auditor-Controller of San Joaquin County (Auditor-Controller), the administrator of the trust fund for former tax increment, to distribute to the taxing entities. The trial court granted judgment in favor of defendants (Cohen and the Department). The City appealed. Of all the arguments the City made in support of its appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed only that a portion of the payments made to the City reflected goods or services that the City provided to the redevelopment project that the successor agency was overseeing. The Court rejected all other claims and affirmed the trial court's judgment as modified. View "City of Tracy v. Cohen" on Justia Law

The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) revoked Branden Lee Hall's driver's license because, after being arrested for driving under the influence, he refused to submit to a chemical test for blood alcohol content. Hall filed a petition for a writ of mandate or review (petition) seeking an order directing the DMV to vacate the revocation on the grounds there was no admissible evidence that police properly admonished him that refusing to submit to a blood alcohol test would result in his license being revoked. While Hall's petition was pending, the DMV hearing officer who upheld the revocation, Alva Benavidez, pleaded guilty in federal court to taking bribes in exchange for giving favorable treatment to persons arrested for driving under the influence. Hall amended his petition to allege Benavidez's corruption deprived him of his due process right to a fair hearing. The DMV filed opposition, asserting there was no evidence Benavidez was actually biased in deciding Hall's case. The superior court granted Hall relief by remanding to the DMV for a new hearing, stating Benavidez's "criminal conduct while acting as a hearing officer for the DMV . . . raises a red flag with respect to all hearings presided by her." Unsatisfied with a new hearing, Hall appealed, contending Vehicle Code section 13559 required the court to order the DMV to reinstate his driver's license. Hall also contends there was no admissible evidence that police properly admonished him that refusing a blood alcohol test would result in revocation of his driver's license. Additionally, Hall again argues Benavidez's bribe-taking in other cases deprived him of his due process right to a fair DMV hearing. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court correctly ordered a new administrative hearing. The Court rejected Hall's contention that section 13559 compelled reinstatement of his driver's license in this case. Furthermore, the Court declined to reach the issue of whether police properly admonished Hall about the consequences of refusing a blood alcohol test. View "Hall v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Suzanne Coe appealed a judgment denying her petition for writ of administrative mandate challenging a decision by the City of San Diego to revoke her nude entertainment business permit. She argued: (1) certain sections of the San Diego Municipal Code applicable to nude entertainment businesses were unconstitutionally vague and did not give sufficient guidance to the permit holder or to the enforcement agency; (2) the City's decision to revoke her permit improperly relied on inadmissible hearsay evidence and there was otherwise insufficient evidence to support the findings underlying the decision; and (3) the penalty of revocation violated her due process rights because it was arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals was not persuaded by any of these contentions and affirmed the judgment. View "Coe v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

San Diegans For Open Government (SDOG), represented by Briggs Law Corporation (BLC), filed a verified answer in response to the City of San Diego's (City) complaint in a validation action regarding the City's plan to levy a special tax to finance the expansion of the San Diego Convention Center. SDOG represented that it was an interested party to the litigation. However, at the time it filed its answer, both SDOG and its counsel knew that SDOG was a suspended corporation and neither SDOG nor its attorney informed the superior court or the City of this fact. After SDOG and another defendant ultimately proved successful in the validation action, SDOG sought its attorney fees. The City discovered after a final judgment was entered in SDOG's favor that SDOG had been suspended when it filed its verified answer and was not revived until well after the time period by which an interested party had to answer the validation action. As such, the City moved to strike SDOG's answer and motion for attorney fees. The superior court denied the City's motion and awarded SDOG attorney fees, but limited those fees because SDOG first appeared when it was suspended and did not inform the court or the City of its status. This case presented an issue of first impression for the Court of Appeal: whether under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, should attorney fees be awarded when a suspended corporation files an answer in a validation action and both the corporation and its attorney know it is suspended and it is not revived before the expiration of the deadline to appear in that action? The Court answered this question in the negative, and thus, reversed the order granting SDOG its attorney fees. The Court affirmed the court's order denying the City's motion to strike both the answer and SDOG's motion for attorney fees. View "City of San Diego v. San Diegans for Open Government" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs (landlords), challenged San Francisco Planning Code 317(e)(4) as conflicting with the Ellis Act of 1985, Government Code section 7060, which protects property owners’ right to exit the residential rental business. The ordinance was enacted in 2013 in response to a growing concern by the Board of Supervisors (and others) about the shortage of affordable local housing and rental properties. Under section 317(e)(4), certain residential property owners (those undertaking no-fault evictions) including “Ellis Act evictions” were subject to a 10-year waiting period after withdrawing a rental unit from the market before qualifying to apply for approval to merge the withdrawn unit into one or more other units. The trial court found that the ordinance impermissibly penalized property owners for exercising their rights under the Ellis Act and was facially void on preemption grounds. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Section 317(e)(4) is preempted by the Ellis Act to the extent it requires a landlord effectuating a no-fault eviction to wait 10 years before applying for a permit to undertake a residential merger on the property. View "San Francisco Apartment Ass'n v. City & Cnty.. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, “telephone corporations” require installation of wireless facilities, including antennas, transmitters, and power supplies, on existing utility poles in the city’s rights-of-way. In 2011, San Francisco adopted an ordinance, requiring Plaintiffs to obtain a permit before installing or modifying any wireless facility in the public right-of-way, citing the need “to regulate placement … that will diminish the City’s beauty.” The ordinance required a showing of technological or economic necessity and created three “Tiers” of facilities based on equipment size. It conditioned approval for Tiers II and III on aesthetic approval; locations designated “Planning Protected” or “Zoning Protected,” or “Park Protected,” triggered different aesthetic standards. Any Tier III facility required a finding that “a Tier II Facility is insufficient to meet the Applicant’s service needs.” “Any person” could protest tentative approval of a Tier III application. The trial court held that the modification provisions violated the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act; provisions conditioning approval on economic or technological necessity, were preempted by section 7901. The aesthetics-based compatibility standards were not preempted. An amended ordinance, enacted in response, retained the basic permitting structure, but removed the size-based tiers, requiring compliance with aesthetics-based standards based on location. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the ordinance was not preempted. View "T-Mobile W., LLC v. City & Cnty. of. San Francisco" on Justia Law

In February 2011, plaintiff Harald Mark Galzinski filed a citizen’s complaint to the Sacramento Police Department against three of the department’s officers related to the taking of biological samples from him following his arrest in December 2003. In July 2014, the department’s internal affairs division notified Galzinski that the division had “reviewed [his] complaint” but “no further action” would be taken on it because, “[b]ased upon the information [Galzinski] provided, the issues [he] raised pertain[ed] to points of law which should have been litigated during [his] criminal trial in 2005. Therefore, the proper venue for resolving [his] complaint would be through the appeals process.” Galzinski sought a writ of mandate from the superior court to compel defendant Samuel D. Somers Jr., Chief of the Sacramento Police Department, and three sergeants in the department’s internal affairs division to “properly investigate” his complaint and to “make official findings as to the validity of [his] allegations.” The superior court denied Galzinski’s petition, concluding that the department had “essentially” found the officers Galzinski accused of misconduct were “ ‘exonerated’ ” and that, in any event, the department did not abuse its discretion “in responding to the complaint in the way that it did.” After its review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in denying Galzinski’s petition: the procedure for addressing citizen complaints the department established and published obligated the department to conduct an investigation into the allegations of the complaint was sufficient to allow the Chief of Police to make one of four possible findings. Defendants did not comply with these obligations, and Galzinski was entitled to a writ of mandate compelling defendants to perform their ministerial duty to satisfy the obligations imposed by the department’s published procedure. View "Galzinski v. Somers" on Justia Law

Aguirre sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) for failing to comply with the Public Records Act (PRA), Government Code sections 6250-6276.48 The complaint alleged that the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station was closed after it leaked radiation in 2012; that costs of the shutdown and loss due to the shutdown exceeded $4 billion; and that CPUC approved the owner assigning $3.3 billion of these costs to utility ratepayers during an ex parte meeting in Warsaw, Poland. Aguirre made PRA requests seeking the production of emails and other documents related to the CPUC’s investigation of the shutdown and the settlement and meetings. The superior court rejected CPUC’s motion to dismiss. The court of appeal agreed with CPUC. Public Utilities Code section 1759 bars the superior court from exercising jurisdiction over the suit. The duty to comply with the PRA is an “official duty” of the CPUC. A “writ of mandate in any court of competent jurisdiction” is one of the statutory means available to enforce the PRA (Gov. Code 6258), and a “writ of mandamus” may be brought against the CPUC in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal in appropriate cases under section 1759(b). View "Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In late August 2015, the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) filed a dependency petition regarding minor, who was about one month shy of his third birthday. While at the emergency room for a cut on his finger, child was observed to have red sores and pustules around his genitals and buttocks. Also, mother reported that she had not taken minor for any well checks since he was one month old, and that minor had not received any vaccinations. The petition alleged that mother had unresolved anger management issues. In 2013 mother was convicted for domestic violence arising from an incident in which she had struck her ex-husband in the head five times and struck his vehicle repeatedly with a metal stick. The petition also alleged that mother had an unresolved substance abuse problem; a history of methamphetamine use. She reportedly had last used methamphetamine approximately two weeks prior to the incident in which minor cut his finger. Mother’s probation officer reported that mother was not enrolled in a drug treatment program, had multiple positive drug tests, and was not attending Narcotics Anonymous meetings. Being sent to jail marked a significant turning point for mother. The child was placed with his maternal aunt and uncle. The aunt and uncle indicated a desire to adopt minor if reunification with mother were to fail. Mother contested the recommendation, and an evidentiary hearing was held. Ultimately, the court sided with SSA, terminated reunification services, and set a hearing. The court described mother’s progress while out of custody as “minimal” and “hollow.” The court described mother’s visitation as “strikingly sporadic.” The court noted, however, that while in custody, “mother has taken advantage of every service . . . available to her, and that certainly is to be commended.” The court also “emphathize[d] with mother for a variety of reasons, her youth, the loss that she has suffered in her life.” Nonetheless, the court felt “constrained by an evaluation of the . . . statutory and case law . . . .” Mother’s petition for writ of mandate arose from the trial court’s order terminating reunification services and the “.26 hearing.” After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court’s finding regarding mother’s actions towards reunification was not supported by substantial evidence. As such, the Court issued the requested writ of mandate. View "J.F. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

To address Monterey County’s water needs, two public agencies and a water company entered into five interrelated agreements, in 2010-2011, to collaborate on a water desalination project. After it was revealed that a board member of one of the public agencies had a potential conflict of interest, the water company took the position that the agreements were void under Government Code section 1090. That board member was eventually convicted under a statute that prohibits “financially interested in any contract made by them in their official capacity, or by any body or board of which they are members.” In an action for declaratory relief, the trial court agreed that four of the five agreements were void. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the challenges were time barred and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the parties’ dispute. A public agency is not bound by the 60-day limitation period that governs validation actions when it seeks a judicial determination of the validity of a contract under section 1090. View "Cal.-Am. Water Co. v. Marina Coast Water Dist." on Justia Law