Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

To combat the practice known as “pension spiking,” by which public employees use various stratagems to inflate their income and retirement benefits, the County Employees Retirement Law, was amended, effective 2013, to exclude specified items from the calculation of retirement income. The trial court concluded application of the new formula to current employees did not amount to an unconstitutional impairment of the employees’ contracts. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the Legislature did not act impermissibly by amending Government Code section 31461. While a public employee does have a “vested right” to a pension, that right is only to a “reasonable” pension; it is not an immutable entitlement to the most optimal formula of calculating the pension. The Legislature may, prior to the employee’s retirement, alter the formula, thereby reducing the anticipated pension, as long as the modifications do not deprive the employee of a “reasonable” pension. The Legislature did not forbid the employer from providing the specified items to an employee as compensation, only the purely prospective inclusion of those items in the computation of the employee’s pension. View "Marin Ass'n of Pub. Employees v. Marin Cnty. Employees Retirement Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Association, on behalf of certain custodial deputies designated as a "peace officer" by Penal Code section 830.1, subdivision (c), filed suit seeking a judicial declaration that such custodial deputies may lawfully carry concealed firearms while off duty without the necessity of obtaining a permit to carry a concealed weapon. The court concluded that the Association correctly maintains that the County's practice does not comport with Penal Code section 25450, which categorically exempts all peace officers listed in section 830.1 from the prohibition against carrying a concealed weapon. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions for the trial court to enter declaratory relief to the Association. View "Stanislaus Cnty. Deputy Sherrifs' Ass'n. v. County of Stanislaus" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and four of her neighbors appealed an order dismissing as an anti-SLAPP, Code Civ. Proc., 425.16, action their complaint against the city council of Culver City and five of its council members for allegedly violating the state’s open meeting laws, Gov. Code, 54950 et seq. (the Brown Act). In this case, plaintiffs sought personal relief in the form of a halt to any attempts by the church to undo the long-standing parking restrictions. Therefore, the court concluded that the public interest exception to the anti-SLAPP provisions does not apply. The court further concluded that plaintiffs are not likely to prevail on the merits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order dismissing plaintiffs' action. View "Cruz v. City of Culver City" on Justia Law

The City and Xerox appealed the trial court's grant of petitioner's petition for writ of mandate. At issue is whether the City, as the “issuing agency” for notice of parking violations in the City, Veh. Code, 40202, must conduct the “initial review” of challenged citations, section 40215, subd. (a), or whether it may delegate that duty to Xerox, its "processing agency," section 40200.6, subd. (a), with which it contracts "for the processing of notices of parking violations," section 40200.5, subd. (a). The court held that, based on the language of section 40215, subdivision (a) and relevant legislative history, the City is required to conduct the initial review, and cannot contract with Xerox to perform that duty. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court’s issuance of a writ of mandate, as well as the trial court's award of approximately $722,000 in attorney fees pursuant to the California private attorney general statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. View "Weiss v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

"The facts as alleged in the complaint and in plaintiff’s declaration in opposition to the motion to strike are not at all clear." Plaintiff Un Hui Nam, a new medical resident in the anesthesiology department at UC Davis Medical Center, "got off to a rocky start" in July of 2009. The Court of Appeal surmised that there appeared to have been some tension and misunderstandings right from the beginning of plaintiff's residency. What occurred thereafter and why was the subject of the underlying lawsuit and appeal. Plaintiff labeled the hospital's actions as "retaliation" when she questioned whether residents were allowed to intubate patients. She expressed her disagreement with any policy that would compel the residents in an emergency to wait for the on-call team rather than independently intubating a patient. The week prior to this email, she had received excellent performance evaluations. Plaintiff copied all of the residents in her email. Some of these residents thereafter informed her that she should expect retaliation for sending it. Defendant, however, insisted the e-mail excited no such reaction. Defendant’s version of plaintiff's residency file consisted of a series of complaints, warnings, investigations, and leaves of absence necessitated by plaintiff’s "shortcomings" over a three-year period and culminating in her ultimate termination. The record contained both complaints and testimonials about plaintiff’s performance. Apparently she had a particularly good rapport with nurses. Defendant built a paper trail of warnings for unprofessional conduct and an inability to get along with other doctors. But many of defendant’s allegations were not substantiated during the internal investigations that ensued, and the anesthesiology department was criticized repeatedly for what it did, and did not do, to teach plaintiff the clinical and interpersonal skills needed to succeed in the program. Plaintiff requested, without success, a formal hearing to contest the termination. In January 2013 she filed her complaint for retaliation, discrimination, sexual harassment, wrongful termination, violations of the Business and Professions Code, and breach of contract. Defendant filed a motion to strike pursuant to section 425.16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, alleging that plaintiff’s complaint constituted a SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) and arose from written complaints made in connection with an official proceeding. Defendant argued that the investigations and corrective action were protected conduct. The trial court disagreed and denied the motion. The trial court's denial of defendant's motion to strike was affirmed: "It is hard to imagine that a resident’s complaint alleging retaliatory conduct was designed to, or could, stifle the University from investigating and disciplining doctors who endanger public health and safety. The underlying lawsuit may or may not have merit that can be tested by summary judgment, but it is quite a stretch to consider it a SLAPP merely because a public university commences an investigation." View "Nam v. Regents of UC" on Justia Law

SCOPE filed suit alleging that the trial court erred in denying its writ of mandate claim because the Agency’s acquisition of Valencia Water Company is unlawful. The court concluded that the court does not have to dismiss the appeal as untimely under the streamlined procedures available for validating certain acts of public agencies, Code Civ. Proc., 860 et seq., because the validation procedures invoke a court’s in rem jurisdiction, and that subject matter jurisdiction attaches only if there is a statutory basis for invoking those procedures and proper notice. Because that basis is absent here and because estoppel does not apply to subject matter jurisdiction, the validation procedures’ accelerated timeline for appeal is inapplicable. The court also concluded that there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s factual finding that the purveyor did not become the agency’s alter ego in this case. The agency did not violate article XVI, section 17 of the California Constitution for two reasons - namely, the provision reaches only stock acquisitions that extend credit and the provision’s exception for stock ownership applies to any “mutual water company” and any other “corporation” (whether or not it is a mutual water company). Thus, the fact that the corporate purveyor in this case was not a mutual water company is of no significance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Santa Clarita Org. v. Castaic Lake Water Agency" on Justia Law

The Permanent Quarry, a 3,510-acre surface mining operation producing limestone and aggregate for the manufacture of cement, is located in unincorporated Santa Clara County. The Quarry, owned by Lehigh, has been in existence since 1903. In 2011 the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors enacted a resolution finding that the Quarry’s surface mining operations are a legal nonconforming use. A non-profit organization, No Toxic Air, sought a peremptory writ of mandate challenging the resolution. The trial court upheld the County’s resolution. The court granted No Toxic Air’s motion to strike the attorney and paralegal expenses Lehigh incurred to prepare the administrative record for the writ of mandate proceedings. Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5(a) provides, “[i]f the expense of preparing all of any part of the record has been borne by the prevailing party, the expense shall be taxable as costs.” The court of appeal reversed, holding that labor costs for attorneys and paralegals to prepare the administrative record are recoverable as expenses under that section. View "No Toxic Air, Inc. v. Lehigh SW Cement Co." on Justia Law

In December 2014, real party in interest Rito Tejeda was charged with murder. A year later, respondent Superior Court of Orange County assigned Tejeda’s case to Judge Thomas Goethals for all purposes and set the matter for a pre-trial hearing in Judge Goethals’ courtroom. That same day, the State moved to disqualify Judge Goethals pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. The declaration represented that Judge Goethals “is prejudiced against the party or the party’s attorney, or the interest of the party or party’s attorney, such that the declarant cannot, or believes that he/she cannot, have a fair and impartial trial or hearing before the judicial officer.” Later that day, the superior court denied the motion to disqualify Judge Goethals. The superior court took judicial notice of facts and events outside the scope of this particular case in supporting its conclusions: (1) the district attorney’s office was engaged in improper “‘blanket papering’” of Judge Goethals in murder cases; and (2) the effect of the blanket challenge was to “substantially disrupt[] the orderly administration of criminal justice in Orange County.” The State appealed the superior court's denial of its motion. The Court of Appeal reversed. "In our view [. . .'Solberg v. Superior Court' 19 Cal.3d 182 (1977)], anticipated circumstances very similar to those faced here. Rightly or wrongly, the Solberg court concluded the peremptory challenge at issue would not constitute a separation of powers violation. Because we are bound by the reasoning in Solberg, we must grant the petition for writ of mandate." View "California v. Superior Court (Tejeda)" on Justia Law

Dynamic Development, LLC (Dynamic) sought to build a new retail store (Project) in Joshua Tree. Residents of Joshua Tree vociferously opposed the Project. They argued that it would clash with the town’s artistic, independent, and rural character; they also argued that it would cause various adverse environmental impacts, including urban decay. Nevertheless, the County of San Bernardino (County) found that an environmental impact report (EIR) was not required and approved the Project. The Joshua Tree Downtown Business Alliance (Alliance) then filed this mandate proceeding challenging the County’s approval of the Project. The trial court agreed there was substantial evidence to support a fair argument that the Project could cause urban decay; it therefore issued a writ of mandate directing the County to set aside its approval of the Project. Dynamic appealed. The Alliance cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by rejecting its other contentions. After review, the Court of Appeal held that the Alliance failed to establish any grounds for a writ of mandate. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was reversed. View "Joshua Tree Downtown Bus. Alliance v. Co. of San Bernardino" on Justia Law

Steven Seapker was administratively appealing a decision by the City of Carlsbad (City) to discharge him from his position as a police officer. His defense was that the City was penalizing him more harshly than it has penalized other similarly situated police officers. This case presented the question of whether a judgment denying a petition for writ of mandate challenging an evidentiary ruling of a hearing officer was an appealable final judgment or a nonappealable interlocutory judgment. The Court of Appeal published this order to clarify that a judgment denying a petition for writ of mandate challenging an evidentiary ruling of a hearing officer was a nonappealable interlocutory judgment where, as here, the superior court did not deny the petition on the merits, the administrative proceedings before the hearing officer were not concluded, the hearing officer was not the final administrative decision maker, and the hearing officer's decision did not a create a substantial risk confidential information would be publicly disclosed. The Court, therefore, dismissed the appeal and denied a related motion for stay as moot. View "City of Carlsbad v. Scholtz" on Justia Law