Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A licensed sidewalk vendor who had operated outside Petco Park in San Diego since 2009 was cited multiple times in mid-2024 under newly enacted city ordinances regulating sidewalk vending. On two occasions, city officials also impounded his merchandise and, in one instance, his sales proceeds. The vendor, who holds a valid city vending permit, alleged that the new ordinances, particularly those related to impoundment and restrictions on vending during certain hours and events, conflicted with state law enacted in 2018 designed to protect the rights of sidewalk vendors. He sought a writ of mandate, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of these local provisions.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied the vendor’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court acknowledged the negative impact on the vendor’s livelihood but found there was a minimal probability of success on the merits, reasoning that the city’s restrictions were permissible under the state law’s allowance for regulations related to health, safety, or welfare. The court concluded that the balance of harms favored the city, given public interest considerations, and thus refused to enjoin enforcement of the challenged ordinances.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, examined both the factual record and the legal questions concerning the interplay between the municipal code and state law. The appellate court held that the city’s ordinances authorizing impoundment of vending equipment and restricting vending hours in nonresidential areas more stringently than for other businesses are in direct conflict with state law. The court found the trial court erred by not adequately considering these conflicts. The appellate court reversed the denial of the preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to apply the correct legal standards and further develop the record as needed. View "Mustaqeem v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that the City of Berkeley violated the Ralph M. Brown Act during three city council meetings in late 2023 and early 2024. At each meeting, disruptions from attendees prevented the council from conducting business. The mayor determined that order could not be restored by removing disruptive individuals but did not order the meeting room cleared. Instead, the meetings were recessed and reconvened in a different, smaller room. The press was allowed to attend in person, while the public could join by video, but the new location could not accommodate all nondisruptive members of the public. No attempt was made to restore order by removing disruptive individuals, nor was the meeting room ordered cleared.The Alameda County Superior Court sustained the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, holding that section 54957.9 of the Brown Act does not require the city council to first attempt to remove disruptive individuals before determining that order cannot be restored. The trial court further found that the city council complied with the statute by recessing and reconvening the meetings in a different room with press attendance. The case was dismissed with prejudice, and plaintiffs appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that, under section 54957.9, a legislative body may order the meeting room cleared and continue in session, but the statute does not authorize relocating the meeting to another room. The court found that recessing and reconvening in a new location is not equivalent to ordering the original meeting room cleared. Plaintiffs stated a claim for relief by alleging that the city council failed to order the meeting room cleared and instead moved the meetings. The judgment was reversed. View "Berkeley People's Alliance v. City of Berkeley" on Justia Law

The petitioner is an inmate serving an indeterminate sentence of 45 years to life for first degree murder, who challenged the timing of his initial youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051. His main contention was that, under regulations adopted by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) following Proposition 57 and Assembly Bill 965, only educational merit credits are counted toward advancing his youth parole eligible date (YPED), whereas a wider range of credits—including good conduct, milestone completion, rehabilitative achievement, and extraordinary conduct credits—may be applied to advance the minimum eligible parole date (MEPD) for other indeterminately sentenced inmates. The petitioner claimed this distinction deprived him of thousands of days of credit and delayed his parole hearing compared to similarly situated inmates.Previously, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District summarily denied the petitioner’s habeas corpus petition. The California Supreme Court then granted review, transferring the case back to the Court of Appeal with instructions to issue an order to show cause and reconsider the petitioner’s claims.Upon review, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District considered both statutory and constitutional arguments, including equal protection and due process claims. The court applied rational basis review to the equal protection claim, emphasizing the deferential standard and the need for a rational relationship between the regulatory distinction and a legitimate state interest. The court concluded that limiting credits for youth offender parole hearings to educational merit credits serves administrative and operational needs, promoting certainty and stability in scheduling, and is rationally related to legitimate governmental objectives. The court found no merit to the statutory, equal protection, or due process challenges and denied habeas corpus relief, discharging the petition. View "In re Thai" on Justia Law

For many years, one company exclusively provided emergency medical services (EMS) in a California county. Seeking improvements, the county initiated a competitive bidding process, issuing a request for proposals (RFP) and identifying policy goals such as improved service, efficiency, and reinvestment. Two entities submitted proposals. After evaluation by a review committee, one received the highest cumulative score, while the other received higher scores from most individual evaluators. The county determined the scores were substantially equivalent and proceeded to negotiate with both parties, ultimately awarding the contract to the bidder that did not have the highest cumulative score.The company that lost the contract protested the decision, arguing the county was required to negotiate only with the highest-scoring proposer, as set forth in the RFP. After an unsuccessful protest, the losing bidder first sued in federal court, where its federal antitrust claims were dismissed under the Parker immunity doctrine, and the district court declined to address state law claims. The company then filed a new action in San Bernardino County Superior Court, seeking a writ of mandate and a preliminary injunction. The superior court found the county’s selection process was ministerial and that the RFP required negotiations only with the highest-scoring proposer. The court granted a preliminary injunction, halting the contract’s implementation.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that neither the governing statute (the EMS Act) nor the RFP imposed a ministerial duty on the county to negotiate exclusively with the highest-scoring proposer. The court further concluded the county acted within its discretionary authority and did not abuse its discretion by considering both proposals. The appellate court reversed the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the superior court, directing it to deny the motion for a preliminary injunction and reconsider the bond amount. View "American Medical Response of Inland Empire v. County of San Bernardino" on Justia Law

The appellant, a Ventura County Deputy Sheriff, suffered two work-related back injuries in 2014 and 2015. Medical evaluations revealed degenerative disc disease and herniation at the L5-S1 level. Multiple physicians recommended surgical intervention, and the County authorized surgery to address his condition. However, the appellant declined the recommended procedures, citing concerns about surgical outcomes and referencing anecdotal experiences of colleagues. Later, his condition progressed, and more extensive surgery was suggested, but authorization for additional procedures was denied due to insufficient evidence. Despite ongoing pain, the appellant also declined to participate in a recommended home exercise program and a work hardening regimen.After the appellant applied for service-connected disability retirement, his application was challenged by the County and assigned to VCERA’s hearing officer for review. During the administrative hearing, the appellant testified about his refusal of surgery and physical therapy, while medical experts presented conflicting views on his prognosis and ability to return to work. The hearing officer found that the appellant had unreasonably refused recommended medical treatments with a high probability of success, and that his refusal likely worsened his condition, making him ineligible for service-connected disability retirement benefits. The Board adopted these findings and denied his application.The Superior Court of Ventura County denied the appellant’s petition for a writ of administrative mandate, concluding that his unreasonable refusal of authorized surgery and other treatments constituted valid grounds to deny benefits under the doctrine of avoidable consequences/mitigation of damages. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed this decision. The court held that a disability retirement application may be denied if the disability is caused, continued, or aggravated by an unreasonable refusal to undergo medical treatment, even if the refused treatment is no longer effective due to the passage of time. View "Mendoza v. Bd. of Retirement of the Ventura County" on Justia Law

A longtime deputy sheriff was convicted by a federal jury of mail and wire fraud after she submitted an insurance claim for items stolen during a burglary at her home, some of which she falsely claimed as her own but actually belonged to her employer, the sheriff’s office. She also used her employer’s fax machine and cover sheet in communicating with the insurance company and misrepresented her supervisor’s identity. The criminal conduct arose after a romantic relationship with a former inmate ended badly, leading to the burglary, but the fraud conviction was based on her false insurance claim, not on the relationship or the burglary itself.Following her conviction, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) determined that her crimes constituted conduct “arising out of or in the performance of her official duties” under Government Code section 7522.72, part of the Public Employees Pension Reform Act, and partially forfeited her pension. The administrative law judge and the San Francisco Superior Court both upheld CalPERS’s decision, reasoning that her actions were sufficiently connected to her employment, particularly in her misuse of employer property and resources and in the context of her relationship with the former inmate.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the statute requires a specific causal nexus between the criminal conduct and the employee’s official duties, not merely any job-related connection. The court found that the deputy’s fraudulent insurance claim, although it referenced employer property and resources, did not arise out of or in the performance of her official duties as required by the statute. Accordingly, the pension forfeiture determination was set aside. View "Myres v. Bd. of Admin. for CalPERS" on Justia Law

A group of petitioners obtained a default judgment exceeding $8 million against two corporations for fraud and misrepresentation related to a Ponzi scheme. The corporations’ presidents had previously been found guilty of criminal fraud and ordered to pay restitution, but this did not cover all losses suffered by the petitioners. The petitioners then applied to the California Secretary of State for restitution from the Victims of Corporate Fraud Compensation Fund, relying on their default judgment as the basis for their claim.The Secretary of State determined that the applications were ineligible, treating them as resubmissions of previously denied applications and closing the file without further review. The petitioners responded by filing a verified petition in the Superior Court of Sacramento County, seeking an order directing payment from the fund. The trial court concluded it had jurisdiction, deemed the Secretary’s response a denial, and granted the petition. The court found that the Secretary had waived any objections to the sufficiency of the applications by failing to request more information and ordered payment to the petitioners.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, held that the trial court had jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s determination. The appellate court found insufficient evidentiary support for the Secretary’s conclusion that the applications were impermissible resubmissions, requiring that determination to be set aside. However, it also concluded that the trial court erred in finding the Secretary waived her other objections; the Secretary retains the authority to assess the merits of the applications. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded the case to the Secretary for reconsideration, specifying that the Secretary cannot reassert the resubmission determination or deny the applications solely for facial deficiencies in the underlying complaint. The petitioners’ and Secretary’s respective burdens at different procedural stages were clarified. View "Amaro v. Weber" on Justia Law

Disney Platform Distribution, BAMTech, and Hulu, subsidiaries of the Walt Disney Company, provide video streaming services to subscribers in the City of Santa Barbara. In 2022, the City’s Tax Administrator notified these companies that they had failed to collect and remit video users’ taxes under Ordinance 5471 for the period January 1, 2018, through December 31, 2020, resulting in substantial assessments. The companies appealed to the City Administrator, and a retired Associate Justice served as hearing officer, ultimately upholding the Tax Administrator’s decision.Following the administrative appeal, the companies sought judicial review by filing a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County. The trial court denied their petition, finding that the Ordinance does apply to video streaming services and rejecting arguments that the Ordinance violated the Internet Tax Freedom Act, the First Amendment, and Article XIII C of the California Constitution. The trial court also found there was no violation of Public Utilities Code section 799’s notice requirements, as the City’s actions did not constitute a change in the tax base or adoption of a new tax.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the Ordinance applies to video streaming services, interpreting the term “channel” in its ordinary, non-technical sense and finding that the voters intended technological neutrality. The court further held that the Ordinance does not violate the Internet Tax Freedom Act because video streaming subscriptions and DVD sales/rentals are not “similar” under the Act. Additionally, the court concluded the tax is not a content-based regulation of speech under the First Amendment, and that delayed enforcement did not constitute a tax increase requiring additional voter approval or notice under the California Constitution or Public Utilities Code section 799. View "Disney Platform Distribution v. City of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

The case concerns a property owner in Sonoma County who, after a fire, conducted timber operations under an emergency waiver of waste discharge requirements. Following observations of waste discharge violations and failure to comply with cleanup orders, the regional water quality control board issued notices of violation and ultimately imposed administrative civil liability, assessing a penalty of $276,000. The property owner did not file a petition with the State Water Resources Control Board within the statutory 30-day period to seek review of the regional board’s order.Subsequently, the property owner filed a writ petition in Sonoma County Superior Court to challenge the civil liability order, and later requested the State Board to review the order on its own motion under Water Code section 13320. The State Board declined to exercise its discretionary review. The property owner amended his writ petition to add the State Board as a party, alleging abuse of discretion in its refusal to review. The State Board and the regional board demurred, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies and that the State Board’s discretionary decision was not subject to judicial review. The Superior Court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment for the respondents.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the State Board’s decision not to exercise its discretionary authority to review a regional board order under Water Code section 13320 is not subject to judicial review. The court rejected arguments that this interpretation violated the separation of powers doctrine, concluding that the State Board’s action was not quasi-judicial and did not adjudicate the parties’ rights. The court confirmed that only regional board orders, not the State Board’s discretionary refusals, are eligible for judicial review under the statutory scheme. View "Bareilles v. State Water Resource Control Board" on Justia Law

A firefighter employed by a county for over two decades reported safety violations concerning the maintenance of fire extinguishers on county fire engines. After raising these concerns with his superiors, he was barred from working in fire prevention, which he believed was retaliation for his whistleblowing activities. Although he filed internal complaints with the county’s Office of Human Resources and the Civil Service Commission, he withdrew his appeal after assurances that his concerns would be addressed. Later, he was investigated for alleged misconduct and ultimately terminated for violations of county rules. He then filed a claim under the Government Claims Act, which the county rejected.The Superior Court of Kern County granted the county’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the internal administrative remedies—specifically, by not appealing his dismissal to the Civil Service Commission—barred his whistleblower retaliation lawsuit. The court denied the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend his complaint, holding that he could not allege exhaustion of remedies.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that the plaintiff was not required to exhaust the county’s internal administrative remedies before bringing his whistleblower retaliation claims because the county’s ordinances and rules did not provide a clearly defined process for submitting, evaluating, and resolving such claims. The court distinguished between general disciplinary appeals and procedures for discrimination or harassment claims, noting that there was no specific administrative remedy for whistleblower retaliation. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the matter with instructions to deny the county’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The holding clarifies that, where an internal administrative process does not address a particular type of claim, exhaustion of that process is not required before filing suit. View "Romero v. County of Kern" on Justia Law