Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in California Courts of Appeal
Romane v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles
Anthony Frank Romane, Jr. was arrested for driving under the influence after being found unconscious in his car. He exhibited signs of intoxication and failed field sobriety tests. At the police station, he refused to submit to a chemical test after being read the Chemical Test Admonition. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) initiated proceedings to suspend his license for one year due to his refusal to submit to testing. Romane requested an Administrative Per Se (APS) hearing to challenge the suspension.The APS hearing was conducted by a single hearing officer, Trena Leota, who introduced three documents into evidence: the arresting officer’s sworn DS 367 form, the unsworn arrest report, and Romane’s driving record. Romane’s counsel objected, arguing that the hearing officer was acting as an advocate, violating due process as explained in California DUI Lawyers Association v. Department of Motor Vehicles. The hearing officer overruled the objections and admitted the documents. Romane’s bodyworn camera footage was also admitted into evidence. The hearing officer ultimately sustained the suspension of Romane’s license.Romane filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate in the Superior Court of San Diego County, arguing that his due process rights were violated because the hearing officer acted as both advocate and adjudicator. The superior court agreed and ordered the DMV to set aside the suspension unless a new hearing was conducted with separate individuals acting as advocate and adjudicator.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case and reversed the superior court’s decision. The appellate court held that the hearing officer did not act as an advocate but merely collected and developed evidence, which is constitutionally permissible. The case was remanded to the superior court to consider Romane’s contention that the evidence did not support the hearing officer’s findings. View "Romane v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law
Golden State Boring & Pipe Jacking, Inc. v. Astaldi Construction
The Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA) awarded a contract to OC 405 Partners Joint Venture (OC 405) for improvements to Interstate 405. OC 405 then awarded subcontracting work to Golden State Boring & Pipe Jacking, Inc. (GSB). However, the parties disagreed on the scope of the subcontract work and did not execute a written subcontract. OC 405 subsequently contracted with another subcontractor, leading GSB to file a lawsuit seeking benefit of the bargain damages, claiming OC 405 did not comply with Public Contract Code section 4107’s substitution procedures.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of OC 405 and other defendants, holding that GSB was not entitled to the protections of section 4107 because it did not meet the requirements of section 4100 et seq. Specifically, GSB was not a "listed subcontractor" in the original bid, and its proposed work did not exceed one-half of 1 percent of the prime contractor’s total bid, a threshold requirement under section 4104.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, concluding that section 4107’s substitution procedures did not apply to OC 405’s substitution of GSB. The court emphasized that the protections of section 4100 et seq. only apply to subcontractors whose proposed work exceeds the one-half of 1 percent threshold of the prime contractor’s total bid. Since GSB’s bid did not meet this threshold, it was not entitled to the protections under section 4107. The court also noted that the contractual provisions in the prime contract did not alter this statutory requirement. Thus, the judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Golden State Boring & Pipe Jacking, Inc. v. Astaldi Construction" on Justia Law
People ex rel. Soto v. Group IX BP Properties
A landlord argued that a case brought by the Los Angeles City Attorney to enforce California's Public Nuisance Law (PNL) violated Government Code section 53165.1, which bars local governments from penalizing tenants or landlords solely due to contact with law enforcement. The case involved a 116-unit apartment complex in North Hollywood, where the People alleged a gang-related public nuisance. The complaint sought abatement of the nuisance, a permanent injunction, and civil penalties.The Los Angeles County Superior Court granted a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to implement several security measures, including proper lighting, video monitoring, and private security. The court also ordered criminal background checks on tenants. Defendants appealed, and a different panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed the preliminary injunction but directed the trial court to consider modifying it in light of section 53165.1. On remand, the trial court modified the injunction to remove the background check requirements but confirmed the validity of the rest of the injunction.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that enforcing the PNL is not prohibited by section 53165.1 because the PNL is a state law, not a local ordinance, rule, policy, program, or regulation. The court also determined that the action brought by the city attorney on behalf of the People of the State of California is not an action by a "local government" within the meaning of section 53165.1. Additionally, the court found that the preliminary injunction did not penalize tenants or landlords solely due to contact with law enforcement. The order was affirmed. View "People ex rel. Soto v. Group IX BP Properties" on Justia Law
Gomes v. Mendocino City Community Services Dist.
Steven Gomes filed a lawsuit to invalidate ordinances regulating groundwater use in Mendocino, adopted by the Mendocino City Community Services District (the district). The district argued that Gomes’s claims were barred by res judicata due to a prior case, Gomes v. Mendocino City Community Services Dist. (2019) (Gomes I), which challenged the district’s groundwater management program. The trial court found the ordinances contained an invalid attorney’s fee provision but rejected Gomes’s other claims.In Gomes I, the trial court denied Gomes’s petition challenging the district’s 2007 groundwater measures, but the judgment was reversed on appeal. The appellate court found the district had authority to limit groundwater extraction and that the 2007 measures were invalid due to non-compliance with statutory procedures. The district subsequently adopted new ordinances in 2020, which Gomes challenged in the present case.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. Gomes argued the ordinances imposed fees for groundwater extraction that required voter approval, which the district did not obtain. The court concluded that the claim was not barred by Gomes I, as it involved different ordinances and provisions. The court held that the fees imposed by the district were not for the extraction of groundwater and thus did not require voter approval under section 10710. The judgment was affirmed, except for the invalid attorney’s fee provision. View "Gomes v. Mendocino City Community Services Dist." on Justia Law
Napa Valley Unified School Dist. v. State Bd. of Education
In 2021, the Napa Foundation for Options in Education (Napa Foundation) filed a petition with the Napa Valley Unified School District (School District) to establish the Mayacamas Charter Middle School. The School District Board of Education denied the petition, and the Napa Foundation then submitted the petition to the Napa County Board of Education (County Board), which also denied it. The Napa Foundation appealed to the State Board of Education (State Board), which reversed the denials. The School District and the California School Boards Association’s Educational Legal Alliance (Educational Legal Alliance) filed petitions for writs of mandate to set aside the State Board’s decision.The trial court granted the writ petitions, finding that the State Board abused its discretion. The court concluded that the District Board did not provide a fair and impartial hearing process and that the County Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, including the fiscal impact of the proposed charter school on the School District.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the State Board’s determination that the District Board failed to provide a fair and impartial hearing was not supported by substantial evidence. The court also found that the County Board’s written factual findings, which detailed the negative fiscal impact of the proposed charter school, were supported by substantial evidence. The court concluded that the State Board’s decision to reverse the County Board’s denial was arbitrary, capricious, and entirely lacking in evidentiary support.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgments, upholding the denials of the charter school petition by the District Board and the County Board. The court emphasized that the State Board failed to properly apply the abuse of discretion standard in its review of the lower boards’ decisions. View "Napa Valley Unified School Dist. v. State Bd. of Education" on Justia Law
Krug v. Board of Trustees of the California State University
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Board of Trustees of the California State University (CSU) mandated remote instruction. Patrick Krug, a biology professor at California State University Los Angeles, incurred expenses for necessary equipment to comply with this directive, which CSU refused to reimburse. Krug filed a lawsuit on behalf of himself and similarly situated faculty, claiming that Labor Code section 2802 required CSU to reimburse these work-related expenses. CSU argued that as a state department, it was exempt from such Labor Code provisions.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained CSU’s demurrer without leave to amend, leading to a judgment of dismissal. The court reasoned that CSU, as a governmental agency, was exempt from section 2802 because the section did not explicitly apply to public employers. Krug appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court held that Labor Code section 2802 did not obligate CSU to reimburse employees for work-related expenses. The court found no express language or positive indicia in the statute or its legislative history indicating that it applied to public employers. The court also noted that applying section 2802 to CSU would infringe on its sovereign powers, as CSU has broad discretion under the Education Code to set its own equipment reimbursement policies.The California Supreme Court granted review and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Stone v. Alameda Health System. Upon reconsideration, the appellate court again affirmed the judgment, maintaining that section 2802 does not apply to public employers like CSU. View "Krug v. Board of Trustees of the California State University" on Justia Law
Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist.
Great Oaks Water Company, a private water retailer, sued the Santa Clara Valley Water District, alleging that the district’s groundwater pumping charges were unlawful taxes levied without voter approval, violating Proposition 26. Great Oaks argued that the charges exceeded the reasonable costs of the governmental activity and were unfairly allocated, benefiting other water users to which Great Oaks had no access. Additionally, Great Oaks contended that the district’s use of ad valorem property taxes to subsidize agricultural groundwater pumping charges was unconstitutional.The trial court ruled in favor of the water district, finding that the groundwater charges did not exceed the costs of the district’s overall water management program. The court held that it was reasonable to use these charges to pay for the program because non-agricultural groundwater pumpers, like Great Oaks, received significant benefits from it. The charges were deemed reasonably allocated on a volumetric basis, and the agricultural discount was found constitutionally valid as it was funded by ad valorem property taxes, not by non-agricultural pumpers.The California Court of Appeal for the Sixth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court concluded that the groundwater charges were not “taxes” under Proposition 26 because they fell under exceptions for specific benefits conferred or government services provided directly to the payor. The court found that the water district proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the charges were no more than necessary to cover the reasonable costs of the governmental activity and that the costs were fairly allocated to Great Oaks. The court also upheld the use of ad valorem taxes to fund the agricultural discount, finding no violation of the California Constitution or the Water Code. View "Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law
Catholic Medical Mission Board, Inc. v. Bonta
The case involves two charitable organizations, Catholic Medical Mission Board, Inc. (CMMB) and Food for the Poor, Inc. (FFP), which were issued cease and desist orders and civil penalties by the Attorney General of California for allegedly making false or misleading statements in their charitable solicitations. The Attorney General found that both organizations overvalued in-kind donations and misrepresented their program efficiency ratios, leading to misleading donor solicitations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case and found that the challenged statutory provisions, sections 12591.1(b) and 12599.6(f)(2) of the Government Code, were unconstitutional under the First Amendment as they constituted prior restraints on speech. The court vacated the civil penalties and issued permanent injunctions against the Attorney General, preventing the enforcement of these provisions. The court also reformed section 12591.1(b) to exclude violations of section 12599.6 from the Attorney General’s cease and desist authority.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s constitutional rulings but vacated the permanent injunctions, stating that the trial court abused its discretion by granting them without requiring the plaintiffs to plead and prove entitlement to such relief. The appellate court remanded the case to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaints to seek injunctive relief and to prove they are entitled to it. The court also affirmed the trial court’s reformation of section 12591.1(b) and vacated the postjudgment orders awarding attorney fees, directing the trial court to reconsider the fees in light of the appellate court’s rulings. View "Catholic Medical Mission Board, Inc. v. Bonta" on Justia Law
Cleveland Nat. Forest Foundation v. County of San Diego
The case involves a challenge by two environmental groups against the County of San Diego's adoption of certain thresholds of significance under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). These thresholds, if met, would generally eliminate the need for developers to perform an analysis of vehicle miles traveled (VMT) for proposed projects. The plaintiffs specifically contested two thresholds: one for "infill" projects within unincorporated villages and another for projects generating no more than 110 automobile trips per day.The Superior Court of San Diego County ruled in favor of the County, determining that the infill threshold was consistent with CEQA and supported by substantial evidence. The court also upheld the small project threshold, noting its alignment with recommendations from the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research (OPR).The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court found that the County's infill threshold was not supported by substantial evidence, as it relied on unsubstantiated assumptions about the transportation impacts of infill development without demonstrating that such development would generally result in insignificant VMT impacts in San Diego County. Similarly, the court determined that the small project threshold lacked substantial evidentiary support, as the County did not provide evidence that projects generating fewer than 110 trips per day would likely have a less than significant transportation impact under local conditions.The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court's decision, directing the lower court to grant the petition for writ of mandate and to determine whether portions of the Transportation Guide are severable and may continue to be applied. The appellate court emphasized the need for substantial evidence to support the adoption of significance thresholds under CEQA. View "Cleveland Nat. Forest Foundation v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law
Kazelka v. Cal. Dept. of Motor Vehicles
A member of the public reported Gregory Kazelka for erratic driving, leading to a traffic stop by Officer Phillips of the California Highway Patrol. Kazelka admitted to drinking excessively and failed field sobriety tests. He underwent a preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) test, which showed a blood alcohol content above the legal limit. Kazelka was arrested, and a subsequent chemical breath test confirmed his intoxication. However, Officer Phillips did not provide the statutory admonition that the PAS test was voluntary.The California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended Kazelka’s license following an administrative hearing. Kazelka challenged the suspension in the Lake County Superior Court, which found that the PAS test results should have been excluded due to the lack of statutory admonition and reversed the suspension.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the statutory admonition was not a foundational requirement for the admissibility of the PAS test results. The court also determined that the exclusionary rule, typically applied in criminal cases, does not apply to administrative per se (APS) hearings. The court found that Officer Phillips’s failure to provide the admonition did not violate Kazelka’s constitutional rights and that the hearing officer did not act as both advocate and adjudicator, thus not violating due process.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s decision, directing the trial court to deny Kazelka’s petition for writ of mandate and reinstate the DMV’s suspension order. The DMV was awarded costs on appeal. View "Kazelka v. Cal. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law