Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A participant in the federal Section 8 housing assistance program received notice from the local housing authority that her benefits would be terminated based on several alleged violations, including a recent eviction for serious lease violations, untimely submission of eligibility documentation, failure to allow an inspection, and failure to maintain her unit. The participant contested the termination, explaining that her appeal of the eviction was still pending and that she ultimately complied with inspection and paperwork requirements.At the administrative hearing, the hearing officer concluded that because a court-ordered eviction had occurred and, according to the officer, had been upheld on appeal, termination of assistance was mandatory under federal regulations. The participant then petitioned the Superior Court of Riverside County for a writ of administrative mandamus, arguing that the finding regarding her eviction was factually incorrect, as the appeal was still pending. Soon after, the appellate division of the Riverside County Superior Court reversed the eviction judgment for insufficient evidence. The trial court acknowledged that the hearing officer’s findings regarding the eviction were not supported by the record. However, it proceeded to independently review the evidence and found other violations of program obligations, upholding the housing authority’s discretionary decision to terminate benefits.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, found that the trial court misunderstood the scope of judicial review under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. The appellate court held that the trial court was required to review whether the administrative agency’s factual findings—not any alternative grounds—were supported by the record. Since the hearing officer’s findings were unsupported and the court could not uphold termination based on new grounds not adjudicated at the administrative hearing, the judgment was reversed with instructions to grant the petition and vacate the termination of assistance. View "Harrington v. Housing Authority of Riverside County" on Justia Law

For many years, the federal government and private entities engaged in activities at the Santa Susana Field Laboratory in Ventura County, resulting in significant environmental contamination. The Boeing Company, which owns much of the site, planned to demolish several buildings within a specific area known as Area IV. California’s Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) is authorized to regulate chemical contamination cleanup at the site, and its actions are subject to environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). In 2013, after Boeing notified DTSC of its demolition intent, the plaintiffs raised concerns about environmental impacts and filed a writ petition alleging DTSC failed to comply with CEQA.The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied the plaintiffs’ petition, finding that demolition activities were private actions not subject to CEQA’s discretionary approval requirements, and thus not subject to CEQA review. The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed this decision, and the California Supreme Court declined review. During subsequent events, DTSC voluntarily included an environmental analysis of the building demolition in its final Environmental Impact Report (EIR), released after the litigation had concluded.The plaintiffs then sought attorney fees under California’s private attorney general statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5), arguing that their litigation was the catalyst for DTSC’s changed conduct. The superior court denied the fee request, finding the plaintiffs were not a “successful party” under the catalyst theory because their lawsuit had been resolved on the merits against them, and thus there was no “threat of victory” that motivated DTSC’s actions.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the denial. The court held that attorney fees under the catalyst theory are not warranted where the moving party lost on the merits, and there was no causal connection between the litigation and the agency’s subsequent voluntary actions. DTSC was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Physicians for Social Responsibility - Los Angeles v. Dept. of Toxic Substances Control" on Justia Law

The case centers on a challenge to a provision in the Los Angeles Administrative Code, section 8.33, which grants the mayor special powers upon declaring a “local housing and/or homelessness emergency.” In July 2023, the mayor declared such an emergency, and the city council subsequently renewed it. The emergency declaration was later lifted in November 2025. During the period the declaration was in place, Fix the City, Inc. contended that section 8.33 was invalid because it conflicted with the California Emergency Services Act (CESA) and another provision in the city’s code, arguing that the city had acted illegally during the emergency.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed Fix the City’s claims for writ and declaratory relief, which sought to vacate the emergency declaration and any resulting directives, as well as a declaration that section 8.33 was void for conflicting with CESA and local law. The city responded with a demurrer, asserting that section 8.33 was a proper exercise of municipal authority and did not conflict with CESA or the city’s own code. The superior court agreed, finding that CESA did not apply to charter cities unless there was a clear legislative directive, and that section 8.33 was not inconsistent with other city code provisions. The court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and Fix the City appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court held that CESA does not preempt section 8.33 because the two do not conflict; section 8.33 is a valid exercise of the city’s home rule powers over municipal affairs. Additionally, section 8.33 did not violate other provisions of the city’s administrative code. The denial of leave to amend was also upheld. View "Fix the City, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Several members of a family brought suit against a court-appointed receiver and his company, alleging breach of fiduciary duty. The dispute arose when the State of California, in the course of a criminal insurance fraud prosecution against one of the plaintiffs, obtained a court order freezing certain assets and appointing the receiver to manage them. The court later ordered the receiver to liquidate specified stock holdings "as soon as practicable." The plaintiffs alleged that the receiver failed to do so, resulting in a significant loss in the value of the accounts during the period before he was replaced by a successor. They claimed damages of over $1.1 million due to the alleged failure to comply with the liquidation order.After the plaintiffs filed their complaint in the Superior Court of Orange County, the defendants responded with an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that the claims arose from protected conduct and that the receiver was immune from liability under the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the claims were based on acts performed in the receiver’s official capacity and that plaintiffs failed to show a probability of prevailing because the receiver’s conduct was protected by both the litigation privilege and quasi-judicial immunity.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that a court-appointed receiver is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for discretionary acts and decisions made in that capacity. The court determined that the plaintiffs’ claims arose from the receiver’s exercise of discretion regarding when liquidation was "practicable," and such discretionary conduct is protected. Because the claims were subject to anti-SLAPP procedures and the plaintiffs failed to establish minimal merit, the appellate court affirmed the order striking the complaint. The court also rejected arguments based on statutory immunities for public employees, clarifying its decision was grounded in common law quasi-judicial immunity. View "Semaan v. Mosier" on Justia Law

A former employee of the County of San Diego pleaded guilty to a felony charge for violating a state conflict-of-interest law, which prohibits public employees from having a financial interest in contracts made in their official capacity. After the guilty plea, but before sentencing, the San Diego County Employees Retirement Association (SDCERA) notified him that a portion of his accrued pension benefits would be forfeited under Government Code section 7522.74, as he had been “convicted” of a job-related felony. At sentencing, the criminal court reduced the offense to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b)(3). The employee then requested reinstatement of his pension benefits, which SDCERA denied.The employee challenged SDCERA’s denial through administrative appeals, including to its chief executive officer and Board of Retirement, but both appeals were denied. He subsequently petitioned the Superior Court of San Diego County for a writ of administrative mandate to set aside SDCERA’s decision. The court denied the petition, finding that section 7522.74 precluded reinstatement of the forfeited pension benefits. The employee timely appealed the judgment.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that a public employee is “convicted” for purposes of Government Code section 7522.74 upon an adjudication of guilt—whether by plea or jury verdict—and not only upon entry of judgment. The reduction of the felony to a misdemeanor at sentencing under Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b)(3), did not retroactively affect the forfeiture. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the employee’s pension benefits remained forfeited, and SDCERA properly denied reinstatement. View "Bishop v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn." on Justia Law

After an adult son sent text messages threatening a mass shooting at a local high school and referenced access to thousands of rounds of ammunition, the city police investigated the home he shared with his father. The father owned multiple firearms and large quantities of ammunition. Evidence showed the son had a history of mental health crises, including involuntary holds, and was subject to a lifetime ban from possessing firearms. Despite this prohibition, the son had access to firearms through his father, participated in shooting competitions, and had knowledge of how to access gun safes in the home. The father failed to turn in all firearms and ammunition as required by a temporary restraining order, and some safes were not adequately secured.The Superior Court of Orange County held an evidentiary hearing, where both the father and a police investigator testified. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the father’s failure to adequately secure his firearms and ammunition, combined with his son’s mental health history and credible threat of mass violence, posed a significant danger to others. The court concluded the father’s conduct enabled his son’s access to firearms and found no adequate, less restrictive alternatives to a Gun Violence Restraining Order (GVRO). A three-year GVRO was issued against the father.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings and that the GVRO statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. The court concluded the trial court reasonably interpreted statutory causation and properly considered alternatives. The father’s Second Amendment and hearsay objections were deemed forfeited for not being raised below. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order granting the GVRO. View "Anaheim Police Dept. v. Crockett" on Justia Law

A.B., a 42-year-old individual with a longstanding diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, had been receiving mental health services in San Francisco since 2008, including numerous psychiatric hospitalizations and crisis interventions. He was previously under conservatorship, which ensured compliance with medication, but historically disengaged from treatment and decompensated when conservatorship ended. In October 2023, following a psychiatric incident at home involving paranoia and disruptive behavior, A.B. was hospitalized. His mother, who provided housing, testified to his history of aggression and repeated decompensation when not medicated, stating she would not allow him to live with her absent a conservatorship and mandatory medication order.The San Francisco County Superior Court initially appointed the public conservator and imposed an involuntary medication order. After a mistrial in April 2023, the parties resolved the matter by conservatorship without a medication order, but following further decompensation, the conservator sought renewal with an involuntary medication order. At the 2025 court trial, testimony from A.B.’s mother and treating psychiatrist indicated that A.B. lacked insight into his illness, would not reliably take medication without a legal mandate, and was unable to maintain shelter independently. Although A.B. testified that he now recognized his diagnosis and would comply with medication, the court credited the testimony of his mother and psychiatrist over his own.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings that A.B. was presently gravely disabled due to his mental disorder and unable to provide for his own shelter without medication, which he would not take absent a court order. The appellate court also affirmed the finding that A.B. was incompetent to give or withhold informed consent for psychotropic medication. The orders renewing the conservatorship and involuntary medication were affirmed. View "Conservatorship of A.B." on Justia Law

A completed driver reexamination request was submitted to the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) by a confidential reporter, prompting the DMV to initiate a review of Richard Louis Brown’s driving qualifications. Brown was notified that he must submit a medical evaluation. His physician, a new provider to Brown, recommended a driving test but did not advise against driving. Following a reexamination, Brown failed a driving test, and his license was suspended. A second hearing officer later reinstated his license, finding no medical basis for the initial suspension and stating that Brown should not have been required to take the tests.Brown filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Sacramento County, seeking disclosure of the reporter’s identity and criminal sanctions against the reporter for alleged false information. The DMV opposed, explaining the confidentiality policy for reporters is intended to promote road safety and prevent retaliatory actions. The trial court denied the petition, applying a public interest balancing test and finding that the interest in maintaining reporter confidentiality outweighed the interest in disclosure. Judgment was entered against Brown, who then appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, held that due process was not violated by the DMV’s nondisclosure of the reporter’s identity. The court found that the risk of erroneous deprivation was low because the suspension was based on Brown’s failed driving test, not the reporter’s complaint, and Brown received notice and two hearings. The court concluded that neither federal nor California constitutional due process required disclosure of the reporter’s identity under the circumstances and affirmed the superior court’s judgment denying Brown’s petition. View "Brown v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

The case involves an individual, B.K., who has schizophrenia and has been under a conservatorship pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act since 2019. The conservatorship was initially established after B.K. was found to be gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder, and it has been renewed annually following court hearings. In several renewal proceedings, B.K. expressed her desire to contest the conservatorship, at times requesting either a court or jury trial. At the most recent renewal proceeding, B.K. initially requested a jury trial but later, after consulting with her attorney, chose to proceed with a court trial instead. B.K. confirmed this choice in open court.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County conducted the court trial, during which expert testimony and B.K.’s own statements supported a finding that she remained gravely disabled and unable to care for herself due to her mental illness. The court renewed the conservatorship for another year. B.K. appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to adequately advise her of her right to a jury trial or to ensure that her waiver of that right was knowing and intelligent.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. Applying de novo review to statutory claims and substantial evidence review to the trial court’s implied finding, the Court of Appeal concluded that B.K. was aware of her right to a jury trial and that, under the totality of the circumstances, her waiver—made through counsel and confirmed in court—was knowing and intelligent. The appellate court held that direct advisement or a personal waiver was not required under the LPS Act when counsel confers with the conservatee and there is no indication of lack of authority or client understanding. The court affirmed the ruling, finding no reversible error. View "Conservatorship of B.K." on Justia Law

A licensed sidewalk vendor who had operated outside Petco Park in San Diego since 2009 was cited multiple times in mid-2024 under newly enacted city ordinances regulating sidewalk vending. On two occasions, city officials also impounded his merchandise and, in one instance, his sales proceeds. The vendor, who holds a valid city vending permit, alleged that the new ordinances, particularly those related to impoundment and restrictions on vending during certain hours and events, conflicted with state law enacted in 2018 designed to protect the rights of sidewalk vendors. He sought a writ of mandate, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of these local provisions.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied the vendor’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court acknowledged the negative impact on the vendor’s livelihood but found there was a minimal probability of success on the merits, reasoning that the city’s restrictions were permissible under the state law’s allowance for regulations related to health, safety, or welfare. The court concluded that the balance of harms favored the city, given public interest considerations, and thus refused to enjoin enforcement of the challenged ordinances.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, examined both the factual record and the legal questions concerning the interplay between the municipal code and state law. The appellate court held that the city’s ordinances authorizing impoundment of vending equipment and restricting vending hours in nonresidential areas more stringently than for other businesses are in direct conflict with state law. The court found the trial court erred by not adequately considering these conflicts. The appellate court reversed the denial of the preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to apply the correct legal standards and further develop the record as needed. View "Mustaqeem v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law