Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Melony Light appealed judgments in favor of her employer, defendant California Department of Parks and Recreation (Department), and her former supervisors, defendants Leda Seals and Kathy Dolinar, following orders granting defendants' motions for summary judgment. Light worked for the Department's Ocotillo Wells District. She alleged numerous claims against the Department, Seals, and Dolinar, including retaliation, harassment, disability discrimination, assault, false imprisonment, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court disposed of several claims at the pleading stage. After two and a half years of litigation, the Department, Seals, and Dolinar moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims against them. As to the Department, the Court of Appeal concluded triable issues of material fact precluded summary adjudication of Light's retaliation claim, but not her disability discrimination claim. Light's claim against the Department for failure to prevent retaliation or discrimination therefore survived based on the retaliation claim. As to Seals and Dolinar, the Court concluded contrary to the trial court that workers' compensation exclusivity did not bar Light's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under the circumstances here. However, as to the merits of that claim, the Court concluded Light has raised a triable issue of fact only as to Seals, not Dolinar. Furthermore, the Court concluded Light raised triable issues of fact on her assault claim against Seals. Therefore, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgments in favor of the Department and Seals, and affirmed in full the judgment in favor of Dolinar. View "Light v. Calif. Dept. of Parks & Rec." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Melony Light appealed judgments in favor of her employer, defendant California Department of Parks and Recreation (Department), and her former supervisors, defendants Leda Seals and Kathy Dolinar, following orders granting defendants' motions for summary judgment. Light worked for the Department's Ocotillo Wells District. She alleged numerous claims against the Department, Seals, and Dolinar, including retaliation, harassment, disability discrimination, assault, false imprisonment, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court disposed of several claims at the pleading stage. After two and a half years of litigation, the Department, Seals, and Dolinar moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims against them. As to the Department, the Court of Appeal concluded triable issues of material fact precluded summary adjudication of Light's retaliation claim, but not her disability discrimination claim. Light's claim against the Department for failure to prevent retaliation or discrimination therefore survived based on the retaliation claim. As to Seals and Dolinar, the Court concluded contrary to the trial court that workers' compensation exclusivity did not bar Light's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under the circumstances here. However, as to the merits of that claim, the Court concluded Light has raised a triable issue of fact only as to Seals, not Dolinar. Furthermore, the Court concluded Light raised triable issues of fact on her assault claim against Seals. Therefore, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgments in favor of the Department and Seals, and affirmed in full the judgment in favor of Dolinar. View "Light v. Calif. Dept. of Parks & Rec." on Justia Law

In a 2005 Cooperation and Option Agreement to facilitate Russell's construction and operation of the Energy Center, a natural gas-fired, combined cycle electric generating facility in Hayward, the city granted Russell an option to purchase 12.5 acres of city-owned land as the Energy Center's site and promised to help Russell obtain permits, approvals, and water treatment services. Russell conveyed a 3.5-acre parcel to the city. The Agreement's “Payments Clause” prohibited the city from imposing any taxes on the “development, construction, ownership and operation” of the Energy Center except taxes tethered to real estate ownership. In 2009, Hayward voters approved an ordinance that imposes “a tax upon every person using electricity in the City. … at the rate of five and one-half percent (5.5%) of the charges made for such electricity” with a similar provision regarding gas usage. Russell began building the Energy Center in 2010. In 2011, the city informed Russell it must pay the utility tax. The Energy Center is operational.The court of appeal affirmed a holding that the Payments Clause was unenforceable as violating California Constitution article XIII, section 31, which provides “[t]he power to tax may not be surrendered or suspended by grant or contract.” Russell may amend its complaint to allege a quasi-contractual restitution claim. View "Russell City Energy Co. v. City of Hayward" on Justia Law

Prior to its dissolution, Culver City’s former redevelopment agency made an unauthorized transfer to the City of about $12.5 million. The Department of Finance (DOF) discovered the unauthorized transfer after the former redevelopment agency was dissolved and the City took over as the successor agency. Based on that discovery, DOF authorized the county auditor-controller to reduce by about $12.5 million the tax increment revenue made available to the successor agency to pay the successor agency’s enforceable obligations. In a prior action, the Sacramento Superior Court held that the former redevelopment agency should have retained the $12.5 million to pay its bills rather than transferring it to the City. DOF did not seek an order requiring the City to repay the $12.5 million. And neither party appealed the superior court’s judgment. Since judgment was entered in “Culver City I”, the City has not repaid the $12.5 million to the successor agency, and DOF has continued to authorize successive reductions to the allotment of tax increment revenue to the successor agency to pay its enforceable obligations. DOF asserts that those funds held by the City are available to the successor agency for payment of its enforceable obligations, but the City maintains that it has no duty to pay the money back. In this action, the City, both in its municipal capacity and as the successor agency of the former redevelopment agency, sought mandamus relief to stop DOF’s successive reductions of tax increment revenue to pay the successor agency’s enforceable obligations. DOF sought an order reversing the former redevelopment agency’s transfer of $12.5 million to the City and requiring the City to return the money. The superior court in this action held that DOF’s successive reductions were not authorized by the Dissolution Law. Based on this holding, the superior court granted the City’s petition for writ of mandate. While recognizing Culver City I’s holding that the former redevelopment agency’ss transfer to the City was unauthorized, the superior court denied DOF’s petition for an equitable writ of mandate requiring the return of the money because there was a statutory remedy for this situation. The State Controller conducted a review and ordered the City to return the $12.5 million to the successor agency. DOF appealed, asserting that the superior court erred by: (1) denying DOF’s petition for writ of mandate directing the City to return the money and (2) finding that successive reductions to the tax increment revenue provided to the successor agency for the same $12.5 million held by the City was not authorized by the Dissolution Law. The Court of Appeal affirmed. View "City of Culver City v. Cohen" on Justia Law

Tetrachloroethylene (also known as perchloroethylene or PCE) and trichloroethylene (TCE), were detected in groundwater drawn from a drinking water well in the South Basin area operated by the Irvine Ranch Water District (IRWD). The Orange County Water District (District) undertook efforts to identify the source of groundwater contamination and engaged consultants to recommend further avenues of investigation. Although the District's investigation has continued, it had not yet developed a final treatment plan or remediated any contamination by the time of the underlying litigation. During its investigation, the District filed suit against various current and former owners and operators of certain sites in the South Basin area that it believed were in some way responsible for groundwater contamination. The District asserted statutory claims for damages under the Carpenter-Presley Tanner Hazardous Substance Account Act (HSAA) and the Orange County Water District Act (OCWD Act) and for declaratory relief. The District also asserted common law claims for negligence, nuisance, and trespass. Following numerous motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication, and a limited bench trial on the District's ability to bring suit under the HSAA, the trial court entered judgments in favor of the defendants on all of the District's claims. The District appealed, challenging the judgments on numerous grounds. The Court of Appeal confirmed that the HSAA allowed the District to bring suit under the circumstances here, and that the District could recover certain remediation-related investigatory costs under the OCWD Act. The Court also addressed the HSAA's nonretroactivity provision and concluded its requirements were not satisfied here. Furthermore, the Court concluded the theory of continuous accrual applies to the District's negligence cause of action, such that no defendant except one has shown the statute of limitations barred that claim. As to the District's causes of action for trespass and nuisance, the Court concluded the District raised a triable issue of fact regarding its potential groundwater rights in the South Basin. In doing so, the Court addressed the State’s potential interests in groundwater (as allegedly delegated to the District), the District's regulatory powers over groundwater, and its rights based on its groundwater replenishment or recharge activities. The Court concluded the District's potential rights in groundwater were insufficient, on the current record in this case, to maintain a trespass cause of action. However, triable issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the District's nuisance claim for all defendants except one. Finally, the Court concluded most of defendants' site-specific arguments (primarily based on causation) did not entitle them to summary adjudication of any causes of action. The judgments will therefore be affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Orange Co. Water Dist. v. Sabic Innovative Plastics" on Justia Law

In this appeal, at issue was whether the trial court erred in granting a petition for writ of administrative mandate ordering the Department of Motor Vehicles (the Department) to rescind an order suspending the driver's license of a person arrested for driving under the influence and awarding attorney fees and costs to the person. California Highway Patrol Officer M. Oka arrested respondent Matthew Murphey for driving under the influence. The Department issued an order suspending Murphey's driver's license pursuant to the administrative per se law. A Department hearing officer held a hearing and issued a written order upholding the suspension. Murphey filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate against Jean Shiomoto, in her capacity as Director of the Department, requesting that the trial court direct the Department to rescind the orders suspending his license. Murphey contended the suspension was invalid because it was not supported by evidence in the administrative record. After hearing argument from counsel, the court stated that it would grant the petition for writ of mandate and award Murphey attorney fees and costs. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in finding that the weight of the evidence did not support the hearing officer's decision to uphold the suspension of Murphey's driver's license. View "Murphey v. Shiomoto" on Justia Law

A 72-foot diseased tree fell on a sleeping child’s tent, in a campground within a 499-acre public wilderness park, owned by San Mateo County. The county claimed immunity as a matter of law for the allegedly dangerous condition of its property under Government Code section 831.2, “natural condition immunity,” which states: “Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused by a natural condition of any unimproved public property, including but not limited to any natural condition of any lake, stream, bay, river or beach.” The court of appeal upheld the trial court’s denial of the county’s motion for summary judgment. There are triable issues of fact as to whether the property was “unimproved.” The heavily wooded park has trails. Its campsites are cleared of trees. The campground area has amenities including paved roads, telephones, restrooms (with electricity, sinks and flush toilets), showers, dedicated parking areas, a dumping station and a store. Plaintiffs’ campsite had two picnic tables, a fire pit, and a metal food locker. A professional land surveyor determined there were 34 man-made improvements within 126 feet of where the tree stood. View "County of San Mateo v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Two City of Santa Ana Police officers were the subjects of an internal affairs investigation based on their conduct during the execution of a search warrant at a marijuana dispensary. The Santa Ana Police Department initiated the investigation after video recordings of the officers were released to the media. The video recordings were made by the dispensary owners without the knowledge of the officers, who had removed all known recording devices before executing the warrant. Plaintiffs Santa Ana Police Officers Association (SAPOA) and the officers (collectively, Plaintiffs) brought this lawsuit against the City of Santa Ana, the Santa Ana Police Department, and the Santa Ana Chief of Police (collectively, Defendants) and asserted two causes of action arising out of the investigation: (1) Defendants violated the California Invasion of Privacy Act by using the video recordings made at the marijuana dispensary as the basis for, and as evidence in, the internal affairs investigation; and (2) Defendants violated Government Code section 3303(g), part of the Public Safety Officers Bill of Rights Act, by refusing to produce tape recordings of the initial interrogations of the officers, transcribed stenographer notes, and any reports or complaints made by the investigators or other persons, before interrogating the officers a second time. The trial court sustained, without leave to amend, Defendants demurrer to the first amended complaint (the Complaint). Plaintiffs appealed that decision. The Court of Appeals concluded the Complaint did not, and could not, state a violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act because the officers had no reasonable expectation as a matter of law that their communications during the raid of the marijuana dispensary were not being overheard, watched, or recorded. The Court also concluded, however, the second cause of action states a cause of action for violation of the Public Safety Officers Bill of Rights Act because, under section 3303(g), Defendants were required to produce the tape recordings of the initial interrogations, transcribed stenographer notes, and reports and complaints made by the investigators or other persons, before the officers were interrogated a second time. View "Santa Ana Police Off. Assn. v. City of Santa Ana." on Justia Law

In 2008, a citizen with whom non-probationary officer Morgado interacted filed a complaint against him with the Office of Citizen Complaints (OCC) of the City’s Police Department. OCC investigated and shared its findings and recommendations with the chief of police. After further investigation by the internal affairs division, the Chief filed a disciplinary complaint with the Police Commission against Morgado in 2009. Morgado, represented by counsel, participated in a hearing before the full Commission, at the conclusion of which the Commission decided to terminate his employment. Morgado sued. The city acknowledged that it did not provide Morgado with an “administrative appeal” from the Commission’s decision. Government Code section 3304(b) provides that “[n]o punitive action . . . shall be undertaken by any public agency against any public safety officer . . . without providing the public safety officer with an opportunity for administrative appeal.” The court of appeal affirmed that the city’s procedure for disciplining police officers violates the statute. View "Morgado v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The date upon which the cause of action would be deemed to have accrued within the meaning of the Government Claims Act's, Gov. Code, 810 et seq., statute of limitations is the date on which a plaintiff discovers or should reasonably have discovered that she had suffered a compensable injury. The trial court overruled the City's demurrer to a complaint, arguing that the real parties in interest failed to comply with the claim presentation requirement of the Act by not presenting their claim to the City within six months. The Court of Appeal held that the parties in interest presented their claim to the City more than 10 months after the date upon which the cause of action accrued and thus failed to comply with the claim presentation requirement. Accordingly, the court granted the City's petition for writ of mandate. View "City of Pasadena v. Superior Court" on Justia Law