Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In the underlying action, inmate Alejandro Franco filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputies David Chang, Anthony Pimentel, and Kris Cordova assaulted Franco. The deputies signed agreements with the County of Los Angeles setting forth the terms and conditions under which the County would defend them. The jury found that the deputies violated Franco's federal civil rights and awarded damages. The deputies’ request for indemnification from the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors was denied. The deputies then filed suit against the County and others, seeking to compel payment of the Franco judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the deputies. The court held, however, that Government Code section 825.2 applies when a public entity employer provides a defense under a reservation of rights that includes reservation of the right not to indemnify for acts committed with actual fraud, corruption or actual malice. An employer’s reservation of the right to indemnity from the employee for acts committed with actual fraud, corruption or actual malice is necessarily a reservation of the right not to indemnify the employee for such acts. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment with directions. View "Chang v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The 2008 Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act (SB 375), was enacted to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Earlier measures empowered the Air Resources Board to enact statewide mandates to reduce emissions. SB 375 empowers the Board to set targets for regional planning agencies to reduce emissions from automobiles and light trucks and requires each regional agency, after extensive planning, to develop a “sustainable community strategy” to meet those targets using regional land use and transportation policies. In 2010, the Board issued targets for the Bay Area region, calling for the Metropolitan Transportation Commission and the Association of Bay Area Governments to develop strategies that would result in per capita percentage reductions in emissions of 7 percent by 2020 and 15 percent by 2035, as compared to emissions in 2005. These reductions were to be in addition to those expected from pre-existing statewide mandates. The Agencies updated the regional transportation plan and prepared their first sustainable communities strategy, “Plan Bay Area” and approved a final environmental impact report. The Board accepted the Agencies’ determination that Plan Bay Area would meet its emission reduction targets. Citizens offered an alternative plan that counted on reductions expected from pre-existing statewide mandates and challenged the environmental impact report and the Plan aa “draconian.” The trial court, concluding that reliance on pre-existing statewide mandates to meet the regional targets would constitute improper double counting not permitted by SB 375, denied Citizens’ petition. The court of appeal affirmed. Citizens’ approach was contradicted by SB 375’s emphasis on regional innovations and legislative declarations and findings. View "Bay Area Citizens v. Ass'n Bay Area Gov'ts" on Justia Law

The Medical Marijuana Regulation and Taxation Ordinance (Proposition D), L.A. Mun. Code, 45.19.6 et seq., bans medical marijuana businesses, but grants certain qualifying businesses a limited immunity from enforcement of the ordinance. Immune medical marijuana businesses may continue their operations if they comply with the numerous restrictions enumerated in Proposition D. Plaintiff filed suit against Progressive, a medical marijuana business, to abate a public nuisance, for injunctive relief, and for civil penalties, based on defendants’ violation of Proposition D, and sought a preliminary injunction barring defendants from operating their medical marijuana business. The trial court granted the preliminary injunction, finding that defendants had not complied with Proposition D’s LiveScan requirement. The trial court later denied defendants’ motion to dissolve the injunction, after defendants attempted to demonstrate that they had “cured” their violation of Proposition D’s LiveScan requirement. The court held that Proposition D does not allow a medical marijuana business which fails to comply with the ordinance to have limited immunity under the ordinance. Accordingly, because Progressive is such a business, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People ex rel. Feuer v. Progressive Horizon" on Justia Law

U.S., the presumed father of five-year-old Robert S. and three-year-old Miguel S., and J.V., Robert’s biological father, each appealed the termination of their respective parental rights to the children. U.S. and J.V. argued insufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) did not apply in this case, and further argued the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) failed to comply with its obligations under ICWA. U.S. and J.V. also argued the juvenile court erred by finding the children adoptable and terminating parental rights while a child abuse report investigation was pending. The Court of Appeal granted SSA’s unopposed motion to take additional evidence under Code of Civil Procedure section 909, which shows the juvenile court concluded the child abuse report was unfounded and the home study for Miguel and Robert’s prospective adoptive parents was completed and approved by SSA. That evidence mooted U.S.’s and J.V.’s challenges to the order terminating parental rights based on the pendency of the child abuse report investigation at the time of the permanency hearing. As for U.S.’s and J.V.’s ICWA challenges, although SSA was informed the children were both eligible to enroll in two different Chippewa tribes, the record did not show that any further efforts on the part of SSA or the juvenile court were made before SSA proposed that the court find that ICWA did not apply and the juvenile court made that finding. The Court of Appeal therefore reversed the order terminating parental rights for the limited purpose of allowing SSA to make active efforts necessary to secure tribal membership for the children, in compliance with rules 5.482(c) and 5.484(c)(2) of the California Rules of Court. View "In re Miguel S." on Justia Law

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. appealed a judgment entered in favor of the Spring Valley Lake Association (Association) determining the City of Victorville failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and the Planning and Zoning Law when the City approved the Tamarisk Marketplace Project. Wal-Mart argued to the Court of Appeal that the judgment should have been reversed because, contrary to the court's decision, there was substantial evidence to support the City's finding the project was consistent with the general plan and the project's environmental impact report (EIR) adequately analyzed the project's greenhouse gas emissions impacts. The Association cross-appealed, contending the Court should have reversed the judgment because the City violated CEQA by failing to recirculate the EIR after the City revised the traffic and circulation impacts analysis, air quality impacts analysis, hydrology and water quality impacts analysis, and biological resources impacts analysis. The Association also contended the City violated the Planning and Zoning Law by failing to make all of the findings required by Government Code section 66474 before approving the project's parcel map. Upon review, the Court of Appeal disagreed with Wal-Mart's contentions and partially agreed with the Association's contentions. Consequently, the Court affirmed the judgment as to the issues raised in Wal-Mart's appeal, reversed the judgment as to certain of the issues raised in the Association's appeal, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Spring Valley Lake Assn. v. City of Victorville" on Justia Law

Appellant Eddie Dunley appealed a judgment extending his commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). He contended that because persons subject to civil commitment after being found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) had a statutory right not to be compelled to testify in proceedings to extend their commitments, so should a person facing commitment as an MDO. The Court of Appeal held that MDO’s, sexually violent predators, and NGI’s are all similarly situated with respect to the testimonial privilege provided for in section 1026.5(b)(7). However, this appeal was moot because a subsequent petition for recommitment was denied by the trial court on or about March 7, 2016, based on the court’s finding that appellant no longer met the criteria for commitment as an MDO. View "California v. Dunley" on Justia Law

E.G. was born in 2015 while his then 22-year-old mother, K.K. (mother), and 34-year-old father, R.G., were incarcerated. After his birth, mother arranged to have an unrelated female take E.G. home from the hospital. About two months later, Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) received a welfare report concerning the state of this woman’s home. SSA substantiated the report, and SSA took E.G. into protective custody. SSA placed E.G. with his maternal grandmother in June 2015, and he seemed to be doing well. Grandmother facilitated weekly supervised visits between E.G. and mother during her incarceration. Mother was happy about E.G.’s placement and expressed the desire to continue regular visitation. She took a parenting class, worked through a parenting handbook, and passed her GED while incarcerated. SSA challenged the juvenile court’s order granting reunification services to the mother. SSA argued the court should have bypassed reunification, citing Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). In rejecting SSA’s argument, the court decided drug treatment ordered as the result of a deferred entry of judgment was not "prior court-ordered treatment" for purposes of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). The Court of Appeal found "no principled difference between drug treatment ordered pursuant to Penal Code section 1000 (PC1000) and any other drug treatment ordered by a court during unrelated criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the Court reversed reversed the judgment and remanded the case for the juvenile court to reconsider its ruling in light of PC1000 as “court-ordered treatment” as contemplated by section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). View "In re E.G." on Justia Law

Plaintiff San Diegans for Open Government (SDOG) submitted a public records request to City of San Diego for all e-mail communications pertaining to City's official business sent to or from the San Diego City Attorney Jan Goldsmith's personal e-mail account during certain time periods. City refused to produce any e-mail communications, stating they did not qualify as public records. SDOG filed this verified action after confirming City would not produce any responsive records. The operative pleading claimed a violation of the California Public Records Act and sought declaratory relief against defendants to compel disclosure of the e-mails. SDOG also alleged a cause of action under section Government Code 526a for taxpayer waste. SDOG ultimately dismissed the waste cause of action with prejudice. The trial court issued a judgment in favor of SDOG on its claim under the Act and granted SDOG declaratory relief against City. Third party, League of California Cities, subsequently petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate under the Act challenging the trial court's order. The Court of Appeal granted the petition and remanded the matter for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court determined SDOG to be the prevailing party under the Act and awarded it attorney fees and costs. The court also denied City's request for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5. City timely appealed both orders. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the current version of section 128.5 applied to any case pending as of its effective date; a party filing a sanctions motion under section 128.5 did not need to comply with section 128.7, subdivision (c)(1) (the safe harbor waiting period); and (3) the legal standard in evaluating a request for sanctions under section 128.5 was whether the challenged conduct was objectively unreasonable. The Court reversed the trial court's order denying sanctions and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the trial court's order finding plaintiff to be the prevailing party and awarding it attorney fees and costs. View "San Diegans for Open Govt. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

The City of San Diego and its city council (City) were subject to the Ralph M. Brown Act, including Gov. Code section 54954.3. The Center for Local Government Accountability (Center) filed this litigation to determine whether the City's adherence to a long-standing ordinance providing for only one non-agenda public comment period over the course of its two-day regular weekly meetings violated section 54954.3. The trial court dismissed the Center's complaint after sustaining the City's demurrer to it without leave to amend. The Center appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded, after review of this matter, that the qualifying phrase "subject to Section 54960.2" in section 54960, subdivision (a), applied only to litigation to determine the Brown Act's applicability to past actions. In addition, the Court concluded the City's continued adherence to a long-standing ordinance providing for one non-agenda public comment period over the course of its two-day regular weekly meetings constituted an ongoing or threatened future action, not a past action. Finally, the Court concluded the City's postlitigation adoption of an ordinance providing for a non-agenda public comment period on each day of its two-day regular weekly meetings could moot this action if there was no reasonable expectation the City will adopt another ordinance resuming its former practice. There was a reasonable possibility the Center could amend its complaint to at least state a viable claim for declaratory relief. Consequently, the Court concluded the court erred in sustaining the City's demurrer without leave to amend and dismissing this action. The judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Center for Local Gov. Accountability v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

California’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 (OPPA), under the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 et. seq.), addresses the obligations of an operator of a commercial Web site or online service regarding the posting of a privacy policy on the Internet. The state sought damages and injunctive relief under OPPA, alleging that Delta’s Fly Delta mobile application violated the privacy policy requirements. The trial court dismissed, finding the suit expressly preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (49 U.S.C. 41713 (b)(1)). The court of appeal affirmed. To compel Delta to comply with the OPPA would effectively interfere with the airline’s “selection and design” of its mobile application, a marketing mechanism “appropriate to the furnishing of air transportation service,” for which state enforcement has been held to be expressly preempted. View "Harris v. Delta Air Lines" on Justia Law