Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff K.C. alleged that she was sexually abused while in foster care under the custody of the County of Merced. The abuse occurred in two separate foster homes between 1971 and 1977. K.C. claimed that she reported the abuse to her social worker, but no corrective action was taken, resulting in continued abuse. She filed a complaint citing negligent acts and omissions by the County and its employees, which she argued proximately caused her injuries.The Superior Court of Merced County sustained the County's demurrer without leave to amend, leading to the dismissal of K.C.'s complaint with prejudice. The court found that the County and its employees were protected by discretionary immunity under Government Code sections 815.2 and 820.2, which shield public employees and entities from liability for discretionary acts.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court held that the social workers' decisions regarding the investigation of child abuse and the continuation of foster home placements were discretionary acts protected by immunity. The court emphasized that these decisions involved the exercise of judgment and policy considerations, which are shielded from liability to ensure that public employees can perform their duties without fear of civil suits. Consequently, the County was also immune from liability under the derivative immunity provided by Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (b). View "K.C. v. County of Merced" on Justia Law

Several skilled nursing facilities challenged the State Department of Health Care Services and its director, Michelle Baass, over the formula used to calculate Medi-Cal reimbursement overpayments. The plaintiffs argued that the Department's method, which was based on the amount Medicare paid for ancillary services rather than the amount Medi-Cal overpaid, violated a ministerial duty and constituted an underground regulation.The trial court sustained the Department's demurrer without leave to amend, concluding that the plaintiffs' claim was not cognizable in a traditional writ of mandate proceeding. The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim that the Department violated a ministerial duty or adopted an underground regulation. Additionally, the trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery of certain documents, deeming them privileged.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court determined that some of the plaintiffs' claims were indeed cognizable in a traditional writ of mandate proceeding and that the petition stated a claim for relief regarding the Department's use of an underground regulation when calculating Medi-Cal reimbursement overpayments. However, the court found that the plaintiffs did not provide an adequate record to review whether the trial court erred in denying their motion to compel discovery.The appellate court reversed the judgment of dismissal and affirmed the trial court's order denying the plaintiffs' motion to compel. The case was remanded to the trial court with instructions to vacate its order sustaining the Department's demurrer without leave to amend and to enter a new order overruling the demurrer. The plaintiffs were awarded their costs on appeal. View "California Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center v. Baass" on Justia Law

The case involves two charitable organizations, Catholic Medical Mission Board, Inc. (CMMB) and Food for the Poor, Inc. (FFP), which were issued cease and desist orders and civil penalties by the California Attorney General for allegedly overvaluing in-kind donations and making misleading statements in their solicitations. The Attorney General found that both organizations used inflated domestic market prices for donated medicines, which could not be distributed within the U.S., and misrepresented their program efficiency ratios to donors.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case and found that the challenged statutory provisions, sections 12591.1(b) and 12599.6(f)(2) of the Government Code, were unconstitutional as they constituted prior restraints on speech. The court vacated the civil penalties and issued permanent injunctions against the Attorney General, preventing the enforcement of these provisions. The court also reformed section 12591.1(b) by adding language to exclude violations of section 12599.6 from the Attorney General's cease and desist authority.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the permanent injunctions without requiring the plaintiffs to plead and prove their entitlement to such relief. The appellate court vacated the injunctions and remanded the case to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaints and prove their entitlement to injunctive relief. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's reformation of section 12591.1(b), allowing the Attorney General to issue cease and desist orders for violations unrelated to speech. The appellate court also vacated the postjudgment orders awarding attorney fees and directed the trial court to reconsider the fees in light of the remand. View "Catholic Medical Mission Board v. Bonta" on Justia Law

The Santa Ana Police Officers Association (SAPOA) and certain anonymous City of Santa Ana police officers (Doe Officers) sued the City of Santa Ana, alleging wrongful disclosure of confidential personnel records, failure to investigate a complaint about the disclosure, and denial of a request for related communications. The first amended complaint included four causes of action: violation of Penal Code section 832.7 and Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045, negligence, failure to investigate under Penal Code sections 832.5 and 832.7, and violation of the Meyers-Milias Brown Act (MMBA).The Superior Court of Orange County sustained the City’s demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend, leading to the dismissal of the case. The court found that the Doe Officers could not proceed anonymously without statutory authority or court authorization. It also concluded that the SAPOA lacked standing and that there was no private right of action for the alleged violations of the Penal Code and Evidence Code sections cited.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the judgment as to the Doe Officers, agreeing they lacked authorization to proceed anonymously. It also affirmed the trial court’s decision regarding the first, second, and fourth causes of action, finding no private right of action for damages under the cited statutes and that the SAPOA failed to exhaust administrative remedies for the MMBA claim. However, the appellate court reversed the judgment concerning the third cause of action, holding that the SAPOA had standing to seek mandamus relief to compel the City to investigate the complaint and notify the SAPOA of the disposition, as required by Penal Code sections 832.5 and 832.7. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this cause of action. View "Santa Ana Police Officers Assn. v. City of Santa Ana" on Justia Law

Gerry Serrano, a police officer for the City of Santa Ana, took a leave of absence to serve as president of the Santa Ana Police Officers Association. The Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) determined that certain special pay additives Serrano received before and during his service as Association president could not be included in his pension. The Administrative Board of CalPERS and the Superior Court of Sacramento County affirmed the exclusion of most of these pay additives from Serrano’s pension. Serrano appealed, arguing that Government Code section 3558.8 mandates he cannot lose any compensation, including pensionable compensation, while serving as the Association president. He also challenged the specific exclusion of a confidential premium and holiday pay from his pensionable compensation.The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied Serrano’s petition for writ of administrative mandamus, which sought to vacate the Board’s decision and include all pay additives in his retirement calculation. Serrano then appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that section 3558.8 did not require the compensation Serrano earned as a police sergeant to be entirely pensionable while he served as Association president. The court concluded that the confidential premium was not pensionable because it constituted nonpensionable overtime and did not meet the regulatory definition for the confidentiality premium. Additionally, the court found that Serrano’s holiday pay was not pensionable because he was not required to work on holidays, as required by the relevant regulation. The court’s decision was based on the interpretation of the Retirement Law and the specific definitions and requirements for pensionable compensation under that law. View "Serrano v. Public Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

John Lowry, a harbor patrol officer, suffered physical and psychiatric injuries, including PTSD, from a workplace accident. His psychiatrist deemed him unfit to return to work, and the Port San Luis Harbor District (the District) indicated that his only option was retirement. Lowry applied for disability retirement, but the District denied his application, stating insufficient information to determine disability. The California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) also denied his application, and the District terminated his employment, claiming he voluntarily resigned, which was later admitted to be untrue.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the District, concluding that Lowry was not eligible for relief under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) because he could not perform his essential job duties with or without reasonable accommodations. The court found that disability retirement does not qualify as a term, condition, or privilege of employment under FEHA.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the denial of disability retirement payments is not an adverse employment action under FEHA. Disability retirement payments serve as income replacement for employees who can no longer work and do not facilitate continued employment, job performance, or advancement opportunities. The court concluded that an individual who is not a qualified employee cannot bring a disability discrimination claim under FEHA for the denial of disability retirement payments. The judgment in favor of the District was affirmed. View "Lowry v. Port San Luis Harbor Dist." on Justia Law

A hospital in Siskiyou County, California, filed a lawsuit against the County of Siskiyou and other defendants, challenging the practice of bringing individuals with psychiatric emergencies to its emergency department under the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act. The hospital argued that it was not equipped or licensed to provide the necessary psychiatric care and sought to prevent the county from bringing such patients to its facility unless they had a physical emergency condition. The hospital also sought reimbursement for the costs associated with holding these patients.The Siskiyou County Superior Court denied the hospital's motion for a preliminary injunction, which sought to stop the county from bringing psychiatric patients to its emergency department. The court found that the hospital had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits and that the burden on the county and the potential harm to the patients outweighed the hospital's concerns.The hospital's complaint included several causes of action, including violations of Medicaid laws, disability discrimination laws, mental health parity laws, and section 17000 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The hospital also alleged breach of an implied-in-fact contract for the costs incurred in providing post-stabilization services to psychiatric patients. The trial court sustained demurrers to the complaint without leave to amend, finding that the hospital failed to identify any clear legal mandate that the county or the Department of Health Care Services had violated.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's judgment of dismissal. The appellate court concluded that the hospital had not identified any mandatory and ministerial duty that the county or the department had violated, which is necessary to obtain a writ of mandate. The court also found that the hospital's breach of contract claim failed because there were no allegations of mutual consent to an implied contract. Consequently, the hospital's appeal from the denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction was dismissed as moot. View "Siskiyou Hospital v. County of Siskiyou" on Justia Law

Matthew V. Herron filed a petition for writ of mandate against the San Diego Unified Port District and the Coronado Yacht Club, alleging that the lease of coastal public trust land to the private club violated the public trust doctrine, the San Diego Unified Port Act, the Public Resources Code, and the Port’s Master Plan. Herron claimed that the lease was executed without public notice or competitive bidding and requested the court to compel the Port District to comply with proper procedures and award the lease to a qualified applicant who would operate the property for public benefit.The Superior Court of San Diego County sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to interfere with the Port District’s discretionary decisions under a writ for traditional mandamus and that the time for filing a writ for administrative mandamus had expired. The court dismissed Herron’s petition with prejudice, leading to Herron’s appeal.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Herron failed to establish a claim for traditional mandamus because the Port District’s decision to lease the land involved discretionary authority, not a ministerial duty. The court also found that Herron’s petition for administrative mandamus was untimely, as it was filed more than four years after the lease became final, exceeding the 90-day statutory limit. Consequently, the appellate court concluded that Herron was not entitled to relief under either theory and affirmed the dismissal of his petition. View "Herron v. San Diego Unified Port District" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Steve Shehyn, owns a 20-acre avocado orchard in Moorpark, California. He alleged that sediment from the Ventura County Public Works Agency and Ventura County Waterworks District No. 1's (collectively, the District) water delivery system permanently damaged his irrigation pipes and orchard. The plaintiff claimed that the sediment was a direct result of the District's water supply facilities' plan, design, maintenance, and operation.The trial court sustained the District's demurrer to the plaintiff's first amended complaint, which included causes of action for breach of contract, negligence, and inverse condemnation. The court allowed the plaintiff to amend the breach of contract and negligence claims but sustained the demurrer without leave to amend for the inverse condemnation claim, citing that the plaintiff "invited" the District's water onto his property. The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, maintaining the inverse condemnation claim unchanged and indicating his intent to seek a writ of mandamus. The trial court entered judgment for the District after the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his contract and negligence claims without prejudice.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded his claim for inverse condemnation. The court found that the plaintiff's allegations that the District's water delivery system delivered a disproportionate amount of sediment to his property, causing damage, supported a claim for inverse condemnation. The court disagreed with the trial court's reliance on Williams v. Moulton Niguel Water Dist., stating that the issue of whether the plaintiff "invited" the water goes to the merits of the claim, not its viability at the pleading stage. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter a new order overruling the demurrer. View "Shehyn v. Ventura County Public Works Agency" on Justia Law

A medical doctor, employed by San Bernardino Medical Group and working for OptumCare Medical Group, faced a summary suspension of his clinical privileges by PrimeCare Medical Network, Inc. after a patient complaint. The patient alleged that the doctor hit her hand during an office visit, which the doctor admitted to in his notes, explaining it was to stop her from arguing. The next day, PrimeCare’s Chief Medical Officer (CMO) summarily suspended the doctor’s privileges, citing imminent danger to patient health.The Corporate Quality Improvement Committee (CQIC) upheld the suspension pending the doctor’s completion of an anger management course. The doctor requested a formal hearing, and PrimeCare’s Judicial Hearing Committee (JHC) found that the summary suspension was not warranted, as the incident was isolated and did not demonstrate imminent danger. The JHC recommended anger management and a chaperone for the doctor but did not find the suspension justified.PrimeCare’s Board of Directors reviewed the JHC’s decision, arguing it was inconsistent with the applicable burden of proof. The Board conducted an independent review, disagreed with the JHC’s findings, and reinstated the suspension, concluding that the doctor’s actions and subsequent comments posed an imminent threat to patients.The doctor filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus, which the Superior Court of San Bernardino County granted. The court ruled that the Board exceeded its jurisdiction and committed a prejudicial abuse of discretion by independently reviewing and reversing the JHC’s decision. The court ordered the Board to adopt the JHC’s decision, reinstate the doctor’s privileges, and report the reinstatement to relevant entities.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment, agreeing that the Board’s actions were unauthorized and inconsistent with the statutory requirement that peer review be performed by licentiates. View "Lin v. Board of Directors of PrimeCare Medical Network" on Justia Law