Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A group of petitioners obtained a default judgment exceeding $8 million against two corporations for fraud and misrepresentation related to a Ponzi scheme. The corporations’ presidents had previously been found guilty of criminal fraud and ordered to pay restitution, but this did not cover all losses suffered by the petitioners. The petitioners then applied to the California Secretary of State for restitution from the Victims of Corporate Fraud Compensation Fund, relying on their default judgment as the basis for their claim.The Secretary of State determined that the applications were ineligible, treating them as resubmissions of previously denied applications and closing the file without further review. The petitioners responded by filing a verified petition in the Superior Court of Sacramento County, seeking an order directing payment from the fund. The trial court concluded it had jurisdiction, deemed the Secretary’s response a denial, and granted the petition. The court found that the Secretary had waived any objections to the sufficiency of the applications by failing to request more information and ordered payment to the petitioners.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, held that the trial court had jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s determination. The appellate court found insufficient evidentiary support for the Secretary’s conclusion that the applications were impermissible resubmissions, requiring that determination to be set aside. However, it also concluded that the trial court erred in finding the Secretary waived her other objections; the Secretary retains the authority to assess the merits of the applications. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded the case to the Secretary for reconsideration, specifying that the Secretary cannot reassert the resubmission determination or deny the applications solely for facial deficiencies in the underlying complaint. The petitioners’ and Secretary’s respective burdens at different procedural stages were clarified. View "Amaro v. Weber" on Justia Law

Disney Platform Distribution, BAMTech, and Hulu, subsidiaries of the Walt Disney Company, provide video streaming services to subscribers in the City of Santa Barbara. In 2022, the City’s Tax Administrator notified these companies that they had failed to collect and remit video users’ taxes under Ordinance 5471 for the period January 1, 2018, through December 31, 2020, resulting in substantial assessments. The companies appealed to the City Administrator, and a retired Associate Justice served as hearing officer, ultimately upholding the Tax Administrator’s decision.Following the administrative appeal, the companies sought judicial review by filing a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County. The trial court denied their petition, finding that the Ordinance does apply to video streaming services and rejecting arguments that the Ordinance violated the Internet Tax Freedom Act, the First Amendment, and Article XIII C of the California Constitution. The trial court also found there was no violation of Public Utilities Code section 799’s notice requirements, as the City’s actions did not constitute a change in the tax base or adoption of a new tax.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the Ordinance applies to video streaming services, interpreting the term “channel” in its ordinary, non-technical sense and finding that the voters intended technological neutrality. The court further held that the Ordinance does not violate the Internet Tax Freedom Act because video streaming subscriptions and DVD sales/rentals are not “similar” under the Act. Additionally, the court concluded the tax is not a content-based regulation of speech under the First Amendment, and that delayed enforcement did not constitute a tax increase requiring additional voter approval or notice under the California Constitution or Public Utilities Code section 799. View "Disney Platform Distribution v. City of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

The case concerns a property owner in Sonoma County who, after a fire, conducted timber operations under an emergency waiver of waste discharge requirements. Following observations of waste discharge violations and failure to comply with cleanup orders, the regional water quality control board issued notices of violation and ultimately imposed administrative civil liability, assessing a penalty of $276,000. The property owner did not file a petition with the State Water Resources Control Board within the statutory 30-day period to seek review of the regional board’s order.Subsequently, the property owner filed a writ petition in Sonoma County Superior Court to challenge the civil liability order, and later requested the State Board to review the order on its own motion under Water Code section 13320. The State Board declined to exercise its discretionary review. The property owner amended his writ petition to add the State Board as a party, alleging abuse of discretion in its refusal to review. The State Board and the regional board demurred, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies and that the State Board’s discretionary decision was not subject to judicial review. The Superior Court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment for the respondents.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the State Board’s decision not to exercise its discretionary authority to review a regional board order under Water Code section 13320 is not subject to judicial review. The court rejected arguments that this interpretation violated the separation of powers doctrine, concluding that the State Board’s action was not quasi-judicial and did not adjudicate the parties’ rights. The court confirmed that only regional board orders, not the State Board’s discretionary refusals, are eligible for judicial review under the statutory scheme. View "Bareilles v. State Water Resource Control Board" on Justia Law

A firefighter employed by a county for over two decades reported safety violations concerning the maintenance of fire extinguishers on county fire engines. After raising these concerns with his superiors, he was barred from working in fire prevention, which he believed was retaliation for his whistleblowing activities. Although he filed internal complaints with the county’s Office of Human Resources and the Civil Service Commission, he withdrew his appeal after assurances that his concerns would be addressed. Later, he was investigated for alleged misconduct and ultimately terminated for violations of county rules. He then filed a claim under the Government Claims Act, which the county rejected.The Superior Court of Kern County granted the county’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the internal administrative remedies—specifically, by not appealing his dismissal to the Civil Service Commission—barred his whistleblower retaliation lawsuit. The court denied the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend his complaint, holding that he could not allege exhaustion of remedies.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that the plaintiff was not required to exhaust the county’s internal administrative remedies before bringing his whistleblower retaliation claims because the county’s ordinances and rules did not provide a clearly defined process for submitting, evaluating, and resolving such claims. The court distinguished between general disciplinary appeals and procedures for discrimination or harassment claims, noting that there was no specific administrative remedy for whistleblower retaliation. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the matter with instructions to deny the county’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The holding clarifies that, where an internal administrative process does not address a particular type of claim, exhaustion of that process is not required before filing suit. View "Romero v. County of Kern" on Justia Law

An 18-year-old named Elijah Henry was driving with friends in Pleasanton, California, when a police officer, Officer Harvey, entered a parking lot to check for vehicle break-ins. Seeing the officer, Henry and his friends got into their car and left. Officer Harvey, suspecting a burglary, began to follow Henry’s car without activating lights or siren, intending to perform a traffic stop but not initiating a formal pursuit as defined by Pleasanton’s police policy. Henry, fearful of police attention, accelerated and ran a red light, colliding with Melanie Gilliland’s car and causing her serious injuries. Henry was later convicted of felony DUI, but no evidence connected him or his friends to the suspected burglary.Gilliland sued both Henry and the City of Pleasanton for negligence. In Alameda County Superior Court, the City moved for summary judgment, arguing it was immune from liability under California Vehicle Code section 17004.7, which protects public entities from damages caused by suspects fleeing police if the entity has a compliant vehicular pursuit policy and provides regular training. The first judge denied summary judgment, finding neither an actual nor perceived pursuit occurred under the City’s policy. At a later bench trial before a different judge, the court found the City immune, reasoning Henry believed he was being “pursued” in the ordinary sense, even though no formal pursuit was initiated.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and held the trial court applied the wrong legal standard for immunity under section 17004.7. The appellate court determined that “pursued” must be defined according to the public entity’s vehicular pursuit policy, not by its ordinary meaning. Because the lower court failed to consider evidence that Henry did not believe he was pursued within the meaning of the policy, the judgment in favor of the City was reversed and remanded for application of the correct standard. View "Gilliland v. City of Pleasanton" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between the California FAIR Plan Association (CFPA), a statutorily created insurer of last resort, and the state’s Insurance Commissioner. The Commissioner issued an order in 2021 directing CFPA to submit a plan to offer and sell a comprehensive “Homeowners’ Policy” that included, among other coverages, premises liability and incidental workers’ compensation. CFPA challenged this order, contending that the Basic Property Insurance Law only required it to provide first-party property insurance—coverage for direct loss to property—not liability coverage or similar third-party protections.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied CFPA’s petition for a writ of mandate. The court found ambiguity in the statutory definition of “basic property insurance,” specifically in the phrase allowing for “other insurance coverages as may be added.” Deeming the term ambiguous, the court deferred to the Department of Insurance’s interpretation that allowed the Commissioner to require CFPA to offer additional coverages, including liability insurance, so long as such coverages had a connection to the insured property. The court relied in part on the longstanding approval of liability coverage in certain businessowner policies since the early 1990s.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the lower court’s decision de novo. It concluded that, while the statutory language was ambiguous, extrinsic evidence such as legislative history and statutory context demonstrated that the Legislature intended for CFPA to be limited to providing first-party property insurance. The court found no sufficient basis to defer to the Department of Insurance’s later-adopted interpretation that expanded coverage to liability. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and directed the trial court to grant CFPA’s petition for writ of mandate, holding that the Commissioner lacked authority under the Basic Property Insurance Law to require CFPA to offer liability coverage. View "California FAIR Plan Assn. v. Lara" on Justia Law

The plaintiff was an employee who brought claims for wrongful termination, Labor Code violations, and breach of contract against two defendants: the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) and the Public Transportation Services Corporation (PTSC). MTA had created PTSC, a nonprofit public benefit corporation, to provide retirement and employment benefits to certain workers and to manage employees who support MTA’s transportation functions. The plaintiff did not file a prelitigation claim under the Government Claims Act (GCA) before suing these entities.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County first granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings in favor of both defendants, finding that the plaintiff had not alleged compliance with the GCA’s claim presentation requirements. The plaintiff was given leave to amend but continued to argue that PTSC was not a public entity subject to the GCA, and that even if it was, the claims presentation requirement should not apply because PTSC had not registered as required by statute. The trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend, finding both defendants to be public entities and that PTSC was not required to register separately from MTA. The court entered judgment for both defendants.On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, the plaintiff did not challenge the judgment in favor of MTA but contested the ruling as to PTSC. The appellate court held that PTSC qualifies as a public entity for purposes of the GCA’s claims presentation requirement, given its creation and control by MTA. However, the court found that if PTSC failed to register properly on the Registry of Public Agencies—including with county clerks where it maintains offices—this would excuse the plaintiff’s noncompliance with the GCA. The judgment for MTA was affirmed, but the judgment for PTSC was reversed and remanded to allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint. View "Black v. L.A. County Metropolitan Transp. Authority" on Justia Law

A homeowners association in San Diego, governed by the Davis-Stirling Act and its own bylaws, held a recall election to remove a board director. The association distributed recall ballot materials, including a candidate statement from the sole candidate seeking to replace the director if the recall succeeded. The sitting director sought to include her own statement in these materials to advocate against her removal but was denied by the elections inspector, who reasoned that only candidate statements were included. The association’s election rules defined “association media” to exclude candidate forms or statements attached to ballots.Previously, the Superior Court of San Diego County, in a separate action brought by the same director, found no violation of the statutory equal-access requirement for association media, concluding that all candidates had equal opportunity to submit statements using the association’s forms for regular board elections. Following the recall, the director filed a new petition and complaint challenging the association’s refusal to distribute her statement, alleging violations of Civil Code section 5105, various Corporations Code provisions, and negligence. After a bench trial, the Superior Court again ruled for the association and the inspector, finding the candidate statement was not “association media” under the relevant statute and that the recall vote met statutory requirements.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed. It held that “association media” as used in Civil Code section 5105 does encompass ballot materials containing candidate statements distributed by the association during an election. The court concluded the director was entitled to equal access to these materials to advocate her position. The court remanded for further proceedings to determine, under Civil Code section 5145, whether the association’s failure to provide equal access affected the election outcome. The judgment was reversed and remanded with directions. View "Arroyo v. Pacific Ridge Neighborhood Homeowners Assn." on Justia Law

A California nonprofit organization focused on preventing deceptive environmental claims filed a lawsuit against a manufacturer of feminine hygiene products. The organization alleged that the manufacturer labeled and advertised certain products, including period underwear, pads, and panty liners, as “organic” or “made with organic cotton” in violation of the California Organic Food and Farming Act (COFFA). The complaint stated that these products contained less than the minimum required percentage of certified organic materials and included nonagricultural and nonorganically produced components not permitted under state or federal organic standards.The case was first heard in the Alameda County Superior Court. The manufacturer moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that COFFA applies only to agricultural products, cosmetics, and pet food—not to personal care products such as feminine hygiene items. The Superior Court agreed with the manufacturer and granted judgment on the pleadings, concluding that COFFA did not govern the products in question. The nonprofit timely appealed that decision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court held that COFFA applies broadly to all products sold as “organic” or containing “organic” materials in California, unless specifically exempted, and that the statute’s plain language encompasses feminine hygiene products. The court found no basis for an implied exception for personal care products and determined that the trial court erred in its interpretation. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment, clarifying that COFFA’s standards and labeling requirements apply to the manufacturer’s products at issue. View "Environmental Democracy Project v. Rael" on Justia Law

A city in California owned a downtown parking garage known as Garage 5, which was in poor condition and underutilized according to studies conducted in 2019 and 2022. The city had previously adopted a housing plan to identify public land suitable for housing development. In public meetings and study sessions throughout 2021 and 2022, city staff and consultants presented data showing declining demand for public parking and the high cost of necessary repairs to Garage 5. After further study and public comment, the city’s council passed a resolution in December 2022 declaring Garage 5 to be surplus land under the Surplus Land Act, provided that any future development retain at least 75 public parking spaces.The owner of nearby properties, Airport Business Center, filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief in Sonoma County Superior Court. The petitioner argued the city had violated the Surplus Land Act by declaring the garage surplus while there was still an ongoing need for public parking and contended that the city’s findings were not supported by the evidence. The Superior Court denied the petition, finding the city’s actions were not arbitrary or capricious, and that there was substantial evidentiary support for the resolution. A temporary stay was granted pending appeal, but the Court of Appeal denied a request for further stay.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that the Surplus Land Act’s requirement that property be “not necessary for the agency’s use” allows a city to designate property as surplus if it is not indispensable for agency operations, even if the property serves a public purpose like parking. The evidence supported the city’s determination, and the findings in the resolution satisfied statutory requirements. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, awarding costs to the city. View "Airport Business Center v. City of Santa Rosa" on Justia Law